Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 1 of 10
[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 18-13907
Non-Argument Calendar
________________________
D.C. Docket No. 9:18-cv-80395-DMM
JUAN CARLOS VELASQUEZ ANDRES,
Plaintiff – Appellant,
versus
JUDGE JANICE BRUSTARES KEYSER,
Defendant – Appellee.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
________________________
(June 14, 2019)
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 2 of 10
Before MARTIN, JILL PRYOR, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Juan Carlos Velasquez Andres appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint against Judge Janice Brustares Keyser, the state court judge who
presided over a child custody matter concerning his then-minor child. Velasquez
Andres alleged Judge Keyser violated his and his child’s federal statutory and
constitutional rights by refusing to include findings in her custody order that are
necessary for the child to pursue special immigrant juvenile status under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(27)(J). The district court dismissed. After careful review, we affirm.
I.
In November 2017, Velasquez Andres filed a petition in the Circuit Court
for Palm Beach County, Florida to determine paternity of a minor child. The
child’s mother was listed as the respondent.
To assist with resolution of the case, the parties jointly submitted a proposed
final judgment of paternity stating Velasquez Andres is the child’s natural and
biological father. The parties also submitted a notarized parenting plan, which was
incorporated into the proposed order and included terms with which the parents
agreed to comply.
2
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 3 of 10
In February 2018, Judge Keyser entered a final judgment of paternity. Judge
Keyser’s order adopted and ratified most of the parties’ parenting plan, but struck
out language stating:
It is detrimental to the minor child to have shared parental
responsibility and timesharing with the mother because
she has abused and neglected the minor child.
Reunification with the mother is not viable due to the
physical abuse and the neglect that placed the child’s
wellbeing in danger. It is not in the best interest of the
minor child, [M.G.V.G.] to be returned to his country of
citizenship and last habitual residence. It is in the best
interest of the Minor Child that the father, Juan Carlos
Velasquez Andres be awarded sole custody.
Weeks later, Velasquez Andres filed a motion for modification of the parenting
plan, which asked Judge Keyser to re-insert the language she deleted.
Judge Keyser held a hearing on the motion, during which she explained she
crossed out the language because she had “no testimony or evidence to support it.”
An attorney for Velasquez Andres argued the parents’ sworn statements
constituted evidence. The attorney also insisted the language was “extremely
important for immigration purposes.” This was because the minor child hoped to
pursue special immigrant juvenile status (“SIJS”) under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J).
That provision offers a path to lawful permanent residency for certain noncitizen
juveniles. See id. To be eligible for SIJS, a juvenile court must have found (1)
“reunification with 1 or both . . . parents is not viable due to abuse, neglect,
3
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 4 of 10
abandonment, or a similar basis found under State law,” and (2) it would not be in
the child’s “best interest to be returned to [his] or [his] parent’s previous country of
nationality or country of last habitual residence.” Id. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i)–(ii).
Judge Keyser declined to revise her order. Velasquez Andres then appealed
to Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeals (“Fourth DCA”).
Around the same time, Velasquez Andres filed suit against Judge Keyser in
the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Velasquez Andres
alleged Judge Keyser violated his and his minor child’s federal and constitutional
rights through her “arbitrary” decision not to re-insert the proposed abuse and
neglect findings.
Along with his complaint, Velasquez Andres attached a declaration from an
attorney who represented him before Judge Keyser. The attorney claimed that
after the hearing on Velasquez Andres’s motion for modification, she returned to
Judge Keyser’s courtroom. At that time, her co-counsel offered to present live
testimony supporting the proposed findings. But, according to the attorney, Judge
Keyser “was not interested in any evidence because she believed that these cases
(apparently referring to all of the cases where Petitioner’s [sic] need state Court
findings as a prerequisite to petitioning [U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services
for SIJS]) were part of a scheme to enable people to come into this country who
should not be here.” In his complaint, Velasquez Andres asked for an injunction
4
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 5 of 10
barring Judge Keyser from “impos[ing] her own views about immigration on
people who come before her seeking legitimate relief” and “direct[ing] [her] to
make findings consistent with the evidence presented to her.”
Judge Keyser moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing, among other things,
that Eleventh Amendment immunity, judicial immunity, and the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine barred the suit.
The district court granted the motion. It reasoned the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine, which typically bars federal district courts from reviewing state court
decisions, did not permit review of Judge Keyser’s order in the custody
proceeding. It also observed the Fourth DCA had affirmed the custody order while
the federal action was pending. See Andres v. Perez, 247 So. 3d 500 (Fla. 4th
DCA 2018) (per curiam). Thus, it concluded that even if the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine did not bar review, Velasquez Andres’s suit would be barred by collateral
estoppel.
This is Velasquez Andres’s appeal.
II.
“The Rooker–Feldman doctrine places limits on the subject matter
jurisdiction of federal district courts and courts of appeal over certain matters
related to previous state court litigation.” Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259
F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001). We review de novo a district court’s decision
5
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 6 of 10
that the Rooker–Feldman doctrine deprives the court of subject matter jurisdiction.
Id. at 1331–32. We also review de novo a district court’s decision to give
preclusive effect to a prior state court judgment. Aldana v. Del Monte Fresh
Produce N.A., Inc., 578 F.3d 1283, 1288 (11th Cir. 2009). In conducting our
review, “[w]e may affirm on any ground supported by the record, regardless of
whether that ground was relied upon or even considered below.” Waldman v.
Conway, 871 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).
III.
Velasquez Andres argues the district court erred in dismissing his complaint.
He contends the Rooker–Feldman doctrine does not bar his suit because the
findings he requested in state court are necessary for his child to pursue SIJS in
federal court. He says “[e]ven though this case commenced in State Court, it is in
reality a Federal Court matter,” and “Federal Courts have jurisdiction over
immigration matters, state courts do not.” Velasquez Andres also argues the state
court judgment should not be afforded preclusive effect because “the State Court
of Appeals has no right to undermine a Federal right simply by supporting and
affirming a decision by a state family court.” Additionally, he says the issues he
presented before the federal district court were not identical to the issues he
presented before the state court of appeals, and he appealed to the state court of
6
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 7 of 10
appeals to “safeguard his appellate rights” and should not be penalized for doing
so.
Judge Keyser maintains the district court properly dismissed Velasquez
Andres’s complaint. She defends the district court’s applications of Rooker–
Feldman and issue preclusion. She also reiterates additional grounds for affirming
that she raised below but that the district court did not reach.
To begin, we agree with Velasquez Andres that the Rooker–Feldman
doctrine does not bar his suit. Under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, “lower federal
courts are precluded from exercising appellate jurisdiction over final state-court
judgments.” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 463, 126 S. Ct. 1198, 1201 (2006).
This Court has made clear that “state proceedings have not ended for purposes of
Rooker–Feldman when an appeal from the state court judgment remains pending at
the time the plaintiff commences the federal court action that complains of injuries
caused by the state court judgment and invites review and rejection of that
judgment.” Nicholson v. Shafe, 558 F.3d 1266, 1279 (11th Cir. 2009). Here,
Velasquez Andres’s appeal to the Fourth DCA was pending when he filed his
federal lawsuit. Therefore, Rooker–Feldman did not divest the federal district
court of jurisdiction.
We also agree with Velasquez Andres that issue preclusion does not bar his
lawsuit. Under the Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, a federal court
7
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 8 of 10
must “give preclusive effect to a state court judgment to the same extent as would
courts of the state in which the judgment was entered.” Kahn v. Smith Barney
Shearson Inc., 115 F.3d 930, 933 (11th Cir. 1997) (quotation marks omitted). That
means we look to Florida law to determine whether the state court judgment should
be afforded preclusive effect.
“The ‘essential elements’ of issue preclusion under Florida law are ‘that the
parties and issues be identical, and that the particular matter be fully litigated and
determined in a contest which results in a final decision of a court of competent
jurisdiction.’” Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324, 1332 (11th
Cir. 2010) (quoting Dadeland Depot, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 945
So. 2d 1216, 1235 (Fla. 2006)). At least one essential element is missing here: the
parties are not identical. The parties to the state court action were the minor
child’s mother and father. The parties to this action are the child’s father and the
judge who presided over the custody matter. Because the actions involved
different parties, issue preclusion cannot apply here. See Stogniew v. McQueen,
656 So. 2d 917, 919 (Fla. 1995) (“Florida has traditionally required that there be a
mutuality of parties in order for the doctrine [of issue preclusion] to apply. Thus,
unless both parties are bound by the prior judgment, neither may use it in a
subsequent action.” (citations omitted)).
8
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 9 of 10
But, in any event, we agree with Judge Keyser that the district court
correctly dismissed Velasquez Andres’s complaint. As Judge Keyser argued both
below and before this Court, she is entitled to judicial immunity.
“A judge enjoys absolute immunity from suit for judicial acts performed
within the jurisdiction of h[er] court.” McCullough v. Finley, 907 F.3d 1324, 1330
(11th Cir. 2018). To decide whether a judge was performing judicial acts, “[w]e
look at the nature and function of h[er] act, not the propriety of the act itself, and
consider whether the nature and function of the particular act is judicial.” Id. at
1330–31. Notably, “[a] judge enjoys absolute immunity for judicial acts regardless
of whether [s]he made a mistake, acted maliciously, or exceeded h[er] authority.”
Id. at 1331. The text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 makes clear immunity applies to most
suits brought for injunctive relief for “an act or omission taken in [a judicial]
officer’s judicial capacity.” Specifically, it provides, “injunctive relief shall not be
granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was
unavailable.” Id.; see also, e.g., Roth v. King, 449 F.3d 1272, 1286 (11th Cir.
2006) (“42 U.S.C. § 1983, as amended in 1996 by the Federal Courts Improvement
Act, explicitly immunizes judicial officers against suits for injunctive relief.”).
There can be no doubt Judge Keyser was acting in her judicial capacity
when she crossed out and then declined to re-insert language Velasquez Andres
proposed for the custody order concerning his child. It is also plain Velasquez
9
Case: 18-13907 Date Filed: 06/14/2019 Page: 10 of 10
Andres seeks injunctive relief. In his brief, Velasquez Andres describes his suit as
“seeking to have the Lower Court instruct the State Court to make a proper,
evidentiary based (including a evidentiary hearing) determination as to whether or
not Petitioner would suffer abuse and neglect were he to be returned to his country
of origin.” Nowhere in his complaint or other filings does Velasquez Andres
suggest a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
Mr. Velasquez Andres argues Judge Keyser’s judicial immunity argument is
“so frivolous that the District Court did not even address” it. He also says judicial
immunity “has no application when one is suing under the Civil Rights Act, and
applies generally when judges are sued for some relief directed against the judge
personally.” But he is mistaken. Because Velasquez Andres has not met the
prerequisites for a suit seeking injunctive relief against a judicial officer for her
official acts, his suit cannot continue.
AFFIRMED.
10