FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
JUN 18 2019
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
HONGBIN HUANG, No. 15-70040
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-286-372
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted June 13, 2019**
Honolulu, Hawaii
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and CALLAHAN and CHRISTEN, Circuit
Judges.
Hongbin Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an
immigration judge’s (IJ) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). We
review factual findings for substantial evidence. Bhasin v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d
977, 983 (9th Cir. 2005). We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we
deny the petition. Because the parties are familiar with the history of this case, we
need not recount it here.
I
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Huang did not
establish “changed circumstances” or “extraordinary circumstances” so that his
asylum application should have been considered notwithstanding its late filing.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The only changed condition Huang cites is a lawsuit
filed against him in China seeking repayment of a bank loan. However, when
Huang left China, he already knew that he was delinquent and in danger of being
sued before he left. While the knowledge of a lawsuit filed against him may have
intensified his fear, it does not constitute a changed circumstance that materially
affected his eligibility for asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(4).
Moreover, Huang argues that the following extraordinary circumstances
directly related to his failure to timely file his application: he did not speak
English, was working seven days a week, and was isolated because he lived in a
dormitory with other foreign workers. The BIA determined, however, that he
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could have accessed asylum information over the internet, is literate in Chinese,
was in contact with a friend and relative who had worked in Guam who had been
an H2B worker himself, has a high level trade skill in construction, and lived on
the small island of Guam that has a Department of Homeland Security sub-office
that he could have consulted. See Lianhua Jiang v. Holder, 754 F.3d 733, 738 (9th
Cir. 2014) (holding that the substantial evidence standard is “extremely
deferential” and courts must uphold administrative findings of fact “unless any
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”) (internal
quotation marks omitted). In short, though there were circumstances that may have
made it more difficult for Huang to seek asylum in a timely manner, he was
nonetheless capable of filing on time. Thus, Huang’s petition for asylum is
statutorily barred.
II
The BIA’s determination that Huang is ineligible for withholding of removal
because he failed to establish an adequate nexus to a protected ground is supported
by substantial evidence. Huang argues that the police used violence on him and a
crowd assembled before the provincial building because of their anti-corrupt
political opinion. However, the police accepted the crowd’s complaint letter, did
not seek further action against the crowd once it disbursed, and instructed the
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crowd to take their complaint to the county government. These facts are consistent
with the BIA’s determination that the police took action—not because they wanted
to harass the crowd for their political opinion—but because they perceived the
crowd as causing a public disturbance.
Huang also notes that bank officials came to his home asking for his
delinquent loan payment immediately after he returned from turning in the above
mentioned complaint letter. He asserts that this is evidence that he was retaliated
against for his political opinion. However, Huang admitted that his bank loan
became due around the same time as his political activities. Thus, substantial
evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Huang is ineligible for withholding
of removal.
III
The BIA’s determination that Huang is ineligible for CAT protection is
supported by substantial evidence. The record does not compel the conclusion that
Huang was tortured in the past or that he more likely than not would be tortured at
the instigation of, or with the acquiescence of, the Chinese government if returned.
See Silaya v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir. 2008).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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