People v. Beck

2019 IL App (1st) 161626

FIRST DISTRICT
SECOND DIVISION
June 18, 2019

No. 1-16-1626

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the
) Circuit Court of
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County, Illinois.
)
v. ) No. 15 CR 13839 01
)
ANTERIUS BECK, ) Honorable
) James B. Linn,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justices Pucinski and Hyman concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Following a 2016 bench trial, defendant Anterius Beck was convicted of unlawful

possession of a firearm by a street gang member and 10 counts of aggravated unlawful use of a

weapon (AUUW), for which he was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. On appeal, Beck

argues that (i) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that the Black P. Stones 1

are a street gang as defined by the Illinois Streetgang Terrorism Omnibus Prevention Act (Act)

(740 ILCS 147/10) (West 2014)); (ii) section 24-1.8 (a)(1), (b) of the Criminal Code of 2012

(720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1), (b) (West 2014)), under which he was convicted, is unconstitutional

because it impermissibly criminalizes a defendant’s status in violation of the eighth amendment;

and (iii) the admission of a “certification” by the State to prove that he did not have a Concealed

Carry License and Firearm Owner’s Identification Card violated his sixth amendment right to

1
The record refers to the “Black P. Stones” and the “L (or L.) Town Black P. Stones”
interchangeably, but all names refer to the same entity. For clarity, we will refer to the “Black P. Stones”
unless directly quoting from the record.
 No. 1-16-1626

confrontation. For the reasons that follow, we reverse Beck’s conviction for unlawful possession

of a firearm by a street gang member, affirm his convictions of AUUW, and remand for

sentencing on the AUUW convictions.

¶2 BACKGROUND

¶3 Beck was charged with 1 count of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang

member and 10 counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon after a police officer, during a

foot chase on August 7, 2015, recovered a gun that Beck tossed to the ground.

¶4 At trial, three police officers from the Chicago Police Department gang investigation

unit—Officers Albert Wyroba, Paul Heyden, and Apacible 2—testified to the events of that day.

At approximately 8 p.m. on August 7, Apacible and Wyroba were performing surveillance on the

700 block of North Lorel Avenue in Chicago, while Heyden was working as an enforcement

officer in the same location. Apacible received information regarding a black male wearing a

blue sweatshirt, white T-shirt, and red pants, who was seen in the area armed with a gun. Wyroba

observed a man matching that description, identified in court as Beck, place a handgun into his

front right pocket while standing among a crowd of approximately 20 other individuals. Wyroba

alerted enforcement officers.

¶5 Heyden received the alert to detain Beck and exited his unmarked Chicago police vehicle,

at which point Beck saw the officer and began running.

¶6 Heyden and Wyroba, who also saw Beck flee, immediately gave chase. As Beck headed

west through a gangway, Apacible joined the pursuit. At this point, Beck took the gun out of his

right pocket and threw it to the ground. Heyden recovered the gun while Apacible and Wyroba

continued to give chase. Beck was ultimately detained at an elementary school by Apacible and

Wyroba.
2
Officer Apacible’s first name is not mentioned in the record.

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¶7 Heyden stood over the gun until another officer secured it, at which point it was

unloaded, placed into a bag, and inventoried. The firearm was a 9-millimeter Ruger handgun

with two rounds in the magazine. Beck was arrested and transported to the police station.

¶8 After Beck waived his Miranda rights, he spoke to two of the officers. Beck told the

officers that he had been a member of the Black P. Stones for five years and he held the position

as the “chief of the shorties” of the “L Town Black P. Stones” and that he had been blessed in by

their chief.

¶9 Officer Wyroba testified based on his eight years’ experience as a gang officer that to be

“blessed” meant to become an active member of the Black P. Stones. Officer Wyroba further

testified that the Black P. Stones are a street gang that controls the narcotics and weapons trade

in an area on the west side of Chicago. That area included Kinzie to Iowa Streets, and Laramie to

Central Avenues. Officer Wyroba testified that Beck had a tattoo on one of his forearms

depicting the street signs of Lorel and Huron, which signified the Black P. Stones’ control of the

area. The State introduced into evidence a photograph depicting Beck’s forearm tattoos.

¶ 10 The State also introduced into evidence a certified letter from the Illinois State Police

Division of Administration stating that Beck had neither a Firearm Owner’s Identification Card

(FOID card) nor Concealed Carry License (CCL). Finally, the State offered into evidence a

certified copy of Beck’s adjudication of delinquency for robbery in case number 14 JD 03937.

Beck did not object to the admission of either document.

¶ 11 After the State rested, the trial court denied Beck’s motion for a directed finding. Beck

rested without presenting any evidence.

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¶ 12 The trial court found Beck guilty on all counts. The court merged the convictions and

sentenced Beck to five years in the Illinois Department of Corrections, which he has fully

served. 3 This appeal follows.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS

¶ 14 Initially, we address Beck’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of

unlawful possession of a weapon by a street gang member. A challenge to the sufficiency of the

evidence requires us to view the trial evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and

inquire whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime

beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); People v. Smith, 185

Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). A criminal conviction will not be reversed “unless the evidence is so

improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt.”

People v. Graham, 392 Ill. App. 3d 1001, 1009 (2009). It is the function of the trier of fact to

assess the credibility of the witnesses, determine the appropriate weight of the testimony, and

resolve conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence. Id.

¶ 15 The State must prove every essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.

People v. Maggette, 195 Ill. 2d 336, 353 (2001). In the context of this case, the State was

required to prove that Beck knowingly

“possesses, carries, or conceals on or about his or her person a firearm and firearm

ammunition while on any street, road, alley, gangway, sidewalk, or any other

lands, except when inside his or her own abode or inside his or her fixed place of

3
Beck’s notice of appeal was filed on May 18, 2016. The record on appeal was not filed until
December 12, 2016, and it was another 16 months before Beck, represented by the Office of the State
Appellate Defender, filed his opening brief. This court has previously commented on chronic delays in
criminal appeals that result in a defendant serving the entirety or the majority of his sentence before the
appeal is ready for consideration by the court. See People v. Dailey, 2018 IL App (1st) 152882; People v.
Cisco, 2019 IL App (4th) 160515. We continue to be troubled by the delays in resolving these appeals.

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 No. 1-16-1626

business, and has not been issued a currently valid Firearm Owner’s Identification

Card and is a member of a street gang.” 720 ILCS 5/24-1.8(a)(1) (West 2014).

A street gang is defined as

“any combination, confederation, alliance, network, conspiracy, understanding, or

other similar conjoining, in law or in fact, of 3 or more persons with an

established hierarchy that, through its membership or through the agency of any

member engages in a course or pattern of criminal activity.” 740 ILCS 147/10

(West 2014).

¶ 16 Here, Beck challenges the State’s proof as to the element of “[c]ourse or pattern of

criminal activity.” The Act defines a course or pattern of criminal activity as:

“[Two] or more gang-related criminal offenses committed in whole or in part

within this State when:

(1) at least one such offense was committed after the effective date

of this Act [(January 1, 1993)];

(2) both offenses were committed within 5 years of each other; and

(3) at least one offense involved the solicitation to commit,

conspiracy to commit, attempt to commit, or commission of any

offense defined as a felony or forcible felony under the Criminal Code

of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012.” Id.

¶ 17 As proof of the element of course or pattern of criminal activity, the State cites the

testimony of Office Wyroba, who had eight years of experience as a gang officer. Specifically,

Wyroba testified that throughout his career he investigated “gang crimes’ including homicides,

aggravated batteries, and “other gun weapons related crimes.” With regard to the Black P.

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Stones, Wyroba testified that they were a street gang that controlled “the narcotics and weapons

trade in a specific area on the west side [of Chicago].”

¶ 18 Beck maintains that this testimony was insufficient because neither Wyroba nor any other

witness testified to two specific crimes the Black P. Stones committed within five years of each

other after 1993, the effective date of the Act. We agree. Officer Wyroba’s general testimony

that the Black P. Stones controlled the trade of narcotics and weapons, without more, does not

establish a course or pattern of criminal activity as that term is defined in the Act. The testimony

lacks any reference to specific crimes or dates, which the Act requires.

¶ 19 We are unpersuaded by the State’s citation of People v. Murray, 2017 IL App (2d)

150599, appeal allowed, No. 123289 (Ill. May 30, 2018). 4 In Murray, the defendant, also

convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member, argued that the State’s

evidence was insufficient to prove that the Latin Kings were a street gang because the State

failed to show a “course or pattern of criminal activity” by the Latin Kings. Id. ¶ 80. There, the

State introduced testimony by an officer who was qualified as a gang expert. Id. ¶ 82. The officer

first testified that gangs use guns to protect their drugs, cash, and members from rival gangs and

engage in intimidation, if necessary, to benefit the gang, before opining that the Latin Kings were

a street gang. Id. We found this sufficient to prove the Latin Kings were a street gang, citing

People v. Jamesson, 329 Ill. App. 3d 446, 460 (2002), for the proposition that “an expert on

gangs may opine on the ultimate issue of whether an organization is a street gang engaged in a

course or pattern of criminal activity without testifying to specific dates or incidents.” Murray,

2017 IL App (2d) 150599, ¶ 83; see also People v. Berrios, 2018 IL App (2d) 150824, ¶ 22

(same).

4
At oral argument, the State urged us to postpone resolution of this case until the supreme court’s
decision in Murray, but finding Murray distinguishable, we see no reason to do so.

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¶ 20 Here, however, neither Officer Wyroba nor any other testifying officer was qualified as

an expert on gang activity. This is not a distinction without a difference. To be sure, while both

experts and lay witnesses may opine as to an ultimate issue in a case (Richardson v. Chapman,

175 Ill. 2d 98, 107 (1997)), a lay witness’s opinion cannot be based on scientific, technical, or

other specialized knowledge within the scope of Illinois Rule of Evidence 702 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011),

which prescribes the subject matter of expert testimony (People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st)

142197, ¶ 58 (citing Ill. R. Evid. 701 (eff. Jan. 1, 2011))). A witness’s opinion regarding whether

a particular organization is a “street gang” within the meaning of the Act is one that requires

specialized knowledge. The Act defines “street gang” with great particularity, specifying the

number of people that must be affiliated with the organization, the need for an “established

hierarchy” and, of course, “a course or pattern of criminal activity” by the organization. See 740

ILCS 147/10 (West 2014). Because Officer Wyroba was not qualified as an expert, his failure to

testify to the basis of his opinion that the Black P. Stones was a street gang was fatal to the

State’s case and insufficient to prove Beck’s possession of a firearm by a street gang member.

Therefore, Beck’s conviction on this count is reversed. 5

¶ 21 Because we reverse Beck’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street

gang member based on the insufficiency of the evidence, we need not consider Beck’s argument

that section 24-1.8(a)(1), (b) of the Criminal Code of 2012, under which he was convicted, is

5
This case may illustrate the old adage “Be careful what you wish for.” The State is now on
notice that in every case in which the defendant is charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a
street gang member, it must satisfy the “street gang” element of the offense either through expert
testimony or through evidence of two felonies committed by gang members within five years of each
other after the Act’s effective date. This is true whether or not the defendant raises the issue at trial.
Nothing says the State must use only non-violent felonies or two felonies that are remote in time from the
offense with which the defendant is charged in order to prove this element of the offense. Clearly, most
defendants faced with the admission of other gang crimes evidence that the State must introduce in its
case in chief would likely prefer to stipulate that whatever gang the defendant is charged with being a
member of, in fact, meets the statutory definition.

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unconstitutional. See Mulay v. Mulay, 225 Ill. 2d 601, 606 (2007) (reviewing court should decide

cases whenever possible on nonconstitutional grounds).

¶ 22 Beck’s final argument concerns the admission of a certified letter from the Illinois State

Police to prove that Beck had never been issued a FOID card or CCL. Beck argues that the letter

was testimonial evidence, such that its admission violated his sixth amendment right to

confrontation, because the declarant was not subject to prior cross-examination and was not

shown to be unavailable and the affidavit was admitted substantively for its truth. We review

de novo whether an out of court statement violates a defendant’s constitutional right to

confrontation. See People v. Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶¶ 55-58 (reviewing de novo

alleged confrontation clause violation where facts were undisputed and trial court had no

opportunity to consider the claim in the first instance).

¶ 23 The confrontation clause of both the federal and state constitutions provides that, in

criminal prosecutions, a defendant shall be allowed to confront the witnesses against him. U.S.

Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59

(2004), the Supreme Court held that the sixth amendment prohibited the admission of out-of-

court “testimonial” statements against a criminal defendant unless the declarant is unavailable

and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. This court has held that

a notarized, certified letter alleging a defendant’s lack of a FOID card is testimonial in nature

and, as such, a defendant is entitled to confront the author of the letter. See People v. Diggins,

2016 IL App (1st) 142088, ¶¶ 16-17; see also Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305,

307-10 (2009) (documents labeled as “certificates” are functionally equivalent to affidavits and

are testimonial in nature).

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¶ 24 As Beck acknowledges, he has failed to preserve his confrontation clause challenge for

review by objecting at trial and in a written posttrial motion. See People v. Enoch, 122 Ill. 2d

176, 186 (1988). His failure to do so operates as forfeiture as to this issue on appeal. People v.

Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 293 (1992). Nevertheless, Beck urges us to review for plain error, or,

alternatively, contends that his counsel’s failure to object to the admission of the certification

letter constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 25 The plain-error doctrine allows a reviewing court to bypass a party’s forfeiture of an issue

if the error is clear or obvious and either (1) the evidence was so closely balanced that the error

alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against him, regardless of the seriousness of the error,

or (2) the error was so serious that it affected the fairness of his trial and challenged the integrity

of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the evidence. People v. Smith, 2016 IL

119659, ¶ 39.

¶ 26 The State counters that Beck in fact acquiesced to the admission of the certified letter and

the plain error doctrine is therefore inapplicable. We agree. While the plain error doctrine

ordinarily excepts a defendant from the consequences of a procedural default, it is not applicable

to a defendant who acquiesces in the complained-of error. People v. Stewart, 2018 IL App (3d)

160205, ¶ 19. In other words, “a party cannot complain of error which that party induced the

court to make or to which that party consented. The rationale behind this well-established rule is

that it would be manifestly unfair to allow a party a second trial upon the basis of error which

that party injected into the proceedings.” In re Detention of Swope, 213 Ill. 2d 210, 217 (2004).

¶ 27 Cox is instructive on this issue. There, the State sought to admit a certified letter

reflecting that the defendant was not in possession of a FOID card as part of its proof that the

defendant committed the offense of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Cox, 2017 IL App

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(1st) 151536, ¶ 47. On appeal, the defendant argued that admission of the letter without allowing

him to cross-examine the declarant violated the confrontation clause. Id. We noted that defense

counsel had three opportunities to object to the use of the certified letter but at each opportunity

he affirmatively stated he had no objection. Id. ¶ 74. Accordingly, we found no error on the part

of the trial court where defendant “invited the trial court to admit the certificate” by failing to

object. Id. ¶ 75. Contra People v. Diggins, 2016 IL App (1st) 142088, ¶¶ 12, 16-17 (finding

admission of certified letter indicating that defendant did not possess a FOID card violated

confrontation clause where defense counsel objected to the letter’s introduction at trial).

¶ 28 Here, just as in Cox, Beck did not object to admission of the Illinois State Police

certification either at trial or in a posttrial motion. Although the trial court did not ask whether

there was an objection to the admission of the certification during trial, nothing prevented

defense counsel from raising an objection. Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 75 (“If the defense

had objected at any point during trial ***, the State could have easily remedied the problem by

simply calling the State employee to the stand.”). During closing argument, defense counsel also

did not mention the certification or dispute whether the State proved beyond a reasonable doubt

that Beck lacked a FOID card or CCL. Finally, counsel did not raise the claimed error in Beck’s

posttrial motion. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Beck acquiesced in the admission

of the certified letter, thus precluding plain-error review. See People v. Boston, 2018 IL App

(1st) 140369, ¶ 109 (invited errors not subject to review for plain error).

¶ 29 In any event, contrary to Beck’s contention, the evidence on this issue was not so closely

balanced so as to merit plain error review. Beck’s own actions of discarding the gun while

running from the police could lead a reasonable fact finder to infer that Beck’s possession of the

firearm was illegal, i.e., that he did not have a FOID card or a CCL. Nor does a confrontation

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clause violation amount to structural error under the second prong of plain error review. See Cox,

2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 87.

¶ 30 In the alternative, Beck argues that his counsel’s decision not to object to the admission

of the certified letter constitutes ineffective assistance. To establish ineffective assistance of

counsel, a defendant must show the conduct of defense counsel fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness and, but for counsel’s deficient performance, a reasonable probability exists

the outcome of the trial would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-

88, 694 (1984). If we determine that a defendant has failed to satisfy one prong of the Strickland

analysis, we need not consider whether he can satisfy the remaining prong. People v. Graham,

206 Ill. 2d 465, 476 (2003).

¶ 31 There is a strong presumption that counsel’s challenged action or inaction was the

product of trial strategy. People v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 44. Stated differently, trial

counsel’s strategic decisions are entitled to substantial deference. People v. Lucious, 2016 IL

App (1st) 141127, ¶ 31. Matters of trial strategy include decisions regarding what matter to

object to and when to object. People v. Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 344 (2007).

¶ 32 In Cox, we rejected the defendant’s similar claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,

holding “the only way that defense counsel’s decision not to object to the certification could

possibly be ineffective assistance was if defendant actually had a FOID card and the certification

was in error. Otherwise, counsel’s decision to waive any objection to its admission was a matter

of trial strategy.” (Emphasis in original.) Cox, 2017 IL App (1st) 151536, ¶ 88. Here, nothing in

the record suggests Beck possessed a valid FOID card or CCL. Instead, defense counsel’s theory

of the case was that Officer Wyroba was incredible and there was no evidence the gun recovered

from Beck was operable. Our review of the record reveals that counsel’s decision not to object to

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the admission of the certified letter was strategic, as he had no reason to highlight Beck’s failure

to possess a FOID card or CCL. Because Beck cannot overcome the strong presumption that

counsel’s decision not to object to the certified letter was sound trial strategy, Beck’s claim of

ineffective assistance fails.

¶ 33 As a final matter, we note that, because the court merged the convictions of AUUW with

the conviction of unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang member, it did not impose a

sentence on the AUUW convictions. Having vacated the unlawful possession offense, we must

determine whether we have jurisdiction to remand for sentencing on the 10 counts of AUUW. 6

¶ 34 The final step in a criminal judgment is a sentence; without a sentence, we ordinarily

cannot entertain an appeal due to lack of jurisdiction. See People v. Relerford, 2017 IL 121094,

¶ 71. However, our supreme court noted a limited exception to this rule in People v. Dixon, 91

Ill. 2d 346 (1982). In Dixon, the trial court (incorrectly) found that the defendant’s conviction

for two lesser offenses merged into his convictions for two more serious offenses and so did not

impose sentence on those lesser offenses. Id. at 349. On appeal, this court reversed one of the

sentenced convictions, but declined the State’s request to remand for sentencing on the lesser

(unsentenced) convictions. Id.

¶ 35 The State appealed and the supreme court reversed, holding that the “anomalous”

situation authorized this court to remand for imposition of sentence. Id. at 353. The court

reasoned that even though the unsentenced convictions were not final orders, both the sentenced

and unsentenced convictions “all arose from a series of separate but closely related acts.” Id.

This, coupled with the fact that the unsentenced convictions were “intimately related to and

6
Although Beck has served the entirety of his sentence on the street gang-related offense
and cannot be sentenced to any greater term, we address the issue of sentencing on the AUUW
convictions for the sake of completeness and clarity of Beck’s criminal record.

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‘dependent upon’ the [sentenced] convictions” allowed this court to remand for sentencing. Id.

(quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(b)(2)).

¶ 36 Similarly, here, Beck’s (sentenced) conviction for unlawful possession of a weapon by a

street gang member and his (unsentenced) convictions for AUUW are “intimately related” to

each other, arising from the same act. And, just as in Dixon, the trial court’s reasoning for

declining to sentence Beck on the AUUW offenses is clear from the record: the court merged

those offenses into the more serious possession offense. Contra Relerford, 2017 IL 121094, ¶ 74

(where record was silent as to reason for trial court’s failure to sentence defendant on three

offenses for which he was convicted, appellate court lacked jurisdiction to address merits of

those convictions or remand for sentencing). Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction

to remand for sentencing on the AUUW convictions.

¶ 37 CONCLUSION

¶ 38 We reverse Beck’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a street gang

member and affirm his conviction on 10 counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.

¶ 39 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for sentencing.

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