People v. Musgrave

FILED
June 10, 2019
2019 IL App (4th) 170106 Carla Bender
4th District Appellate
NO. 4-17-0106 Court, IL

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of
v. ) McLean County
TARYLL MUSGRAVE, ) No. 15CF275
Defendant-Appellant. )
) The Honorable
) Scott D. Drazewski,
) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Turner specially concurred, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 In February 2015, defendant, Taryll Musgrave, was pulled over by the police

while driving. During the traffic stop, defendant consented to being searched. Later that month,

the State charged defendant with (count I) unlawful possession of a controlled substance with

intent to deliver and (count II) unlawful possession of a controlled substance. 720 ILCS

570/401(a)(2)(A), 402(a)(2)(A) (West 2014). In September 2015, defendant filed a motion to

suppress evidence obtained from the search conducted during the traffic stop. The trial court

denied this motion.

¶2 In August 2016, the State and defense counsel presented the trial court with a

proposed plea agreement in which defendant would plead guilty and be sentenced to 13 years in

prison. Defendant rejected this agreement in open court and elected to proceed to trial.
¶3 In October 2016, the State dismissed count I and the parties proceeded to a

stipulated bench trial on count II. The trial court found defendant guilty of count II (unlawful

possession of a controlled substance). In December 2016, the court sentenced defendant to 16

years in prison.

¶4 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to

suppress because the police prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete the

mission of the stop, (2) the trial court’s sentence was an abuse of discretion, and (3) the trial

court imposed “a trial tax.” We disagree and affirm.

¶5 I. BACKGROUND

¶6 A. The Charges

¶7 In February 2015, the State charged defendant with (count I) unlawful possession

of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (more than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of a

substance containing cocaine) and (count II) unlawful possession of a controlled substance (more

than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of a substance containing cocaine). Id. §§ 401(a)(2)(A),

402(a)(2)(A). The State noted that defendant was extended-term eligible for count II due to his

prior criminal record. After the trial court initially appointed the public defender’s office at

defendant’s request, he chose to proceed pro se.

¶8 B. The Motion To Suppress

¶9 In September 2015, defendant pro se filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained

from a search conducted during his traffic stop. In his motion, defendant wrote that on February

26, 2015, he “was pull[ed] over for a traffic violation” and that “Officer Jared Johnson asked if I

had anything illegal on me. He also ask[ed] for consent to search me. I granted the consent.” In

pertinent part, defendant essentially argued that his consent was “tainted” because the police

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prolonged the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop.

¶ 10 In November 2015, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s pro se

motion to suppress. Defendant first called Officer Tyrel Klein as a witness.

¶ 11 1. Officer Klein

¶ 12 Klein testified that he was a police officer with the Bloomington Police

Department. On February 26, 2015 at 2:10 p.m., he pulled over a taxicab that defendant was

driving. Klein noted that defendant had a passenger in the back seat of his taxicab. Klein stated

that he pulled defendant over because he was speeding, failed to use his turn signal, and made an

improper left turn. During the State’s cross-examination, Klein testified as follows:

“Q. Now when you made the traffic stop, what did you initially do or say

to the defendant?

A. I—like I do with every traffic stop—I introduced myself, and I

explained the reason for the stop and I asked for [defendant’s] driver’s license and

proof of insurance.

Q. And so you explained the speeding, as well as the signal and the turn

issues?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that at about 14:10:59 [2:10 p.m.]?

A. Yes.

***

Q. And did, in fact, did you take his driver’s license and insurance card?

A. Yes.

Q. And as part of your routine traffic stop, what do you do with those

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items?

A. I completed a records check through the Illinois Secretary of State

using my in-car computer.

Q. Do you have to walk back to your squad car [to do that]?

A. Yes.

Q. Initially you received the traffic driver’s license and insurance card

from the defendant at 14:11 and 33 seconds [2:11 p.m.]?

A. Yes.

Q. And did you go back to your car to fill out paperwork?

A. Yes.

Q. And as far as that goes, there is more than one form, correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Did you find out who [the] passenger was?

A. I did.

Q. Did you go on your computer to check to see whether that person was

clear or had any active warrants or anything like that?

A. I checked that person as well.

Q. And did you check the defendant?

A. Yes.

Q. And what, if anything, did he as far as him being clear or valid [sic]?

A. His license was valid.

Q. Does that take a few minutes to run those records through the

computer?

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A. To type it in and run it, yes.

Q. Likewise, you had to obtain the identification from both individuals

prior to that?

A. Yes.

Q. And you did all that, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And while you’re doing that you also had to deal with paperwork,

correct?

A. Correct.

Q. Did you—Officer Jared Johnson arrive[d] while you were dealing with

paperwork and these records checks?

A. Yes.

Q. Was that about 14:18 and 36 seconds [2:18 p.m.]?

A. Yes.

Q. And as far as that goes, the paperwork you included, let’s specifically

talk about that. Did you get out and assist Officer Jared Johnson?

A. When I saw Officer Johnson placing the defendant into custody, I

stepped up to assist.

Q. In the interim you were just doing paperwork and not helping [Officer

Johnson] relating to his role?

A. Correct.

***

Q. Officer Johnson, what was his role?

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A. He’s a backup officer.

Q. Did he come to back you up?

A. Yes.

Q. As far as that goes, were you in the squad car when he was dealing with

the defendant?

A. Yes.

***

Q. And did you see Officer Jared Johnson handcuff him?

A. Yes.

***

Q. And when he handcuffed him, is it fair to say that was about 14:20 and

25 seconds [2:20 p.m.]?

A. Yes.

Q. You hadn’t completed all of your paperwork after doing the records

check at that point, had you?

A. I had not.

Q. And, in fact, what paperwork, if any, had you fully completed?

A. I hadn’t even fully completed the written warning.

***

Q. Did you finish that [written warning] after actually [sic] the traffic stop

occurred?

A. Yes.”

¶ 13 2. Officer Johnson

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¶ 14 Officer Johnson, during defendant’s pro se direct examination, testified as

follows:

“Q. *** Did you have occasion to see [me] parked in a vehicle ***?

A. Yes.

Q. Was I in the vehicle?

A. Yes.

Q. Was I with anyone?

A. Yes.

Q. Who was I with?

A. A passenger, female. I don’t know [her] name.

Q. What type of vehicle was I in?

A. Taxi cab.

Q. Who was driving the vehicle?

A. You were.

***

Q. Then you asked [defendant] if you could search him to make sure he

had nothing illegal on him?

***

A. That sounds accurate.

Q. You *** asked if there was any reason the K-9 would indicate for the

odor of narcotics, correct?

A. At some point, yes.

***

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Q. What was the situation you wanted to explain to the defendant when

you requested him to exit the car?

A. That the K-9 was going to do a free-air sniff of the car, the K-9 was

already on scene and by our policy we remove all occupants of the vehicle before

the K-9 does a free-air sniff.”

¶ 15 During the State’s cross-examination, Johnson testified as follows:

“Q. You were the backup officer. Is that right?

A. Yes, sir.

***

Q. And when you arrived, when you went up to the car that the defendant

was in at about 14:19 [2:19 p.m.] and 18 seconds. Is that right?

A. Correct.

***

Q. Did you tell him you were going to have him exit the car?

A. I did.

Q. Was there another officer who arrived by the name of Officer Shively?

A. There was.

Q. And why would you have him get out of the car, because Officer

Shively was there?

A. Because Officer Shively is our K-9 officer *** by our policy for safety

reasons, when we have the K-9 conduct a free-air sniff of the vehicle we have all

of [the] occupants of the vehicle, with the exception of infants and small children,

exit the vehicle.

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Q. And so the female [passenger] was taken out of the car?

A. Eventually, yes.

Q. And the defendant got out of the car pretty easily. Is that right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. Was he cooperative?

A. He was.

Q. And where did you go? Did you go off to the side of the road?

A. We got out of the lane of traffic and off to the side, yes.

Q. While that’s happening, Officer Tyrel Klein, he’s in his squad car,

correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. What is he doing?

A. Running the driver’s information, maybe issuing a citation.

Q. Just so it’s clear, he’s not helping you?

A. Negative, he’s not [helping me].

Q. He’s dealing with the traffic citation?

A. Correct.

***

Q. So he’s doing his paperwork related to the traffic stop, correct?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And you’re doing dealing [sic] with the defendant and the free-air

sniff?

A. Correct.

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Q. And Officer Shively is there as well?

A. That’s correct.

Q. In fact, it didn’t get to that point [of using the drug dog], though, did it?

A. It did not.

Q. And, in fact, at 14:19:36 [2:19 p.m.] you asked [defendant] if you

[could] searched [sic] him real quick. Is that right?

A. That’s correct.

Q. And [defendant] said if you want to. Is that right?

A. Correct.

***

Q. So, in fact, did you conduct that search?

A. I did.

Q. And where is Officer Klein at that time?

A. Still in the driver’s seat of his squad car.

Q. Doing the paperwork?

A. Correct.

***

Q. And then at 14:20 and 25 seconds [2:20 p.m.], that’s when you

handcuffed the defendant?

A. That sounds correct.

Q. And where was Officer Klein at that time?

A. In his driver’s seat.

Q. And, again, he wasn’t helping you in any form or fashion dealing with

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this secondary aspect or [the] K-9 free-air sniff preparation?

A. Correct.”

¶ 16 3. The Trial Court’s Ruling

¶ 17 Following this testimony, defendant pro se argued that “the officer went beyond

the scope of the *** traffic stop *** which also tainted the consent to search.” The State argued

that the officers were “basically textbook perfect” and that they did not prolong the traffic stop.

The trial court agreed with the State and denied defendant’s pro se motion to suppress. The court

found that, based on the evidence presented, “it’s at most ten minutes, ten minutes from the time

that the defendant was stopped until the time that he was actually placed under arrest, and that is

not an unreasonable amount of time[.]” Following the denial of his pro se motion, defendant

hired private counsel.

¶ 18 C. The Rejected Plea Agreement

¶ 19 In August 2016, the State and defense counsel presented the trial court with a

proposed plea agreement. Pursuant to this agreement, defendant would (1) plead guilty to count I

(unlawful possession with intent to deliver), (2) receive a 13-year prison sentence, (3) receive

credit for 525 days he had spent in pretrial custody, and (4) pay a $2000 fine. Further, the State

would dismiss count II (unlawful possession of a controlled substance). In open court, defendant

rejected the proposed agreement. In September 2016, the court reappointed the public defender.

¶ 20 D. The Stipulated Bench Trial

¶ 21 In October 2016, the trial court conducted a stipulated bench trial. The State

dismissed count I (unlawful possession with intent to deliver) and proceeded on count II

(unlawful possession). 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A), 402(a)(2)(A) (West 2014). The State and

defendant agreed to an evidence stipulation which, in pertinent part, stated the following:

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(1) defendant was lawfully stopped and consented to be searched; (2) Officer Johnson found a

cigarette package inside defendant’s pocket which contained a white powdery substance; (3) this

white powdery substance tested positive for the presence of cocaine and weighed 22.5 grams;

and (4) the street value of the drugs was $2250. Defendant did not concede that this stipulation

would be sufficient to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Following this stipulation, the

court found defendant guilty of count II (unlawful possession of a controlled substance). Id.

§ 402(a)(2)(A).

¶ 22 E. Sentencing

¶ 23 In December 2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing. The parties

agreed that, due to defendant’s prior convictions, his permissible sentence ranged from a 6-year

minimum to a 30-year maximum. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2016). In aggravation, the

State highlighted defendant’s criminal history, which included (1) a 1997 Class X felony

conviction for possession of cannabis and (2) a 2007 Class 1 felony conviction for delivery of a

controlled substance. Specifically, the State argued as follows:

“Obviously the most aggravating factor here when you look at where the

defendant is at today is his criminal record. It’s significant. He’s facing mandatory

Class X sentencing because of his prior record. *** He served 10 years on that

[1997 conviction]. Then he served 12 years on another drug offense [in 2007]. It’s

almost as if he’s like serving a life sentence on the installment plan with drug

offenses.

At this point in time this defendant doesn’t get it. He has no interest in

leading a law-abiding life. Never had any real employment or anything like that in

his entire life. His adult life has been about drugs. There is no realistic expectation

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when you look at this defendant and history that he’s going to change his ways.”

¶ 24 Based upon this, the State recommended a 20-year sentence. Defense counsel

requested a sentence “in the range” of 6 to 10 years. Defense counsel highlighted defendant’s

traumatic childhood, his good behavior while in pretrial custody, and his apparent drug

addiction. Defense counsel further argued that defendant was neither violent nor a threat to

society.

¶ 25 In his statement of allocution, defendant apologized and took “complete

responsibility” for his actions. Defendant stated that drug addiction took control of his life. He

admitted to using drugs while at work and was “ashamed” that he put his “customers and other

pedestrians in harm’s way” because of it. He further stated that he was “truly good” to his family

and supported his children “first and foremost.” However, defendant conceded that the rest of his

money “went to [his] habits and addictions” and that his “savings, tips, and extra money” were

used to purchase drugs. He stated that he had “sinned against [his] family” and that he had been

“away from [his family] without being able to provide for them, provide for them [with] overall

love and support.” Defendant’s presentence report stated that he “does not seem to contribute

financially to support his family as he indicates his paychecks are often spent on illicit

substances.”

¶ 26 The trial court began by commending defendant for “thinking about *** how your

actions have had an impact not only upon your own life but the life of your family in

particular[.]” The court stated that by defendant’s “own admission, at least for the last several

years when you were full-time employed, it was your wife who was supporting financially the

family’s needs and expenses while you were taking the money that you were earning and

selfishly spending it on yourself.” The court stated that “part of accepting the blame or taking

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responsibility, however, is being aware that consequences flow from those actions[.]”

¶ 27 The trial court also stated that defendant had significant rehabilitative potential

because he took advantage of opportunities while in custody. The court stated that defendant had

become a “role model” for other prisoners because he adhered to the rules and regulations of the

facility and completed life skills and job training.

¶ 28 The trial court stated that defendant’s “prior [criminal] history *** is a factor

which the Court can and is taking into consideration along with *** all the factors in aggravation

and mitigation.” To this point, the court explained as follows:

“But with your previous criminal history and the fact that you have been to prison

not just on two previous occasions but for fairly lengthy periods of time, 12 years

on the first offense in ‘97, and then 10 years on the second offense arising out of

the incident in 2007. And so, when someone appears in court again for a serious

felony, that, to me, is one of the reasons why the Court is allowed to look at one’s

history of prior delinquency and criminal activity, and also to look at whether or

not a sentence is necessary to deter others from committing the same type of a

crime, which is [why] there needs to be increasing responsibility. There needs to

be an increase in the punishment which is imposed because if there’s not an

increase in general, not all the time, then one is rewarded for their behavior. Not

only is one rewarded for their bad behavior but the message that is sent to others

is not one of deterrence, it is one of roll the dice because good things might and/or

could happen to you so long as you take responsibility for your actions. So I’m

saying it’s a balancing act.”

¶ 29 Ultimately, the trial court (1) sentenced defendant to 16 years in prison,

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(2) granted him 673 days credit for time already served, (3) imposed a $2250 fine, and

(4) recommended defendant for substance abuse treatment. In reaching this conclusion, the court

reasoned as follows:

“I’m not going to impose the 20 years that [the State] requested, but the

reason I’m not going to impose the 20 years is primarily based upon the fact that I

do see the rehabilitative potential in yourself. The opportunity for you to continue

to atone for your mistakes, for your transgressions, for your actions, and get you

back to your family and hopefully get you back to your family in a sense where

you can not only be there for them as a husband and a father, but also as one

who’s able to financially support that family as well.”

¶ 30 This appeal followed.

¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32 Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the trial court should have granted his motion to

suppress because the police prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete the

mission of the stop, (2) the trial court’s sentence was an abuse of discretion, and (3) the trial

court “imposed a trial tax.” We address these issues in turn.

¶ 33 A. The Motion To Suppress

¶ 34 Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress

because the police prolonged the traffic stop beyond the time necessary to complete the mission

of the stop. We disagree.

¶ 35 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 36 Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution proscribe

unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A traffic

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stop entails the seizure of the driver. People v. Harris, 228 Ill. 2d 222, 231, 886 N.E.2d 947, 954

(2008). In determining whether a traffic stop was an unreasonable seizure, a court must consider

the following questions: (1) Was the initial traffic stop lawful? (2) Assuming the initial stop to be

lawful, was the stop prolonged beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop?

(3) Assuming it was so prolonged, was the continued detention of the defendant supported by a

reasonable suspicion? People v. Sadeq, 2018 IL App (4th) 160105, ¶ 56.

¶ 37 In this case, defendant concedes that the initial traffic stop was valid.

Furthermore, the State does not argue that the police had reasonable suspicion to justify the

continued detention of defendant. Accordingly, the sole issue is whether the stop was

unreasonably prolonged beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop. See id.

¶ 56.

¶ 38 In determining whether a stop was impermissibly prolonged, a court “must first

decide when the stop began.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 63. “A lawful roadside

stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation.” Arizona v.

Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009). “Generally, a [valid] traffic stop ends when the paperwork of

the driver and any passengers has been returned to them and the purpose of the stop has been

resolved.” People v. Leach, 2011 IL App (4th) 100542, ¶ 12, 959 N.E.2d 680.

¶ 39 A traffic stop has been prolonged beyond the time necessary to complete the

mission of the stop “when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have

been—completed.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. ___, ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).

“[A] traffic stop prolonged beyond that point is unlawful.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. “A traffic stop is analogous to a Terry stop, and its permissible

duration is determined by the seizure’s mission.” People v. Cummings, 2016 IL 115769, ¶ 13, 46

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N.E.3d 248 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). The seizure’s mission includes

(1) addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop and (2) related safety concerns.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1614. “In a traffic stop, the officer’s mission is to check

the driver’s license, find out if there are any warrants against the driver, inspect the automobile’s

registration and proof of insurance, and decide whether to issue a ticket.” People v. Thomas,

2018 IL App (4th) 170440, ¶ 68, 115 N.E.3d 325.

¶ 40 “An officer’s inquires into matters unrelated to the justification for the traffic stop

*** do not convert the encounter into something other than a lawful seizure, so long as those

inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of the stop.” Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; see also

People v. Litwin, 2015 IL App (3d) 140429, ¶ 36, 40 N.E.3d 784. “An officer, in other words,

may conduct certain unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop” but “he may not

do so in a way that prolongs the stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to

justify detaining an individual.” Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. “The critical

question, then, is not whether [a matter unrelated to the traffic stop] occurs before or after the

officer issues a ticket *** but whether conducting [those activities] prolongs—i.e., adds time

to—the stop ***.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 1616. Accordingly, there is a “bright

line against prolonging a stop with inquiries outside the mission of a traffic stop, unless an

officer has reasonable suspicion for those inquiries.” Cummings, 2016 IL 115769, ¶ 7; see also

David J. Robinson, A Sniff Too Far: No Dog Sniffs After Completed Traffic Stops, 103 Ill. B.J.

42, 45 (2015). If the traffic stop has been prolonged, a defendant’s subsequent consent to a

search may be “tainted” by the unlawful detention. People v. Al Burei, 404 Ill. App. 3d 558, 566,

937 N.E.2d 297, 304 (2010).

¶ 41 “Determination of whether a traffic stop was unduly prolonged requires an

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analysis of a totality of the circumstances.” People v. Reedy, 2015 IL App (3d) 130955, ¶ 27, 39

N.E.3d 318; see also People v. Baldwin, 388 Ill. App. 3d 1028, 1034, 904 N.E.2d 1193, 1199

(2009). “Among the circumstances considered are the brevity of the stop and whether the police

acted diligently during the stop.” Reedy, 2015 IL App (3d) 130955, ¶ 27. Courts also consider

“the nature of the offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to the stop.” People v. Wofford,

2012 IL App (5th) 100138, ¶ 27, 969 N.E.2d 383. If the stop was prolonged, the continued

detention of the defendant may be justified “if the officer discovers specific, articulable facts

which give rise to a reasonable suspicion that the defendant has committed, or is about to

commit, a crime.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baldwin, 388 Ill. App. 3d at 1035; see also

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1615.

¶ 42 In People v. Pulido, 2017 IL App (3d) 150215, ¶ 14, 83 N.E.3d 1111, Trooper

Korando pulled over the defendant’s vehicle for speeding. While Korando was speaking with the

defendant, Trooper Degraff arrived on the scene with Rico—his drug-sniffing canine. Id. ¶ 15.

While Korando spoke with the defendant and addressed matters related to the traffic stop,

Degraff conducted a free air sniff with his canine. Id. ¶ 17. As a result of the free air sniff,

methamphetamine was eventually found inside of the defendant’s vehicle. Id. ¶ 26. Although his

conviction was reversed on other grounds, the Third District concluded that “[b]ecause the sniff

occurred while Korando was still performing the duties related to the initial purpose of the stop,

we find the sniff did not impermissibly prolong the encounter.” Id. ¶ 38. In reaching this

conclusion, the court reasoned as follows:

“Here, Korando pulled defendant over for speeding. After obtaining

defendant’s information, Korando and defendant returned to Korando’s squad car

so that Korando could run the information through LEADS and write defendant a

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warning. Before Korando finished writing defendant a warning and receiving the

confirmation from LEADS, Degraff arrived on the scene and conducted the free-

air sniff. After Rico alerted on the vehicle, Korando was informed by radio that

defendant’s LEADS check was clear. A free-air sniff conducted during a lawful

traffic stop does not violate the fourth amendment, as long as it is done, as it was

here, within the time reasonably required to complete the mission of the initial

traffic stop.” Id. ¶ 41.

¶ 43 2. The Standard of Review

¶ 44 When reviewing a motion to suppress, the appellate court applies a bifurcated

standard of review. Sadeq, 2018 IL App (4th) 160105, ¶ 49. The trial court’s findings of fact are

entitled to great deference, and a reviewing court will reverse those findings only if they are

against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Heritsch, 2017 IL App (2d) 151157, ¶ 8,

98 N.E.3d 420. The ultimate decision of whether the evidence should be suppressed, however, is

reviewed de novo. People v. West, 2017 IL App (3d) 130802, ¶ 19, 76 N.E.3d 60.

¶ 45 3. This Case

¶ 46 At the suppression hearing, Officer Klein stated that he pulled over defendant’s

taxicab at approximately 2:10 p.m. Klein noted that he had to (1) obtain identification from

defendant and his passenger, (2) check whether defendant had a valid driver’s license, (3) check

whether defendant had car insurance, (4) determine whether there were any active warrants for

defendant or his passenger, and (5) fill out paperwork related to the traffic stop. Klein stated that

while he was performing these activities, Officer Johnson arrived on the scene at approximately

2:18 p.m. Klein testified that he did not assist Johnson until he saw him place defendant under

arrest—which was at approximately 2:20 p.m. Klein confirmed that prior to assisting with the

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arrest, he was “just doing paperwork” which was related to the traffic stop. Klein clarified that he

“hadn’t even fully completed the written warning” when defendant was placed under arrest.

¶ 47 Johnson testified that, at approximately 2:19 p.m., he searched defendant’s

person. Johnson stated that Klein was “[s]till in the driver’s seat of his squad car” and was doing

“paperwork” during the search. Johnson stated that Klein was not assisting “in any form or

fashion” until defendant was placed under arrest. Johnson stated that he arrested defendant at

approximately 2:20 p.m.

¶ 48 Based upon this record and the trial court’s findings, we conclude that the officers

did not prolong the stop beyond the time necessary to complete the mission of the stop. See

Pulido, 2017 IL App (3d) 150215, ¶ 41 (concluding the stop was not prolonged when one officer

worked only on matters related to the traffic stop while another officer conducted a “free-air”

sniff).

¶ 49 The stop began at approximately 2:10 p.m. when Klein pulled over defendant’s

vehicle. At approximately 2:19 p.m., Klein was diligently working on matters related to the

traffic stop while Johnson questioned and searched defendant. The record contains no evidence

to suggest that Klein delayed or otherwise hindered his efforts so that other officers could

investigate matters unrelated to the traffic stop. Moreover, at the time that Johnson searched

defendant, Klein was still carefully working on matters related to the traffic stop while in his

squad car. Thus, we conclude that the police did not prolong the stop because (1) the tasks tied to

the traffic infraction were not completed at the time of the search and (2) the search was

conducted within the time reasonably required to complete the mission of the initial traffic stop.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 1616; Pulido, 2017 IL App (3d) 150215, ¶ 41.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress.

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¶ 50 B. Defendant’s Sentence

¶ 51 Defendant next argues that the trial court’s sentence was an abuse of discretion.

Specifically, although he concedes that his sentence was within the statutory framework

provided by the legislature, defendant argues that “the judge employed a personal sentencing

policy in the guise of deterrence, he misinterpreted two mitigating factors as aggravating, [and]

there was no evidence that this particular offense resulted in harm to anyone aside from

himself[.]” We disagree.

¶ 52 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 53 “All penalties shall be determined both according to the seriousness of the offense

and with the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I,

§ 11. “The trial court has broad discretionary powers when selecting an appropriate sentence.”

People v. Garcia, 2018 IL App (4th) 170339, ¶ 37, 99 N.E.3d 571.

¶ 54 The Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS 5/1-1-1 et seq. (West

2016)) sets forth mitigating and aggravating factors that the trial court must consider when

determining an appropriate sentence. People v. Brunner, 2012 IL App (4th) 100708, ¶¶ 43-45,

976 N.E.2d 27. A defendant’s “history of prior delinquency or criminal activity” and the need “to

deter others from committing the same crime” are aggravating factors. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(a)(3),

(7) (West 2016). It is a mitigating factor if a “defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor

threatened serious physical harm to another.” Id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(1). Likewise, it is a mitigating

factor if “[t]he imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive hardship to his

dependents.” Id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(11).

¶ 55 A trial court abuses its discretion when it considers an improper factor in

aggravation. People v. Minter, 2015 IL App (1st) 120958, ¶ 147, 37 N.E.3d 238. Likewise, the

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trial court may not have a personal sentencing policy that fails to conform to the standards of the

Unified Code. See People v. Bolyard, 61 Ill. 2d 583, 586-87, 338 N.E.2d 168, 169-70 (1975);

People v. Clemons, 175 Ill. App. 3d 7, 13, 529 N.E.2d 577, 581 (1988). Whether the trial court

relied upon an improper factor during sentencing is a question of law reviewed de novo. People

v. Arbuckle, 2016 IL App (3d) 121014-B, ¶ 39, 60 N.E.3d 185. Nonetheless, there is a strong

presumption that the trial court’s sentence was based on proper legal reasoning, and a reviewing

court should consider the record as a whole rather than a few isolated statements. People v.

Canizalez-Cardena, 2012 IL App (4th) 110720, ¶ 22, 979 N.E.2d 1014. A defendant bears the

burden to affirmatively establish that his sentence was based on an improper factor. People v.

Williams, 2018 IL App (4th) 150759, ¶ 18, 99 N.E.3d 590.

¶ 56 “The weight to be given to any proper factor, however, is left to the sound

discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion.”

(Emphasis in original.) People v. Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 104. The appellate

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have

weighed these factors differently. People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11, 65 N.E.3d

419. Further, a reviewing court presumes that a sentence imposed within the statutory range

provided by the legislature is proper. People v. Charleston, 2018 IL App (1st) 161323, ¶ 16. A

trial court’s sentence is an abuse of discretion if it is greatly at odds with the spirit and purpose of

the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. People v. Geiger, 2012 IL

113181, ¶ 27, 978 N.E.2d 1061. The trial court’s sentence is entitled to “great deference because

the trial court is in the best position to consider the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general

moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age.” People v. Etherton, 2017 IL

App (5th) 140427, ¶ 15, 82 N.E.3d 693.

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¶ 57 2. This Case

¶ 58 Defendant was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance in that

he knowingly and unlawfully possessed more than 15 grams but less than 100 grams of a

substance containing cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(A) (West 2014). The parties agree—both

before the trial court and this court—that defendant’s permissible sentence ranged from a 6-year

minimum to a 30-year maximum. 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West 2016). At trial, the State

recommended a 20-year sentence while defense counsel requested a sentence “in the range” of 6

to 10 years. The trial court, after carefully considering defendant’s rehabilitative potential and his

prior criminal history, sentenced defendant to 16 years in prison.

¶ 59 Defendant argues that there was “overwhelming” mitigating evidence.

Specifically, defendant argues that he “purchased cocaine for himself to feed an addiction” and

that his actions did not harm others. See id. § 5-5-3.1(a)(1) (it is a mitigating factor if a

“defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical harm to another”).

Likewise, defendant argues that his sentence would cause hardship to his dependents. See id. § 5-

5-3.1(a)(11) (it is a mitigating factor if “imprisonment of the defendant would entail excessive

hardship to his dependents”). However, the trial court found that the following aggravating

factors existed: (1) defendant’s prior criminal history and (2) the need to deter others. Id. § 5-5-

3.2(a)(3), (7). This court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because

we could have weighed these factors differently. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 11.

¶ 60 Likewise, defendant essentially argues that his drug addiction is a mitigating

factor because he committed the offense to “feed an addiction” and that no one else was hurt by

his actions. However, “[u]nder the Unified Code, drug addiction is not an explicit factor in

mitigation or aggravation.” Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105; see also 730 ILCS 5/5-

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5-3.1, 5-5-3.2 (West 2016). Accordingly, “the trial court is not required to view drug addiction as

a mitigating factor.” Sturgeon, 2019 IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105; see also People v. Madej, 177

Ill. 2d 116, 139, 685 N.E.2d 908, 920 (1997). “Instead, a history of substance abuse is a ‘double-

edged sword’ that the trial court may view as a mitigating or aggravating factor.” Sturgeon, 2019

IL App (4th) 170035, ¶ 105 (quoting People v. Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d 1, 83, 842 N.E.2d 618, 662

(2005)). To that point, “the court could have properly concluded that defendant’s drug addiction

lessened his rehabilitative potential, increased the seriousness of the offense, increased the need

to protect society, and increased the need for deterrence.” Id. ¶ 108. Accordingly, this argument

fails to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion.

¶ 61 Defendant further argues that the trial court “had a policy of imposing a longer

sentence each time a defendant was convicted, notwithstanding other factors such as the nature

of the offense and other factors in a defendant’s life.” This argument is based upon the following

portion of the record: