BLD-201 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 19-2029
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IN RE: HECTOR L. HUERTAS,
Petitioner
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On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey
(Related to D.C. No. 1-17-cv-01891)
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Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
May 30, 2019
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE and PORTER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 13, 2019)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Hector Huertas petitions for a writ of mandamus. For the reasons that follow, we
will deny the petition.
Huertas filed suit pro se in the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey in connection with his purchase of a used car on December 22, 2016. Huertas
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
claimed that he was under duress when he purchased the car at an inflated price and on
credit terms that he could not afford. Huertas claimed that he went to the Cherry Hill
Mitsubishi dealership and was told that he qualified to purchase a car with no down
payment. He ultimately purchased a 2013 Hyundai Sonata for $17,000.95, signing a
Motor Vehicle Retail Order Agreement which contained an arbitration provision.
Huertas sought, but evidently was unable, to cancel the sale, and this suit alleging
violations of various state and federal consumer protection laws followed. Huertas
sought compensatory and statutory damages in the amount of $81,092.40 and punitive
damages.
Defendants Foulke Management Corp., Cherry Hill Mitsubishi, Cherry Hill
Triplex, and Anthony Trapani (“Foulke”) moved to dismiss the complaint and compel
arbitration on the ground that Huertas signed an arbitration agreement that required him
to arbitrate his claims. Defendant Capital One separately moved to dismiss the complaint
and compel arbitration.1 In response to Capital One’s motion, Huertas moved to amend
his complaint. In an order entered on December 18, 2017, the District Court (1) granted
Foulke’s motion to compel arbitration but stayed Huertas’ claims against Foulke pending
the arbitrator’s decision concerning arbitrability of the claims; (2) ordered that Capital
One’s motion to compel arbitration be administratively terminated; and (3) dismissed
Huertas’ motion to amend without prejudice for failure to comply with L. Civ. R. 7.1(f).
1
Foulke assigned its rights under the sales contract to Capital One.
2
The Court determined that, because Huertas challenged the validity of the sales contract
as a whole, in accordance with the arbitration agreement’s delegation clause and Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68-69 (2010), his substantive claims, as well
as his challenges concerning arbitrability, all must be decided by the arbitrator.2
On or about May 29, 2018, Arbitrator Robert K. Amron determined preliminarily
that the arbitration agreement was valid and that he had jurisdiction to arbitrate Huertas’
consumer fraud claims against Foulke. Huertas then renewed his motion to amend his
complaint with respect to Capital One; the District Court granted the motion in part; and
Capital One moved to dismiss the amended complaint and compel arbitration. Huertas
also filed a motion to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision.
In an order entered on March 13, 2019, the District Court (1) denied Capital One’s
motion to dismiss pending expedited discovery on issues relevant to whether Huertas’
claims against Capital One were subject to arbitration;3 and (2) denied as premature
Huertas’ motion to vacate the Arbitrator’s decision concerning the extent of his
jurisdiction with respect to the claims against Foulkes. On May 15, 2019, Capital One
2
In Rent-A-Center, the Supreme Court held that a provision of an employment
agreement which delegated to an arbitrator exclusive authority to resolve any dispute
relating to the agreement’s enforceability was a valid delegation under the Federal
Arbitration Act (“FAA”). We note that the FAA represents “a congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.” Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
3
See generally Guidotti v. Legal Helpers Debt Resolution, L.L.C., 716 F.3d 764, 774-75
(3d Cir. 2013) (if affirmative defense of arbitrability is not apparent from face of
complaint, motion to compel arbitration should be decided under summary judgment
3
answered the amended complaint. The Magistrate Judge assigned to this matter has
scheduled a conference for July 2, 2019 to arrive at a schedule to manage discovery.
Although the case is ongoing in the District Court, on May 7, 2019, Huertas filed a
petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651,
challenging the U.S. District Judge’s December 18, 2017 and March 13, 2019 orders. He
asks that we direct the District Judge assigned to his case to vacate those orders, arguing
that they were issued in excess of the District Judge’s jurisdiction. Specifically, Huertas
complains that the District Judge has unnecessarily delayed resolution of his claims by
referring an arbitrability question to the Arbitrator, ordering discovery, and blocking his
efforts to appeal to this Court by issuing nonfinal interlocutory orders. He also argues
that the Arbitrator’s decision on arbitrability is in conflict with Goffe v. Foulke
Management Corp., 185 A.3d 248 (N.J. Super. Ct., App. Div. 2018). Extraordinary
circumstances are present, he argues, and can only be remedied by issuance of the writ.
The Hyundai is not roadworthy, he claims, and if Capital One had notified him that he
qualified for a $17,000 auto loan, he would have “shopped around different dealers for
the best price.” Petition, at 26.
We will deny the petition for writ of mandamus. A writ of mandamus is an
extraordinary remedy. In re: Pressman-Gutman Co., Inc., 459 F.3d 383, 398 (3d Cir.
2006). The petitioner must have no other adequate means to obtain the relief desired and
standard).
4
must show a “clear and indisputable” right to the writ. See Kerr v. United States District
Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976). A writ of mandamus may not issue if a petitioner can
obtain relief by way of an appeal. See Madden v. Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 77 (3d Cir. 1996),
superseded in part on other grounds by 3d Cir. LAR 24.1(c). Under 9 U.S.C. § 16(b), an
interlocutory order granting a motion to compel arbitration is not immediately appealable.
Section 16 “makes clear that any order favoring litigation over arbitration is immediately
appealable and any order favoring arbitration over litigation is not.” Ballay v. Legg
Mason Wood Walker, Inc., 878 F.2d 729, 732 (3d Cir. 1989) (emphasis added).
Nevertheless, Huertas may obtain any relief he is due by appealing at the conclusion of
his case in the District Court.
Huertas argues that he will be prejudiced if he is required to wait until the
conclusion of his case to appeal but the argument is unavailing. Review after final
judgment is sufficient to cure the harm to a litigant who has lost his case in the District
Court. See Madden, 102 F.3d at 78. To the extent that Huertas focuses his argument on
the Goffe case, the relevance of Goffe to arbitrability and the circumstances of his
purchase of the Hyundai may be fully considered on appeal.4 Moreover, the management
4
Goffe involved two plaintiffs, one of whom purchased a Buick at the Cherry Hill
Mitsubishi dealership and signed several documents, including one that contained an
arbitration provision. The plaintiff later cancelled the sales contract. The trial court ruled
that the matter was subject to arbitration and dismissed the case. On appeal, the
Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court reversed and remanded, holding
that “the circumstances surrounding the execution of the documents in question raise
legitimate questions about the enforceability of defendants’ otherwise acceptable
5
of her docket is committed to the sound discretion of the District Judge. See In re: Fine
Paper Antitrust Litigation, 685 F.2d 810, 817 (3d Cir. 1982). Here, the alleged delay is in
no way tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction. See Madden, 102 F.3d at 79.
arbitration provisions, namely: (a) whether … an enforceable sales contract was ever
formed; (b) whether, in both cases, defendants complied with [N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-
2.22], and (c) whether -- with the agreements to rescind reached by the parties in both
cases -- the arbitration provisions contained in the sales contracts were also rescinded.”
185 A.3d at 256.
6