Com. v. Micucci, J.

J-S30039-19 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : JOSEPH A. MICUCCI, : : Appellant : No. 1268 EDA 2018 Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 11, 2018 in the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0002527-2017 BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J. MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED JULY 30, 2019 Joseph A. Micucci (“Micucci”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed following his conviction of simple assault and recklessly endangering another person (“REAP”).1 We affirm. In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant factual and procedural history underlying this appeal, which we incorporate as though fully stated herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/18, at 1-6. Micucci now raises the following issues for our review: 1. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and abuse of discretion in finding [Micucci] guilty of [REAP] because the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence[,] beyond a reasonable doubt[,] to prove the element of reckless conduct by [Micucci,] which placed or may have placed another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury: to wit[, Micucci] simply pointing a lawfully owned and possessed gun in his home at Tracy ____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(1), 2705. J-S30039-19 Thomson [(“Thomson”)] did not amount to reckless conduct that placed someone in danger of death or serious bodily injury[?] 2. Whether the trial court committed an error of law and abuse of discretion in prohibiting [Micucci] from cross[-]examining the complaining witness[, ] Thom[]son[,] regarding her past mental health history and drug use, as it was relevant to show motive and bias against [Micucci?] 3. The trial court committed an error of law and abuse of discretion in imposing the deadly weapon [] sentencing guidelines for the charge of [REAP], when the actual weapon being used was the basis for the guilty verdict of the crime[?] Brief for Appellant at 4-5 (some capitalization omitted). In his first claim, Micucci argues that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his REAP conviction. Id. at 11. Micucci acknowledges that he briefly pointed his gun at Thomson’s head, but states that “the brandishing of the weapon was fleeting in nature….” Id. at 13. According to Micucci, there is no evidence that he threatened to kill Thomson, and the two never struggled over the gun. Id. Micucci also claims that pointing a loaded firearm at Thomson, without more, does not support a finding that he consciously disregarded a known risk. Id. at 14-15; see also id. (wherein Micucci states his apparent belief that his knowledge of how to operate a firearm precludes the possibility of an accidental discharge). In its Opinion, the trial court set forth the relevant law, addressed Micucci’s first claim, and concluded that it lacks merit. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/18, at 7-10. The trial court highlighted the “highly charged and emotionally unstable atmosphere in which the underlying episode occurred.” -2- J-S30039-19 Id. at 9. The trial court further noted that Micucci had pointed his gun at Thomson’s head while she was kneeling on the floor, defenseless. Id. at 10. We agree with the trial court’s analysis, and conclude that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, was sufficient to sustain Micucci’s REAP conviction. See id. at 7-10. We therefore affirm on the basis of the trial court’s analysis as to Micucci’s first claim. See id. In his second claim, Micucci challenges the trial court’s preclusion of testimony, during cross-examination, regarding Thomson’s mental health history and drug use. Brief for Appellant at 16. Micucci argues that such evidence would have impeached Thomson’s credibility. Id. at 17-18. According to Micucci, Thomson’s mental health had a major impact on the parties’ custody proceedings, and Micucci’s proposed “impeachable line of questioning” would explain Thomson’s motive to exaggerate or fabricate information in an attempt to gain custody of their daughter, as well as her bias against Micucci. Id. at 18-19. Initially, we observe that Micucci has provided only a cursory citation to the Rules of Evidence, and points to only one specific portion of Thomson’s testimony, which, he believes, was an exaggeration or fabrication of information. Micucci fails to support his claim with citation to, and discussion of, relevant case law. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that the argument shall include “such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent.”). -3- J-S30039-19 Therefore, this claim is waived. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009) (stating that “where an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”).2 In his third claim, Micucci challenges the trial court’s imposition of the deadly weapon enhancement. Brief for Appellant at 20. Micucci asserts that because his conviction was based on the use of a firearm, “imposition of the deadly weapon [] enhancement amounts to a double penalty….” Id. at 20; see also id. at 21-22 (asserting that the limited exception set forth at 204 ____________________________________________ 2 In its Opinion, the trial court determined that Micucci’s evidentiary claim was likewise waived because he failed to adequately preserve it at trial. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/18, at 10-12; see also id. at 12 (indicating that, during trial, Micucci intended to question Thomson regarding her mental health history and the impact of taking—or not taking—medications in order to attack her credibility; however, Micucci did not raise an argument concerning Thomson’s motive or bias at any time during trial). The trial court nevertheless addressed the merits of Micucci’s claim, and concluded that it lacks merit because (1) Micucci did not adequately develop the record with expert testimony, reports, or any other evidence to substantiate a claim that Thomson’s mental health affected her credibility; and (2) even without such testimony, the record contains ample evidence concerning the parties’ potential biases and motivations, i.e., undisputed testimony by both Micucci and Thomson regarding the volatile nature of their relationship and their custody battle. See id. 13-14. Even if Micucci had not waived this claim, we would conclude that it lacks merit for the reasons stated by the trial court in its Opinion. See id. -4- J-S30039-19 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(3)(xi)3 should extend to the instant case, because his possession of a deadly weapon, although not an element of REAP, was the basis for his conviction). Micucci’s claim raises a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Tavarez, 174 A.3d 7, 9-10 (Pa. Super. 2017). “It is well-settled that, with regard to the discretionary aspects of sentencing, there is no automatic right to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010). An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test: We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether the appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether the appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. Super. 2010). Here, Micucci filed a timely Notice of Appeal, preserved his sentencing claim in a timely post-sentence Motion, and included a Rule 2119(f) Statement ____________________________________________ 3 Section 303.10(a)(3)(xi) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides that the deadly weapon enhancement shall not be applied to “[a]ny other offense [i.e., other than those otherwise enumerated under Section 303.10] for which possession of a deadly weapon is an element of the statutory definition.” 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(3)(xi). -5- J-S30039-19 in his brief.4 Additionally, Micucci’s claim raises a substantial question for our review. Tavarez, 174 A.3d at 10 (stating that “a substantial question is raised where an appellant alleges his sentence is excessive due to the sentencing court’s error in applying the deadly weapon enhancement.” (citation, quotation marks and brackets omitted)). While Micucci has raised a substantial question, he fails to adequately develop his argument, or provide citation to or discussion of any relevant case law in support of his claim. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Because Micucci’s final claim is not properly developed for our review, it is waived. See Johnson, supra.5 Judgment of sentence affirmed. ____________________________________________ 4 We note that Micucci combines his Rule 2119(f) Statement with the Argument, rather than including a separate section in his brief. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) (providing that an appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must include a separate section setting forth a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal). 5 Even if Micucci had not waived this claim, we would conclude that it lacks merit. The Sentencing Code provides that the deadly weapon enhancement “shall apply to each conviction offense for which a deadly weapon is possessed or used.” 204 Pa. Code § 303.10(a)(4). “The trial court may not disregard an applicable enhancement when determining the appropriate sentencing ranges.” Tavarez, 174 A.3d at 10. Further, as the trial court stated in its Opinion, “[t]he record in this case amply reflects the violence, requisite recklessness, and tremendous potential for serious injury, if not death[,]” which would merit the enhanced penalties. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/9/18, at 16-17. -6- J-S30039-19 Judgment Entered. Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 7/30/19 -7- Circulated 07/03/2019 03:09 PM IN THE COURT OF COMI\ION PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA CRIMINAL DIVISION � ,-..,;, . = OD COYJ.MONWEAL TH OF PENNSYLVANIA : NO. 2527-17 1268 EDA 2018�