UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
JAMES F. DAVIDSON, JR.,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 18-2062 (JEB)
ANUJA MEHROTRA, et al.,
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Pro se Plaintiff James F. Davidson, Jr. seeks damages from several officials involved in
the revocation of his supervised release. He alleges that Defendants Anuja Mehrotra, Tarsha
Jones, and Charles Massarone all acted improperly in the execution of an unjustified warrant that
caused him to be re-incarcerated. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings or, in the
alternative, for summary judgment. Agreeing, this Court will grant the Motion for Summary
Judgment.
I. Background
Plaintiff never responded to Defendants’ current Motion. So while a court would
normally view the facts in the light most favorable to him on summary judgment, there is only
one sworn set of facts here. On August 14, 2009, Davidson was sentenced in D.C. Superior
Court to twelve months of incarceration and twelve months of supervised release for distribution
of cocaine. See ECF No. 14 (Def. MSJ), Exh. 1 (Superior Court J&C). After his discharge from
prison, a long chronicle of supervised-release violations ensued, which the Court will not spend
time rehashing. Id., Exhs. 4–23. Suffice it to say, he was still under supervised release when, as
a result of one such violation, he was arrested pursuant to a warrant on August 8, 2014. Id., Exh.
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25 (Warrant) at 1. On October 6, 2014, Plaintiff agreed to serve eight months in confinement
followed by 42 months of supervised release (starting from August 8, 2014). Id., Exh. 27 (Resp.
Revocation Proposal) at 1. After his release on June 22, 2015, however, his misconduct
continued. Id., Exh. 32 (Warrant) at 1. The United States Parole Commission wrote an official
letter warning Davidson about continued non-compliance on August 31, 2016. Id., Exh. 30
(Letter of Reprimand). Plaintiff did not heed this missive. Id., Exh. 31 (Warrant Application) at
3.
Two years later, but still within his 42-month period of supervised release, he again
violated his terms of parole. Anuja Mehrotra, an employee of the Court Services and Offender
Supervision Agency (CSOSA), submitted a report to USPC case analyst Tarsha Jones notifying
her that Plaintiff had once again violated his supervised release. Id.; see also MSJ at 17; ECF
No. 12 (Answer), ¶ 5. USPC Commissioner Charles Massarone then signed and issued a warrant
for Davidson’s arrest for using drugs, failing to submit to drug testing, and neglecting to report to
his supervising officer. Id., Exh. 32 (Warrant); see also MSJ at 17. This warrant was executed
on May 8, 2018. Id., Exh. 33 (Revocation Assessment) at 3. His supervised-release term was
subsequently revoked, and he was ordered to serve twelve additional months of incarceration
followed by eighteen months of supervised release. Id., Exh. 35 (Revocation) at 1.
Plaintiff’s suit challenges the legitimacy of this warrant. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.). He
alleges that it was based on false claims and that the USPC lacked jurisdiction to execute the
warrant. Id. at 2–3. While he does not mention a dollar amount, he seeks “a jury trial to sue for
pain, emotional stress and suffering cause [sic] by the following people.” Id. at 3. Defendants
now move for judgment on the pleadings or for summary judgment.
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II. Legal Standard
As the Court decides the case on summary judgment — given that it considers material
beyond the pleadings — it sets forth only that standard. Summary judgment may be granted if
“the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A material fact is one that would
change the outcome of the litigation. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986) (“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”). A dispute is “genuine” if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party.
See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). “A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is
genuinely disputed must support the assertion” by “citing to particular parts of materials in the
record” or “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine
dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.” Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).
III. Analysis
The Court looks first at the two USPC employees and then at the CSOSA one.
A. Jones and Massarone
Plaintiff does not specify whether his claims against the USPC employees — Jones and
Massarone — are brought against them in their personal capacities or their official capacities. In
either instance, they are immune from suit.
1. Individual Capacity
Defendants first point out that they were improperly served in their individual capacities
and that the suit should therefore only proceed in their official capacities. See Answer at 1 n.1.
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While this may be true, Plaintiff is alternatively barred from proceeding against Jones and
Massarone in their individual capacities (in what appears to be a Bivens action) because they are
immune.
USPC commissioners are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity given the parallels
between their activities and judicial duties. See Jones v. Fulwood, 860 F. Supp. 2d 16, 22
(D.D.C. 2012); Nelson v. Williams, 750 F. Supp. 2d 46, 52–53 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 2011 WL
2618078 (D.C. Cir. June 23, 2011) (parole commissioners protected by quasi-judicial immunity
from damages claim in individual capacity). As a USPC commissioner, Massarone is thus
immune from suit.
Several courts have also extended quasi-judicial immunity to other USPC employees.
See Mowatt v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 815 F. Supp. 2d 199, 206 (D.D.C. 2011) (dismissing claims
against USPC case analyst who “assisted the Commission in issuing a parole violator warrant for
Plaintiff’s arrest” because these were “exactly the sorts of activities intertwined with the exercise
of quasi-judicial power for which absolute immunity is afforded”) (citations removed); Anderson
v. Reilly, 691 F. Supp. 2d 89, 92 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing claims against USPC employees
when they act in “a quasi-judicial” role and perform such quasi-judicial functions “in making a
parole determination in [a] specific case”). Even if Jones is not protected by absolute judicial
immunity, moreover, she would still be immune based on qualified immunity. Qualified
immunity shields “government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct
does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known.” Ford v. Mitchell, 890 F. Supp. 2d 24, 32 (D.D.C. 2012) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). The key inquiry here is whether the individual “acted reasonably in light
of the situation [she] confronted.” Id. Here, Jones did indeed act reasonably and is thus immune
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from a suit for damages.
2. Official Capacity
A suit against a defendant in her official capacity is considered a suit against the agency
or entity itself. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985) (stating that official-
capacity suits “generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of
which an officer is an agent” and should “be treated as a suit against the entity”) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff’s suit against Jones and Massarone in their official
capacities is therefore essentially a suit against USPC, which is a federal agency. As a result of
sovereign immunity, however, the federal government is subject to suit only upon consent, which
must be clear, express, and unequivocal. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538
(1980). If an entity is entitled to sovereign immunity, this strips a court of jurisdiction to hear
claims against it. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994) (“Sovereign immunity is
jurisdictional in nature.”); Stoddard v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 900 F. Supp. 2d 38, 41 (D.D.C.
2012).
Although Plaintiff does not identify a specific cause of action, this Court will, given his
pro se status, assume he seeks to raise claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b). “Under the FTCA, plaintiffs may sue the United States in federal court for state-law
torts committed by government employees within the scope of their employment.” Harbury v.
Hayden, 522 F.3d 413, 416 (D.C. Cir. 2008). The FTCA thus acts as a waiver of sovereign
immunity, subject to many enumerated limitations.
To the extent Davidson is seeking to recover for a constitutional tort, such as violation of
due process, this claim cannot proceed because “the United States simply has not rendered itself
liable under § 1346(b) for constitutional tort claims.” FDIC, 510 U.S. at 477–78.
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Assuming Plaintiff would also like to raise claims related to the allegedly wrongful
warrant as a violation of federal regulations, these claims are also not actionable because the
FTCA only authorizes suits “under circumstances where the United States, if a private person,
would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.” 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). FTCA claims arising from violations of the CFR cannot
proceed, therefore, because “a private person could not be sued under District of Columbia law
for failing to adhere to a legal requirement imposed on a federal agency.” Pate v. United States,
328 F. Supp. 2d 62, 76 (D.D.C. 2004). This proposition also blocks any negligence claim, since
a private person could not issue a parole-violation warrant.
Finally, Plaintiff might seek to use the FTCA as an avenue for bringing intentional state-
law tort claims, such as defamation, wrongful imprisonment, or intentional infliction of
emotional distress. These claims, however, are still improper. While the FTCA acts as a waiver
of sovereign immunity, it expressly exempts intentional torts such as “false imprisonment, false
arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, [or] libel.” 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h); see also
Millbrook v. United States, 569 U.S. 50, 52 (2013) (discussing FTCA intentional-tort exception).
Plaintiff is alternatively barred from proceeding under the FTCA based on his failure to
exhaust. The Act requires that a plaintiff exhaust any administrative remedies before filing suit.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2675; see also McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993) (“The FTCA
bars claimants from bringing suit in federal court until they have exhausted their administrative
remedies.”); Reynolds El v. Husk, 273 F. Supp. 2d 11, 13 (D.D.C. 2002) (“A tort claim against
the United States for money damages must be ‘first presented . . . to the appropriate Federal
agency.’”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a)). While Plaintiff has appealed the USPC’s decision, see
MSJ, Exh. 37 (Appeal), that is not FTCA exhaustion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b); Stoddard, 900 F.
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Supp. 2d at 41–42. Plaintiff furthermore “bears the burden of proving exhaustion.” Id. (citing
GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 919 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). As has neither pleaded nor
proven exhaustion, he cannot proceed. See Stoddard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 41.
B. Mehrotra
As with the USPC personnel, it is unclear whether Plaintiff sues CSOSA employee
Mehrotra in her official capacity or her individual capacity. This ultimately has no bearing, as
neither type of suit can prevail.
1. Individual Capacity
A suit against Mehrotra in her individual capacity would be barred. Absolute immunity
protects acts of adjudicatory discretion and officials who perform judicial functions. See Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514 (1978); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967). This Circuit
has found that federal probation officers, when “preparing and submitting” reports, are immune
from suit for this reason. See Turner v. Barry, 856 F.2d 1539, 1540–41 (D.C. Cir. 1988); accord.
Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1987). Courts have likewise held that CSOSA
employees who take “actions . . . at the direction of, or to assist, the parole commission” are also
immune. See Ali v. D.C. Court Servs., 538 F. Supp. 2d 157, 162 (D.D.C. 2008). As Mehrotra
made her report about Davidson in an attempt to assist the Parole Commission, she is immune.
2. Official Capacity
As mentioned, a claim against an individual in her official capacity is tantamount to a
claim against the entity; accordingly, official-capacity claims against Mehrotra are effectively
claims against CSOSA. Courts have considered CSOSA to be a federal agency, see Epps v. U.S.
Atty. Gen., 575 F. Supp. 2d 232, 234 n.1 (D.D.C. 2008); as a result, they have held that claims
against CSOSA are barred by sovereign immunity absent a specific waiver. Ali, 538 F. Supp. 2d
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at 161. Here, no such waiver is apparent, and Plaintiff points to no specific renunciation of
immunity. For the same reasons discussed above, this type of suit is thus also futile.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant Defendants’ Motion for Summary
Judgment. An Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ James E. Boasberg
JAMES E. BOASBERG
United States District Judge
Date: July 31, 2019
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