2019 WI 50
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2017AP2021
COMPLETE TITLE: Town of Rib Mountain,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Marathon County,
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner,
Town of McMillan, Town of Mosinee, Town of
Stettin, Town
of Texas, Town of Wausau and Town of Weston,
Defendants-Respondents.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 493,916 N.W.2d 164
PDC No:2018 WI App 42 - Published
OPINION FILED: May 16, 2019
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: February 14, 2019
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Marathon
JUDGE: Gregory B. Huber
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING: ABRHAMSON, J. and A.W. BRADLEY, J. did not
participate.
ATTORNEYS:
For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Scott M. Corbett, corporation counsel. There was an
oral argument by Scott M. Corbett.
For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Dean R. Dietrich, Esq., Alyson D. Dieckman, Esq., and Dietrich
Vanderwaal S.C., Wausau. There was an oral argument by Dean R.
Dietrich.
An amicus curiae brief was filed on behalf of Wisconsin
Counties Association by Andrew T. Phillips, Bennett J. Conard,
and Von Briesen & Roper, S.C., Milwaukee.
2
2019 WI 50
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2017AP2021
(L.C. No. 2017CV207)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
Town of Rib Mountain,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
FILED
Marathon County,
May 16, 2019
Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner,
Sheila T. Reiff
Town of McMillan, Town of Mosinee, Town of Clerk of Supreme Court
Stettin, Town of Texas, Town of Wausau and Town
of Weston,
Defendants-Respondents.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.
¶1 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J. In 1957, the Wisconsin
legislature conferred authority on counties to "establish a
rural naming or numbering system in towns for the purpose of
aiding in fire protection, emergency services, and civil
defense." Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) (2017-18).1 Marathon County
1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2017-18 version unless otherwise indicated.
No. 2017AP2021
decided to establish such a system in 2016 but the Town of Rib
Mountain challenged its authority to do so, contending the
statute confines counties to implementing naming and numbering
systems only within "rural" areas of towns. Marathon County
maintains that the only territorial restriction on its authority
to establish a "rural naming or numbering system" is "in towns."
The circuit court denied the Town declaratory relief, the Town
appealed its decision, and the court of appeals reversed. We
agree with Marathon County and hold, consistent with the text of
the statute, that Marathon County may establish a rural naming
or numbering system in towns, and the statute does not restrict
this exercise of authority to only rural areas within them.
"Rural" merely describes the naming or numbering system and the
roads to which the system applies; it has no independent
operative effect. We reverse the decision of the court of
appeals.
I. BACKGROUND
¶2 In 2016, Marathon County passed Ordinance #O-7-16 to
"establish[] and maintain[] a county addressing system for
Marathon County." See Marathon Cty. Or. § 9.20(2) (2018).
Under the ordinance, Marathon County would "assign each location
[in Marathon County] a unique address which will aid emergency
[personnel] in providing fire protection, emergency medical
services, and law enforcement services; and meet other general
locational needs such as delivery services of the public." See
id. The ordinance applied "to each road, home, business, farm,
2
No. 2017AP2021
structure, or other establishments in the unincorporated areas
of the County." See Marathon Cty. Or. § 9.20(4) (2018).
¶3 The Town of Rib Mountain was one of 40 towns required
by Marathon County to participate in the addressing system. The
Town filed an action for declaratory relief against Marathon
County.2 The Town alleged that "Marathon County's authority to
implement a naming and numbering system in towns is limited to
rural naming and numbering systems, upon which only rural roads
and intersections, homes, businesses, farms, and other
establishments may be assigned a name or number, and only when
the purpose of implementing a rural naming and number system in
towns is to aid in fire protection, emergency services, and
civil defense." The Town asserted that Marathon County's
"[o]rdinance unlawfully exceeds the statutory authority granted
to Marathon County by the Wisconsin Legislature and intrudes
upon the Town's statutory authority to choose or change the
names of urban or non-rural roads."
¶4 The circuit court denied the Town's claim for
declaratory relief.3 The circuit court disagreed with the Town's
assertion that "rural" as used in Wis. Stat. § 59.54 restricts
where Marathon County may establish an addressing system, and it
2
The Complaint added the Towns of McMillan, Mosinee,
Stettin, Texas, Weston, and Wausau as necessary parties. Those
towns filed letters with the Clerk of the Supreme Court stating
that they will not be filing a brief and will abide by this
court's decision.
3 The Honorable Gregory Huber presided.
3
No. 2017AP2021
held that the term "'rural' modifies 'naming or numbering
system'——it has to do with the type of system, not with the
location where it can be imposed." The circuit court ruled that
"rural" was best read to mean "unincorporated." Because, the
circuit court reasoned, the statute's "only limitations are that
it be implemented 'in towns' and that it be implemented 'for the
purpose of aiding in fire protection, emergency services, and
civil defense,'" the circuit court denied the motion for
declaratory relief.
¶5 The Town appealed, and the court of appeals reversed
the circuit court. Town of Rib Mountain v. Marathon Cty., 2018
WI App 42, 383 Wis. 2d 493, 916 N.W.2d 164. The court of
appeals determined Marathon County could implement a naming or
numbering system only in "unincorporated areas that also qualify
as 'rural.'" Id., ¶1. The court of appeals rejected Marathon
County's argument that the word "rural" describes the type of
naming or numbering system and does not impose a territorial
limitation on Marathon County's authority. Id., ¶¶12-13. The
court of appeals concluded that the "use of the word
'rural' . . . unambiguously demonstrates that [the legislature]
intended to restrict a county's naming and numbering authority
to 'rural' areas." Id. The court of appeals rejected the
circuit court's definition of "rural" to mean
"'unincorporated' . . . because it renders the word 'rural' in
Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m) surplusage." Town of Rib
Mountain, 383 Wis. 2d 493, ¶¶15-16.
4
No. 2017AP2021
¶6 Having concluded that the statute restricts Marathon
County's authority to implement a naming and numbering system to
rural areas in towns, the court of appeals consulted
dictionaries to give meaning to "rural." Id., ¶18. Combining
several definitions, the court of appeals adopted the following
definition of "rural" for Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m):
[T]hese definitions establish that: (1) the term
"rural" is used to describe things that are
characteristic of, or related to, the "country"; and
(2) the "country" encompasses places that are distinct
from "urban" areas——i.e., areas with comparatively
higher concentrations of people or buildings. Based
on these definitions, we conclude the term "rural" in
Wis. Stat. § [59.54](4) and (4m) denotes areas that
are not urban. In other words, the term "rural"
refers to areas that are comparatively less densely
populated by people or buildings, or areas that are
characteristic of, or related to, the country.
Town of Rib Mountain, 383 Wis. 2d 493, ¶20 (footnote omitted).
¶7 Employing this definition of "rural," the court of
appeals held that "[t]he County thus exceeded its authority by
mandating the implementation of a uniform addressing system in
all unincorporated areas of the County, without regard to
whether those areas also qualified as 'rural.'" Id., ¶28.
However, despite adopting a definition of "rural" and declaring
Marathon County's ordinance too broad, the court of appeals
remanded the case, placing the burden on Marathon County to
"demonstrate which portions of Rib Mountain, if any, qualify as
'rural,' according to the plain meaning of the term as set forth
above." Id., ¶29. The court of appeals instructed:
As a general matter, we do not require the County to
use any particular criteria in order to determine
5
No. 2017AP2021
which unincorporated land within its territory
qualifies as "rural," for purposes of Wis. Stat.
§ 59.54(4) and (4m), and which does not. The
legislature chose not to include any specific criteria
in those subsections for distinguishing between rural
and non-rural areas. Its failure to do so makes
sense, because the criteria used to make that
distinction will likely vary on a county-by-county
basis, as land that might reasonably be categorized as
rural in the context of a more populous county could
conceivably be categorized as urban in the context of
a less populous county.
Town of Rib Mountain, 383 Wis. 2d 493, ¶30. The court of
appeals did "not endeavor to establish specific factors for
determining what property qualifies as rural" and tasked
Marathon County with "establish[ing] clear, reasonable criteria
for identifying 'rural' areas within its territory." Id., ¶31.
A reviewing court in the future was to "review any challenges to
a county's criteria or their implementation by considering both
the unique factual circumstances presented and the purposes of
the relevant statutory subsections, so as to determine the
reasonableness of the county's conclusions." Id.
¶8 Marathon County petitioned this court for review, and
we granted the petition.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶9 This case requires us to interpret Wis. Stat.
§ 59.54(4) and (4m). Statutory interpretation is a question of
law we review de novo. CED Props., LLC v. City of Oshkosh, 2018
WI 24, ¶20, 380 Wis. 2d 399, 909 N.W.2d 136. "[S]tatutory
interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute'" and
"[i]f the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop
6
No. 2017AP2021
the inquiry." State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane
Cty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoted
source omitted). We give statutory language "its common,
ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or
specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or
special definitional meaning." Id. Context and structure are
also "important to meaning," and we interpret statutory language
"in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as
part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or
closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or
unreasonable results." Id., ¶46. "Where statutory language is
unambiguous, there is no need to consult extrinsic sources of
interpretation, such as legislative history." Id.
B. Analysis
1. Wisconsin Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m) apply in towns.
¶10 The issue is whether Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m)
restrict Marathon County's authority to establish a naming or
numbering system to "rural" areas. Generally, towns possess the
authority to assign a name to, or rename, each road within their
borders. See Liberty Grove Town Bd. v. Door Cty. Bd. of
Supervisors, 2005 WI App 166, ¶¶9-10, 284 Wis. 2d 814, 702
N.W.2d 33; see also Wis. Stat. § 60.23(17) (the town board may
"[n]ame, or change the name of, any street in the town under"
Wis. Stat. § 82.03(7)); and § 82.03(7) ("The town board shall,
by ordinance, assign a name to each of the roads that are under
7
No. 2017AP2021
the town's jurisdiction."). Originally enacted in 1957,4 Wis.
Stat. § 59.54, "gives counties discretionary authority to
establish a rural naming or numbering system when the purpose of
the system is to aid in fire protection, emergency services and
civil defense," thereby overriding towns' traditional authority
to name roads. Liberty Grove Town Bd., 284 Wis. 2d 814, ¶¶11,
15. The Town argues that Marathon County exceeded its statutory
authority by enacting an ordinance calling for the renaming of
roads throughout the Town because at least certain areas within
the Town are not rural, as the Town perceives them.5
¶11 Wisconsin Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m) provide as
follows:
(4) Rural naming or numbering system. The board may
establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns
for the purpose of aiding in fire protection,
emergency services, and civil defense, and appropriate
and expend money therefor, under which:
(a) Each rural road, home, business, farm or other
establishment, may be assigned a name or number.
(b) The names or numbers may be displayed on uniform
signs posted on rural roads and intersections, and at
each home, business, farm or other establishment.
(4m) Rural naming or numbering system; town
cooperation. The rural naming or numbering system
4The original version of the statute was enacted in 1957 as
Wis. Stat. § 59.07. See 1957 Wis. Laws, ch. 23, § 1.
5The Town argues that it is urban, but it maintains that
"the rural or urban nature of Rib Mountain is more appropriately
decided by the Circuit Court," and it agrees with the court of
appeals decision to remand for a factual determination on this
issue.
8
No. 2017AP2021
under sub. (4) may be carried out in cooperation with
any town or towns in the county.
¶12 Under the text of Wis. Stat. § 59.54, Marathon County
"may establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns."
§ 59.54(4) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the territorial limit
on Marathon County's authority to establish a "rural naming or
numbering system" is "in towns." Subsection (4) does not say
"in rural towns" or "in rural portions of towns." And "rural"
does not modify this locational limitation. Subsections (4) and
(4m) both describe a "rural naming or numbering system,"
repeating the title given to each subsection, at least in part.6
The word "rural" in these subsections describes the "naming or
numbering system"; it does not modify the territorial scope of
"in towns." As a textual matter, the use of "rural" in
subsections (4) and (4m) does not impose an additional
territorial constraint on the establishment of naming or
numbering systems, limiting them to only rural towns or rural
portions of towns. In subsections (4) and (4m), "rural" instead
is a general description of the naming or numbering system,
while "in towns" is the territorial scope of Marathon County's
authority.
¶13 Paragraphs (4)(a) and (4)(b) likewise do not modify
subsection (4)'s territorial perimeter of "in towns." Paragraph
6
"The titles to subchapters, sections, subsections,
paragraphs and subdivisions of the statutes and history notes
are not part of the statutes." Wis. Stat. § 990.001(6); see
also Manitowoc Co. v. Lanning, 2018 WI 6, ¶72 n.4, 379
Wis. 2d 189, 906 N.W.2d 130 (R. Grassl Bradley, J., concurring).
9
No. 2017AP2021
(a) states that "[e]ach rural road, home, business, farm or
other establishment, may be assigned a name or number," and
paragraph (b) provides that the "numbers may be displayed on
uniform signs posted on rural roads and intersections, and at
each home, business, farm or other establishment." Wis. Stat.
§ 59.54(4)(a)-(b) (emphasis added). The Town "concedes the
adjective 'rural' may not apply to each noun" in these lists.
We agree. "Rural" modifies "road" in paragraph (a) and "roads
and intersections" in paragraph (b). Here too the word "rural"
describes the roads and intersections but does not modify
subsection (4)'s territorial restriction of establishing the
system "in towns." The text of § 59.54(4) and (4m) plainly
delineates where a county may establish a rural naming or
numbering system——"in towns"——while the word "rural" generally
describes the "naming or numbering system" and the "roads and
intersections" within that system.
2. "Rural" has descriptive but not operative
meaning in Wis. Stat. § 59.54.
¶14 Having concluded that "rural" does not modify the
locational parameter of "in towns," we now address what the word
"rural" means in the context of this statute. The Town insists
that we "must consider each term in the statute to avoid
surplusage" and argues that "rural" further restricts Marathon
County's authority to establish a naming or numbering system
within only the rural portions of towns rather than throughout
towns in their entirety. The Town asks us to adopt the court of
appeals' definition of "rural" which was "not urban," "areas
10
No. 2017AP2021
that are comparatively less densely populated by people or
buildings, or areas that are characteristic of, or related to,
the country." Town of Rib Mountain, 383 Wis. 2d 493, ¶20.
Marathon County urges us to reject the court of appeals'
definition and instead hold that "rural" refers to
unincorporated areas, meaning towns that have not been
incorporated into villages or cities. We reject both
definitions because "rural" is most reasonably read as a general
descriptor. Because it has no legally operative meaning, it is
surplusage.
¶15 Even though our interpretation results in declaring
"rural" surplusage, the canon against surplusage is not an
imperative that must be followed inexorably regardless of where
that leads. See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cty.,
2019 WI 24, ¶17 n.10, 385 Wis. 2d 748, 924 N.W.2d 153; State v.
Mason, 2018 WI App 57, ¶26, 384 Wis. 2d 111, 918 N.W.2d 78 ("The
directive that we endeavor to give meaning to all parts of
statutes so as to avoid surplusage is not a directive that we
give different terms different meanings, regardless where that
leads."). Rather, the surplusage canon merely instructs that
statutory language should be read "where possible to give
reasonable effect to every word." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46
(emphasis added). We recognize that "[s]ometimes drafters do
repeat themselves and do include words that add nothing of
substance." Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 385 Wis. 2d 748, ¶24
(quoting Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The
Interpretation of Legal Texts 176 (2012)); see also Arlington
11
No. 2017AP2021
Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1
(2006) ("While it is generally presumed that statutes do not
contain surplusage, instances of surplusage are not unknown.");
United States v. Bronstein, 849 F.3d 1101, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2017)
(declining to apply the canon against surplusage, and observing
that at times "drafters do repeat themselves and do include
words that add nothing of substance" (quoting Scalia at 176-
77)). For this reason, the canon against surplusage is not
absolute. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 385 Wis. 2d 748, ¶17
n.10; Mason, 384 Wis. 2d 111, ¶26 ("the 'preference for avoiding
surplusage constructions is not absolute'" (quoted source
omitted)).
¶16 Because surplusage does exist in legislative drafting,
"[w]e should be wary . . . of 'creat[ing] unforeseen meanings or
legal effects from' what is nothing more than a 'stylistic
mannerism.'" Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 385 Wis. 2d 748, ¶25
(quoting Scalia, supra ¶15, at 177; alteration in original).
Indeed, courts have observed that "[s]ometimes the most
reasonable reading of a statute, one that gives it the
legislatively intended effect, is one that renders some language
in the statute surplusage." See Milwaukee Dist. Council 48, 385
Wis. 2d 748, ¶24 (quoting Mason, 384 Wis. 2d 111, ¶26).
Applying the rule against surplusage may be inappropriate where
it would render an otherwise unambiguous statute ambiguous. See
e.g., Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004)
(adopting an interpretation that rendered a term "surplusage" to
avoid ambiguity because "[w]e should prefer the plain meaning"
12
No. 2017AP2021
and doing so would "avoid the pitfalls that plague too quick a
turn to the more controversial realm of legislative history");
see also Barton v. United States Attorney Gen., 904 F.3d 1294,
1301 (11th Cir. 2018) (explaining that when "faced with a choice
between a plain-text reading that renders a word or clause
superfluous and an interpretation that gives every word
independent meaning but, in the doing, muddies up the statute——
courts 'should prefer the plain meaning since that approach
respects the words of Congress.'" (quoting Lamie, 540 U.S. at
536)); TMW Enters., Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 619 F.3d 574, 578
(6th Cir. 2010) (interpreting an insurance contract and
explaining "'[w]here there are two ways to read the text'——and
the one that avoids surplusage makes the text ambiguous——
'applying the rule against surplusage is, absent other
indications, inappropriate.'" (quoting Lamie, 540 U.S. at 536)).
¶17 The imprecision of "rural" and the absence of a
statutory definition supports our conclusion that "rural" as
used in Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m) is a general descriptive
term, not a territorial constraint. The ordinary definition of
"rural" is both broad and nebulous; attempting to apply it would
generate unnecessary ambiguity. "Rural" broadly refers to
things that are related to, or are characteristic of, the
country in contrast to more populated areas. The common
dictionary definitions relied upon by the court of appeals
illustrate the point:
The dictionaries we have consulted generally define
the adjective "rural" as describing something that is
13
No. 2017AP2021
related to, or characteristic of, the country. For
instance, one dictionary defines "rural" as "in,
relating to, or characteristic of the countryside
rather than the town." Rural, New Oxford American
Dictionary (2001). Another dictionary similarly
defines "rural" as "of or relating to the country,
country people or life, or agriculture." Rural,
Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1977). A third
defines "rural" as "of, relating to, associated with,
or typical of the country." Rural, Webster's Third
New International Dictionary (1993).
Town of Rib Mountain, 383 Wis. 2d 493, ¶18. Our review of other
dictionary definitions yields essentially identical results.7
¶18 If "rural" means something related to the "country,"
these definitions beg the question of what "country" means. The
dictionaries relied upon by the court of appeals similarly fail
to establish a more concrete definition:
"Country," in turn, is defined by one dictionary as
"districts and small settlements outside large towns,
cities, or the capital." Country, New Oxford American
Dictionary (2001). Another dictionary states that
"country" means both "an indefinite usu[ally] extended
expanse of land" and "rural as distinguished from
urban areas." Country, Webster's New Collegiate
Dictionary (1977). A third dictionary similarly
defines "country" as both "an expanse of land of
undefined but usu[ally] considerable extent" and
"rural regions as distinguished from city, town, or
7 Black's Law Dictionary defines "rural" as "[c]oncerning
the country, as opposed to urban (concerning the city)." Rural,
Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed. 1990). The American Heritage
Dictionary defines "rural" as "[o]f, relating to, or
characteristic of the country," "relating to people who live in
the country," or "relating to farming." Rural, American
Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011). Finally, the Shorter Oxford
English Dictionary defines "rural" in pertinent part as "[o]f,
pertaining to, or characteristic of the country or country life;
existing or performed in the country; agricultural, pastoral."
Rural, Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed. 2007).
14
No. 2017AP2021
other thickly inhabited and built-up areas." Country,
Webster's Third New International Dictionary (1993).
Town of Rib Mountain, 383 Wis. 2d 493, ¶19 (emphasis added;
alterations in original). The dictionaries we reviewed provide
similar definitions.8
¶19 These definitions illustrate that the meaning of
"rural" is subjective and indeterminate. Common dictionary
definitions are somewhat circular because "rural" points us to
"country," and "country" is often defined as comprising "rural"
areas, which brings us back full circle to "rural" but with no
elucidation of its meaning. "Rural," according to prevailing
dictionary definitions, generally refers to things that are
related to, or are characteristic of, the country, in contrast
to more populated areas, rendering "rural" a relative term,
subject to the eye of the beholder. What is considered rural in
one area might be deemed urban in another. The criteria used to
determine whether an area is rural or urban will undoubtedly
change from county to county because land might be categorized
as rural (i.e., more sparsely populated) in a more populous
county but that same land might be categorized as urban in a
8Black's Law Dictionary defines "country" as "[r]ural, as
distinguished from urban areas," country, Black's Law Dictionary
(6th ed. 1990), the American Heritage Dictionary defines it as
"[a]n area or expanse outside cities and towns; a rural area,"
country, American Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2011), and the
Shorter Oxford English Dictionary defines it in part as "[o]f or
pertaining to rural as distinct from urban districts; situated
or living in the country; belonging to or characteristic of the
country, esp. as contrasted with the town." Country, Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary (6th ed. 2007).
15
No. 2017AP2021
less populous county. Merely contrasting "rural" with "urban"
is unhelpful and gives no clues as to how one would go about
ascertaining what constitutes "rural" and what constitutes
"urban." There is no way to determine how sparsely populated an
area must be in order to be rural, and the common dictionary
definitions do not include such criteria. Saying that "rural"
means "characteristic of, or related to, the country,"
"comparatively less densely populated by people or buildings,"
or "not urban"——as the Town would have us define it——is little
more than a tautology. It is merely a melding of common
dictionary definitions, which lack objective definitional
content. The general definition is not, as the Town insists,
"workable and pragmatic"; it is utterly indeterminate. Nor are
we able to discern a better, more usable definition given the
vagueness of common dictionary definitions.
¶20 The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 59.54, as expressed in its
text, supplies an additional reason to reject the Town's
interpretation. Ascribing different meaning to "rural" on a
town-by-town basis is unworkable and undermines the purpose of
§ 59.54. "[P]urpose [is] perfectly relevant to a plain-meaning
interpretation of an unambiguous statute as long as
the . . . purpose [is] ascertainable from the text and structure
of the statute itself, rather than extrinsic sources, such as
legislative history." Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶48. The purpose
of § 59.54(4) and (4m) is expressed in the text of the statute:
to allow counties to establish naming or numbering systems "to
aid[] in fire protection, emergency services, and civil
16
No. 2017AP2021
defense." § 59.54(4). The Town's (and the court of appeals')
construction of "rural" as a constraint on implementation of
such systems would frustrate the public safety purpose
pronounced in the statute. A county would be required to make a
largely arbitrary determination of the extent to which a naming
or numbering system should apply to particular areas within each
town, based upon relative population density, effectively
precluding any uniformity within the system. Because of varying
population characteristics, the definition of "rural" would be
inconsistent, resulting in the statute's application varying
from county to county, from town to town, and, under the court
of appeals' construction, even within towns because only "rural"
portions of towns would participate in the system. Such
variation would hinder rather than help a county's provision of
emergency services, frustrating the explicit statutory purpose.
"A textually permissible interpretation that furthers rather
than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored."
Scalia, supra ¶15, 63; see also Student Ass'n of Univ. of
Wisconsin-Milwaukee v. Baum, 74 Wis. 2d 283, 294-95, 246
N.W.2d 622 (1976) (explaining "the purpose of the whole act is
to be sought and is favored over a construction which will
defeat the manifest object of the act"). Given the absence of
any textual indication that "rural" has a legally operative
meaning, the purpose expressed in the language of the statute
lends additional support to our rejection of the Town's
interpretation of "rural" as a town-by-town limitation on the
scope of Marathon County's authority.
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No. 2017AP2021
¶21 Marathon County's proffered definition of "rural" as
"unincorporated," while more precise than the definition the
Town proposes, fares no better. At oral argument, Marathon
County explained that by "unincorporated" it meant towns that
had not incorporated into villages or cities; in other words,
Marathon County's use of "unincorporated" simply means "towns."9
But defining "rural" to mean "town" is duplicative of "in
towns." It creates unnecessary surplusage rather than giving
independent meaning to "rural," which would leave us where we
started: "rural" has no independent legal meaning.
Furthermore, "rural" does not mean "unincorporated" or "town,"
even if towns are generally rural. "Rural" means something
characteristic of or related to the country or areas that are
more sparsely populated. In the absence of a statutory
definition showing that the legislature intended "rural" to mean
"unincorporated" or "town" we will not read one into the
statute. The text of the statute says Marathon County's
authority to establish a naming or numbering system is limited
to towns; therefore, this is the meaning we apply. Wis. Stat.
§ 59.54(4).
9
Marathon County is correct. Three categories of
municipalities exist in Wisconsin: towns, villages, and cities.
Towns are corporate bodies, see Wis. Stat. § 60.01(1) ("A town
is a body corporate[.]"), but may, under certain circumstances,
incorporate into villages or cities. See generally Wis. Stat.
§ 66.0203. Any municipal territory that has not been
incorporated into a village or a city remains unincorporated
territory, that is, a town. Accordingly, "unincorporated"
territory and "town" are one and the same.
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¶22 Our analysis is supported by other uses of "rural" in
the statutes, which demonstrate that when the legislature wants
to give "rural" a legally operative meaning, it has done so by
defining the term. For example, in Wis. Stat. § 85.08(5), the
legislature defined "rural municipality" as "[a] city, town or
village with a population of 4,000 or less" or "[a] city, town
or village that is located in a county with a population density
of less than 150 persons per square mile," and in Wis. Stat.
§ 231.35(1)(d) it defined "rural" as "outside a metropolitan
statistical area specified under 42 CFR 412.62(f)(ii)(A) or in a
city, village, or town with a population of not more than
14,000." While these definitions of "rural" differ from each
other, each provides objective criteria for applying what is
otherwise an amorphous term. Each legislatively drafted
definition provides content capable of application whereas
"rural," as generally understood, does not.
¶23 In contrast, the legislature does not define "rural"
in Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m). We are left with general
dictionary definitions of the word, which are too vague to apply
in any meaningful manner. Any attempt to give legally operative
meaning to "rural" using its general definition requires us to
add words to the statute. Nothing within the statutory language
suggests that "rural" denotes shifting boundary lines for a
county's authority based on population density or other
criteria. The lack of any workable definition of "rural" and
the placement of "rural" as a modifier of the "naming or
numbering system" suggests the only reasonable reading of the
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text renders "rural" merely descriptive of the "naming or
numbering system" and the "roads and intersections" within the
system. "Rural" does not impose an additional territorial
limitation on a county's authority. We decline to transform a
stylistic mannerism into an independent legal limitation absent
any textual directive to do so.10
III. CONCLUSION
¶24 Marathon County's authority to establish a rural
naming or numbering system under Wis. Stat. § 59.54(4) and (4m)
is plain. The statutory text provides that a county may
establish such a system "in towns." Accordingly, Marathon
County acted within its authority by enacting an ordinance to
create a uniform naming and numbering system in towns throughout
Marathon County. The text does not support the Town's
10
The parties appear to agree that towns were generally
rural when Wis. Stat. § 59.54 was enacted in 1957. The Town
specifically states that "it is important for the Court to note
that in 1956, the unincorporated areas in counties in the State
of Wisconsin were made up almost exclusively by sparse
populations that were almost certainly rural." Marathon County
similarly maintains that the word "rural" described the nature
of the system that existed in 1957. If true, the predominantly
rural character of towns at the time § 59.54 was enacted could
explain why the legislature chose to call the addressing system
under subsections (4) and (4m) "a rural naming or numbering
system." The parties' apparent agreement suggests potential
stylistic reasons the drafters chose to include the word in the
statute. This is consistent with our analysis of the statutory
language that "rural" is merely a general description of the
naming or numbering system and the roads subject to it. We need
not resolve this historical detail because "rural" does not
restrict the locations where naming or numbering systems may be
established.
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No. 2017AP2021
construction of "rural" as an additional limitation on the
territorial scope of Marathon County's authority to implement a
rural naming or numbering system. "Rural" merely describes the
naming or numbering system and affording it any meaning beyond
this would require reading additional words into the statute,
which we decline to do.
By the Court.——The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed.
¶25 SHIRLEY ABRAHAMSON, J., withdrew from participation
before oral argument.
¶26 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., did not participate.
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