In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
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No. 07-19-00174-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF J.F., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 137th District Court
Lubbock County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017-527,563; Honorable John J. “Trey” McClendon III, Presiding
June 13, 2019
ORDER DIRECTING APPOINTMENT OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
Before QUINN, C.J., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
Appellant, B.T., appeals from the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to her son, J.F.1 B.T. was represented by appointed counsel at various times during the
termination proceedings, but is currently without appellate counsel.
1 To protect the privacy of the parties involved, we refer to them by their initials. See TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (West Supp. 2018). See also TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8(b). The father of J.F. signed an
affidavit of voluntary relinquishment of his parental rights and did not appeal.
The termination proceedings began in October of 2017. On November 2, 2017,
the trial court appointed Ms. Lezlie Olibas as B.T.’s trial counsel. Ms. Olibas subsequently
moved to withdraw and to substitute Mr. Charles Chambers as retained counsel. The trial
court granted the motion on March 14, 2018. On August 15, 2018, Mr. Chambers also
moved to withdraw as counsel. The record does not contain an order permitting Mr.
Chambers to withdraw, but B.T. appeared pro se at the termination proceedings before
the associate judge. The associate judge signed an order of termination on October 24,
2018. That day, proceeding pro se, B.T. filed a request for de novo hearing. On February
27, 2019, the referring court signed an order finding B.T. indigent and appointing Mr.
James Moore as counsel. Mr. Moore represented B.T. at the de novo hearing before the
referring court on May 16, 2019.
Based on the evidence presented at the final hearing, the referring court signed an
order terminating B.T.’s parental rights on May 21, 2019. The court found clear and
convincing evidence that B.T. (1) knowingly placed or allowed the child to remain in
conditions or surroundings which endangered his well-being, (2) engaged in conduct or
knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered his
well-being, and (3) failed to comply with a court order that established the actions
necessary for the parent to obtain the return of the child following his removal under
chapter 262 of the Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), & (O)
(West Supp. 2018). The trial court also found that termination of B.T.’s parental rights
was in her child’s best interest. § 161.001(b)(2). That day, Mr. Moore filed a notice of
appeal and a motion to withdraw as counsel. In his motion to withdraw, Mr. Moore
requested appointment of new appellate counsel for B.T. On June 3, 2019, the referring
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court signed an order allowing Mr. Moore to withdraw, but to this date, B.T. remains
without representation to pursue this appeal.
The natural right existing between parents and their children is of constitutional
dimension. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed.
2d 599 (1982). See also Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Recently, the
Texas Supreme Court reiterated that “[o]ne of the most fundamental liberty interests
recognized is the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their children.” In
re N.G., No. 18-0508, 2019 Tex. LEXIS 465, at *6-7 (Tex. May 17, 2019) (per curiam)
(citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000)). A
parent must be permitted to appeal the termination of parental rights, and due process
requires that the appeal be meaningful. In re N.G., 2019 Tex. LEXIS 465, at *8.
In a suit filed by a governmental entity to terminate the parent-child relationship,
appointment of counsel for an indigent parent is mandatory. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
107.013(a)(1) (West 2019). When the trial court determines that a parent in a termination
proceeding is indigent, a presumption of indigence is created for the duration of the suit
and any subsequent appeals absent “a material and substantial change in the parent’s
financial circumstances.” § 107.013(e). The Texas Supreme Court has recognized that
the statutory right to counsel in a termination proceeding filed by a governmental entity
applies to all proceedings, including the filing of a petition for review. In re P.M., 520
S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).
Accordingly, we direct the trial court to appoint B.T. appellate counsel to pursue
this appeal. The name, address, e-mail address, telephone number, and state bar
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number of newly-appointed counsel shall be provided to the clerk of this court in an order
from the trial court. A supplemental clerk’s record containing the trial court’s order shall
be filed with the clerk of this court on or before June 24, 2019.
B.T.’s appellate brief shall be due within twenty days after the order appointing
counsel is signed.
It is so ordered.
Per Curiam
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