FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT June 12, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TIMOTHY DOYLE YOUNG,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 18-1466
(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-02959-LTB)
WARDEN, USP-MAX-ADX, (D. Colo.)
Respondent - Appellee.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
TIMOTHY DOYLE YOUNG,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 18-1485
(D.C. No. 1:18-CV-03105-CMA)
BABCOCK, Judge; WARDEN, USP- (D. Colo.)
MAX-ADX,
Respondents - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
_________________________________
*
Oral argument would not materially help us to decide this appeal. We
have thus decided the appeal based on the appellate briefs and the record
on appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
This order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except
under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if
otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Before BRISCOE, BALDOCK, and BACHARACH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
In these cases, the district court ordered dismissal based on a failure
to comply with filing restrictions. We affirm.
I. Background
Mr. Timothy Young is a pro se litigant who incurred filing
restrictions in the District Court for the District of Colorado. See Young v.
United States, No. 14-cv-00073-LTB (D. Colo. June 13, 2014) (ECF No.
24). 1 Without complying with these restrictions, Mr. Young brought two
cases in district court. In these cases, he alleged that the district court, our
court, and the Tenth Circuit Judicial Council are blocking his access to the
courts, violating the Constitution, and committing wire and mail fraud. See
Appeal No. 18-1466, R. at 3–5; Appeal No. 18-1485, R. at 3–5. In both
cases, the district court ordered that the actions be stricken for failure to
comply with the filing restrictions. And in one of the actions (the one
underlying Appeal No. 18-1466), the court sanctioned Mr. Young $400.
1
As of 2014, Mr. Young had apparently brought 184 cases in district
court and 98 appeals. See Young v. United States, No. 14-cv-00073-LTB,
slip op. at 4–5 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2014) (ECF No. 20) (directing
Mr. Young to show cause why filing restrictions should not be imposed
given his initiation of 184 cases and 98 appeals).
2
Mr. Young has appealed the orders striking both cases, 2 arguing that
the district court had committed crimes, falsified orders and facts, and
refused to send necessary forms. He also moved for leave to proceed
without prepaying the filing fees in the two appeals. We affirm the orders
striking both actions and deny the motions to avoid prepayment of the
filing fees.
II. Striking the Two Cases
In reviewing the underlying orders, we apply the abuse-of-discretion
standard. See Gripe v. City of Enid, 312 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2002)
(reviewing a sanction of dismissal for an abuse of discretion). We affirm
under this standard. The restrictions warned Mr. Young that continued
noncompliance would result in a $400 sanction and an order striking all
non-compliant filings. See Young v. United States, No. 14-cv-00073-LTB,
slip op. at 5-6 (D. Colo. June 13, 2014) (ECF No. 24). Given the warning,
the district court could reasonably enforce the filing restrictions. We thus
affirm the dismissals.
The filing restrictions required Mr. Young to
file a motion seeking leave to file a pro se action,
attach a copy of the order with the filing restrictions,
2
In Appeal No. 18-1466, the court clerk directed Mr. Young to show
cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We
conclude that we have jurisdiction in Appeal No. 18-1466.
3
attach a complaint or habeas form and pay the filing fee or
move for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [IFP] (with the
required inmate account statement),
attach a list of his prisoner complaints and habeas actions that
are pending or that he had previously filed in federal court, and
attach an affidavit stating that the claims are not frivolous,
aren’t asserted in bad faith or for an improper purpose, and
have not been presented in another federal court.
Mr. Young didn’t comply with these restrictions, so the district court
dismissed both cases. 3
Mr. Young does not give any excuse for failing to comply with the
filing restrictions. He instead argues that they had been unjustified. The
court had imposed these restrictions in 2014 (Young v. United States,
3
In these appeals, Mr. Young asserts that Magistrate Judge Boland
refused to furnish the required forms. Mr. Young previously lodged similar
allegations against the Bureau of Prisons, claiming that it refused to send
him the forms for prisoner complaints and a certified copy of his account
statement. Given these allegations, Magistrate Judge Boland directed the
warden to respond. Mr. Young then voluntarily dismissed the complaint.
Though the case had been dismissed, two Bureau of Prisons’
employees stated under oath that (1) a legal assistant had delivered the
complaint form, the filing instructions, an IFP form, and a certified copy of
Mr. Young’s account statement and (2) Mr. Young had not requested a
copy of his account statements. Mr. Young had fourteen days to reply, but
he didn’t. Despite this history, Mr. Young accuses Magistrate Judge
Boland of refusing to furnish the required forms. Mr. Young has not
provided any support for this accusation.
4
No. 14-cv-00073-LTB (D. Colo. June 13, 2014) (ECF No. 24)). This order
is not among the rulings that Mr. Young has appealed.
To challenge the filing restrictions, he needed to appeal the 2014
order. See Werner v. Utah, 32 F.3d 1446, 1448 (10th Cir. 1994)
(per curiam) (“[I]f petitioner disagrees with the district court’s filing
restrictions, his avenue for review is an appeal from the order establishing
the restrictions.”). But he didn’t appeal the 2014 order.
Nor do the present appeals encompass the 2014 order. Nonetheless,
Mr. Young is arguing that the district court shouldn’t have enforced the
filing restrictions because they shouldn’t have been entered in the first
place. This argument constitutes a collateral challenge to the filing
restrictions, which is improper. See Stine v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons,
506 F. App’x 846, 848 (10th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (“[T]o the extent
Plaintiff is challenging the terms or scope of the filing restrictions, he
cannot collaterally attack those restrictions in this proceeding.”); accord
Schildhaus v. Moe, 335 F.2d 529, 530 (2d Cir. 1964) (“The injunction,
whether right or wrong, is not subject to impeachment in its application to
the conditions that existed at its making.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). We thus affirm the orders striking the two actions for
noncompliance with the filing restrictions.
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III. Relief from Prepayment of the Filing Fees
We also deny the motions to proceed on appeal without prepayment
of the filing fees. To proceed without prepayment, Mr. Young “must show
a financial inability to pay the required filing fees, as well as the existence
of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in support of the
issues raised in the action.” Lister v. Dep’t of Treasury, 408 F.3d 1309,
1312 (10th Cir. 2005). Although Mr. Young is indigent, his challenge to
the reasoning is frivolous. We thus deny his motions to be relieved of
prepayment of the filing fees.
IV. Disposition
We affirm the orders striking the two cases and deny Mr. Young’s
motions to proceed without prepayment of the filing fees.
Entered for the Court
Robert E. Bacharach
Circuit Judge
6