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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MICHAEL J. ROGAN, M.D. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
GEISINGER CLINIC D/B/A GEISINGER
MEDICAL GROUP
Appellant No. 1551 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Dated September 13, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Civil Division at No: 2018-CV-4760
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STABILE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED MAY 29, 2019
Appellant, Geisinger Clinic d/b/a Geisinger Medical Group (“Geisinger”),
appeals from an order granting the motion of Appellee, Michael J. Rogan, M.D.
(“Rogan”), for special relief under Pa.R.C.P. 1531. We vacate the order
granting relief and remand for further proceedings.
On September 12, 2018, Rogan filed a motion for special injunctive relief
in the trial court and transmitted a copy of the motion to counsel for Geisinger.
Rogan had not filed a complaint, but rather commenced this action with the
filing of a writ of summons.
In his motion, Rogan alleged the following: Rogan is a board-certified
physician in internal medicine, pediatrics, and child abuse pediatrics, and he
has worked for Geisinger for 29 years. Under the terms of a 1990 practice
agreement between Rogan and Geisinger, Rogan could not practice medicine
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within 25 miles of Geisinger’s facility for two years after termination of his
employment. On July 11, 2018, Rogan reported to Geisinger his concern that
exam rooms at Geisinger’s facility were contaminated. Two days later, on July
13, 2018, Geisinger terminated Rogan’s employment. Rogan appealed
internally, but on July 29, 2018, Geisinger upheld its termination decision.
Rogan’s motion requested the court to (1) schedule a hearing on Rogan’s
request for permanent injunctive relief under Pa.R.C.P. 1531; (2) declare the
25-mile restriction in his practice agreement unenforceable; (3) enjoin
Geisinger from interfering with Rogan’s relationship with his patients by
“misleading and requiring” patients to select a new physician at Geisinger;
and (4) order Geisinger to provide him his patients’ contact information so
that he could contact them directly. Motion, Prayer for Relief, 9/12/18, at 14.
On September 13, 2018, one day after Rogan filed his motion, the court
held oral argument but did not take evidence from the parties. On the same
date, the court ordered that:
1. [Geisinger] should refrain from interfering in the
physician/patient relationship between [Rogan] and his existing
patients as of July 13, 2018;
2. [Geisinger] is directed to provide [Rogan] with a list of patients
being treated by [Rogan] as of July 13, 2018 together with each
patient’s current contact information, within seven (7) days of the
date of this Order;
3. [Geisinger] should use as a starting point the list of those
patients whom it contacted regarding [Rogan’s] employment
status subsequent to July 13, 2018; [and]
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4. A hearing on [Rogan’s] Petition for Special Injunctive Relief
shall be held on Friday, October 19, 2018[.]
Order, 7/13/18. The court did not order Rogan to post a bond. On September
18, 2018, Geisinger appealed to this Court.
During the pendency of this appeal, Geisinger ruled Rogan to file a
complaint. Rogan filed a motion to strike the rule and to direct Geisinger to
produce pre-complaint discovery. In an order sent to the parties on May 6,
2019, the trial court granted Rogan’s motion to strike the rule; directed
Geisinger to produce pre-complaint discovery within twenty days; and
directed Rogan to file a complaint within twenty days after receiving all pre-
complaint discovery.
In this appeal, Geisinger argues that the trial court erred in granting
injunctive relief because (1) Rogan did not file a complaint; (2) Rogan did not
post a bond; (3) the trial court failed to grant Geisinger’s motion for recusal
following disclosure of the fact that the court’s spouse is Rogan’s patient; and
(4) Geisinger did not have the opportunity to present evidence in opposition
to Rogan’s motion. We agree with Geisinger’s first, second and fourth
arguments.1
To obtain a preliminary injunction,
there are six “essential prerequisites” that a party must
establish[.] The party must show: 1) that the injunction is
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1Geisinger’s third argument seeking recusal is moot because of our disposition
of the other arguments and because the judge who issued the September 13,
2018 order subsequently recused himself.
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necessary to prevent immediate and irreparable harm that cannot
be adequately compensated by damages; 2) that greater injury
would result from refusing an injunction than from granting it,
and, concomitantly, that issuance of an injunction will not
substantially harm other interested parties in the proceedings; 3)
that a preliminary injunction will properly restore the parties to
their status as it existed immediately prior to the alleged wrongful
conduct; 4) that the activity it seeks to restrain is actionable, that
its right to relief is clear, and that the wrong is manifest, or, in
other words, must show that it is likely to prevail on the merits;
5) that the injunction it seeks is reasonably suited to abate the
offending activity; and, 6) that a preliminary injunction will not
adversely affect the public interest. The burden is on the party
who requested preliminary injunctive relief[.]
Synthes USA Sales, LLC v. Harrison, 83 A.3d 242, 249 (Pa. Super. 2013)
(citation omitted). The moving party’s burdens at the preliminary injunction
stage
track the burdens at trial[.] To establish a reasonable probability
of success on the merits, the moving party must produce sufficient
evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the underlying cause
of action. Whether success is likely requires examination of legal
principles controlling the claim and potential defenses available to
the opposing party.
Id. at 249 n.4 (citations omitted). “Extensive fact-finding” is necessary in
order for the moving party to establish it is likely to prevail on the merits. Id.
at 249.
In addition, a petition for injunctive relief is effective only “where it is
ancillary to an already pending action,” i.e., only when a complaint has been
filed. In Re G.J.K. & Sons, LLC, 175 A.3d 1033, 1036 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(citing Wm. Garlick & Sons, Inc. v. Lambert, 287 A.2d 143, 144 (Pa.
1972)). Finally, to obtain a preliminary or special injunction, the moving
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party must post a bond with the prothonotary “in an amount fixed and with
security approved by the court.” Pa.R.C.P. 1531(b)(1). The bond requirement
“is mandatory and an appellate court must invalidate a preliminary injunction
if a bond is not filed by the plaintiff.” Walter v. Stacy, 837 A.2d 1205, 1208
(Pa. Super. 2003).
Before proceeding further, we note our disagreement with the court’s
contention that it did not actually grant preliminary injunctive relief. The court
claimed that it merely scheduled a subsequent hearing on the merits and
“directed the parties to share information in a collaborative vein,” a subject it
viewed as “tangential” to the issue of whether Geisinger properly terminated
Rogan. Opinion, 10/24/18, at 2. Comparison of Rogan’s motion with the
September 13, 2018 order demonstrates that the trial court granted three of
the four forms of relief requested in Rogan’s motion, including a prohibition
against interfering with Rogan’s relationship with his existing patients and a
directive to provide Rogan with his patients’ contact information. These
clearly are forms of injunctive relief on central issues in this case, not merely
instructions to “collaborate” on “tangential” matters.
Turning to the merits, the injunction entered by the court is defective
for at least three reasons. First, Rogan has not filed a complaint, but instead
is in the course of obtaining pre-complaint discovery from Geisinger. Without
a complaint, there is no way to assess the causes of action that Rogan intends
to prove, or examine whether he alleges sufficient facts to prove each element
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of his action(s). This in turn prevents reasoned evaluation of whether Rogan
is likely to prevail on the merits. Synthes, 83 A.3d at 249. Second, the trial
court did not conduct any fact-finding, let alone the “extensive fact-finding”
called for under Synthes. Id. Before entering the injunction, the trial court
merely held oral argument with counsel for the parties. Third, the court failed
to order Rogan to post a bond, a mandatory requisite for preliminary injunctive
relief under Rule 1531(b).
Accordingly, we must vacate the trial court’s order and remand for
further proceedings. On remand, we direct the trial court expeditiously to
hold the evidentiary hearing called for under Synthes if Rogan still seeks
special relief. The court, however, shall not hold this hearing until Rogan has
filed his complaint. If the court awards injunctive relief following the hearing,
it shall order Rogan to post a bond in accordance with Rule 1531(b).
Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings in accordance
with this memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/29/2019
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