AFFIRMED; Opinion Filed May 21, 2019.
In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-18-00215-CV
RUTH TORRES, Appellant
V.
THE CONTINENTAL APARTMENTS, ALL CITIES TOWING INC., AND
CITY VEHICLE STORAGE INC., Appellees
On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 4
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-03695-D
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Whitehill, Partida-Kipness, and Pedersen, III
Opinion by Justice Partida-Kipness
Appellant Ruth Torres appeals pro se from the trial court’s final ruling entered in appellees’
favor. We affirm. Because the issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. See
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.
BACKGROUND
On June 4, 2017, appellant Ruth Torres’s car was towed when she parked in front of the
loading dock of appellee The Continental Apartments. The car was towed by appellee All Cities
Towing, Inc. and stored at appellee City Vehicle Storage, Inc. Torres filed a Request for Tow
Hearing which included the following allegations: (1) she was charged more for her tow than what
is legally authorized; (2) property management failed to provide reasonable parking options due
to safety reasons; (3) property management failed to provide communication to address a change
in common parking practice at the dock; and (4) property management failed to provide notice or
warning that she could be towed when she only planned to be there a few minutes. A hearing was
held pursuant to Chapter 2308 of the Texas Occupations Code before the Justice of the Peace Court
(JP court) and the court entered findings that: (1) probable cause existed for the removal and
placement of the vehicle in the storage lot; (2) the towing charge and storage fee was authorized
and just; (3) Torres’s payment of the tow fee was just and owing; and (4) Torres was responsible
for court costs. Torres appealed the JP court’s decision to the County Court of Law No. 4.
In county court, Torres filed a motion to protect and compel discovery and appearance.
Torres asked the court to compel appellees to produce documents, video recordings, and witnesses.
In response, the county court entered an order which narrowed the scope of the discovery and
limited the number of trial subpoenas. Torres then filed a motion to amend and sought to add
claims alleging violations of section 2308.401 and 2308.402 of the Texas Occupations Code
against Continental and All Cities Towing. The county court denied Torres’s motion to amend.
Torres also filed a motion for contempt which alleged that appellees failed to respond to her
discovery requests. Torres then filed a motion for sanctions due to spoliation which alleged that
Continental failed to preserve the recording of the tow. Prior to conducting the administrative tow
hearing, the county court heard Torres’s motion for spoliation and the county court denied the
motion.
Following the hearing, the county court concluded in its Final Ruling/Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law that the tow was not illegal. In addition, the county court found as follows:
(1) there was signage all over the loading dock area informing drivers that towing was enforced
and the length of time that Torres intended to park there was irrelevant; (2) there was probable
cause for Torres’s car to be towed; (3) reasonable parking options existed and there were no
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legitimate safety concerns that warranted parking in front of the dumpsters; (4) towing at the
Continental was enforced for years; (5) Torres’s payment of the tow, impoundment and storage
fees was justified; (6) All Cities Towing and City Vehicle Storage are properly licensed; (7) there
is no evidence that Torres was charged towing or storage fees greater than what is authorized; and
(8) Torres was liable to defendants for their attorney’s fees and court costs. Torres then filed this
appeal.
ANALYSIS
In fives issues, Torres appears to argue as follows: (1) the county court erred by not finding
that the violations of the Texas Occupations Code made the tow illegal: (2) the county court erred
in finding probable cause for the towing under the Texas Occupations Code; (3) the county court
erred in failing to find violations of the Texas Property Code; and (4) the county court abused its
discretion in denying the motion to amend, limiting discovery, preventing testimony and awarding
attorney’s fees.1
A. Standard of Review
Our review of the trial court’s conclusions of law is de novo. See Burlington N. and Santa
Fe. Ry. Co. v. City of Houston, 171 S.W.3d 240, 245 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no
pet.).
The standard of review of denial of leave to amend is abuse of discretion. See Austin v.
Countrywide Homes Loans, 261 S.W.3d 68, 75 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, pet.
1
Although we construe pro se pleadings and briefs liberally, we hold pro se litigants to the same standards
as licensed attorneys and require them to comply with the applicable laws and rules of procedure. In re N.E.B., 251
S.W.3d 211, 211–12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.); see also Gonzalez v. VATR Const. LLC, 418 S.W.3d 777, 784
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (“Appellate courts must construe briefing requirements reasonably and liberally,
but a party asserting error on appeal still must put forth some specific argument and analysis showing that the record
and the law support his contention.”). To do otherwise would give a pro se litigant an unfair advantage over a litigant
who is represented by counsel. In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d at 212.
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denied). A trial court abuses its discretion when it reaches a result so arbitrary and unreasonable
that it amounts to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Id.
The abuse of discretion standard also applies to the trial court’s decisions regarding
discovery and attorney’s fees. See Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cleveland, 223 S.W.3d 485, 490
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.) (“[T]he abuse of discretion standard applies in reviewing the
ruling of the trial court regarding a discovery question.”); RSL Funding, LLC v. Aegon Structured
Settlements, Inc., 384 S.W.3d 405, 409 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2012, pet. denied) (“The standard
of review of a trial court’s award of attorney’s fees is abuse of discretion.”).
B. Texas Occupations Code Sections 2308.401 and 2308.402
In her first issue, Torres appears to argue that Continental and All Cities Towing violated
sections 2308.401 and 2308.402 of the Texas Occupations Code when Continental allegedly
received a fifty dollar gift card from All Cities Towing. See TEX. OCC. CODE §§ 2308.401–.402.
Section 2308.401 provides that a “parking facility owner may not directly or indirectly accept
anything of value from a towing company in connection with the removal of a vehicle from a
parking facility[.]” See OCC. § 2308.401(a)(1). Section 2308.402 provides that a “towing
company or booting company may not directly or indirectly give anything of value to a parking
facility owner in connection with the removal of a vehicle from a parking facility[.]” See OCC. §
2308.402(a)(1). These allegations were not included in Torres’s initial claims against appellees in
the JP Court. On November 15, 2017, Torres filed a motion to amend and sought to add these
claims against Continental and All Cities Towing in the county court. The county court denied
Torres’s motion to amend and, accordingly, did not address this claim. Further, we note that the
scope of the hearing held pursuant to Chapter 2308 of the Texas Occupations Code is limited to
the following issues: (1) whether probable cause existed for the removal and placement of the
vehicle; and (2) whether a towing charge imposed or collection was greater than the amount
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statutorily authorized. See OCC. § 2308.458(c); Black Bull Towing, LLC v. Ybarra, No. 02-14-
00227-CV, 2015 WL 3637933, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 11, 2015, pet. denied) (mem.
op.); Badaiki v. Miller, No. 14-17-00450-CV, 2019 WL 922289, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston Feb.
26, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.). As these allegations were not proper claims to be addressed during
the tow hearing, the county court would have lacked jurisdiction to address them. For all these
reasons, we overrule Torres’s first issue.2
A. Texas Property Code Claims
In her third issue, Torres argues that the county court erred in failing to find violations of
Texas Property Code sections 92.013 and 92.0131. See TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 92.013, 92.0131.
Section 92.013 provides that a landlord shall give tenants in a multiunit complex “a copy of any
applicable vehicle towing or parking rules or policies of the landlord[.]” See PROP. § 92.013(a).
Torres also alleges that Continental failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth in
section 92.0131. See PROP. § 92.0131(d), (e). Section 92.0131(d) states that if “a landlord changes
the vehicle towing or parking rules or policies during the term of the lease agreement, the landlord
shall provide written notice of the change to the tenant before the tenant is required to comply with
the rule or policy change.” See PROP. § 92.0131(d). Section 92.0131(e) states that if a rule or
policy change is made during the term of the lease agreement that the change must apply to all of
the tenants and be “based on necessity, safety or security of tenants, reasonable requirements for
construction on the premises, or respect for other tenants’ parking rights[.]” PROP. § 92.0131(e).
As noted above, the only issues to be addressed in a tow hearing are whether probable
cause existed for the removal of the vehicle and whether the towing charge imposed was statutorily
authorized. See OCC. § 2308.458(c); Black Bull Towing, LLC, 2015 WL 3637933, at *2; Badaiki,
2
To the extent that Torres is arguing that the county court abused its discretion in denying the motion to amend,
that argument is addressed separately in Section C(1).
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2019 WL 922289, at *3. As Torres’s allegations relating to violations of the property code were
not proper claims to be considered during the tow hearing, the county court lacked jurisdiction to
consider these claims. For this reason, we overrule Torres’s third issue that the county court erred
in failing to find violations of Texas Property Code sections 92.013 and 92.0131.
B. Probable Cause
In her second and fourth issues, Torres argues that the county court erred in finding
probable cause for the towing. The Occupations Code provides that “[a] parking facility owner
may, without the consent of the owner or operator of an unauthorized vehicle, cause the vehicle
and any property on or in the vehicle to be removed and stored at a vehicle storage facility at the
vehicle owner’s or operator’s expense if: (1) signs that comply with Subchapter G prohibiting
unauthorized vehicles are located on the parking facility at the time of towing and for the preceding
24 hours and remain installed at the time of the towing[.]” See OCC. § 2308.252(a)(1) (Supp.).
The Occupations Code further provides that the “owner or operator of a vehicle may not leave
unattended on a parking facility a vehicle that: (2) obstructs pedestrian or vehicular access to an
area that is used for the placement of a garbage or refuse receptacle used in common by residents
of the apartment complex[.]” See OCC. § 2308.253(b)(2) (Supp.). Torres concedes that (1) she
parked at the dock and (2) signage existed at the dock which restricted parking. Victor Morado,
the foreman at All Cities Towing, testified that signage was present on the date of the tow. In this
case, there was probable cause for the tow because Torres was obstructing access to a dumpster in
a restricted parking area. Torres even conceded in her testimony that “she parked right in front of
[a] dumpster because that’s the closest to get up the stairs.”
Torres argues that Continental failed to provide notice pursuant to section 2308.253(e) of
the Texas Occupations Code because the “towing company was directed to tow vehicles which
lacked registration insignia.” To clarify, section 2308.253(e) provides as follows:
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A contract provision providing for the towing from a parking facility of a vehicle
that does not display an unexpired license plate or registration insignia is valid only
if the provision requires the owner or operator of the vehicle to be given at least 10
days’ written notice that the vehicle will be towed from the parking facility at the
vehicle owner’s or operator’s expense if it is not removed from the parking facility.
See OCC. § 2308.253(e) (Supp.). Based upon Torres’s citations, it appears that she misinterprets
“registration insignia” to reference a resident sticker and placard issued by Continental. However,
the “registration insignia” in this code section refers to state registration requirements under
chapter 502 of the Texas Transportation Code. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE §§ 502.001–.492.
Accordingly, Torres’s argument that there was no probable cause for the towing based upon the
lack of notice fails.
Torres also argues that it is reasonable to “consider that common practice, and inconsistent
towing enforcement justifiably undermines the position that generic signage alone satisfies the
requirement of adequate notice to residents that parking at the loading dock, even for a few
minutes, would be reasonable grounds to expect to be towed.” In her brief, Torres refers to certain
hearing testimony by Lindsay Diaz, the resident services coordinator at Continental, in which Diaz
states that there was a mechanism for residents to park at the dock if they reserved it with
Continental and Continental informed the towing company that they could tow anyone who was
illegally parked after 6:00 p.m. Diaz also testified that it was common for people to park at the
dock and that they were not always towed. At the hearing, no evidence was presented that Torres
had reserved the dock with Continental. Because she was parked at the dock without permission
and has conceded the existence of the towing signs, we cannot conclude that Torres’s car was
towed without probable cause even if the towing happened sporadically or without consistency.
For all the reasons described above, we overrule Torres’s second and fourth issues.
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C. Denial of Motion to Amend, Limiting Discovery and Testimony and
Awarding Attorney’s Fee
In her fifth issue, Torres argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying her
motion to amend her claims, limiting the discovery, and awarding attorney’s fees to appellees. We
disagree.
1) Motion to Amend
As stated above, Torres sought to amend her claims to add allegations that Continental
violated sections 2308.401 and 2308.402 of the Texas Occupations Code when it allegedly
received a fifty dollar gift card from All Cities Towing. As stated above, the tow hearing
encompasses a narrow scope of issues. See OCC. § 2308.458(c). As these allegations do not impact
whether there was probable cause for the tow or if the tow charge was correct, the county court
did not abuse its discretion in denying Torres’s motion to amend her claims.
2) Discovery
In this case, the county court allowed each party to send ten interrogatories, five requests
for production, and a request for disclosure to all other parties. Torres was allowed two trial
subpoenas per defendant and defendants were allowed two trial subpoenas. On appeal, Torres
complains that the trial court denied her request for (1) appellees’ proof of licensure and insurance
and (2) discovery on appellees’ alleged violations of sections 2308.401 and 2308.402 of the Texas
Occupations Code. As stated above, however, the tow hearing only encompasses whether there
was probable cause for the tow and if the tow charge was correct. As Torres’s additional discovery
requests were irrelevant to assist in determining these issues, the county court did not abuse its
discretion in denying Torres’s requests for additional discovery.
Torres also appears to assert that the trial court erred in denying her request for the video
of the towing and her motion for sanctions based upon the alleged spoliation of this evidence.
Torres asserted that Continental had a duty to preserve the video of the recording of the tow. Torres
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argues that the video would show that the “tow truck pulled up to tow the vehicle the minute
Appellant entered the door to the building.” Torres’s assertion, however, is irrelevant to whether
there was probable cause for the tow. We cannot conclude that the county court abused its
discretion in denying Torres this additional discovery as the video is irrelevant to whether there
was probable cause for the tow.
3) Attorney’s Fees
The Texas Towing and Booting Act enables the court to award attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party. See OCC. § 2308.458(e)(1). Here, Torres argues that the county court awarded
unreasonable attorney’s fees. Torres specifically objects to the fees sought by Jack Norman, the
attorney for All Cities Towing and City Vehicle Storage. At the hearing, Norman testified as to
the time involved, the nature of services rendered, and the reasonableness of the fees. Norman
sought fees totaling $7,000 and testified that his fees were reasonable and necessary in light of
Torres’s excessive motion practice. The county court ordered Torres to pay All Cities Towing and
City Vehicle’s Storage’s attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,000.
As stated above, the allowance of attorney’s fees rests with the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be reversed without a showing of abuse of that discretion. Radsdale v.
Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex. 1990). Here, we cannot conclude that the
trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees to All Cities Towing and City Vehicle’s
Storage’s as Norman’s evidence was uncontroverted and the amount awarded was less than was
sought by appellee.
For these reasons, we overrule Torres’s fifth issue.
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CONCLUSION
On the record of this case, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Robbie Partida-Kipness/
ROBBIE PARTIDA-KIPNESS
JUSTICE
180215F.P05
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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
RUTH TORRES, Appellant On Appeal from the County Court at Law
No. 4, Dallas County, Texas
No. 05-18-00215-CV V. Trial Court Cause No. CC-17-03695-D.
Opinion delivered by Justice Partida-
THE CONTINENTAL APARTMENTS, Kipness. Justices Whitehill and Pedersen,
ALL CITIES TOWING INC., AND CITY III participating.
VEHICLE STORAGE INC., Appellees
In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellees THE CONTINENTAL APARTMENTS, ALL CITIES
TOWING INC., AND CITY VEHICLE STORAGE INC. recover their costs of this appeal from
appellant RUTH TORRES.
Judgment entered this 21st day of May 2019.
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