In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-18-00253-CV
___________________________
HENRY PEREZ AND WILLIAM LOPEZ, Appellants
V.
EULA THOMAS, Appellee
On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 2
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2015-005958-2
Before Gabriel, Kerr, and Pittman, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Henry Perez and William Lopez appeal from the trial court’s final judgment
granting summary judgment against them on statute-of-limitations grounds in their
suit against Eula Thomas. We will affirm.
Background
On October 16, 2013, Thomas allegedly ran a red light and crashed into a truck
that Perez was driving. Lopez was a passenger in Perez’s vehicle.
On October 15, 2015 (the day before limitations expired), Perez and Lopez
sued Thomas for negligence, seeking personal-injury and property damages. See Tex.
Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (setting a two-year limitations period for
personal-injury and property-damage actions). In July 2016, the trial court dismissed
the case for want of prosecution. Perez and Lopez successfully moved to reinstate the
case the following month.
Perez and Lopez served Thomas on April 27, 2017. Thomas answered and
then moved for summary judgment, arguing that limitations barred Perez’s and
Lopez’s claims because she was served 18 months after limitations had expired and
they did not exercise due diligence in serving her with citation and the petition. Perez
and Lopez responded, but the trial court granted Thomas’s motion and issued a take-
nothing judgment against Perez and Lopez. Perez and Lopez have appealed, raising
two issues: (1) Perez and Lopez’s summary-judgment evidence raised a material fact
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issue on diligence and (2) Thomas did not carry her summary-judgment burden
because she did not submit evidence with her motion.
Standard of Review
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d
860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable
to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors
could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors
could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844,
848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the
nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008).
Limitations is an affirmative defense. Tex. R. Civ. P. 94. A defendant is entitled
to summary judgment on an affirmative defense if the defendant conclusively proves
all elements of that defense. Frost Nat’l Bank v. Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508–
09 (Tex. 2010); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c). To accomplish this, the defendant must
present summary-judgment evidence that conclusively establishes each element of the
affirmative defense. See Chau v. Riddle, 254 S.W.3d 453, 455 (Tex. 2008).
Service Outside the Limitations Period
A plaintiff must bring suit for personal injuries and property damages arising
from an automobile accident not later than two years after the day the cause of action
accrues. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a). To “bring suit,” a plaintiff
must not only file suit within the limitations period but must also use diligence in
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serving the defendant. Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Tex. 1990). If a plaintiff
files suit within the limitations period but serves the defendant after that period has
expired, the service date relates back to the filing date if the plaintiff was diligent in
serving the defendant. See id.; see also Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007).
When a defendant affirmatively pleads a limitations defense and shows that the
plaintiff effected service after limitations expired, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to
explain the delay. Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216. The plaintiff then has the burden to
present evidence regarding the efforts that he made to serve the defendant and to
explain every lapse in effort or period of delay. Id. “In some instances, the plaintiff’s
explanation may be legally improper to raise the diligence issue and the defendant will
bear no burden at all.” Id. In others, “the plaintiff’s explanation of its service efforts
may demonstrate a lack of due diligence as a matter of law, as when one or more
lapses between service efforts are unexplained or patently unreasonable.” Id. If the
plaintiff’s explanation raises a material fact issue regarding diligence, then the burden
shifts back to the defendant to show why, as a matter of law, the explanation is
insufficient. Id.
“The duty to exercise diligence is a continuous one, extending from the date
suit is filed until service is obtained.” Tate v. Beal, 119 S.W.3d 378, 380 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied); see Sharp v. Kroger Tex. L.P., 500 S.W.3d 117, 120 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (stating that “the measure of diligence
begins from the time the suit is filed”). A plaintiff’s diligence is generally a fact
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question and “is determined by examining the time it took to secure citation, service,
or both, and the type of effort or lack of effort the plaintiff expended in procuring
service.” Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216. The relevant inquiry in assessing diligence is
whether the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily prudent person would have acted under
the same or similar circumstances and was diligent until the defendant was served. Id.
But if no excuse is offered for the delay or if the lapse of time and the plaintiff’s acts
conclusively negate diligence, lack of diligence will be found as a matter of law. See
Sharp, 500 S.W.3d at 120 (noting that Texas courts have consistently held that due
diligence is lacking as a matter of law when there are unexplained lapses of time
between filing suit, issuance of citation, and service).
Analysis
We consider Perez and Lopez’s issues in reverse order because before they
were required to explain their delay in serving Thomas, she had the burden to plead a
limitations defense1 and to show that she was served after limitations had expired. See
Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216.
Thomas moved for summary judgment on a limitations defense even though
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she had not pleaded it. An unpleaded affirmative defense may serve as a basis for
summary judgment when it is raised in the motion and the opposing party does not
object to the lack of pleading either in its written response or before rendition of
judgment. Roark v. Stallworth Oil & Gas, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 492, 494 (Tex. 1991). Because
Perez and Lopez made no complaint in the trial court (or raise any complaint on
appeal), Thomas’s pleading omission has no effect on our analysis.
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In their second issue, Perez and Lopez complain that Thomas was not entitled
to summary judgment because she did not support her motion with affidavits or other
evidence. Although Thomas did not attach evidence to her motion, she asked the trial
court to take judicial notice of its own record and relied on the trial court’s record in
her motion. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (stating that summary-judgment proof need
only be “on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment
with permission of the court”); Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 732 (Tex. 2018)
(“Our rules require a trial court to grant a summary-judgment motion if the evidence
‘on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereafter and before judgment with permission
of the court,’” establishes that the movant is “entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
(emphasis added) (quoting Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c))); Weisberg v. London, No. 13-02-659-
CV, 2004 WL 1932748, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 31, 2004,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (“When considering a summary-judgment motion, the trial court
may judicially notice documents that are part of its record in the case at issue, since
they are already on file and available for the court’s consideration.”); Jones v. Jones,
888 S.W.2d 849, 852–53 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ) (stating that
because trial court may take judicial notice of documents and orders that are part of
its record, movant need not attach copies of such documents and orders to summary-
judgment motion).
The record shows that Perez and Lopez sued Thomas on October 15, 2015. In
their original petition, they stated that the accident occurred on October 16, 2013. See
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Simmons v. Elmow Holdings, Inc., No. 2-08-027-CV, 2008 WL 2716805, at * 4 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth July 10, 2008, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (concluding that plaintiff’s
statement in his live pleading that the accident occurred on or about a certain date was
a judicial admission that the accident occurred on that date); Commercial Structures &
Interiors, Inc. v Liberty Educ. Ministries, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 827, 835 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2006, no pet.) (“Although pleadings generally do not constitute summary
judgment proof, if a plaintiff’s pleadings contain judicial admissions negating a cause
of action, summary judgment may properly be granted on the basis of the
pleadings.”). The record also shows Thomas was served on April 27, 2017, over
18 months after limitations had expired. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann.
§ 16.003(a). By asking the trial court to take judicial notice of its own record and
because the trial court’s record showed an 18-month gap between the dates of filing
and service of the lawsuit, Thomas’s motion sufficed to shift the burden to Perez and
Lopez to explain their delay in serving her. We therefore overrule their second issue.
In their first issue, Perez and Lopez argue that their summary-judgment
evidence raised a material fact issue regarding diligence. In their summary-judgment
response, Perez and Lopez’s attorney complained that when she filed suit in October
2015, she had difficulty requesting citation through Tarrant County’s electronic-filing
system. She claimed that her repeated requests for citation through the e-filing system
were rejected and that the trial-court clerk rejected her oral, in-person request for
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citation. According to counsel, “problems with the new efiling system[2] were the
ONLY reason and the ONLY cause for the delay” in serving Thomas. 3
As evidence of diligence, Perez and Lopez attached emails from
eFileTexas.gov, Texas courts’ e-filing system. According to these emails, Perez and
Lopez’s attorney might have attempted to have citation issued on October 27, 2015,
but that filing was returned.4 Perez and Lopez waited over nine months before
requesting citation again on August 3, 2016. But the clerk rejected that request
2
The electronic-filing system was not new. See Tex. R. Evid. 201(b)(1), (c)(1).
When Perez and Lopez filed suit in October 2015, e-filing had been mandatory in civil
cases filed in Tarrant County courts at law for almost two years. See Supreme Court of
Tex., Amended Order Requiring Electronic Filing in Certain Courts, Misc. Docket
No. 13-9164 (Dec. 9, 2013).
3
Perez and Lopez supported their summary-judgment response with an
“affidavit” from their attorney in which she swears that the facts in the response are
within her personal knowledge and are true and correct. Even though this document
is in the form of an affidavit, it is not an affidavit under rule 166a(f), and it amounts to
nothing more than a verified responsive pleading, which is not competent summary-
judgment evidence. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f) (setting out required form of
supporting and opposing affidavits); Olsen v. Comm’n for Lawyer Discipline, 347 S.W.3d
876, 886 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, pet. denied). But even if we consider statements in
the response as evidence, they do not raise a fact issue on diligence because, as we
explain, there were prolonged, unexplained periods of inactivity between filing suit
and service.
4
This rejection email listed the “Filing Type” as “Notice” but made no mention
of a citation request. The email’s stated reason for rejection was “PDF Documents
Combined – Please separate Lead Documents.” In the “Return Comment” section,
the filer was instructed: “Please do not add documents as attachments; all documents
efiled should be separate lead documents; you must resubmit your filing within
24 hours of this return in order to retain your original submission date; questions 817-
884-1248 Lekedra.” There is no evidence that Perez and Lopez’s attorney resubmitted
this filing.
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because the case had been dismissed for want of prosecution the month before, on
July 12, 2016. The record shows that Perez and Lopez successfully moved to reinstate
the case on August 5, 2016, but they did not request citation again for another eight
months. The trial-court clerk rejected that April 5, 2017 request because it was not
made by an attorney. On April 10, 2017, Perez and Lopez’s attorney requested
citation. This time, she was successful, and the trial-court clerk issued citation on April
11, 2017. The record shows Thomas was served about two weeks later.
As noted above, in determining diligence we examine “the time it took to secure
citation, service, or both, and the type of effort or lack of effort the plaintiff expended
in procuring service.” Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216 (emphasis added). When there are
unexplained lapses of time between filing suit, citation issuance, and service, Texas
courts have consistently held that due diligence is lacking as a matter of law. Sharp,
500 S.W.3d at 120; see also Mauricio v. Castro, 287 S.W.3d 476, 479 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2009, no pet.) (“Texas courts have consistently held that lack of diligence may be
shown based on unexplained lapses of time between the filing of the suit, issuance of
the citation, and service of process.”).
Here, even if we accept Perez and Lopez’s attorney’s problems-with-electronic-
filing excuse as true, the record shows that after the attorney’s first failed request for
citation two weeks after she filed suit, there was an unexplained delay of more than
nine months before she asked the trial-court clerk to issue citation again. This request
was rejected because the trial court had dismissed the case. After the trial court
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reinstated the case, the attorney inexplicably waited eight more months before
requesting citation again. Even though Perez and Lopez served Thomas relatively
quickly after they finally successfully requested citation, the time between filing suit
and serving Thomas was over 18 months, most of which was filled with significant
unexplained periods of inaction.
Because Perez and Lopez’s summary-judgment response failed to explain the
months-long gaps between their citation-request attempts before they finally served
Thomas 18 months after they filed suit, we conclude that the evidence established, as
a matter of law, that they failed to diligently procure citation and serve Thomas. See,
e,g., Sharp, 500 S.W.3d at 121 (concluding that unexplained five-month delay between
filing suit and requesting citation and effecting service negated due diligence as a
matter of law). We therefore overrule their first issue.
Conclusion
Having overruled Perez and Lopez’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Elizabeth Kerr
Elizabeth Kerr
Justice
Delivered: June 6, 2019
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