Townsend v. City of Chicago

2019 IL App (1st) 180771
No. 1-18-0771

SECOND DIVISION
July 25, 2019

______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

MICHAEL TOWNSEND, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of Cook County.
Plaintiff-Appellant, )
)
v. ) No. 16L1968
)
RICKY ANDERSON; DARRYL WARE; ROBIN ) The Honorable
BEAVERS; THE CITY OF CHICAGO, a ) Judge Kathy Flanagan,
Municipal Corporation; JAMES ) Judge Presiding.
LEWANDOWSKI; BRIAN WARCHOL; and )
JASON MARTINO )
)
Defendants )
)
(The City of Chicago, James Lewandowski, Brian )
Warchol, and Jason Martino, Defendants- )
Appellees). )

______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Mason concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Hyman dissented, with opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Plaintiff Michael Townsend was injured in a car accident when the vehicle in which he

was a passenger was struck by another vehicle driven by a man who had fled the scene of a

traffic stop effectuated by several Chicago police officers. Townsend subsequently filed suit
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against the City of Chicago and the three of the City’s police officers who involved in the traffic

stop and subsequent apprehension of the fleeing driver: Brian Warchol, Jason Martino, and

James Lewandowski (collectively “defendants”). Defendants, in turn, filed a motion for

summary judgment, arguing that they were immune from liability pursuant to the Local

Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort Immunity Act) (745 ILCS

10/1-101 et seq. (West 2014)). The circuit court granted the motion, finding that defendants were

immune from liability pursuant to section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/4-

106(b) (West 2014)), a provision that immunizes public entities and their employees from

liability for injuries inflicted by escaped or escaping prisoners. On appeal, Townsend argues that

the circuit court erred in finding that his injuries were inflicted by an escaping prisoner and in

granting defendants’ motion for summary judgment. For the reasons explained herein, we affirm

the judgment of the circuit court.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On March 2, 2015, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Chicago police officers Pete Higgins and

James Lewandowski effectuated a traffic stop on a red 2007 Toyota Solara near 1227 West

Garfield Boulevard. At the time of the traffic stop, the vehicle contained four male occupants:

Arieus Fitch, the driver; Darwin Walls, the front seat passenger; and Ricky Anderson and Cory

Williams, the two backseat passengers. During the course of the traffic stop, after Fitch and

Walls had exited the vehicle and were both handcuffed by the officers, Anderson slipped into the

Solara’s driver’s seat and drove away from the scene. Several minutes later, Anderson struck

another motor vehicle driven by Vernard Chapman near the intersection of Normal Boulevard

and 63rd Street. Anderson and Williams were subsequently apprehended by Officers Warchol

and Martino, who arrived at the scene of the crash shortly after the impact. Townsend, who was a

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passenger in Chapman’s vehicle at the time of the crash, sustained a number of injuries as a

result of the collision, including head, neck, back, shoulder, and hand pain.

¶4 Townsend subsequently filed suit against the City of Chicago and several of the City’s

police officers, alleging that the officers engaged in a wrongful and unsafe pursuit of Anderson,

which caused Anderson to drive erratically and resulted in him striking Chapman’s vehicle and

injuring plaintiff. Specifically, in Townsend’s second amended complaint, he included claims of

willful and wanton conduct against Officers Lewandowski, Warchol, and Martino. Townsend

also included a willful and wanton conduct claim against the City, citing the conduct of its

employees in engaging in the unsafe pursuit. 1 In addition to the aforementioned defendants,

Townsend also named several other individuals as defendants in his second amended complaint,

including Anderson. 2

¶5 Defendants, in turn, filed a written answer and an amendment thereto. In their amended

answer, defendants invoked various provisions of the Tort Immunity Act, including section 4-

106(b), which immunizes public entities and public employees from liability for “[a]ny injury

inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.” 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2014).

¶6 The parties then engaged in discovery. In their discovery depositions, Officers Higgins

and Lewandowski testified that they were on patrol when they encountered the red Solara driving

eastbound on 55th Street. Because it was dusk and the vehicle was operating without its

headlights illuminated, the officers curbed the vehicle. Officer Higgins approached the driver’s

side of the vehicle, and Officer Lewandowski approached the front passenger’s side of the

1
Townsend also included a spoliation of evidence claim against the City in his second amended
complaint. The basis for the claim was the City’s purported failure to properly retain the global
positioning system tracking data from the police cars involved in the alleged pursuit. On appeal, he raises
no argument concerning the circuit court’s ruling on his spoliation of evidence claim, and as such, we
need not discuss that claim any further.
2
Because the other defendants and the claims advanced against them are not relevant to this
appeal, we will not address those claims in this disposition.

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vehicle. When Fitch, the driver of the Solara, was unable to produce a driver’s license, Officer

Higgins ordered him out of the vehicle and handcuffed him. Officer Lewandowski, in turn,

noticed Walls, the front seat passenger, making furtive movements toward the floor of the

vehicle and observed an opened container of alcohol near his person. As such, Officer

Lewandowski ordered Walls out of the vehicle and began handcuffing him. At that point, Officer

Higgins observed Anderson “jump[ ]” into the driver’s seat and alerted his partner that Anderson

“was getting in the front seat.” When Officer Lewandowski looked over, Anderson was “already

in the front seat and he was putting the car in gear and trying to take off while [Officer Higgins]

was grabbing at him.” Officer Higgins explained that he grabbed at Anderson because neither of

the two backseat passengers was free to leave at that point. In response to Officer Higgins’s

efforts to “grab at him,” Anderson said “something *** like [‘]why are you grabbing me.[’] ”

Officer Higgins testified that Anderson was ultimately able to elude his efforts to restrain him

and that he “dropped the car in gear and took off eastbound on 55th Street.” Officer Higgins then

relayed what had occurred over his radio, providing details about the fleeing car and the direction

in which it was heading.

¶7 Shortly after making the radio broadcast, the officers’ watch commander “gave a

termination order,” which Officer Anderson described as “an order from a supervisor saying not

to pursue or not to chase a vehicle.” Accordingly, Officers Anderson and Lewandowski did not

immediately follow the Solara; rather, they remained at the scene where they had handcuffed

Fitch and Walls. Approximately five minutes later, they heard a radio broadcast that Anderson

and Williams were in custody. At that point, they relocated to the scene where Anderson and

Williams had been detained by Officers Martino and Warchol after the Solara had struck another

vehicle. The accident site was approximately two miles away from the scene of the initial traffic

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stop. Upon arriving at the scene, the officers confirmed that the two men in custody were the

occupants of the fleeing car.

¶8 Neither Officer Anderson nor Officer Lewandowski had any firsthand knowledge as to

whether Officers Martino and Warchol had been engaged in a “pursuit” of the Solara at the time

of the accident. Officer Anderson explained that, if the officers were simply in the general area

when they encountered the vehicle, there was no “pursuit.” He emphasized that a pursuit

termination order does not preclude officers from driving in a safe manner without their lights

and sirens activated to the area in which a suspect was last seen and looking for him. He did not

recall hearing sirens or observing flashing lights at the scene of the crash. Similarly, Officer

Lewandowki explained that, pursuant to his understanding of department policy, whether a

“pursuit” occurs “depends on the circumstances” and that officers who observe a vehicle

matching a radio broadcast description may follow behind that vehicle in an effort to confirm the

identity of the vehicle or the suspects without necessarily “pursuing” the vehicle.

¶9 In their discovery depositions, Officers Warchol and Martino testified that they were on

patrol in the same general vicinity of the aforementioned traffic stop when they heard a radio

dispatch message relaying that a vehicle that had been stopped by another unit had fled from the

scene. A short time later, the officers observed a vehicle matching the description of the red

Solara from the dispatch message. According to Officer Warchol, the vehicle was driving

eastbound on Garfield Boulevard at a “high rate of speed.” Neither officer, however, was able to

estimate the rate of speed at which the Solara was traveling. At the time of the sighting, the

officers were stopped at a red light on an unknown “north-south street.” When the light changed,

Officer Warchol, the driver of the patrol vehicle, turned onto Garfield and traveled east. By that

time, however, the Solara had turned southbound onto another street, and the officers lost sight

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of the vehicle. Officer Warchol contacted dispatch about the sighting and relayed the direction in

which the vehicle was traveling. After losing sight of the vehicle, the officers continued driving

around the area. Officer Warchol could not recall if he activated his vehicle’s lights and sirens,

but he testified that it was not his standard practice to “automatically throw [his] lights and

sirens” on. Officer Warchol testified that, at the time they were looking for the vehicle, he was

not driving in excess of the speed limit. Officer Martino estimated that they were actually

traveling “at or below” the posted speed limit because they were looking down intersections to

see if they could spot the Solara. During their search, the officers “happened upon” the accident

site. The officers did not observe the actual collision. When they arrived at the scene, the Solara

was unoccupied. Eyewitnesses informed them that Anderson and Walls had fled on foot

eastbound on 63rd Street. Officers Warchol and Martino ultimately apprehended the two men,

who had boarded a Chicago Transit Authority bus located several blocks away. Other officers

arrived at the accident scene shortly thereafter.

¶ 10 Both officers denied that they were engaged in a “pursuit” of the Solara prior to the

accident. Officer Warchol emphasized that “there’s a difference between following somebody

and pursuing somebody.” According to Officer Warchol, a pursuit occurs when an officer

follows a vehicle that is not complying with the officer’s active efforts to curb the vehicle. In this

case, however, he and his partner lost sight of the vehicle shortly after encountering it. They then

came upon the accident site after driving around the area in which they had last seen the Solara.

Officer Martino, in turn, emphasized that their conduct was not in contravention of their

department’s pursuit termination policy, explaining that a termination order does not preclude

officers from being “diligent” and “touring the area” in an effort to observe a suspect vehicle and

its occupants.

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¶ 11 An incident report completed by law enforcement personnel following the arrest of

Anderson and Williams reveals that cannabis was recovered from Williams’s pants pocket.

Officers also recovered a loaded, unregistered, .45-caliber handgun. Anderson and Fitch were

both subsequently charged with traffic offenses, and Williams was charged with possession of a

controlled substance. Walls, in turn, was ultimately released without charges.

¶ 12 Various lay witnesses were also deposed during the discovery process and provided

details about the events that transpired on the evening of March 2, 2015. Charles Johnson

testified that he was traveling east on 55th Street that evening when he observed a red car that

had been curbed by a police truck. Shortly thereafter, he saw the red car “barreling down” behind

him. As the red car tried to maneuver around him, the car sideswiped the passenger side of his

vehicle. Johnson estimated that the vehicle was traveling approximately 60 miles per hour.

Approximately 40 seconds to 1 minute later, Johnson observed a police truck drive past him and

travel in the same direction of the red vehicle. He did not know if the truck that was following

the car was the same one that he observed at the traffic stop, but he testified that the truck

appeared to be the same model as the police truck he had seen earlier. He estimated that the

police truck was traveling at approximately 45 to 50 miles per hour. Johnson did not recall

whether the police truck’s lights and sirens were activated. After he was sideswiped, Johnson

pulled into a nearby gas station, called 911, and reported what had occurred.

¶ 13 During his discovery deposition, Townsend recalled that he and his friend Vernard

Chapman were traveling south on Normal when he felt an impact and heard a “boom” as a red

car struck the rear passenger side of Chapman’s vehicle. The red car then continued on and hit a

parked car and a light pole. Townsend, who was sitting in the front passenger seat of Chapman’s

car at the time of the impact, hit his head on the door frame. He did not recall observing any

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police vehicles prior to the accident but testified that one “zoomed up *** right after the

accident.” He estimated that the police car arrived two to three seconds after the impact.

Townsend did not recall whether the police car had its lights and sirens activated. Shortly after

that police car arrived at the scene, “quite a few” other police cars arrived at the crash site.

¶ 14 Darryl Ware, owner of the parked car damaged by the Solara, talked to a police officer

who was in the area shortly after the accident. He was told that his car was damaged during the

course of an “auto theft chase.”

¶ 15 Townsend’s friend, Chapman, was not deposed but submitted an affidavit. In his

affidavit, Chapman averred that his vehicle was struck by a red car traveling south on Normal “at

a very high rate of speed.” A police truck also operating “at a high rate of speed” arrived at the

scene “within a couple of seconds” of the accident. The truck “had its lights activated.” Chapman

further averred that he heard police sirens before the accident.

¶ 16 After completing the aforementioned discovery, defendants filed a motion for summary

judgment. In the motion, defendants again asserted that they were entitled to immunity pursuant

to section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act because Anderson was an “escaped prisoner” at the

time of the traffic accident and, thus, they could not be subject to liability for Townsend’s

injuries. Alternatively, defendants argued that there was no evidence that they proximately

caused the accident and Townsend’s injuries. They noted that Anderson had not been deposed

and, as such, there was no evidence as to why he fled the scene of the traffic stop, why he

traveled at a high rate of speed, or whether he ever saw any police officers following him.

¶ 17 In response to defendants’ motion, Townsend disputed the applicability of section 4-

106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. He also argued that there were genuine issues of material fact

as to whether the defendant officers had been engaged in a dangerous and unauthorized high-

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speed pursuit of Anderson at the time of the accident and whether their conduct was a proximate

cause of his injuries.

¶ 18 In a detailed written order, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

In doing so, the court initially found that there was “conflicting” evidence “as to whether a

pursuit occurred” and “whether any acts on the part of the City and the officers proximately

caused the accident.” As such, the court rejected defendants’ argument that lack of probable

cause was a basis to enter summary judgment in their favor. The court, however, found that

defendants were nonetheless immune from liability because Anderson was an “escaping

prisoner” within the meaning of section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act at the time that he

caused Townsend’s injuries. The court reasoned:

“Here, the police curbed a vehicle and began to question the occupants. The officers

were in the process of handcuffing the driver and front seat passenger, when a backseat

passenger, Anderson, jumped into the driver’s seat to get away. The testimony of both

Officer Higgins and Officer Lewandowski indicates that as Anderson got into the driver’s

seat, Officer Higgins grabbed him to stop him from leaving, but then he stepped on the

gas and fled. Even applying the broadest interpretation of ‘custody,’ Anderson was a

prisoner attempting to escape within the meaning of section 4-106. Consequently, the

injuries the Plaintiff sustained from the collision with the vehicle that Anderson was

driving were caused by an escaping prisoner, and the immunity afforded under section 4-

106 applies. On the basis of the application of this immunity, summary judgment in favor

of the City of Chicago and the individual officers would be appropriate.”

¶ 19 This appeal followed.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 21 On appeal, Townsend argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that Ricky

Anderson was an “escaping prisoner” pursuant to the Tort Immunity Act and in granting

defendants’ motion for summary judgment.

¶ 22 Defendants, in turn, respond that the court properly found that they were immune from

liability under the Tort Immunity Act because the record clearly establishes that Anderson was

an escaping prisoner when he fled the scene of a traffic stop, struck another vehicle, and caused

Townsend’s injuries.

¶ 23 Summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on

file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c)

(West 2014). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, a court must construe the pleadings,

depositions, admissions, and affidavits strictly against the moving party to determine whether a

genuine issue of material fact exists. Williams v. Manchester, 228 Ill. 2d 404, 417 (2008). A

genuine issue of fact exists where the material relevant facts in the case are disputed or where

reasonable persons could draw different inferences and conclusions from undisputed facts.

Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004). To survive a motion for summary

judgment, the nonmoving party need not prove his case at this preliminary stage of litigation;

however, the plaintiff must present some evidentiary facts, not mere speculation or conjecture, to

support each element of his cause of action, which would arguably entitle him to a judgment.

Garcia v. Nelson, 326 Ill. App. 3d 33, 38 (2001); Peters v. R. Carlson & Sons, Inc., 2016 IL App

(1st) 153539, ¶ 13; Richardson v. Bond Drug Co. of Illinois, 387 Ill. App. 3d 881 (2009).

Although summary judgment has been deemed a “drastic means of disposing of litigation”

(Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229, 240 (1986)), it is nonetheless an appropriate mechanism to

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employ to expeditiously dispose of a lawsuit when the moving party’s right to a judgment in its

favor is clear and free from doubt (Morris v. Margulis, 197 Ill. 2d 28, 35 (2001)). The circuit

court’s ruling on a motion for summary judgment is subject to de novo review. Weather-Tite,

Inc. v. University of St. Francis, 233 Ill. 2d 385, 389 (2009).

¶ 24 The Tort Immunity Act was enacted by the Illinois legislature in 1965 in response to the

Illinois Supreme Court’s abolishment of the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity in its

decision in Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 20 (1959).

Zimmerman v. Village of Skokie, 183 Ill. 2d 30, 43 (1998). Pursuant to that common-law

doctrine, governmental entities were “afforded blanket immunity from all tort liability.” Id. In

enacting the Tort Immunity Act, the legislature “adopted the general principle from Molitor ‘that

local governmental units are liable in tort but limited this with an extensive list of immunities

based on specific government functions.’ ” Id. (quoting Burdine v. Village of Glendale Heights,

139 Ill. 2d 501, 506 (1990)). The various immunities afforded to governmental entities pursuant

to the Tort Immunity Act essentially serve as affirmative defenses, which if properly raised and

proven by a public entity, bar a plaintiff’s right to recover for a tort claim (id. at 44) and

“ ‘ “prevent the diversion of public funds from their intended purpose to the payment of damages

claims” ’ ” (DeSmet v. County of Rock Island, 219 Ill. 2d 497, 505 (2006) (quoting Village of

Bloomingdale v. CDG Enterprises, Inc., 196 Ill. 2d 484, 490 (2001), quoting Bubb v. Springfield

School District 186, 167 Ill. 2d 372, 378 (1995))). One of the immunities set forth in the Tort

Immunity Act that “protect[s] local public entities and public employees from liability arising

from the operation of government” (745 ILCS 10/1-101.1(a) (West 2014)) is the “escaped or

escaping prisoner” provision set forth in section 4-106(b) (745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2014)).

That provision provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]either a local public entity nor a public

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employee is liable for *** [a]ny injury inflicted by an escaped or escaping prisoner.” 745 ILCS

10/4-106(b) (West 2014).

¶ 25 The Tort Immunity Act’s “escaped or escaping prisoner” provision was discussed in

detail by the supreme court in Reis v. City of Chicago, 242 Ill. 2d 205 (2011). In that case, a

Chicago police officer placed Demario Lowe, a man who was suspected of fleeing the scene of

an accident, in the backseat of a squad car. While he was left briefly unsupervised, Lowe, who

had not been handcuffed, managed to gain control of the police car and drove away from the

scene. Officers subsequently pursued the fleeing vehicle, and during the course of that pursuit,

Lowe struck another vehicle. The occupants of the vehicle were injured and subsequently

brought suit against the City of Chicago. The cause subsequently proceeded to a jury trial, which

resulted in a verdict in the plaintiffs’ favor. Following the circuit court’s denial of the City’s

motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the City appealed and argued that it could not

be held liable for the plaintiffs’ injuries because their injuries were caused by an escaping

prisoner within the meaning of section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act. Id. at 208-12.

¶ 26 Upon review, our supreme court agreed with the City that it was immune from liability

for plaintiffs’ injuries, concluding that Lowe had been a prisoner who escaped police custody at

the time that he stole the police vehicle and caused the accident. In doing so, the court began

with the recognition that “[t]he Act does not require a formal arrest or imprisonment, but rather

defines ‘prisoner’ as a ‘person held in custody.’ ” Id. at 216 (quoting 745 ILCS 10/4-101 (West

2008)). After noting that the Tort Immunity Act did not define the term “custody,” the court

referred to Black’s Law Dictionary. The court noted:

“Black’s defines [custody] as ‘the detention of a person by virtue of lawful process or

authority.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 442 (9th ed. 2009). Black’s further defines ‘physical

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custody’ as ‘custody of a person (such as an arrestee) whose freedom is directly

controlled and limited.’ Black’s Law Dictionary 1263 (9th ed. 2009). *** [A]n earlier

edition of Black’s explained that ‘ “The term [custody] is very elastic and may mean

actual imprisonment or physical detention or mere power, legal or physical, of

imprisoning or of taking manual possession.” ’ ” Id. at 216 (quoting People v. Campa,

217 Ill. 2d 243, 254 (2005), quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 347 (5th ed. 1979))).

¶ 27 After reviewing dictionary definitions, the court then looked at how the term “custody”

had been applied in different legal contexts. For example, in the context of the speedy trial

statute, the court noted that the term “custody” was construed to be sufficiently broad to include

a defendant who was in a day reporting center program. Id. at 216-17 (citing Campa, 217 Ill. 2d

at 255). Moreover, the court noted that, “[i]n the Miranda context [(Miranda v. Arizona, 384

U.S. 436 (1966))], in which custodial interrogation triggers the requirement of the Miranda

warnings, a person is considered in custody when a reasonable person would have felt that he or

she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Id. at 217 (citing People v.

Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d 492, 506 (2003)).

¶ 28 Ultimately, after considering the aforementioned sources and authorities, the court

concluded: “If the legislature had meant the term ‘custody’ to be so restrictive as to include only

imprisonment, the legislature almost certainly would have used the term ‘imprisonment’

instead.” Id. Although the court found it unnecessary to determine how broadly the term

“custody” could be construed, it determined that that the term was “certainly broad enough” to

encompass the scenario at issue. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that Lowe was in custody

when he was placed in the back of the squad car. At that point, his freedom of movement was

limited, and no reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Id. Because Lowe was in

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custody, he “met the definition of a prisoner under the statute,” and he was thus an escaping

prisoner at the time that he stole the police car, struck plaintiffs’ vehicle, and caused their

injuries. Id. at 218. Therefore, the court determined that the City was immune from liability

pursuant to section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act.

¶ 29 Both parties rely on Reis to support their respective claims. Townsend notes that

Anderson, unlike Lowe, was not under arrest and placed in the back of a police car at the time

that he absconded with a vehicle and caused a traffic accident. He emphasizes that “Anderson

was never told that he was suspected of committing any crime and, in fact, was never even

spoken to by either officer.” Defendants acknowledge that Anderson had not been arrested when

he fled the scene of the traffic stop, but they submit that he was nonetheless in custody at that

time because no reasonable person in his position would have felt free to leave the scene of the

traffic stop. In support, defendants note that Anderson was sitting in the “back seat of a car that

had been pulled over by police, with both the driver and front seat passenger physically

restrained by the officers at the scene. At that point, the car and its occupants were under the

officers’ control.”

¶ 30 Upon review, we agree with defendants. Initially, we note that neither Anderson nor any

of the other three occupants of the Solara at the time of the traffic stop have been deposed.

Accordingly, the only accounts of the circumstances of the traffic stop contained in the record

are the accounts provided by Officers Higgins and Lewandowski. We reiterate that, in order to

survive a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff need not prove his case at this preliminary

stage of litigation; however, he must nonetheless present some evidentiary facts, not mere

speculation or conjecture, to support his cause of action. Garcia, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 38. Here,

given Townsend’s failure to provide a competing account of the traffic stop and the events that

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transpired during that stop, this court’s review is necessarily limited to the uncontradicted

accounts provided by Officers Higgins and Lewandowski.

¶ 31 According to the deposition testimony provided by those officers, they curbed the Solara

because it was operating without its headlights illuminated. After effectuating the stop, Officers

Higgins and Lewandowski took positions on both sides of the vehicle, with Officer Higgins

approaching the driver’s side and Officer Lewandowski approaching the passenger’s side of the

car. The positioning of the officers effectively curtailed Anderson’s and the other three

occupants’ freedom of movement. 3 See Reis, 242 Ill. 2d at 217 (explaining that an individual is

in custody for purposes of the Tort Immunity Act when his “freedom of movement had been

directly controlled and limited” by an officer’s exercise of his “lawful authority”). Shortly after

approaching the vehicle, the officers then ordered Fitch, the driver of the vehicle, and Walls, the

front seat passenger, out of the Solara and placed both men in handcuffs. Officer Higgins

handcuffed Fitch when he was unable to produce a valid driver’s license, and Officer

Lewandowski, in turn, handcuffed Walls when he observed Walls make several furtive

movements and observed an open container of alcohol near his person.

¶ 32 Although it is true that there was no evidence that the officers suspected Anderson, one of

the backseat passengers, of any criminal activity at that point, we do not believe that a reasonable

person in his position would have objectively felt free to leave, given that two of the four

occupants of the vehicle were physically restrained and the traffic stop had not yet concluded. Id.

(a finding that an individual is in custody is supported by the fact that no reasonable person in his

position would have felt free to leave). Indeed, courts reviewing traffic stops have recognized
3
We note that neither officer specified whether the 2007 Solara was a two-door or a four-door
vehicle. Moreover, the parties do not discuss the specific design of the car. A Wikipedia search reveals
that the second generation Toyota Solara was manufactured between 2003 and 2008. Pictures of the
second generation model depict a two-door design. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Toyota_Camry_
Solara (last visited July 23, 2019) [https://perma.cc/FXM4-WXED].

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that police officers exercise control over all of the occupants of a vehicle that is subjected to a

traffic stop. See, e.g., Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 257 (2007) (recognizing that

“during a traffic stop an officer seizes everyone in the vehicle, not just the driver” because “[a]

traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passenger has chosen just as much as it halts the

driver, diverting both from the stream of traffic to the side of the road”); People v. Johnson, 408

Ill. App. 3d 107, 119 (2010) (“[T]he rule is clear that when an automobile is apprehended for a

traffic stop, police have valid right to detain passengers as well as the driver.”). Given the

exercise of police authority during a traffic stop, courts have further recognized that a reasonable

passenger involved in a traffic stop would not feel free to leave before the stop is concluded and

permission to depart is given. See Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 257 (explaining that “[a]n officer who

orders one particular car to pull over acts with an implicit claim of right based on fault of some

sort, and a sensible person would not expect a police officer to allow people to come and go

freely from the physical focal point of an investigation into faulty behavior or wrongdoing. If the

likely wrongdoing is not the driving, the passenger will reasonably feel subject to suspicion

owing to close association; but even when the wrongdoing is only bad driving, the passenger will

expect to be subject to some scrutiny, and his attempt to leave the scene would be so obviously

likely to prompt an objection from the officer that no passenger would feel free to leave in the

first place.”); see also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 333 (2009) (recognizing “[a] lawful

roadside stop begins when a vehicle is pulled over for investigation of a traffic violation. The

temporary seizure of a driver and passengers ordinarily continues, and remains reasonable, for

the duration of the stop. Normally, the stop ends when the police have no further need to control

the scene, and inform the driver and passengers they are free to leave.”). Although we are not

equating the term “custody” as used in the Tort Immunity Act with “seizures,” we nonetheless

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find that the aforementioned fourth amendment jurisprudence provides further support for our

conclusion that Anderson, as a passenger subjected to an ongoing vehicle stop in which both the

driver and front seat passenger had been handcuffed, would not have reasonably felt free to leave

the scene of that stop.

¶ 33 Moreover, Anderson’s own conduct supports the conclusion that he did not subjectively

feel free to simply exit the Solara and walk away from the scene of the traffic stop. Instead of

doing so, Anderson maneuvered into the driver’s seat when the officers’ attention was diverted,

evaded Officer Higgins’s attempts to “grab at” him, and drove away at a high rate of speed.

Based on Officer Higgins’s uncontradicted deposition testimony, Anderson was evidently aware

of the officer’s efforts to physically restrain him after relocating to the driver’s seat because

Anderson inquired “why” Officer Higgins was attempting to do so. The mere fact that Anderson

had not been handcuffed or formally arrested prior to fleeing the scene of the traffic stop does

not, as Townsend appears to suggest, preclude a finding that he was in custody within the

meaning of section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act because the term is not limited to

situations involving “formal arrest or imprisonment.” Reis, 242 Ill. 2d at 216 (citing 745 ILCS

10/4-101 (West 2008)).

¶ 34 Ultimately, given the elasticity afforded to the term, we conclude that Anderson was in

custody at the time that he fled the scene of the ongoing traffic stop and that he was thus an

escaping prisoner when he caused the traffic accident that resulted in Townsend’s injuries.

Although we acknowledge that the record contains discrepant evidence as to whether there was

an unauthorized police “pursuit” of the Solara, these discrepancies have no bearing on the key

issue concerning Anderson’s status as an escaped or escaping prisoner. As our supreme court

noted, “[t]he legislature chose not to focus on the conduct of law enforcement officials in

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enacting [section 4-106(b) of the Tort Immunity Act], but rather worded it broadly to provide

immunity for all injuries inflicted by escaping prisoners.” Id. at 219. Because Townsend’s

injuries were caused by an escaping prisoner within the meaning of section 4-106(b) of the Tort

Immunity Act, there is no genuine issue of material fact that defendants are immune from

liability. The circuit court thus properly granted their motion for summary judgment.

¶ 35 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 36 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 37 Affirmed.

¶ 38 JUSTICE HYMAN, dissenting:

¶ 39 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Anderson was in custody for

purposes of the Tort Immunity Act. The parties and the majority look to Ries v. City of Chicago,

242 Ill. 2d 205 (2011), as the centerpiece of the analysis, but Ries does not provide as much

guidance as they suggest. Certainly the supreme court in Ries thought so by not answering the

question about how to define custody. Id. at 217 (“For purposes of this case, it is not necessary to

define how broad the term ‘custody’ may be ***.”). The court went on to expressly limit its

conclusion to the facts before it. Id. (however defined, the word custody “is certainly broad

enough to include situations such as this”). Nonetheless, the situation in Ries differs considerably

from the situation here.

¶ 40 In Ries, an officer went to put gas in his supervisor’s car. Id. at 208. He saw a group of

people standing around a man, Demario Lowe, who members of the group said had been

involved in a traffic accident and had tried to flee the scene. Id. The officer put Lowe in the back

of his squad car. Id. Lowe was not handcuffed, and the car did not have a screen separating the

back and the front, so he was able to get to the front and drive away. Id. As Lowe drove away,

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the supervisor arrived and pursued Lowe. Id. During the pursuit, Lowe hit several parked cars

and eventually blew a red light and hit the plaintiff’s car, causing injuries to the plaintiff. Id.

¶ 41 The escapee in Ries knew he was under suspicion of a crime, having been identified to

the officer as attempting to leave the scene of an accident. See 625 ILCS 5/11-402(a) (West

2008) (leaving scene of accident with vehicle damage a Class A misdemeanor). Here, the

officers made no indication to Anderson or the other backseat passenger that they were the

subjects of suspicion. The driver had been pulled over for a traffic infraction, and only the front

seat passenger had been asked to get out of the car. The officer in Ries moved the escapee to the

squad car, a location within the officer’s control. Here, the officers left Anderson in the car in

which he had originally been riding. The majority also suggests that Anderson was “aware of the

officer’s efforts to physically restrain him” because he asked “why” they were attempting to do

so. In my view, this connotes Anderson’s belief that he was otherwise free to leave, as he

expressed surprise at the officer’s efforts to detain him.

¶ 42 The majority correctly points out that the evidence in the record limits our review, but at

the summary judgment stage we are to construe that evidence against the moving party (the

City). Keating v. 68th & Paxton, LLC, 401 Ill. App. 3d 456, 470 (2010) (evidence viewed “in the

light most favorable to the nonmoving party”). Given the record we have, construing the

evidence in Townsend’s favor requires us to presume Anderson’s questioning of the officer, and

even the simple act of his driving away, indicate a belief that he was free to leave.

¶ 43 I do not believe our supreme court directly imported the “free to leave” custody standard

into the escaped prisoner provision of the Tort Immunity Act to the extent of the majority’s

interpretation. The court alluded to this possibility in Reis by citing cases that define custody in

the context of an officer’s requirement to give Miranda warnings (see People v. Braggs, 209 Ill.

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2d 492 (2003)) and the speedy trial statute. See People v. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d 243 (2005),

abrogated on other grounds by People v. Clark, 2019 IL 122891. These standards do not work

so well for the purpose of defining “custody” as it is used in the Tort Immunity Act.

¶ 44 To determine whether a person is held in “custody” for the purpose of requiring Miranda

warnings, asking whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave is only half of a two-part

test. Braggs, 209 Ill. 2d at 506. Before even asking that question, a court must determine whether

the circumstances surrounding an interrogation indicate a custodial event. Id. Our supreme court

has enumerated at least 11 factors that go into this calculation. Id. In other words, “custody” in

the context of Miranda warnings becomes largely self-defining. See id. (“a court should first

ascertain and examine the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, and then ask if, given

those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he or she was not at liberty to ***

leave” (emphasis added)). The 11 factors inform the analysis of whether a person is free to leave.

Indeed, those 11 factors are related to the precise ills that Miranda sought to remedy—an overly

coercive interrogation. These factors are not helpful in the context of the Tort Immunity Act,

which uses “custody” in a different sense.

¶ 45 Broader definitions of custody, employed by our supreme court in Campa, also fall short.

For example, one of the definitions of “custody” is “ ‘control of a thing or person with such

actual or constructive possession as fulfills the purpose of the law or duty requiring it.’ ”

(Emphasis added.) Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 253 (quoting Webster’s Third New International

Dictionary 559 (1993)). Legal dictionaries split custody into two types: “physical custody,”

requiring a subject’s freedom to be “ ‘directly controlled and limited’ ” (emphasis added), and

“constructive custody,” only requiring a subject’s freedom to be “ ‘controlled by legal

authority’ ” without direct physical control. Id. at 253-54 (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 412,

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1193 (8th ed. 2004)). The court in Campa found that the definition of custody is “elastic” and

can “encompass lesser forms of restraint than confinement.” Id. at 254.

¶ 46 The facts of Campa give us some idea of what a “lesser form” of confinement looks like

and, again, involve a much greater restriction of liberty than the officers’ actions here. In Campa,

the defendant was required to report to a day reporting program as a condition of his bail. Id. at

245-46. As part of the program, he was required to report Monday through Friday from 8 a.m.

until 1:30 p.m. Id. at 246. In finding the program constituted an example of “custody,” the court

emphasized that the program required participants to “adhere to a schedule and engage in

productive activities,” subjected the participants to mandatory drug testing, and mandated

anywhere from three to nine hours of physical presence at the center each day. Id. at 254-55. In

Campa, as in Ries, a critical aspect of “custody” incorporates notice to the person subject to

custody that he or she is under “ ‘a legal duty to submit.’ ” (Emphasis omitted.) Campa, 217 Ill.

2d at 257 (quoting People v. Simmons, 88 Ill. 2d 270, 273-74 (1981)). As I have said, no notice

was given to Anderson.

¶ 47 Campa and Braggs demonstrate that the definition of “custody” is context specific and

related to the purposes of the particular custodial situation. Indeed, Campa expressly says as

much. Campa, 217 Ill. 2d at 254 (“The legislature intended that the term ‘custody’ evolve with

the changing programs in our correctional institutions.”); see also Webster’s Third New

International Dictionary 559 (1993) (“control of a thing or person with such actual or

constructive possession as fulfills the purpose of the law or duty requiring it” (emphasis added)).

¶ 48 I believe we should not separate “custody” from the statutory context in which it arises—

here, the Tort Immunity Act.

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¶ 49 Construing definitions in statutes, “the task is not always properly accomplished by the

mechanical application of the dictionary definitions of the individual words and phrases.”

Whelan v. County Officers’ Electoral Board, 256 Ill. App. 3d 555, 558 (1994).Often, we read

definitions in the context of the statutory scheme as a whole. Courts have struggled in other

statutes to derive the meaning of “custody” in a statutory scheme that lacks context. See People

v. Smith, 2014 IL App (3d) 130548, ¶ 26 (discussing definition of “custody” in section 5-8-7 of

the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-8-7 (West 2004))). We, however, are not adrift

like the court in Smith. The Tort Immunity Act provides contextual clues about the proper

construction of the word “custody.” The provision that refers the reader to “custody” states:

“Neither a local public entity nor a public employee is liable for *** [a]ny injury inflicted by an

escaped or escaping prisoner.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/4-106(b) (West 2014).

¶ 50 Here the meaning of “custody” must be understood by the word it seeks to define:

“prisoner.” The word “prisoner” means “[a] person who has been apprehended by a law

enforcement officer *** regardless of whether the person has yet been put in prison.” (Emphasis

added.) Black’s Law Dictionary 1314 ( 9th ed. 2010). The most natural reading of both the word

“prisoner” and “apprehend” suggests a custodial situation much closer to formal arrest. See

People v. Maxey, 2018 IL App (1st) 130698-B, ¶ 118 (we give language in statutes their natural

and ordinary meaning). Only a highly strained definition of “custody,” when read in the context

of “prisoner,” would apply to a backseat passenger in a car pulled over for a run-of-the-mill

traffic stop—and even more so here, where the officers made no attempt to communicate to

Anderson that he could not leave.

¶ 51 This interpretation also unites with the purpose of the Tort Immunity Act, which is to

protect local public entities from liability under some circumstances. Monson v. City of Danville,

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2018 IL 122486, ¶ 15. But the Tort Immunity Act only provides these protections when liability

arises “from government operations.” Id. We construe the Tort Immunity Act strictly against the

entity seeking immunity because it departs from the common law. Id. We want officers to focus

on their duties in the moment without fear of liability for the unpredictable actions that an

apprehended person might take to frustrate the exercise of those duties. But to benefit from

immunity, officers must ensure they have communicated to the person that he or she is subject to

their control. Otherwise, an officer is not truly performing a “government operation,” at least as

to that person. This is particularly salient here, where Townsend’s injury was caused by an

accident allegedly related to a police chase. Is it reasonable for an officer to engage in a high-risk

pursuit of a person that he or she has failed to adequately secure in the first place?

¶ 52 Furthermore, a reasonable backseat passenger traveling in a car pulled over for a traffic

violation would not understand the term “prisoner” applied to him or her. Similarly, no

reasonable person in this position would think he or she was “escaping” from any type of

custody by leaving the scene. Absent direct communication or action by the officers, like the

ones they took for the driver and front seat passenger, I cannot agree that Anderson and the other

backseat passenger were in “custody” within the meaning of this provision of the Tort Immunity

Act.

The General Assembly made a conscious choice when it linked the words “prisoner” and

“custody.” If the legislature intended section 4-106(b) to apply to a broader range of situations, it

had broader language available. By borrowing words associated with fourth amendment traffic

stop cases (e.g., “seizure,” “detention,” etc.), the majority has suggested terms that could apply.

Unless and until the legislature itself chooses those words, however, I would find that Anderson

was not in “custody” and would reverse.

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No. 1-18-0771

Cite as: Townsend v. City of Chicago, 2019 IL App (1st) 180771

Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 16-L-1968;
the Hon. Kathy Flanagan, Judge, presiding.

Attorneys Robert A. Langendorf, of Robert A. Langendorf, P.C., of
for Chicago, for appellant.
Appellant:

Attorneys Edward N. Siskel, Corporation Counsel, of Chicago (Benna Ruth
for Solomon, Myriam Zreczny Kasper, and Sara K. Hornstra,
Appellee: Assistant Corporation Counsel, of counsel), for appellees.

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