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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN ROBERT ADAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1869 WDA 2017
Appeal from the PCRA Order November 22, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0006922-2016
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., SHOGAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.: FILED JULY 09, 2019
John Robert Adams, pro se, appeals from the order denying his first
petition for relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), see 42
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Adams contends the PCRA court erred in concluding
his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel had no merit without first holding
a hearing. We affirm.
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Adams pleaded guilty to one count of
Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse (“IDSI”), a second IDSI count under
a different subsection, two counts of Aggravated Indecent Assault, and one
count each of Sexual Abuse of Children, Endangering the Welfare of Children,
Corruption of Minors, and Possession of Child Pornography.1 After Adams
____________________________________________
1See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3123(a)(1), 3123(a)(7), 3125(a)(8), 6312(b),
4304(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(iii), and 6312(d)(1), respectively.
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accepted the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced him to five to ten years
of incarceration on February 9, 2017. After this sentencing, Adams did not
file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal.
On August 7, 2017, Adams filed his first PCRA petition. Thereafter,
appointed counsel filed a petition to withdraw and a Turner/Finley2 “no
merit” letter. Subsequently, the PCRA court dismissed Adams’s PCRA petition
and granted appointed counsel’s petition to withdraw. Adams’s timely appeal
followed.
Adams asserts three errors on appeal:
1) The PCRA court erred in denying his petition because it did not
allow for an evidentiary hearing nor provide a meaningful review
of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, where Adams
avers his counsel failed to protect his post-sentence and direct
appeal rights.
2) The PCRA court erred in denying his petition because Adams
was illegally sentenced under the wrong statute.
3) The PCRA court erred in denying his petition because said
petition included a merited argument regarding Adams’ counsel
failing to subpoena critical witnesses on the day of trial.
See Appellant’s Brief, at 4.
Adams’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim can be summarized
as follows. Adams claims that he presented letters to both trial counsel and
the trial court requesting the status of his requested post-sentence motion
____________________________________________
2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc).
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and direct appeal. As it is undisputed that counsel did not file post-sentence
motions or an appeal, Adams contends counsel violated the provisions of Roe
v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000).
Specifically, Adams argues that there was inadequate consultation
between Adams and counsel as to whether Adams wanted to appeal.
Moreover, Adams believes he presented a material issue of fact to the PCRA
court that required a hearing before the court could properly dismiss his
petition.
Trial counsel must make “a reasonable effort to discover the defendant’s
wishes” regarding the defendant’s desire to take an appeal. Flores-Ortega,
528 U.S. at 478. “If counsel has consulted with the defendant, the question
of deficient performance is easily answered: Counsel performs in a
professionally unreasonable manner only by failing to follow the defendant’s
express instructions with respect to an appeal.” Id. However, “[i]f counsel
has not consulted with the defendant, the court must … ask a second …
question: whether counsel’s failure to consult with the defendant itself
constitutes deficient performance.” Id. From this, the United States Supreme
Court held that trial counsel
has a constitutionally imposed duty to consult with the defendant
about an appeal when there is reason to think either (1) that a
rational defendant would want to appeal (for example, because
there are nonfrivolous grounds for appeal), or (2) that this
particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he
was interested in appeal.
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Id., at 480. There is, however, no bright-line rule that “counsel must always
consult with the defendant regarding an appeal.” Id.
“Where a petitioner can establish that but for counsel’s erroneous
advice, he would have filed a direct appeal, he is entitled to the reinstatement
of his direct appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. Markowitz, 32 A.3d 706,
717 (Pa. Super. 2011). We have also held that “failing to properly advise a
client can be grounds for an ineffectiveness claim.” Id.
However, “counsel is presumed to be effective and the burden of
demonstrating ineffectiveness rests on the appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Rivera, 10 A.3d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To meet this burden, an
appellant must demonstrate:
1) that the underlying claim has merit;
2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her action
or inaction; and
3) but for the errors of omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable
probability that the proceedings would have been different.
Id. In its opinion, the PCRA court states that Adams “has produced no
evidence that he requested [a post-sentence motion or direct appeal] be
filed.” PCRA Court Opinion, 7/11/18, at 3. In contrast, Adams did attach to
his PCRA petition “a letter from [his] counsel that stated [Adams] did not
direct counsel to file a post-sentence motion or direct appeal.” Id.
Adams affixed to his brief a letter dated July 9, 2017. In the letter,
Adams stated that he “would like to know the status of [his] post sentence
motion or the direct appeal.” Appellant’s Brief, Appendix E.
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July 9, 2017, is exactly five months after Adams’s sentencing occurred.
There is no additional evidence of record to establish Adams’s desire to appeal
any aspect of this case. Nor is there anything to even suggest that Adams
desired to file either a timely post-sentence motion or a timely direct appeal.
Conversely, the sentencing transcript leads to only one conclusion: that
Adams had been apprised of and was cognitively aware of his post-sentence
and appellate rights. See N.T., 2/9/17, at 23-24 (indicating that the trial
court identified Adams’s post-sentencing rights, Adams stated that he had
spoken to his attorney about those rights, and that Adams unequivocally
remarked that he understood those rights). We have stated that “we will not
allow evidence to contradict the terms of the record, where the trial court’s
strict adherence to the detailed procedures of the plea colloquy ensure[s] that
[an] [Appellant] was fully informed of the nature and results of his plea.”
Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789, 791 (Pa. Super. 1999).
Adams admitted, during his plea colloquy, to having discussed with his
post-sentencing rights with counsel. Further, there is a complete lack of
timely indicia that Adams’s counsel “fail[ed] to follow the defendant’s express
instructions with respect to an appeal.” Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. at 478. We
therefore cannot conclude the PCRA court erred in finding that counsel was
not ineffective.
Even if we assume Adams’s counsel had not consulted with Adams,
Adams has not established a right to relief under Flores-Ortega as he has
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not established that he conveyed to counsel that he was interested in a timely
appeal. See 528 U.S. at 480. Adams’s post hoc letter, dated some five months
after sentencing, suggesting that he was interested in either the filing of a
post-sentence motion or an appeal, does not change this result.
Nor has Adams established that a rational defendant in his position
would desire to appeal the judgment of sentence. Adams fails to identify any
non-frivolous grounds for an appeal. The record belies his claim that he did
not understand that the court could run his sentences consecutively. See N.T.,
2/9/17, at 5, 16 (prosecutor noting “[t]he defendant will serve five to ten
years of state incarceration plus probation set by the [c]ourt upon release”),
(defense counsel noting “I would submit that [Adams] was here today knowing
that he was probably taking five to ten”). As a result, Adams has not exhibited
that counsel erred in not filing an appeal in the absence of Adams
communicating his desire to do so.
Ancillary to Adams’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is his
contention that the PCRA court failed to rule on his motion for extension of
time to file a response to the notice of intention to dismiss. See Appellant’s
Brief, at 15. Adams contends that the PCRA court violated Pa.R.Crim.P.
905(a), as it did not rule on Adams’s motion for extension of time in order to
amend his PCRA petition to be responsive to PCRA counsel’s Turner/Finley
Letter and the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss. See Commonwealth
v. Williams, 828 A.2d 981, 987-88 (Pa. 2003) (identifying that the Rules of
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Criminal Procedure “explicitly demand[] action from a judge allowing
amendment or withdrawal of a petition”). This claim is not present in his Rule
1925(b) concise statement of matters complained of on appeal nor is it
included within the statement of questions involved in his brief. Accordingly,
in light of these deficiencies, Adams has waived this issue. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a).
Adams next claims that the PCRA court’s denial of his petition was
mistaken because he was sentenced under the wrong statute. As such, he
believes his correspondingly enhanced sentence under the incorrect statute
was illegal. Essentially, Adams asserts that the victim was not under the age
of 16 at the time he committed the various offenses. Adams argues that
when the court incorrectly sentenced [Adams] under 18
Pa.[C.S.A. §] 3123(a)(7) and 18 Pa.[C.S.A. §] 3126(a)(8) they
[sic] elevated his punishment, his sentence, as well as his parole
and probation requirements. This placed him in a different
classification requiring different programs and review for
activities, visits, education, probation and parole.
Appellant’s Brief, at 19. To bolster his position, Adams singularly cites to
Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 854 A.2d 489 (Pa. 2004), for the proposition
that a guilty plea can be defective if there is an “absence of a
contemporaneous record of the factual basis for the plea and [an] erroneous
… instruction” as to the sentenced crime. 854 A.2d at 500.
We note that the argument section of Adams’s brief covers
approximately one and one-half pages of text. In that space, the argument
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presented is convoluted, asserting both that the sentence is illegal and that
the guilty plea was unknowingly entered.
“When a party’s brief fails to conform to the Rules of Appellate Procedure
and the defects are substantial, this Court may, in its discretion, quash or
dismiss the appeal pursuant to Rule 2101.” Giant Food Stores, LLC v. THF
Silver Spring Development, L.P., 959 A.2d 438, 443 (Pa. Super. 2008)
(citing Pa.R.A.P. 2101). “When issues are not properly raised and developed
in briefs, when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for
review[,] a Court will not consider the merits thereof.” Branch Banking and
Trust v. Gesiorski, 904 A.2d 939, 942-943 (Pa. Super. 2006).
While this court is willing to liberally construe materials filed by a
pro se litigant, we note that appellant is not entitled to any
particular advantage because she lacks legal training. As our
supreme court has explained, any layperson choosing to represent
herself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent,
assume the risk that her lack of expertise and legal training will
prove her undoing.
Id. at 942 (citations omitted). This Court does not take on the mantle of
advocate and perform as appellant’s counsel. See Commonwealth v. Maris,
629 A.2d 1014, 1017 (Pa. Super. 1993). We therefore parse Adams’s
argument to the best of our ability; any issue we do not address that Adams
believes he has raised are waived due to the defects in his brief.
First, to the extent Adams frames this question as an “illegality of the
sentence” issue, we acknowledge it would not be subject to waiver, as argued
by the Commonwealth. If there were a proper challenge to the legality of a
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sentence before us, Adams’s plea would not have operated as waiver to the
issue. “The entry of a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of all defects and
defenses except lack of jurisdiction, invalidity of the plea, and illegality of the
sentence.” Commonwealth v. Tareila, 895 A.2d 1266, 1267 (Pa. Super.
2006).
However, we conclude Adams’s argument, properly read, does not
constitute a challenge to the legality of his sentence. The universe of what
constitutes an illegal sentence is not limitless. We have interpreted “illegal
sentences” as “a class of cases that includes: (1) claims that the sentence fell
outside of the legal parameters prescribed by the applicable statute; (2)
claims involving merger/double jeopardy; and (3) claims implicating the rule
in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).” Commonwealth v.
Farrow, 168 A.3d 207, 212 (Pa. Super. 2017).
Adams “maintains that at the time of the alleged offense(s), the victim
was sixteen.” Appellant’s Brief, at 19 (unnumbered). He therefore contends
the court “elevated his punishment, his sentence, as well as his parole and
probation requirements.” Id.
He does not argue that sentence imposed was greater than the statutory
maximum. Nor is there any plausible reading of his argument that invokes
merger or double jeopardy concerns have been invoked. Therefore, the only
possible basis to conclude that Adams’s sentence is illegal is that the trial court
violated the dictates of Apprendi v. New Jersey.
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The United States Supreme Court in Apprendi held that “[o]ther than
the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. Here, however, Adams
pled guilty to the charges at issue. During his guilty plea, Adams stipulated to
all of the facts necessary to authorize the sentences imposed:
THE COURT: Have you reviewed the affidavit of
probable cause being the police report and all of the
discovery in this case with [your attorney?]
[Adams]: Yes, I have Your Honor.
THE COURT: And would you like a factual summary or
would you like to waive that and stipulate that the
Commonwealth would be able to place a factual record
summary on the record that would support the charges here
today?
[Adams]: I would like to waive it and would let the
Commonwealth stipulate.
N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing, 2/9/17, at 13.
Furthermore, the only authority Adams cites in support of his argument
is Flanagan. In Flanagan, our Supreme Court did not address an illegal
sentence argument. Rather, it addressed an argument that plea counsel was
ineffective for allowing Flanagan to enter an unknowing guilty plea. See id. at
502-504. We therefore cannot construe Adams’s argument as a challenge to
the legality of his sentence.
If we construe it as a challenge to the voluntariness of his guilty plea, it
is arguably waived. An issue is waived under the PCRA “if the petitioner could
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have raised it but failed to do so … on appeal.” See Commonwealth v.
Keaton, 45 A.3d 1050, 1060 (Pa. 2012). A claim that a guilty plea was
entered unknowingly is cognizable on direct appeal. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Lincoln, 72 A.3d 606 (Pa. Super. 2013).
On the other hand, this claim would be cognizable if Adams had couched
it as a challenge to the effective assistance of plea counsel. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Fears, 86 A.3d 795, 806 (Pa. 2014) (finding challenge
to voluntariness of guilty plea was previously litigated and not cognizable
under the PCRA, while finding same claim couched as ineffective assistance of
counsel cognizable). However, Adams’s argument does not mention counsel,
let alone allege deficient performance.
Under these circumstances, we can only treat Adams’s argument as a
claim that the lack of an explicit, on-the-record factual basis during the plea
colloquy rendered his plea unknowing and involuntary. See Appellant’s Brief,
at 20. However, we note that defendants are bound by statements they make
during their guilty plea colloquies and may not successfully assert any claims
that contradict those statements. See Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794
A.2d 378, 384 (Pa. Super. 2002). Here, as quoted above, Adams told the court
he had reviewed the affidavit of probable cause with his attorney and that he
wished to stipulate that the Commonwealth could provide a factual summary
that would support all the charges to which he was pleading guilty. The
affidavit of probable cause asserted that Adams started sexually assaulting
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the victim when she was 13 years old. As Adams is bound by his stipulation,
he cannot now establish that there was an insufficient factual basis for his
guilty plea.
In any event, Adams has not identified a “showing of prejudice
amounting to manifest injustice” that would allow for the withdrawal of a guilty
plea. Commonwealth v. Jackson, 569 A.2d 964, 966 (Pa. Super. 1990).
The trial court conducted an on-the-record inquiry into the specifics of the
crimes for which Adams was charged, and Adams assented to the terms of his
plea voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. See Commonwealth v.
Kephart, 594 A.2d 358, 360 (Pa. Super. 1991). The testimony leads to the
unequivocal conclusion that Adams “understood the nature of the charges
against him,” which accordingly establishes the voluntariness of his plea.
Commonwealth v. Myers, 642 A.2d 1103, 1105 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citation
and quotations omitted).
Adams has failed to establish his burden and prove manifest injustice.
As such, Adams is due no relief on this issue.
In his final issue, Adams claims that his counsel failed to subpoena
critical witnesses on the day of trial, which induced him into accepting a guilty
plea moments before trial. Adams maintains that this inducement amounted
to coercive pressure, leaving him with no other choice but to accept the terms
of a plea agreement. Adams’s contention is not included in his PCRA petition
and his omission amounts to a waiver of this issue. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a);
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see also Commonwealth v. Lambert, 797 A.2d 232, 240-41 (Pa. 2001)
(finding waiver of claims not raised in appellant’s PCRA petition).
Even if this claim were properly preserved, Adams is once again bound
by the statements he made at the guilty plea. There, he conceded that no one
had “forced, threatened, or coerced” him into pleading guilty. N.T., Guilty Plea,
2/9/17, at 7. Adams further conceded he was satisfied with the services
counsel had provided him. See id. at 10. Adams would therefore be unable to
establish that counsel’s failure to subpoena critical witnesses on the day of
trial coerced Adams into involuntarily pleading guilty, even if the claim was
properly before us.
Accordingly, we affirm the PCRA court’s order dismissing Adams’s PCRA
petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/9/2019
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