NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 20 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GERALD LEE MCNEIL, No. 17-56839
Petitioner-Appellant, D.C. No.
2:16-cv-04598-AB-JPR
v.
A. ASUNCION, MEMORANDUM*
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Andre Birotte, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 16, 2019**
Pasadena, California
Before: NGUYEN and OWENS, Circuit Judges, and BAYLSON,*** District
Judge.
California state prisoner Gerald McNeil appeals from the district court’s
denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition challenging his convictions
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Michael M. Baylson, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
for attempted murder and attempting to dissuade a witness. As the parties are
familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s denial of a habeas petition. Rowland v.
Chappell, 876 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2017). Our review is governed by the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. Under AEDPA, when a state court has decided a claim on the merits, we
may grant relief only if the adjudication “(1) resulted in a decision that was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal
law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of
the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). This
standard is “highly deferential” and “difficult to meet.” Harrington v. Richter, 562
U.S. 86, 102, 105 (2011) (citations omitted).
1. McNeil argues that he was deprived of his confrontation and due process
constitutional rights when the trial court allowed a witness, Crystal Goodridge, to
refuse to name the person who told her about a purported bribe from McNeil’s
family. The confrontation and due process clauses give criminal defendants the
right to cross-examine witnesses. See Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 678
(1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-16 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi,
410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). However, “trial judges retain wide latitude . . . to
2
impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination,” and the constitution only
“guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination
that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.”
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
The California Court of Appeal reasonably determined that McNeil’s
constitutional rights were not violated by the trial court declining to strike
Goodridge’s testimony after she refused to name the person who told her about the
offer from McNeil’s family. Defense counsel was able to otherwise extensively
cross-examine Goodridge about the offer, the trial court instructed the jury that
Goodridge’s testimony about the offer was limited to her credibility and not for the
truth of the offer’s existence, and during closing argument defense counsel was
able to use Goodridge’s refusal to cast doubt on her credibility.
McNeil argues that the California Court of Appeal incorrectly used a
“collateral issues” test by noting that a trial court is not required to strike a
witness’s entire testimony if the question she refuses to answer pertains to a
“collateral” matter, “such as credibility.” However, it is unnecessary to reach
whether the California Court of Appeal’s statement about collateral matters
conflicts with U.S. Supreme Court precedent because the Court of Appeal
reasonably concluded that defense counsel had an adequate opportunity to cross-
examine Goodridge, despite her refusal to say who told her about the offer.
3
Therefore, the California Court of Appeal’s decision was not contrary to, or
an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1).
2. McNeil also argues that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably
determined the facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) when it stated that “[t]he
evidence about [Goodridge] learning of the offer was presented to the jury for the
sole purpose of showing its effect on her state of mind, and was therefore relevant
to her credibility.” McNeil waived this issue because he failed to raise it in the
district court. See Miles v. Ryan, 713 F.3d 477, 494 n.19 (9th Cir. 2013).
Moreover, McNeil’s argument is unpersuasive because the California Court of
Appeal’s statement was not an unreasonable determination of the facts.
AFFIRMED.
4