Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00294-CR
Michael Lemone ROBERTS,
Appellant
v.
The STATE of Texas,
Appellee
From the County Court at Law No. 14, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 526617
Honorable Susan Elizabeth Skinner, Judge Presiding
Opinion by: Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Sitting: Rebeca C. Martinez, Justice
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
Delivered and Filed: May 15, 2019
AFFIRMED
Michael Lemone Roberts was convicted by a jury of driving while intoxicated and
sentenced by the trial court to six months in jail probated for eighteen months. On appeal, Roberts
asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Roberts also asserts the evidence is
legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
04-18-00294-CR
BACKGROUND
Seconds after a car accident involving a car and a truck, Roberts was seen walking and then
running away from the scene. Residents in the neighborhood chased Roberts as he ran from the
scene.
Based on information regarding the direction in which Roberts fled, Investigator Melanie
Bowser drove to a baseball field about three or four blocks from the accident scene and observed
Roberts walking next to the field. When Investigator Bowser activated her lights, Roberts ran into
a wooded area. With the assistance of a flashlight, Investigator Bowser located Roberts lying on
his stomach in the tree line. Investigator Bower pointed her gun at Roberts and ordered him to
crawl out. Roberts initially stated he was “not going anywhere” before eventually crawling out.
Investigator Bowser immediately smelled a strong odor of alcohol emitting from Roberts.
Investigator Bowser handcuffed Roberts and assisted him to his feet. Investigator Bowser
observed that Roberts was too unsteady to stand without leaning on her patrol car for support.
Investigator Bowser asked Roberts if he was involved in an accident, which Roberts
denied. Roberts also refused to perform field sobriety tests or to provide a breath or blood
specimen. Investigator Bowser arrested Roberts and returned with him to the accident scene.
Investigator Bowser conducted a field identification and stated a witness at the scene identified
Roberts as the person who fled the accident scene. Investigator Bowser did not know the identity
of the witness.
Investigator Bowser obtained a search warrant to draw a specimen of Roberts’s blood.
Subsequent testing revealed Roberts’s blood alcohol content was 0.134.
The trial court denied Roberts’s motion to suppress, and a jury found him guilty of driving
while intoxicated. Roberts appeals.
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REASONABLE SUSPICION/PROBABLE CAUSE
In his first two issues, Roberts asserts the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress
all evidence obtained as a result of his illegal arrest. Roberts argues Investigator Bowser lacked
reasonable suspicion to detain him or probable cause to arrest him. Specifically, Roberts argues
none of the witnesses at the accident scene saw Roberts driving the car involved in the accident.
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated
standard of review. Lerma v. State, 543 S.W.3d 184, 189–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). Because
the trial judge is the sole judge of credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their
testimony at a suppression hearing, we afford almost complete deference to the trial court’s
determination of the historical facts. Id. at 190. “However, whether the facts, as determined by
the trial court, add up to reasonable suspicion or probable cause is a question to be reviewed de
novo.” State v. Ford, 537 S.W.3d 19, 23 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017).
B. Applicable Law
“[A]n investigative detention occurs when a person yields to [a] police officer’s show of
authority under a reasonable belief that he is not free to leave.” Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49
(Tex. Crim. App. 2010). “Reasonable suspicion to detain a person exists when a police officer has
specific, articulable facts that, when combined with rational inferences from those facts, would
lead him to reasonably conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in
criminal activity.” Furr v. State, 499 S.W.3d 872, 878 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (internal quotation
omitted).
“Probable cause [to arrest] exists where the facts and circumstances known to law
enforcement officers are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
belief that an offense has been or is being committed.” Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596,
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599–600 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (internal quotation omitted). We must consider the totality of
the circumstances known to the officer in determining the existence of probable cause. Id. at 600.
C. Analysis
As previously noted, Roberts argues Investigator Bowser did not have reasonable suspicion
or probable cause because none of the witnesses at the accident scene saw him driving the car
involved in the accident. In evaluating whether “reasonable suspicion” exists however, we are
permitted to consider rational inferences from the specific, articulable facts. Furr, 499 S.W.3d at
878. Furthermore, in evaluating probable cause, we consider the totality of the circumstances.
Marcopoulos, 538 S.W.3d at 599–600.
Here, the testimony presented at the suppression hearing established Richard Reyna saw
Roberts eight to ten feet from the car just seconds after the accident, and the car’s driver’s side
door was open. Reyna was one of the people who chased Roberts when he started running from
the scene after an onlooker yelled at Roberts not to run. Reyna testified regarding the path of the
chase and saw Roberts being arrested. Reyna walked to the location where Roberts was arrested
and told the police Roberts was the man he was chasing. See State v. Martinez, No. PD-0324-17,
2019 WL 137754, at *4 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 9, 2019) (holding sum of information known to
cooperating officers should be considered in assessing probable cause). Investigator Bowser found
Roberts at a location in the direction where a bystander saw him run. Investigator Bowser smelled
a strong odor of alcohol immediately upon encountering Roberts, who had red, bloodshot eyes and
was unsteady on his feet. Finally, Roberts refused to perform field sobriety tests. See State v.
Garrett, 22 S.W.3d 650, 655 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.) (“While we regard absent factors
as a part of the totality of the circumstances, they are only a part, and where many of the missing
factors are due to a defendant’s conduct, we believe that the officers could reasonably consider
that conduct as part of the totality of the circumstances.”). Given the totality of the circumstances
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and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the facts, we hold the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in finding Investigator Bowser had reasonable suspicion to detain Roberts and
probable cause to arrest him.
Roberts’s first and second issues are overruled.
CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION
In his third issue, Roberts contends the trial court should have suppressed statements he
made after Investigator Bowser ordered him out of the woods at gunpoint. Roberts asserts the
statements were made as a result of custodial interrogation, and he had not been given his Miranda
rights. We apply the same standard of review detailed above in reviewing this issue.
A. Applicable Law
“A person is in ‘custody’ only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would
believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest.”
Hines v. State, 383 S.W.3d 615, 621 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2012, pet. ref’d) (internal quotation
omitted). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has outlined four situations that may constitute
custody: “(1) when a suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way; (2) when a police officer tells a suspect he cannot leave; (3) when a police officer creates a
situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe his freedom of movement has been
significantly restricted; and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and a police officer does not
tell a suspect he is free to leave.” Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
In the first, second, and third situations, the restrictions upon the suspect’s freedom of movement
must rise to the degree associated with an arrest as opposed to an investigative detention. Id.
Statements made by a suspect during a custodial interrogation are inadmissible unless
certain warnings were given to the suspect before he made those statements. Miranda v. Arizona,
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384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). A defendant has the burden to establish he was in custody before the
State bears the burden to show compliance with Miranda. Hines, 383 S.W.3d 621.
Although a person who has been handcuffed has been detained, there is no bright-line rule
that handcuffing a suspect always constitutes an arrest. State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 283
(Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Campbell v. State, 325 S.W.3d 223, 234 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010,
no pet.). Handcuffing a suspect during an investigative detention may be appropriate “when
reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the detention: investigation, maintenance of the status
quo, or officer safety.” Campbell, 325 S.W.3d at 234. Other factors that bear on the issue of
whether a particular seizure is an arrest or merely an investigative detention are “[t]he nature of
the crime under investigation, the degree of suspicion, the location of the stop, the time of day, and
the reaction of the suspect.” Id. “It is also important to consider whether the officer actually
conducts an investigation after seizing the suspect—that is, whether the officer briefly questions
the suspect about his identity, his reason for being in the area, or similar reasonable inquiries of a
truly investigatory nature.” Id. (emphasis added).
Custodial interrogation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement. Lam v.
State, 25 S.W.3d 233, 239 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2000, no pet.); see also Griffith v. State, 55
S.W.3d 598, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“Questions normally accompanying the processing of a
D.W.I. arrestee do not constitute interrogation. ... ‘In the context of an arrest for driving while
intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an
interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.’”) (quoting South Dakota v. Neville, 469 U.S. 553,
564 n.15 (1983)) Spontaneous statements that are not in response to questioning are not the
product of custodial interrogation. See Dossett v. State, 216 S.W.3d 7, 24 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 2006, pet. ref’d).
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B. Analysis
In this case, Roberts ran from Investigator Bowser when she activated her lights and hid in
a wooded area requiring Investigator Bowser to use her flashlight to locate him. Given the time
of day, the darkness of the area, and Roberts’s efforts to evade Investigator Bowser, Investigator
Bowser’s use of her handgun to order Roberts from the wooded area, and her use of handcuffs to
detain him were both reasonably necessary to effect the goal of the detention. Campbell, 325
S.W.3d at 234.
Roberts’s statement that he was “not going anywhere” was in response to a command by
Investigator Bowser to crawl out from the wooded area, not in response to questioning by
Investigator Bowser. Accordingly, the statement was not in response to custodial interrogation.
Roberts’s second statement regarding his not being involved in an accident was made as
Investigator Bowser conducted her investigation after detaining him. Her questions related to his
reason for being in the area, a request to submit to field sobriety tests, and a request to provide a
blood or breath specimen, which are reasonable inquiries of a truly investigatory nature. See id.
Because we hold Investigator Bowser’s questioning was of a truly investigatory nature to effect
the goal of the detention, we hold Roberts’s statement that he was not involved in an accident was
not the result of custodial interrogation.
Roberts’s third issue is overruled.
SUFFICIENCY
In his fourth issue, Roberts contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
conviction. Specifically, Roberts asserts the record contains no evidence establishing he drove the
car while intoxicated prior to the accident.
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A. Standard of Review
When addressing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we consider whether, after
viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). This standard requires us to defer “to the responsibility of the trier of
fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. “We may not re-weigh the evidence or substitute
our judgment for that of the factfinder.” Zuniga v. State, 551 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. Crim. App.
2018).
“Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are equally probative, and circumstantial
evidence alone may be sufficient to uphold a conviction so long as the cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Id. at 733. Additionally,
“juries are permitted to draw any reasonable inferences from the facts so long as each inference is
supported by the evidence presented at trial.” Id. “[A] inference is a conclusion reached by
considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them.” Hooper v. State, 214
S.W.3d 9, 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
B. Analysis
A person commits the offense of driving while intoxicated “if the person is intoxicated
while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04(a). The two
elements of the offense challenged by Roberts in his brief are whether the evidence is sufficient to
prove: (1) he was driving the car that was involved in the accident; and (2) he was intoxicated
while driving the car.
With regard to the evidence establishing Roberts was driving the car, Reyna testified he
heard the accident and arrived at the scene within five seconds. Upon arriving at the scene, he saw
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the driver’s side door to the car was open, and Roberts was about eight feet from the car. Roberts
was initially walking away from the car but began running when onlookers at the scene yelled at
him not to run. The jury also heard a 911 call from Horando 1 Vasquez. Vasquez told the 911
operator that he heard the accident, ran out, and starting chasing the man who ran away because
“they” said that he was the driver. Finally, the evidence established Roberts was the owner of the
car. From this evidence, the jury could draw a reasonable inference that Roberts was driving the
car. See Hernandez v. State, 13 S.W.3d 78, 80–81 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (rejecting
argument that evidence was insufficient to establish appellant was driver of pickup truck involved
in an accident because he “was placed by witnesses, immediately after the accident, on the driver’s
side of a pickup truck which belonged to him”).
With regard to the evidence establishing Roberts was intoxicated while driving the car,
Investigator Bowser smelled a strong odor of alcohol immediately upon encountering Roberts
which was within one to two minutes after she was pointed in the direction he had fled. See
Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 780 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting “factfinder may draw an
inference of guilt from the circumstance of flight”). She also observed he had red, bloodshot eyes
and was so unsteady that he had to use the patrol car to support himself. Finally, the evidence
established Roberts’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.134 at the time of the blood draw.
Although Roberts contends the testimony that he was unsteady on his feet is inconsistent with his
ability to run away from the accident scene, we may not reweigh the evidence. See Zuniga, 551
S.W.3d at 732. Accordingly, based on the foregoing evidence, the jury could infer Roberts was
intoxicated when he was driving the car.
Roberts’s fourth issue is overruled.
1
The first name is spelled based on the manner in which it is pronounced on the tape from the 911 call.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice
DO NOT PUBLISH
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