UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4418
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
AFRIES SANDONICAES MAHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:17-cr-00266-D-1)
Submitted: April 25, 2019 Decided: May 23, 2019
Before MOTZ and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and TRAXLER, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
G. Alan DuBois, Federal Public Defender, Eric Joseph Brignac, Chief Appellate
Attorney, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellant. Robert J. Higdon, Jr., United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker,
Assistant United States Attorney, Kristine L. Fritz, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Afries Sandonicaes Maham appeals from his 180-month sentence imposed
pursuant to his guilty plea to being a felon in possession of a firearm, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012). On appeal, Maham challenges his classification as an armed
career criminal, arguing that his prior North Carolina breaking or entering convictions did
not qualify as violent felonies under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). We
affirm.
We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a violent felony under
the ACCA. United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 683 (4th Cir. 2017). Under the
ACCA, a defendant convicted of violating § 922(g) is subject to a mandatory minimum
sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment if he has at least three prior convictions for either a
violent felony or a serious drug offense. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2012). “The ACCA defines
‘violent felony’ to include, as relevant here, any offense that ‘is burglary.’” United
States v. Mungro, 754 F.3d 267, 268 (4th Cir. 2014) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).
To determine if North Carolina breaking or entering qualifies as burglary, we
apply the categorical approach. Winston, 850 F.3d at 683. Under the categorical
approach, we “focus solely on whether the elements of the crime of conviction
sufficiently match the elements of generic burglary, while ignoring the particular facts of
the case.” Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). The Supreme Court
has defined generic burglary as “an unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in,
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a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575, 598 (1990).
Maham argues that North Carolina breaking or entering is broader than generic
burglary because its “building” element includes certain mobile homes and travel trailers.
But since generic burglary under the ACCA “includes burglary of a structure or vehicle
that has been adapted or is customarily used for overnight accommodation,” United
States v. Stitt, 139 S. Ct. 399, 403–04 (2018), Maham fails to demonstrate that North
Carolina breaking or entering is broader than generic burglary and thus not categorically
a violent felony.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We deny Maham’s motion
to place the case in abeyance. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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