In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: J.P. (Minor Child) and R.P. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
FILED
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Aug 01 2019, 7:56 am
Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as
precedent or cited before any court except for the CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Kristin Szczerbik Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Lawrence County Public Attorney General of Indiana
Defender Agency Robert J. Henke
Bedford, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination August 1, 2019
of the Parent–Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of: J.P. (Minor Child) 19A-JT-421
and Appeal from the Lawrence
Circuit Court
R.P. (Father),
The Hon. Andrea K. McCord,
Appellant-Respondent, Judge
The Hon. Nathan G. Nikirk,
v. Juvenile Referee
Trial Court Cause No.
The Indiana Department of Child
47C01-1810-JT-367
Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

Bradford, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-421 | August 1, 2019 Page 1 of 20
 Case Summary
[1] J.P. (“Child”) was born on May 13, 2011, to R.P. (“Father”) and A.C.

(“Mother”1) (collectively, “Parents”). In May of 2015, Child was living with

Mother and was removed from her home following a violent altercation

between Mother and another woman over drugs and money. The Indiana

Department of Child Services (“DCS”) petitioned to have Child adjudicated a

child in need of services (“CHINS”), and the juvenile court did so. Despite

some initial compliance with ordered services, Father relapsed on

methamphetamine in September of 2016, which ultimately resulted in the

revocation of the probation he was serving at the time and incarceration.

Following Father’s incarceration, he did not engage with DCS again or

complete any services. Following an arrest in February of 2017, Father also

stopped participating in visitation.

[2] In October of 2018, DCS filed its petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights

to Child (“TPR Petition”). A hearing was held in January of 2019, at which

Father testified that he had failed to engage with DCS due to incarceration,

homelessness, and/or indigency. The DCS family case manager (“FCM”) and

Child’s court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) both testified that

termination was in Child’s best interests and that DCS’s permanency plan was

for adoption of Child by his current foster parents. On January 24, 2019, the

1
Mother does not participate in this appeal.

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 juvenile court ordered termination of Father’s parental rights to Child. Father

contends that the juvenile court’s judgment is clearly erroneous and that DCS

denied him due process by failing to provide him with adequate access to

services. Because we disagree, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[3] Child was born on May 13, 2011, to Parents. On June 1, 2015, Child was

removed from Parents’ care following an altercation between Mother and

another woman over drugs and money. Child was placed with relatives of

Mother’s, where he remains. On June 3, 2015, DCS petitioned to have Child

adjudicated a CHINS. On June 26, 2015, the State charged Father with Level 6

felony domestic battery and Level 6 felony criminal confinement in cause

number 47D01-1506-F6-727 (“Cause No. 727”). On September 2, 2015, the

juvenile court found Child to be a CHINS and ordered that Parents complete

several services. The same day, Father pled guilty as charged in Cause No. 727

and was sentenced to two and one-half years of incarceration with one and one-

half suspended to probation.

[4] On December 8, 2015, the juvenile court issued an order indicating, inter alia,

that Parents had not enhanced their abilities to parent Child, complied with

services, or visited Child. The juvenile court noted that Father had neither

remained in contact with DCS nor completed a substance-abuse evaluation.

The juvenile court issued another periodic case review on March 9, 2016, in

which it noted that Parents were now compliant with Child’s case plan and

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 cooperating with DCS. On September 2, 2016, the juvenile court’s periodic

case review indicated that Mother was no longer compliant with Child’s case

plan, although Father still was. The permanency plan for Child was still

reunification, with a projected date of December 1, 2016.

[5] On September 29, 2016, Father tested positive for methamphetamine,

marijuana, and tramadol and was arrested. On October 3, 2016, Father

admitted that he had violated the terms of his probation in Cause No. 727 and

was released four days later, and, on November 16, the trial court re-imposed

Father’s suspended sentence of 451 days. Also on November 16, 2016, the

juvenile court found that Father was no longer compliant with Child’s case plan

due to his arrest and incarceration.

[6] On March 8, 2017, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. By this time,

Child had been removed from Father’s care for approximately twenty-three

months. The juvenile court found that Father was not in compliance with the

case plan because he had been incarcerated for violation of the terms of his

probation in Cause No. 727 from September 29 to October 7, 2016. The court

changed the permanency plan to a concurrent plan of reunification and

adoption. On March 15, 2017, Father admitted that he had again violated the

terms of his probation in Cause No. 727, and the trial court ordered that he

execute his previously-suspended sentence. Father was released from

incarceration in July of 2017.

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[7] On August 23, 2017, the juvenile court held another permanency hearing.

Child had been in the same relative placement for over two years and was

progressing well. The juvenile court also found that Father had completed a

portion of the Crossover drug-rehabilitation program while incarcerated.

Father, however, had failed to set up the post-incarceration portion of the

program, missed an appointment with Centerstone, and had no contact with

DCS upon his release from incarceration. While Father had made one

unsuccessful attempt to contact DCS, he could not provide reliable contact

information and had made no further attempts. Following the hearing, the

juvenile court changed the permanency plan to adoption.

[8] On January 10, 2018, the juvenile court held a review hearing. The juvenile

court found that Father had not complied with Child’s case plan, had not

participated in any services or maintained contact with DCS, had not enhanced

his ability to fulfill his parental obligations, had not visited Child, and had not

cooperated with DCS. On June 28, 2018, the State charged Father with Level 6

felony domestic battery and Class A misdemeanor intimidation in cause

number 36COl-1806-F6-269 (“Cause No. 269”).

[9] On September 19, 2018, the juvenile court held a permanency hearing. The

juvenile court found that Child had been in the same relative placement for

approximately twenty-seven months and was progressing well in his placement.

The juvenile court also found that Father had not complied with Child’s case

plan. The juvenile court found that it was “most appropriate and consistent”

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 with Child’s best interests “to have a proceeding to terminate the parent–child

relationship and be placed for adoption.” Ex. Vol. p. 58.

[10] On September 27, 2018, the State charged Father with Level 6 felony marijuana

possession, Class B misdemeanor marijuana possession, and Class C

misdemeanor paraphernalia possession in cause number 40C01-1809-F6-359

(“Cause No. 359”). Father was arrested in Cause No. 359 on October 24, 2018.

Meanwhile, on October 16, 2018, Father had pled guilty in Cause No. 269 to

intimidation, and the trial court sentenced him to 365 days of incarceration

with 235 days suspended. On October 30, 2018, DCS filed its TPR Petition.

On November 26, 2018, the State charged Father with Class B misdemeanor

marijuana possession in cause number 40D01-1811-CM-597 (“Cause No.

597”). Eventually, a bench trial was set for February 28, 2019.

[11] On January 18, 2019, the juvenile court conducted an evidentiary hearing on

the TPR Petition. At the hearing, Father testified that had been incarcerated in

Jennings County in Cause No. 359 for approximately four months and that he

had stopped engaging with DCS after relapsing with methamphetamine in

2016. Father had, in fact, been incarcerated for approximately fourteen out of

the previous twenty-four months, including incarceration in Jackson County for

intimidation in Cause No. 269. Father testified that he had been living in his

car prior to his Jackson County incarceration, that he had not visited with Child

in more than eighteen months, and that he had not engaged in services when he

was not incarcerated because he was homeless.

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[12] According to Child’s foster mother, when he was placed with her in June of

2015, he was terrified, severely behind regarding things he should have known

for a child his age, and he had a severe speech delay. As of the day of the

termination hearing, his foster mother described Child as smart, very social,

and funny. Child’s foster mother testified that she believed it was in Child’s

best interests to stay with her and her husband and agreed that it would be

detrimental to Child “if this process is drug on longer.” Tr. Vol. II p. 95. Child

has never asked about Father.

[13] FCM Melissa Sears testified that Child has been in the same relative placement

for approximately three and one-half years and has never been returned to

either Parent’s care. After Father’s arrest for using methamphetamine and

marijuana and subsequent release in the fall of 2016, he stopped engaging in

random drug screens and quit his individual therapy. While Father continued

visits until he was arrested again in February of 2017, he has not visited Child

since. FCM Sears never received any communication from Father but

eventually found him incarcerated in September of 2018 after searching for

several months. FCM Sears went to the jail to serve Father a summons but was

not permitted to see him. FCM Sears left her card for Father but never heard

back. FCM Sears testified that Father did not maintain contact with DCS,

inform DCS of any changes of address, inform DCS of his arrests or criminal

charges, maintain appropriate housing, complete a substance abuse assessment,

or obey the law.

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[14] As for Child’s progress, FCM Sears testified that he was doing well in current

placement and was engaging in therapy to address some issues with acting out.

Child had developed a good routine in his foster placement and called his foster

parents “mom” and “buddy.” Tr. p. 71. DCS’s plan was for Child to be

adopted by his foster family. FCM Sears testified that it is in Child’s best

interests to terminate Parents’ parental rights and for him to be adopted because

he needs stability, is receiving the care he needs in his foster placement, and has

been in the same stable and loving home for the past three and one-half years.

[15] Child’s CASA Paul Smoot tried to contact Father during the CHINS case but

was not successful. Father’s own legal counsel did not have Father’s contact

information. CASA Smoot had had contact with Child at least fifteen times in

the nineteen months since his appointment in his foster home, at his school

when Child was playing basketball, and at a birthday party outside the foster

home. CASA Smoot observed that Father had not adhered to the court-ordered

services, and, after Father was released from one of his incarcerations, he

“disappeared for over a year where nobody could find him until DCS located

him in the Jackson County Jail, once again.” Tr. Vol. II p. 107. CASA Smoot

testified that it was in Child’s best interests for the juvenile court to terminate

Parents’ parental rights to Child. In CASA Smoot’s opinion, adoption by

Child’s current foster family is in his best interests, because they have provided

him with a loving, stable home in which he has continued contact with other

members of his extended family.

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[16] On January 24, 2019, the court ordered termination of Parents’ parental rights

to Child. The juvenile court’s termination order provides, in part, as follows:

1. On June 1, 2015, [Child] was removed from Mother and
Father on an emergency basis due to allegations of abuse and/or
neglect.
2. Father has been incarcerated 14 of the last 24 months and
Father had issues of homelessness prior to his incarceration.
3. Father has not kept in contact with DCS and has not
visited with the child since February, 2017.
[…]
6. The child was placed on June 1, 2015 with the foster
family with whom he [] still resides. The foster family is pre-
adoptive and desires to move forward with said adoption.
7. The parents have failed to participate with DCS services
and have failed to comply with the dispositional decree.
8. Mother and Father have had substantial issues with
homelessness and drug abuse.
9. [Child] is extremely bonded with his foster placement, his
siblings in the foster home, and his environment.
10. The CASA is Mr. Paul Smoot.
11. The CASA testified that [Child] is well cared for by his
foster family and that [Child] is doing very well.
12. The CASA has been involved in this case since June,
2017. During that time period the CASA made approximately
15 visits to see the child in Greenwood, Indiana and the CASA
attended all Court hearings.
13. The CASA has also talked extensively with [Child]’s
school teachers, school counselors and his therapist.
l4. The CASA testified that he attempted to set up a time to
talk with [Father] in July, 2017. Further, the CASA testified that
he attended the review hearings during the pendency of this case
and that [Father]’s whereabout[s] were unknown and could not
be ascertained from [Father]’s counsel during the pendency of the
case.

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 15. Lastly, the CASA testified it is in [Child]’s best interest[s]
to remain in the foster home and be adopted by his foster
placement as the foster parents have provided a loving home and
care deeply about the minor child. The CASA testified that
[Child] is extremely bonded with his foster parents and that
[Child] is tired of being a foster child and wants to be adopted by
his foster parents.
[….]
The Child has been removed from the home and custody
of Mother and Father and has been under the supervision of
DCS for at least fifteen (15) of the most recent twenty-two (22)
months, and has been removed from his Mother and Father for
more than six (6) months pursuant to the terms of the
dispositional decree.
There is a reasonable probability that:
The conditions which resulted in Child’s removal and
continued placement outside the home will not be remedied by
Mother and Father;
That continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to Child’s well[-]being.
Termination of parental rights is in Child’s best interests.
There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the Child, that being adoption.

Order pp. 3–4, 6.

Discussion and Decision
[17] The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution protects the

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children. Bester v.

Lake Cty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 145 (Ind. 2005). Further,

we acknowledge that the parent–child relationship is “one of the most valued

relationships of our culture.” Id. However, although parental rights are of a

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 constitutional dimension, the law allows for the termination of those rights

when parents are unable or unwilling to meet their responsibilities as parents.

In re T.F., 743 N.E.2d 766, 773 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied. Therefore,

parental rights are not absolute and must be subordinated to the children’s

interests in determining the appropriate disposition of a petition to terminate

the parent–child relationship. Id.

[18] In reviewing termination proceedings on appeal, this court will not reweigh the

evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. In re Invol. Term. of Parental

Rights of S.P.H., 806 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004). We only consider

the evidence that supports the juvenile court’s decision and reasonable

inferences drawn therefrom. Id. Where, as here, the juvenile court includes

findings of fact and conclusions thereon in its order terminating parental rights,

our standard of review is two-tiered. Id. First, we must determine whether the

evidence supports the findings, and, second, whether the findings support the

legal conclusions. Id. In deference to the juvenile court’s unique position to

assess the evidence, we set aside the juvenile court’s findings and judgment

terminating a parent–child relationship only if they are clearly erroneous. Id. A

finding of fact is clearly erroneous when there are no facts or inferences drawn

therefrom to support it. Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous only if the legal

conclusions made by the juvenile court are not supported by its findings of fact

or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

[19] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b) governs what DCS must allege and establish

to support a termination of parental rights:

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 (A) that […] the following is true:
(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least
six (6) months under a dispositional decree.
[….]
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions
that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for
placement outside the home of the parents will not be
remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation
of the parent–child relationship poses a threat to the well-
being of the child.
[…]
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).

[20] Father contends that DCS failed to establish that termination is in the best

interests of Child or that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of

Child. Father also claims that DCS’s failure to provide him with adequate

services deprived him of substantive due process.

I. Child’s Best Interests
[21] Father contends that insufficient evidence supports the juvenile court’s

conclusion that termination is in Child’s best interests. We are mindful that in

determining what is in the best interests of Child, the juvenile court is required

to look beyond the factors identified by DCS and look to the totality of the

evidence. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185,

203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). In doing so, the juvenile court must subordinate the
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 interests of the parents to those of the children involved. Id. Moreover, we

have previously determined that the testimony of a child’s CASA and FCM

regarding the child’s need for permanency supports a finding that termination is

in the child’s best interests. See id. (“The testimony of [FCM] Fields and

[CASA] Dr. Heumann alone is sufficient to support the court’s conclusion that

termination is in the children’s best interests.”).

[22] FCM Sears testified that it is in Child’s best interests to terminate Parents’

parental rights and for him to be adopted because Child needs stability, is

receiving the care he needs in his foster placement, and has been in the same

stable and loving home for the past three and one-half years. CASA Smoot

agreed that it was in Child’s best interests for the juvenile court to terminate

Parents’ parental rights to Child. CASA Smoot testified that adoption with his

current foster family would provide Child a loving, stable home in which he has

continued contact with other extended family members. While this testimony

is likely sufficient by itself to support a conclusion that termination is in Child’s

best interests, there is more.

[23] The record contains ample and undisputed evidence that Father has significant

issues with substance abuse, incarceration, and homelessness, much of which

evidence was provided by Father himself. There is also no dispute that Father

has not successfully completed even one service ordered by the juvenile court,

has not kept in contact with DCS, and has not visited Child since February of

2017. In addition, the record indicates that Child is thriving since his removal

from Father’s care. When Child was placed with his foster family in June of

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 2015, he was terrified and developmentally delayed. As of the termination

hearing, Child was doing well in current placement and was engaging in

therapy to address some issues with acting out. Child has developed a good

routine in his foster placement and calls his foster parents “mom” and “buddy.”

Tr. p. 71. FCM Sears described Child’s placement as a “stable and loving

home[,]” while CASA Smoot described it as “a loving, stable home where

[Child] also has contact with extended family.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 71, 108.

[24] Father argues, essentially, that he should be given more time to prove that he

can be a good parent to Child, relying on the decisions in In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d

1257 (Ind. 2009); Rowlett v. Vanderburgh County Office of Family & Children, 841

N.E.2d 615 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied; and In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191

(Ind. 2009). None of these cases help Father, as they are all easily

distinguished.

[25] In G.Y., the mother committed a crime before her child’s conception. 904

N.E.2d at 1258. Several years later, the mother was arrested and sentenced for

her part in the crime after her child had been born. Id. at 1258–59. Upon

mother’s arrest, she arranged for childcare, but that care later failed, and DCS

took custody of G.Y. Id. at 1259. On transfer, the Indiana Supreme Court

concluded there was insufficient evidence to establish that termination was in

G.Y.’s best interests. In doing so, the Court noted that the mother had taken

what steps she could while incarcerated to better herself, including completing

college classes that would help her provide permanency for the child upon her

release, making arrangements for housing and employment upon her release,

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 completing a drug-rehabilitation program, and completing a parenting class. Id.

at 1262. The mother had also maintained a consistent, positive relationship

with G.Y., and, additionally, there was no evidence the mother had a pattern of

criminal activity likely to continue upon her release from prison. Id. at 1262–

63. The Court also noted that Mother was likely to be released soon. Id.

[26] The facts of this case contrast sharply with those in G.Y. Father’s criminal

conduct arose shortly after the underlying CHINS case began and continued

throughout the case, and he was again incarcerated and awaiting trial on two

pending criminal cases by the time of the hearing on the TPR Petition. Father

did not complete a single service ordered by the court, has not visited Child

since February of 2017, has never been in consistent contact with DCS (even

when not incarcerated), and has taken no perceptible steps to improve himself

by furthering his education or otherwise improving his employment prospects.

Father’s one tangible attempt at self-improvement, participation in the

Crossover program while incarcerated, did not take: Father did not implement

the post-incarceration phase of the program and has been charged with four

drug-related crimes since. The facts of this case are clearly a far cry from those

in G.Y.

[27] Father also seems to argue that his case is analogous to Rowlett. In Rowlett, an

incarcerated parent who was set to be released from prison just six weeks after

the scheduled termination filed for a continuance, which request was denied.

Id. at 618–19. The parent in Rowlett had not had a prior opportunity to engage

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 in reunification services. Id. at 617–18. Moreover, while incarcerated, the

parent in Rowlett

took steps and made a good-faith effort to better himself as a
person and as a parent. […] Father had participated in nearly
1,100 hours of individual and group services, including services
in encounters, anger management and impulse control, parenting
skills, domestic violence, self-esteem, self-help, and substance
abuse. Father had also earned twelve hours of college credit
through Ball State University, maintaining a 2.33 grade point
average, and at the time of the termination hearing was enrolled
in an additional eighteen hours.

Id. at 622. We concluded that the juvenile court abused its discretion in

denying the parent’s request to continue the hearing because under the

circumstances he was entitled to “a sufficient period following his release to

demonstrate his willingness and ability to assume parental duties.” Id. at 619.

As with G.Y., Rowlett is clearly distinguishable from this case, as Father wasted

his opportunities to avail himself of services and took no perceptible steps to

improve himself or his situation.

[28] Finally, Father’s reliance on J.M. is misplaced. In J.M., the juvenile court

denied DCS’s TPR petition based, in part, upon evidence that the parents were

being released early from prison and had completed programs during their

incarcerations, meaning that the child’s permanency was not prejudiced by

waiting upon parents’ release and waiting to further judge their fitness. J.M.,

908 N.E.2d at 194–96. After a panel of this court reversed the juvenile court’s

denial of the TPR petition, the parents sought transfer, arguing that the court of

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 appeals had not found the juvenile court’s findings to be clearly erroneous and

had not relied upon the evidence most favorable to the juvenile court’s

judgment. Id.

[29] The Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer and agreed with parents that the

record supported the juvenile court’s decision that the parents’ “ability to

establish a stable and appropriate life upon release can be observed and

determined within a relatively quick period of time. Thus, the child’s need of

permanency is not severely prejudiced.” Id. at 196. The Indiana Supreme

Court concluded that the juvenile court’s order was not clearly erroneous and

affirmed the juvenile court. Id. J.M. largely addresses the standard of review in

these cases, which is highly deferential, and by which “[a]n appellate court may

not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court if any evidence or

legitimate inferences support the trial court’s judgment.” Best v. Best, 941

N.E.2d 499, 502 (Ind. 2011). Because J.M. stands for the proposition that the

juvenile court’s findings should not be disturbed if supported by the evidence,

J.M. is not really applicable here, where the juvenile court made findings

sufficient to terminate Father’s parental rights, and those findings are

unchallenged. Father has failed to establish error in this regard.

II. Plan for Care and Treatment of Child
[30] Father briefly seems to argue that DCS failed to establish that it has a

satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of Child. DCS’s plan for the Child

if the juvenile court granted termination is adoption by his current foster

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 parents. “For a plan to be ‘satisfactory,’ for purposes of the statute, it ‘need not

be detailed, so long as it offers a general sense of the direction in which the

child will be going after the parent–child relationship is terminated.’” Lang v.

Starke Cty. Office of Family & Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)

(quoting In re Termination of Parent–Child Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258,

268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied), trans. denied. DCS’s plan for adoption

by Child’s current foster family easily satisfies this test, as even “(a)ttempting to

find suitable parents to adopt [the Children] is clearly a satisfactory plan.” Id. at

375 (citing Matter of A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). In any

event, DCS’s plan is more than just a general sense of direction, as FCM Sears

and CASA Smoot both testified that the permanency plan for Child was for his

current foster parents to adopt him. Father has failed to establish error in this

regard.

III. Due Process
[31] Father also argues that DCS failed to provide services to him during the CHINS

case. As an initial matter, there is no indication that Father raised this issue in

the juvenile court. To preserve a claim for review, “counsel must object to the

trial court’s ruling and state the reasons for the objection.” Durden v. State, 99

N.E.3d 645, 651 (Ind. 2018). Father has waived this issue for appellate review.

Id. We choose to address this claim on its merits despite Father’s waiver.

[32] First, it is worth noting that proof of services offered parents is not an element

of termination proceedings. See In re H.L., 915 N.E.2d 145, 148 n.3 (Ind. Ct.

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 App. 2009) (“failure to provide services does not serve as a basis on which to

directly attack a termination order as contrary to law”). That said, even if DCS

had been required to establish proof of services, it did so. The record is clear

that Father was provided services, and during 2016 he was cooperating with

those services to the point where it appeared he would be engaging in a trial

home visit with Child. Father, however, admitted that he stopped engaging

with DCS after he relapsed on methamphetamine in 2016 because he was either

homeless and/or in and out of jail. Father also admitted that while

incarcerated he did not reach out to DCS, claiming that he was indigent and did

not even have enough money to send a letter. There is no indication that DCS

failed to provide Father services.

[33] Finally, Father has not demonstrated that he requested additional services from

DCS. See Prince v. Allen Cty. DCS, 861 N.E.2d 1223, 1231 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)

(“[T]he responsibility to make positive changes will stay where it must, on the

parent. If the parent feels the services ordered by the court are inadequate to

facilitate the changes required for reunification, then the onus is on the parent

to request additional assistance from the court or DCS.”). The record indicates

that after Father was released from incarceration, he “disappeared for over a

year where nobody could find him until DCS located him in the Jackson

County Jail, once again” in early fall of 2018. Tr. Vol. II p. 107. Father failed

to stay in contact with DCS or the CASA in order to be offered services and

therefore has no basis to complain now. See Jackson v. Madison Cty. Dep’t of

Family & Children, 690 N.E.2d 792, 793 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (“A parent may

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-421 | August 1, 2019 Page 19 of 20
 not sit idly by for such an extended period without asserting a need and desire

for services and then successfully argue that [he] was denied services to assist

[him] with [his] parenting.”), trans. denied. Father has failed to establish that he

was denied due process.

[34] The judgment of the juvenile court is affirmed.

Crone, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-JT-421 | August 1, 2019 Page 20 of 20