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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
ANGELA WEST-BOGANS, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
v. : No. 1767 MDA 2017
:
TRACY C. BOGANS :
Appeal from the Order Entered October 30, 2017,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County
Civil Division at No. 2012-02458
BEFORE: OTT, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 02, 2019
Angela West-Bogans (“Wife”) appeals from the October 30, 2017 order
entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County denying her
request to reopen and/or vacate the divorce decree. For the following
reasons, we dismiss Wife’s appeal.
The relevant procedural history of this case is as follows: On April 20,
2012, Wife filed a complaint in divorce. After extensive litigation, the trial
court entered a divorce decree on September 27, 2017. On October 27, 2017,
Wife filed a motion to reopen and/or vacate the divorce decree, alleging,
among other things, “both extrinsic and intrinsic fraud.” (See Wife’s motion
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to reopen and/or vacate divorce decree, 10/27/17 at 1.) The trial court denied
Wife’s motion on October 30, 2017.1
On November 16, 2017, Wife filed a notice of appeal. The trial court
ordered Wife to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Wife timely complied. On December 13,
2017, the trial court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
As noted by the trial court, Wife’s “concise” statement fails to comply
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). This court has long recognized that “Rule 1925 is a
crucial component of the appellate process because it allows the trial court to
identify and focus on those issues the parties plan to raise on appeal.” Kanter
v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394, 400 (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 880 A.2d
1239 (Pa. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1092 (2006). “The Statement shall
concisely identify each ruling or error that the appellant intends to challenge
with sufficient detail to identify all pertinent issues for the judge.”
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii). The filing of a timely Rule 1925(b) statement alone
“does not automatically equate with issue preservation.” Tucker v. R.M.
Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 346 (Pa.Super. 2007), affirmed, 977 A.2d 1170 (Pa.
2009). In Tucker, we explained that:
this Court has held that when appellants raise an
outrageous number of issues in their
1925(b) statement, the appellants have deliberately
1 We can discern no allegation or evidence of either extrinsic or intrinsic fraud
presented in appellant’s brief. Rather, appellant appears to simply argue error
related to the September 27, 2017 divorce decree from which no appeal was
taken.
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circumvented the meaning and purpose of
Rule 1925(b) and ha[ve] thereby effectively
precluded appellate review of the issues [they] now
seek to raise. We have further noted that such
voluminous statements do not identify the issues
appellants actually intend to raise on appeal because
the briefing limitations contained in Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a)
make[] the raising of so many issues impossible.
Further, this type of extravagant 1925(b) statement
makes it all but impossible for the trial court to provide
a comprehensive analysis of the issues.
Id. at 346 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted; brackets in
original). Thus, “the Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement must be sufficiently
concise and coherent such that the trial court judge may be able to identify
the issues to be raised on appeal, and the circumstances must not suggest
the existence of bad faith.” Jiricko v. Geico Ins. Co., 947 A.2d 206, 210
(Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis added), appeal denied, 958 A.2d 1048 (Pa.
2008); see also Kanter, 866 A.2d at 401 (finding issues in Rule 1925(b)
statements waived where the court determined that “outrageous” number of
issues was deliberate attempt to circumvent purpose of Rule 1925).
Here, we cannot conclude that Wife’s 12-page statement was so concise
and coherent that the trial court was able to conduct a meaningful review of
the issues she sought to raise. (See Wife’s Rule 1925(b) statement, 12/8/17.)
Accordingly, Wife waives all issues on appeal for circumventing the meaning
and purpose of Rule 1925(b) so as to preclude judicial review.
Alternatively, even if Wife had complied with Rule 1925(b), we would
nonetheless dismiss this appeal because her brief entirely fails to adhere to
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the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is well settled that parties
to an appeal are required to submit briefs in conformity, in all material
respects, with the requirements of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, as nearly
as the circumstances of the particular case will admit. Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
“Although this Court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a pro se
litigant, pro se status confers no special benefit upon the appellant.”
In re Ullman, 995 A.2d 1207, 1211-1212 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied,
20 A.3d 489 (Pa. 2011) (citations omitted). We will not advocate or act as
counsel for an appellant who has not substantially complied with our rules.
Bombar v. W. Am. Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 78, 93 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citation
omitted). “This Court may quash or dismiss an appeal if the appellant fails to
conform to the requirements set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure.” Ullman, 995 A.2d at 1211 (citation omitted); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 2101.
Instantly, Wife’s pro se brief falls well below the standards delineated
in our Rules of Appellate Procedure. Specifically, Wife’s entire brief is
comprised of prose in which Wife makes various allegations of misconduct on
the part of appellee. Wife also fails to divide her argument into as many parts
as there are questions to be argued, in violation of Rule 2119(a), nor does she
develop any analysis of the issue raised.
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Accordingly, we dismiss Wife’s appeal.
Appeal dismissed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/2/2019
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