TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-19-00267-CR
NO. 03-19-00268-CR
NO. 03-19-00269-CR
Wilfred Warren Sheppard, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 2 OF BELL COUNTY,
NO. 2C14-01404, NO. 2C14-02351, & NO. 2C16-04640
THE HONORABLE JOHN MICHAEL MISCHTIAN, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Wilfred Warren Sheppard filed pro se pretrial notices of appeal of the
trial court’s oral order denying his pretrial “Motion to Quash Indictment (Information)” filed in
cause numbers 2C14-01404 and 2C14-02351 and his motion to sever cause number 2C16-
04640. 1 (Although the motion to quash appears to have been filed in all three cause numbers,
Sheppard’s notices of appeal only challenge its denial in the two listed cause numbers.) We lack
jurisdiction over Sheppard’s appeal.
In criminal cases, this Court has jurisdiction to consider appeals from the entry of
an appealable order. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.02; see also Tex.
R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). However, there must be a written, signed order from which to appeal.
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The trial court’s docket sheet reflects that a Faretta hearing has been held and that
Sheppard is representing himself at trial.
See State v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252, 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (noting that “our
precedent requires that an order be in writing” when discussing State’s statutory right to appeal
pretrial suppression order); see also State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398, 401-02 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (holding that for purposes of appeal, trial court “enters” order when judge signs
order). The record before us contains no written, signed order denying Sheppard’s motion to
quash or his motion to sever; thus, there has been no entry of an appealable order. See, e.g.,
Dekneef v. State, No. 03-13-00699-CR, 2013 WL 6801261, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin
Dec. 20, 2013, no pet.)
Even if the trial court had signed an order, we find no authority for Sheppard to
appeal either type of order. In Texas, appeals in a criminal case are permitted only when they are
specifically authorized by statute. State ex rel. Lykos v. Fine, 330 S.W.3d 904, 915 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011); see Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (“[A] defendant’s
right of appeal is a statutorily created right.”). The standard for determining whether an
appellate court has jurisdiction to hear and determine a case “is not whether the appeal is
precluded by law, but whether the appeal is authorized by law.” Blanton v. State, 369 S.W.3d
894, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (quoting Abbott v. State, 271 S.W.3d 694, 696-97 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008)); State ex rel. Lykos, 330 S.W.3d at 915. Thus, a court of appeals does not have
jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders unless that jurisdiction has been expressly granted by
law. Ex parte Apolinar, 820 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Ex parte Shumake, 953
S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). No such grant exists for a defendant’s
direct appeal of an interlocutory order denying a pretrial motion to quash or a pretrial motion to
sever. See, e.g., Ex parte Wiley, 949 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, no writ)
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(dismissing appeal because “[t]here is no statute providing for interlocutory appeal of denial of
a motion to dismiss”).
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P.
25.2(a)(2), (d); id. R. 43.2 (f).
__________________________________________
Jeff Rose, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Kelly and Smith
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: May 24, 2019
Do Not Publish
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