IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0795
Filed July 24, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF L.T., A.T., and D.T.,
Minor Children,
K.T., Mother,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Linn County, Cynthia S. Finley,
District Associate Judge.
The mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Ellen R. Ramsey-Kacena, Cedar Rapids, for appellant mother.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Kimberly A. Opatz of Linn County Advocate, Inc., Cedar Rapids, attorney
and guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Doyle and May, JJ.
2
POTTERFIELD, Presiding Judge.
The mother’s rights to these children were at issue at a termination-of-
parental-rights (TPR) hearing in November 2016. After an extended delay, the
juvenile court entered a written order in July 2018, terminating the mother’s
parental rights. The mother appealed, and in In re L.T., 924 521, 530 (Iowa
2019), our supreme court reversed the termination and remanded to the juvenile
court.1 The termination hearing on remand took place in April 2019, and the
juvenile court again found the grounds to terminate the mother’s parental rights.
The mother appeals, arguing the Iowa Department of Human Services (DHS)
failed to make reasonable efforts until the July 2018 termination order was
entered and termination of her rights is not in the children’s best interests. She
also asks for additional time to work toward reunification with the children.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The mother has a history of involvement with DHS and the juvenile court;
her parental rights to two other children were terminated in 2011. The mother’s
substance abuse, mental-health issues, and instability were at the heart of the
case.
DHS became involved with the mother in the present case in May 2015,
when D.T. was born testing positive for amphetamines. At that time, L.T. was
two years old and A.T. was one year old.
Both the mother and father tested positive for methamphetamine, and all
three children were placed in foster care. By Thanksgiving 2015, all three were
1
The father’s parental rights were also terminated following the first hearing; he did not
appeal and therefore was not part of the termination hearing after remand.
3
in the care of their foster mother, Samantha, who has remained their caretaker at
all times since.
The mother’s use of methamphetamine continued, and a hearing on the
petition for termination of the parental rights took place in November 2016. At
that hearing, the mother acknowledged using methamphetamine one week
earlier and stated she “absolutely” needed treatment for her abuse of
substances. The juvenile court deemed the matter submitted in late November.
The State sought to reopen the record, and its request was granted. At
the May 23, 2017 hearing for that purpose, the State admitted additional exhibits.
The mother testified she received notice she was approved for subsidized
housing. The mother was unemployed and, though she was attending
substance-abuse treatment, admitted to relapsing on methamphetamine in
February and April 2017 and not attending a drug screen one week earlier. At
the close of the hearing, the court stated from the bench that it was going to grant
the State’s petition to terminate the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(f), (g), and (h) (2016); the court noted a written order
would be entered.
In October 2017, the mother filed a motion asking that reasonable efforts
continue until a written termination order was entered. In the motion, the mother
maintained that, after receiving a final visit with the children following the court’s
statement from the bench, she did not have any other contact with the children
and was not otherwise receiving services. Specifically, the mother requested
ongoing visits and phone calls with the children, a family team meeting, drug
testing, and assistance with furnishing her new home.
4
On July 1, 2018, the mother filed a motion asking the court to allow her to
reopen the record to introduce evidence of her progress since the May 2017
hearing.
The juvenile court entered a written order terminating the mother’s
parental rights to L.T., A.T., and D.T. on July 27—approximately twenty months
after the November 2016 TPR hearing. The court also entered an order denying
the mother’s July 2018 request to reopen the record and October 2017 request
for reasonable efforts.
The mother appealed the juvenile court’s decision, and, in March 2019,
our supreme court determined the juvenile court’s decision to not reopen the
record for the mother was in error. L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 530. Based on this
conclusion, the supreme court reversed the termination of the mother’s parental
rights and remanded the case to the juvenile court to reopen the record. Id. at
527. Additionally, the supreme court concluded the statutory obligation of DHS
to make reasonable efforts “continues until either a final written termination order
or a waiver by the juvenile court” and ordered the juvenile court on remand to
“consider DHS’s efforts, or lack of efforts, in the period following the district
court’s termination hearing in determining whether the State has shown
reasonable efforts as part of its ultimate proof.” Id. at 530.
The TPR hearing on remand took place in late April 2019. At it, the
mother testified that she had maintained the same home since November 2017
with the help of a Section 8 voucher. The mother’s voucher had recently been
terminated when she failed to provide some necessary paperwork, and she
believed she would need to move to a more affordable home; she would have to
5
wait for five years to become eligible for another voucher. The mother testified
her sober date from methamphetamine was September 27, 2018—two months
after the written TPR order was entered. The mother did not have any evidence
of her recent sobriety; she did not take drug tests or have evidence of any
substance-abuse treatment she completed. The mother had a “goodbye visit”
with the children in July 2017; she did not have any contact with them afterward. 2
The mother was employed at a restaurant at the time of the hearing—a job she
had kept for about one year. She did not work regular hours and sometimes
went a couple weeks without working. The mother testified her volatile
relationship with the father was over, though she acknowledged they were still
legally married and that she had attempted to reconcile with him in August or
September 2018. Two DHS social workers testified—the worker assigned to the
children in September 2018 as their adoption worker, Katy, and the worker who
had been assigned to the family from June 2015 until September 2018, Laura.
Katy testified she had not provided any services to the mother since she took
over the case. Laura testified she did not provide or allow the mother to have
any visits with the children after the final June 2017 visit because she believed a
written termination order was imminent and that further contact between the
children and the mother, who was openly admitting to Laura that she continued
to use methamphetamine, was not in the children’s best interests. Laura also
testified she did not authorize further drug testing for the mother because at the
2
Both the mother and the foster mother testified about a time they saw each other at
Target while the children were with the foster mother. The mother shouted she loved the
children across the parking lot, but the children did not hear her and there was no other
interaction.
6
time the mother requested it as a “reasonable effort”—October 2017—the mother
was continuing to admit use, making drug tests unnecessary. Regarding the
mother’s request for help furnishing her home, Laura testified DHS does not
provide funding to parents to help furnish a home. In the months following the
court’s stated intention to terminate the mother’s parental rights, the mother
continued to reach out to Laura and the family’s service provider with questions
and for advice, and both Laura and the service provider met and spoke with the
mother.
Less than a week after the hearing on remand, the juvenile court entered
a written order. The court noted that the mother testified she participated in a
faith-based recovery organization for her substance abuse beginning in October
2018, but the only objective evidence she presented was a paper with the
heading “Results & Recommendations” that stated, “[The mother] has initiated
the assessment process and is anticipated to complete her evaluation October
22, 2018.” The document was signed and dated April 18, 2019. Per the juvenile
court,
What is glaringly absent is any documentation of dates attended or
progress toward discharge made, even though approximately six
months had passed since the time of the anticipated evaluation. . . .
Of particular concern is evaluating whether [the mother] is actually
in substance abuse treatment is that she was not able to articulate
any treatment goals, nor any idea as to when she would be
considered to discharge from treatment.
The court also considered whether the State provided reasonable services,
ruling:
In this case, considering the length of time [the mother] had been
given to work with the full spectrum of services, her admission to
continued use of methamphetamine, and lack of stability in other
areas such as housing and employment, it was reasonable after
7
one year and eleven months of services in the current case, plus
those given to address the same issues in the previous case, to
focus the efforts provided to the family on those needed by the
children for their long term stability and nurturing in a permanent
home with an adoptive family. The court, in May 2017, made this
change in focus clear by informing the parties of [its] intention to
grant the State’s Petition for Termination of Parental Rights.
The Court finds that reasonable and adequate services have
been provided to the family both in an attempt to achieve family
reunification and to achieve permanent placement for the children.
If [the mother] had been willing or able to address the issues with
the services provided, she could have clearly done so over all the
years that services have been provided. [The mother] was
additionally provided the opportunity for more intensive services
and supervision when she was accepted into Family Treatment
Court on September 25, 2015, but was discharged unsuccessfully
on July 28, 2016. As of May 2017, after what [DHS] believed to be
a valid verbal termination of the parent’s rights, services became
geared to the goal of adoption and focused strictly on the girls’
wellbeing and progress toward permanency through adoption. . . .
In addition, during the time between May 2017 and April
2019, at any point [the mother] reached out to any of the providers,
they met with her and offered advice and support on whatever
issues she needed to discuss. . . .
During the time period between May 2017 and April 2019,
services continued to be provided to the children to secure
permanent placement for them. They had a final visit with [the
mother], received counseling services, and regular visitation and
supervision by the adoption worker, Katy . . . . The court finds
these services to be reasonable under the specific facts of this
case. If the court had granted the Mother’s request to reopen the
record in July 2018, the testimony would show that [she] admitted
that she continued to regularly use methamphetamine, was not
actively involved in substance abuse treatment, had achieved
housing, and had sporadic employment. The children could not
have been returned to [the mother] without being subjected to
adjudicatory harm in July 2018, nor could they be returned now, or
in the reasonably near future.
The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa
Code section 232.116(1)(f) (L.T. and A.T.), (g) (all children), and (h) (D.T.).3
The mother appeals.
3
The juvenile court did not specify which sections it applied to which parent-child
relationship.
8
II. Standard of Review.
“We review termination proceedings de novo.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d
489, 492 (Iowa 2000). “The primary interest in termination proceedings is the
best interests of the children.” Id.
III. Discussion.
Here, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to
section 232.116(1)(f), (g), and (h). The mother does not specifically dispute any
of the elements of the paragraphs under which her rights were terminated. But
she does challenge whether the State fulfilled its obligation to make reasonable
efforts until the written termination order was entered in July 2018. Challenging
reasonable efforts implicates the fourth element of paragraphs (f) and (h). See
id. at 493 (“[T]he reasonable efforts requirement is not viewed as a strict
substantive requirement of termination. . . . The State must show reasonable
efforts as a part of its ultimate proof the child cannot be safely returned to the
care of a parent.”).
The State has the obligation to make reasonable efforts until the final
termination order is entered. See L.T., 924 N.W.2d at 528 (“We think the
reasonable efforts obligation runs until the juvenile court has entered a final
written order of termination.”). But those efforts do not necessarily have to be
aimed toward reunification of the children and parent, and under these facts and
circumstances, we cannot fault DHS for discontinuing such services. See id. at
528–29. At the time of the May 2017 hearing, the mother had almost two years
of services in the present case as well as additional services in her first case
involving the children to whom her rights were terminated in 2011; the mother
9
continued to have issues with substance abuse and instability and was not able
to parent the children. Moreover, at no time before the July 2018 termination
order was entered was the mother able to reunify with the children, as she
continued to use methamphetamine consistently until at least September 2018.
The mother maintains she should have been allowed to have visits and
phone calls with the children until the July 2018 TPR order. Visitation is not a
required part of reasonable efforts. See In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa
Ct. App. 1996) (considering reasonable efforts and noting, “Visitation, however,
cannot be considered in a vacuum”). And no evidence at the April 2019 hearing
indicated continuing visitation would have helped the mother be able to resume
caring for her children. See id. According to the juvenile court’s May 2017
statement from the bench:
The problem is, neither you or [the father] have really been able to
gain control of your addiction issues, and your substance abuse
issues, and, that, combined with mental health issues is the primary
reason that your children cannot be safely returned to your care.
It’s not about your ability to feed them the right food or to pay
attention to their needs, it’s about your continuous use of
substance. And I wish it were different, but it’s not.
Additionally, we credit the DHS worker’s statements that there was no value in
continuing to authorize drug testing for the mother as she readily admitted to her
use of substances throughout the time between May 2017 and the July 2018
order and that DHS does not have a service that includes giving parents funds
for furniture. It is unclear what the mother hoped to achieve with the requested
family-team meeting; without more, we cannot say this is a service DHS had to
provide in order to meet its reasonable-efforts mandate.
10
Although DHS discontinued services aimed at reunifying the mother and
the children, the family’s social worker and service provider continued to be
resources for the mother and continued to meet with her when she requested it
following the May 2017 statement from the court. And the children continued to
receive a number of services—both those aimed at permanency and their
adoption and also other services as needed, such as therapy services and
evaluations. Under these unique facts and circumstances, DHS met its burden
to make reasonable efforts.
Next, the mother claims termination of her parental rights is not in the
children’s best interests. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The mother asks us to
consider the bond she shared with the children at the time of the 2016 TPR
hearing.4 But we cannot ignore the reality of the children, who, at the time of the
hearing on remand, were ages six, five, and three years5 and had been in the
care of their foster mother approximately three and one-half years. See L.T., 924
N.W.2d at 529 (“Our caselaw has recognized that the interests of the child take
precedence over family reunification. Our primary concern in termination
proceedings has always been the best interests of the child.”). At the recent
hearing, testimony indicated the children are happy and well cared for in the
home of the foster mother. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b). The foster mother
has provided a safe, stable home for these children throughout the entirety of
4
Even if we could consider the facts and circumstances as they existed more than two
years ago, we would not be convinced the children were so bonded to their mother that
termination is not in their best interests. The children were ages three, two, and one
years at the time of the first termination hearing and had been out of the mother’s care
for approximately fourteen months.
5
D.T. was one month shy of turning four at the time of the hearing on remand.
11
these proceedings; it is in their best interests to remain in the home without
disruption.
Finally, the mother argues she should be given additional time—with the
resumption of services geared toward reunification—to show she can parent the
children safely. She maintains additional time would allow her to prove her
sobriety. The extended duration of these proceedings is not the fault of the
mother, but she failed to make use of the delay. By her own admission, she
continued to use methamphetamine regularly during the nearly twenty months
between the termination hearing in November 2016 and the entry of the written
ruling in July 2018. The proceedings of this case have been somewhat
extended, but our maxims hold true: childhood is short and does not await the
wanderings of the judicial process. In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987).
Children deserve permanency sooner rather than later. See In re J.L.W., 570
N.W.2d 778, 781 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997), overruled on other grounds by In re P.L.,
778 N.W.2d 33, 39 (Iowa 2010).
We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.