NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUL 24 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AVON DAVIES, No. 18-16848
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:14-cv-02831-MCE-
CKD
v.
CROSSON, Dr., MEMORANDUM*
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Morrison C. England, Jr., District Judge, Presiding
Submitted July 15, 2019**
Before: SCHROEDER, SILVERMAN, and CLIFTON, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Avon Davies appeals pro se from the district court’s
summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review de novo. Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Davies failed
to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendant was deliberately
indifferent to Davies’s eye-related medical issues. See id. at 1057-60 (a prison
official is deliberately indifferent only if he or she knows of and disregards an
excessive risk to inmate health; medical malpractice, negligence, or a difference of
opinion concerning the course of treatment does not amount to deliberate
indifference).
We reject as unsupported by the record Davies’s contentions that he alleged
a due process claim and that the district court erred by failing to consider it.
To the extent Davies appeals the district court’s September 21, 2017 order
denying his motion for a preliminary injunction, it was previously affirmed by this
court in Davies v. Crosson, 731 Fed. App’x 681 (9th Cir. 2018), and cannot be
reexamined. See S. Or. Barter Fair v. Jackson County, 372 F.3d 1128, 1136 (9th
Cir. 2004) (“The law of the case doctrine . . . precludes a court from reexamining
an issue previously decided by the same court . . . .”).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED.
2 18-16848