[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
May 11, 2005
No. 04-15957 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00354-CV-P-S
SOUTHTRUST BANK, an Alabama
Banking Corporation,
Plaintiff-Appellee
Cross-Appellant,
versus
COLLINS HOLDING CORPORATION,
f.k.a. Collins Music Co., Inc., et al.,
Defendants-Appellants
Cross-Appellees.
________________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Alabama
_________________________
(May 11, 2005)
Before BIRCH, DUBINA and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This case was presented to the district court on cross-motions to enforce a
settlement agreement reached at the conclusion of a mediation that took place in
Atlanta, Georgia. After conducting an evidentiary hearing, the district court found
that the parties entered into a valid settlement that included paragraph 4 of the
Memorandum Of Understanding (“MOU”).
The question of whether the parties intended to enter into a valid settlement
agreement is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
See Lee v. Hunt, 631 F.2d 1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980).1 The question of whether
an attorney had the requisite authority to bind his client to a settlement agreement
is also a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.
Gymco Constr. Co. v. Architectural Glass and Windows, Inc., 884 F.2d 1362,
1364 (11th Cir. 1989).
This court reviews a district court’s conclusions of law de novo.
Sunderland Marine Mut. Ins. Co. v. Weeks Marine Const. Co., 338 F.3d 1276,
1277 (11th Cir. 2003).
1
In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), we
adopted as binding precedent the decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to
October 1, 1981.
2
After reviewing the record and reading the parties’ briefs, we conclude that
the district court correctly found that the parties entered into a valid settlement
containing paragraph 4 of the MOU. Moreover, the district court correctly found
that defendants’ counsel had the authority to bind defendants to the settlement
agreement.
SouthTrust Bank has filed a cross-appeal contending that it is entitled to
contractual attorneys’ fees and collection costs incurred as a result of the
defendants’ appeal. We do not read the district court’s order requiring SouthTrust
“to convey all of the bank’s rights, title and interest in and to the notes and loan
documents evidencing all of defendants’ indebtedness to the bank” as precluding
SouthTrust from requesting contractual attorneys’ fees and collection costs
following resolution of this appeal. We agree with the defendants that
SouthTrust’s requests for attorneys’ fees and costs is premature. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
3