FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 13 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-10120
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
1:02-cr-00133-HG-BMK-1
v.
ROYAL LAMARR HARDY, AKA MEMORANDUM*
Royale LaMarr Sounet,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Hawaii
Helen W. Gillmor, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted June 11, 2019**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit
Judges.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Defendant-Appellant Royal Lamarr Hardy appeals the district court’s
imposition of special conditions of supervised release. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court.
1. We review for abuse of discretion the imposition of the special
condition regarding Hardy’s employment at Mana Medical Clinic (No. 19). See
United States v. Wolf Child, 699 F.3d 1082, 1089 (9th Cir. 2012). Pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2), the district court “may modify, reduce, or enlarge the
conditions of supervised release, at any time prior to the expiration or termination
of the term of supervised release” provided that the district court: (1) considers the
listed § 3553(a) factors; (2) abides by the relevant provisions of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure; and (3) follows “the provisions applicable to the initial
setting of the terms and conditions of post-release supervision.” With respect to
this last requirement, initial conditions must: (1) be “reasonably related” to the
listed § 3553(a) factors; (2) “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is
reasonably necessary to achieve” the goals of deterrence, protection of the public,
and defendant rehabilitation; and (3) be “consistent with any pertinent policy
statements issued by the Sentencing Commission[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d); see
United States v. Bainbridge, 746 F.3d 943, 951 (9th Cir. 2014). The district court
properly followed the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) in modifying
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Hardy’s conditions of supervised release to include the requirement that Hardy
“not be employed by or with Mana Medical Clinic.” Contrary to Hardy’s
assertions, the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Special
Condition No. 19 involved no greater deprivation of liberty than necessary to
achieve the goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation.
Hardy also contends that the district court committed procedural error
because: (1) the court relied on testimony from a probation officer who was not
under oath; and (2) there was no relation between the condition imposed and
Hardy’s supervised release violations. But the district court need not adhere to
stringent procedural requirements when imposing new conditions. Compare Fed.
R. Crim. P. 32.1(c) with Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b); see, e.g., United States v. King,
608 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that the imposition of new conditions
does not require an evidentiary hearing or a violation finding). Further, supervised
release conditions need not relate to specific violations or even to the offense of the
conviction as long as the conditions are reasonably related to the goals of
deterrence, protection of the public, or rehabilitation of the offender. See
Bainbridge, 746 F.3d at 952; United States v. Bare, 806 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir.
2015). The district court properly relied on evidence in the record and did not
abuse its discretion in imposing Special Condition No. 19.
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2. Because Hardy failed to object to the imposition of the remaining
supervised release conditions that he now challenges on appeal (Nos. 11, 12, 14,
17, and 18), our review is limited to plain error. See Wolf Child, 699 F.3d at 1089.
“[T]he district court [generally] need not state at sentencing the reasons for
imposing each condition of supervised release, if it is apparent from the record.”
Bainbridge, 746 F.3d at 951 (second alteration in original) (footnote omitted)
(quoting United States v. Becker, 682 F.3d 1210, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012)). There is
ample evidence in the record that these employment-related conditions were no
greater than necessary to achieve the goals of deterrence, protection of the public,
and rehabilitation, particularly given Hardy’s extensive criminal history involving
tax and fraud crimes, Hardy’s actions with Mana Medical Clinic, Hardy’s
involvement with Royal Financial Solutions, and the third-party personal
information found in Hardy’s possession. The district court properly followed the
requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) and did not err in modifying Hardy’s
supervised release conditions to include these employment-related conditions.
AFFIRMED
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