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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 19-10230
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cv-00053-DHB-BKE
JOHN DOPSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
CHRIS STEVERSON,
JEFFERY DEAL,
RON BOWDOIN,
BETTY RIDDLE,
ATHANIEL KING,
JEROME DANIELS,
TOMMY BARRENTINE,
CHRIS SCREWS,
Defendants-Appellees.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Georgia
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(June 11, 2019)
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Before WILLIAM PRYOR, JILL PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
John Dopson appeals the dismissal of his complaint against Chris Steverson,
the Sheriff of Telfair County, Georgia, three of his deputies, and four deputies of
the Sheriff’s Office of Dodge County, Georgia. Dopson complained of false arrest,
false imprisonment, and the infliction of emotional distress in violation of Georgia
law, O.C.G.A. §§ 51-7-1, 51-7-2, 51-12-6, and of cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of article 1, section 1, paragraph XVII of the Georgia Constitution. The
district court dismissed Dopson’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). We affirm.
We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Clements v. LSI Title Agency, Inc., 779 F.3d 1269, 1273 (11th Cir. 2015). We
accept as true the allegations in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the plaintiff. Id.
The jurisdiction of the federal courts is limited to “that power authorized by
Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (quoting
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). Congress
has granted the district courts “original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For a
claim to arise under federal law, the allegations in the plaintiff’s complaint must
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establish that “federal law creates the cause of action asserted” or that his right to
relief necessarily depends upon the resolution of a substantial question of federal
law. Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257; see Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392
(1987) (“The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed by
the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists
only when a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly
pleaded complaint.”). If “a federal court determines that it is without subject matter
jurisdiction, [it] is powerless to continue” and is obligated to dismiss the action.
Univ. of S. Alabama v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 405, 410 (11th Cir. 1999); see
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).
Dopson’s complaint fails to allege a claim that arises under federal law. In
the first count of his complaint, Dopson alleges that he was falsely arrested “in
violation of Georgia law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-7-1” and that he was “falsely
imprisoned . . . in violation of Georgia law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-7-2.”
Similarly, Dopson alleges in counts two and three of his complaint, respectively,
that he was “subjected to cruel and unusual punishment or abuse” in violation of
“Article 1, § 1, Paragraph XVII of the Georgia Constitution” and that “[t]he
conduct of Defendants . . . constitutes both negligent and intentional infliction of
emotional distress . . . in violation of Georgia law pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 51-12-
6.” Dopson argues that his “state law claims . . . necessarily state a federal issue,”
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but “[t]he mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action does not
automatically confer federal-question jurisdiction,” Dunlap v. G&L Holding Grp.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1285, 1290 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 813 (1986)). And Dopson’s right to relief for his claims
under state law does not necessarily depend on resolution of a substantial federal
issue. See Gunn, 568 U.S. at 257. Dopson’s claims can be resolved without
deciding whether the officers violated his rights or deprived him of a right owed
under federal law. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 108 (1945)
(“Violation of local law does not necessarily mean that federal rights have been
invaded.”). The district court correctly dismissed Dopson’s complaint for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.
We AFFIRM the dismissal of Dopson’s complaint.
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