FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 5, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GARLAND E. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
No. 19-3018
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; (D.C. No. 2:18-CV-02540-CM-TJJ)
MARTIN L.C. FELDMAN, U.S. District (D. Kan.)
Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana;
MICHAEL B. NORTH, U.S. Magistrate
Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before LUCERO, PHILLIPS, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Garland Williams, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the
district court’s dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim, pursuant to
28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B). Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
Williams filed a civil complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas on October 10, 2018. The complaint named as defendants the
United States of America, U.S. District Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Martin Feldman, and U.S. Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Louisiana
Michael B. North. Because Williams was proceeding in Kansas district court in
forma pauperis, a magistrate judge sua sponte reviewed Williams’s complaint and,
subsequently, recommended that the district court dismiss it.
In her Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge found that while
Williams’s complaint “references the United States District Court for the District of
Louisiana’s lack of jurisdiction” and “the . . . judges’ failure to meet their
obligations,” the “complaint does not make clear what, if any, factual basis these
claims rest on.” ROA at 45. The magistrate judge noted that Williams’s complaint
was difficult to understand. Though the judge was able to discern that Williams’s
complaint “seems to arise from factual allegations that the Magistrate Judge’s Report
and Recommendation in Williams v. USA et. al., 2:18-cv-2552-F-5 (E.D. La. 2018),
was improper,” she nonetheless found it “unclear what claim or claims [Williams] is
asserting” before the district court in Kansas, or whether there is a factual basis for
the court’s jurisdiction over those claims. ROA at 45–46.
The magistrate judge also found that venue was not proper in Kansas because
both Williams and the defendants reside in Louisiana and “the events giving rise to
[Williams’s] claim occurred in Louisiana.” ROA at 46. Lastly, the magistrate judge
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observed that any claims Williams has against Judge Feldman and Magistrate Judge
North would be barred by judicial immunity, and that the United States “is also likely
immune from this suit.” ROA at 46.
The district court adopted the Report and Recommendation and dismissed
Williams’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Williams timely appealed.
II.
This court reviews de novo a district court’s dismissal of a pro se complaint
for failure to state a claim. Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t of Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th
Cir. 1999). Pursuant to § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the court may dismiss sua sponte an in
forma pauperis action that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 1997); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).1 “Such dismissal is warranted only where it is patently obvious
that the plaintiff could not prevail on the facts alleged,” and that an opportunity for
amendment would be futile. Whitney, 113 F.3d at 1173 (citations and quotations
omitted).
Williams fails to show how the district court erred in dismissing his complaint.
Like the complaint at issue, Williams’s opening brief is difficult to understand. Even
1
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) refers to “prisoners,” this court has
repeatedly concluded that § 1915(e)(2)(B) “applies to all in forma pauperis
proceedings.” Getachew v. Google, Inc., 491 F. App’x 923, 925 (10th Cir. 2012); see
also Ruston v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 304 F. App’x 666, 668
(10th Cir. 2008).
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after construing his pleadings liberally, as we must, United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d
972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009), we cannot discern any meaningful argument, and we find
no error below. The adopted Report and Recommendation correctly noted that
Williams’s complaint lacks even basic factual assertions: the complaint does not
reveal what the factual basis of Williams’s claims is. As such, the district court did
not err in concluding that Williams failed to “nudge his claims across the line from
conceivable to plausible.” ROA at 61 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
554, 570 (2007)). Indeed, we are not able discern from the complaint what claims
Williams is attempting to state.
Finally, the district court did not err in concluding that offering Williams the
opportunity to amend his complaint would be futile because “he still could not
overcome the hurdles of immunity and venue.” ROA at 61. On appeal, Williams
does not explain why venue is proper in Kansas, i.e., whether Defendants are
residents of Kansas or whether “a substantial part of the events or omissions giving
rise to the claim occurred” in Kansas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Nor does Williams
explain why Judge Feldman, Judge North, or the United States would not be immune
from suit. See Henriksen v. Bentley, 644 F.2d 852, 855 (10th Cir. 1981) (“Judges are
absolutely immune from civil liability for judicial acts, unless committed in the clear
absence of all jurisdiction.”); F.D.I.C. v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Absent a
waiver, sovereign immunity shields the Federal Government . . . from suit.”).
Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not err in dismissing Mr.
Williams’s case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
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III.
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
Entered for the Court
Allison H. Eid
Circuit Judge
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