NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
ALBA LUZ MALDONADO-MENDOZA, No. 17-73161
Petitioner, Agency No. A078-283-413
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted July 15, 2019**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
Alba Luz Maldonado-Mendoza, a native and citizen of Honduras, petitions
for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing her
appeal from an immigration judge’s order denying her motion to reopen removal
proceedings conducted in absentia. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to reopen.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Sembiring v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2007). We deny the petition
for review.
The agency did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Maldonado-
Mendoza’s motion to reopen based on lack of notice, where the record indicates
that the notice of hearing was properly served by mail on her counsel of record at
the time. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(c)(2) (notice is
sufficient for in absentia purposes when written notice is “provided to the alien or
the alien’s counsel of record”); Garcia v. INS, 222 F.3d 1208, 1209 (9th Cir. 2000)
(notice of hearing is properly served if it is served on alien’s counsel of record).
Because service on her counsel of record is dispositive, we do not reach
Maldonado-Mendoza’s contentions regarding whether she rebutted the
presumption of service by mail of the notice of hearing to her last reported address.
See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies
are not required to decide issues unnecessary to the results they reach).
To the extent Maldonado-Mendoza contends her in absentia order should be
rescinded due to ineffective assistance of counsel, that contention is not properly
before us. See Solorio-Ruiz v. Sessions, 881 F.3d 733, 738 (9th Cir. 2018) (review
is limited to the grounds relied upon by the BIA).
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The agency did not err or abuse its discretion in denying Maldonado-
Mendoza’s motion to reopen based on changed country conditions, where she did
not establish prima facie eligibility for asylum. See Toufighi v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d
988, 996-97 (9th Cir. 2008) (evidence must demonstrate prima facie eligibility for
relief to warrant reopening based on changed country conditions); Bhasin v.
Gonzales, 423 F.3d 977, 984 (9th Cir. 2005) (an applicant must generally show an
individualized, rather than a generalized, risk of persecution to establish prima
facie eligibility for asylum or withholding). Maldonado-Mendoza’s contention
that the BIA improperly required her to show conclusive evidence of future
persecution is not supported by the record.
The BIA did not engage in impermissible factfinding, where the BIA
properly accepted the facts in Maldonado-Mendoza’s affidavit regarding her
asylum claim as true and determined that her evidence was insufficient to warrant
reopening. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1); Bhasin, 423 F.3d at 987.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.
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