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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JANICE LIND,
Appellant : No. 1825 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006459-2017
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JANICE LIND,
Appellant : No. 1826 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 18, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006458-2017
BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 1, 2019
Janice Lind (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence
imposed following her convictions for unlawful contact with a minor and two
counts each of conspiracy to commit rape, endangering the welfare of a
child, corruption of minors, conspiracy to commit involuntary deviate sexual
*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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intercourse (IDSI) with a child, and conspiracy to commit incest. Upon
review, we affirm.
Appellant had been charged with the systematic sexual
abuse of two of her minor biological children, her [son, AL.F,]
and [the] eldest of [Appellant's] three daughters, [A.F.
(collectively, Children),] committed in concert and independently
with her husband[, C]hildren's biological father[, R.F.]. Charges
had not [been] brought against Appellant for the sexual abuse of
her two younger daughters who had also been reported as
similarly abused per [Children. R.F.,] who had also participated
in the sexual abuse, however, had died before the authorities
learned of the [abuse]. The abuse of these [C]hildren had
occurred between 2011 and 2013, inside the home where
Appellant and [R.F.] had resided together with their minor
children, who had ranged [in age from] under eight years to
approximately eighteen months[. Children and their sisters] had
been removed from this residence by the City of Philadelphia
Department of Human Services [DHS] due to inhabitable [sic]
conditions in the home and reported narcotics abuse of both
parents before any information was related concerning sexual
and physical abuse.
[A.F.,] who was 12 years old when she testified at trial,
had reported being repeatedly sexually abused by both
[Appellant and R.F.], particularly when she was six or seven
years old. She stated in summary that she and [AL.F] were
often abused in Appellant's bedroom. Appellant had played
pornographic movies on the television. Appellant directed
[Children] to mimic the sexual acts portrayed on the television.
[Appellant] had directed them to touch each other's private
parts. [A.F.] recalled that Appellant had touched her front
private parts and put "burning powder" on her front private
parts. She testified that [R.F.] had touched her private parts in
concert with Appellant. Appellant had put [R.F.'s] private part
into [A.F.'s] private part. [A.F.] testified that Appellant had been
laughing while the sexual activity was occurring.
[AL.F.] was 10 years old when he testified. He recalled
frequent instances when Appellant had ordered all four children
to enter her bedroom when [R.F.] was in the bedroom only to be
subjected to myriad forms of abuse. He reported that Appellant
had touched his front and rear private parts. [R.F.] inserted his
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front private part into [AL.F's] back private part. He said that
Appellant had watched this activity. [AL.F.] said that Appellant
had touched and performed sexual acts on all three of his sisters
including a time when the youngest was just a baby. As to the
second oldest sister, he said that Appellant had touched her back
part while the father touched her front part. He recalled that his
father had put his private part into [A.F.'s] private part.
[AL.F.] testified that Appellant had given pills to [C]hildren
to ingest while the sexual activity was occurring. He also
remembered that [R.F.] had put a substance on his back private
part and that Appellant had also put a substance on the
youngest child's front private part. He had frequently observed
Appellant give herself an injection with needles. [AL.F.] said
that Appellant would "whoop" the children with wires, hangers
and belts if they did not comply with all demands of Appellant
and [R.F].
C.A. testified that she was the biological sister of [R.F.]
and [C]hildren's aunt. After [R.F.] died in January 2016, she
discovered that all four children had been removed from
Appellant's home and placed in various foster care homes. She
contacted [DHS] and arranged to have [C]hildren [and their
sisters] placed to live with her and her children.
After [C]hildren [and their siblings] began living with C.A.
and her children, C.A. discovered that Appellant's youngest child
had displayed sexual behavior to C.A.'s minor children. C.A.
immediately questioned [AL.F. and A.F. separately. AL.F.] told
her that Appellant and [R.F.] had hurt him in his private part and
that Appellant had played pornographic movies on the television.
He told her that [R.F.] had put his private part in his back area.
[AL.F] also said that [R.F.] put a "powder on his private part
which burned." [AL.F.] reported to her that Appellant had made
his three sisters perform sexual acts. He said that Appellant told
him and [A.F.] to perform sexual acts on each other. [AL.F.] said
that Appellant told him to watch the television and perform the
acts which he saw. He said Appellant laughed at the children
during these horrific acts.
[A.F.] independently corroborated [AL.F.'s] report of
sexual abuse that had been mimicked. [A.F.] told C.A. that
Appellant had played a movie on the television, and told her and
[AL.F.] to do what was portrayed on the television. She
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described sexual activity that had been demanded. [A.F.] said
that the sexual activities hurt so much that she had bled. Upon
hearing the individual accounts of [AL.F. and A.F.], C.A.
immediately called [DHS. DHS] separated Appellant's children
and all but one child had been permanently removed from C.A.'s
home and placed in homes wherein other children did not reside.
Christopher Li, social worker for [DHS], testified that as
the initial intake responder, he had conducted minimal fact
interviews with [AL.F. and A.F.]. The interviews were "minimal"
so as not to re -traumatize [C]hildren. [AL.F.] reported to him []
that he remembered being brought into his parents' bedroom,
forced to watch pornographic movies, forced to perform oral sex
on [R.F.] and forced to engage in sexual activities with his
parents and sisters who at that time ranged in ages from six or
seven to less than two years old. [A.F.] also said that she had to
do "stuff" with her parents and siblings. Mr. Li then referred the
case to the Philadelphia Children's Alliance, an agency tasked
with interviewing children who suffered sexual abuse.
Michelle Kline, a forensic interview specialist with the
Philadelphia Children's Alliance[,] testified that she interviewed
the four children separately. Videotapes of the interviews were
shown to the jury. The videotape recordings depicted [AL.F.'s
and A.F.'s] credible separate reporting of long term penetrating
sexual abuse committed by [Appellant and R.F.] in response to
non -confrontational and non -suggestive questions posed by the
Child Alliance forensic interview specialist.
Itwas stipulated at trial that when the third oldest child[,
0.F.,] had been interviewed by [DHS], she did not disclose
sexual abuse. It was also stipulated that Appellant was born on
December 13, 1975. The respective dates of birth of each of
Appellant's four biological children including [AL.F. and A.F.]
were entered by way of stipulation as well. Appellant's brother,
John Lind, testified that Appellant had a reputation as being a
peaceful and nonviolent citizen.
Appellant testified, without any presented emotional affect,
at trial that her four biological children had never even entered
the bedroom[ with R.F.]. She calmly denied playing any
pornographic videos. She denied sexually abusing [AL.F. and
A.F.]. She denied witnessing any sexual abuse from [R.F.]. She
claimed to have no idea why [C]hildren had accused her. She
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had also claimed that her home had been quite suitable for
habitation for her family that had also included her disabled
mother.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 2-6 (citations omitted). Following trial, on
March 2, 2018, Appellant was convicted of the aforementioned crimes.
On May 18, 2018, following full and fair sentencing hearing
during which th[e trial c]ourt heard argument and victim impact
testimony as well as testimony on behalf of Appellant and after
review of all sentencing factors and incorporation of considered
pre -sentence investigative [(PSI)] report[ and] mental health
assessments[, at docket number] CP-51-CR-0006458-2017,
Appellant was sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration of
10 to 20] years of incarceration for conspiracy [to commit rape
of a child]; three and one-half [] to seven [] years of
incarceration for endangering the welfare of child; and three and
one-half [] to seven [] years for corruption of minors. The two
remaining conspiracy counts merged into the sentence for
conspiracy [to commit rape of a child].
Under CP 51-CR-0006459-2017, [] Appellant was
sentenced to consecutive terms of incarceration of [10 to 20]
years for unlawful contact with minor; [10 to 20] years for
conspiracy [to commit rape of a child,] three and one-half [] to
seven [] years for endangering welfare of [a] child; [and] three
and one-half [] to seven [] years for corruption of minors. The
two remaining conspiracy counts merged into the sentence for
conspiracy [to commit rape of a child. The sentences at the
abovementioned docket numbers were ordered to run
consecutively to one another].
In each case Appellant had been deemed without objection
as a Tier II Sexual Offender. Due notice of reporting and
registration requirements were provided. Rehabilitative
conditions were imposed which had included no contact [with]
Appellant's children and prosecution witnesses. The
Commonwealth's representative did not pursue designation of
Appellant as a Sexual [Violent Predator (SVP)]. Post -sentence
motions requesting reconsideration of sentence and a new trial
were timely filed and denied without hearing on June 13, 2018.
Id. at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization and citations omitted).
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This appeal followed.' On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency
and weight of the evidence to sustain her convictions, as well as the
discretionary aspects of her sentence. Appellant's Brief at 5. We review
these claims sequentially.
Regarding Appellant's sufficiency claim, before we address the merits
of this issue, we consider whether she preserved it for appeal.
An appellant's concise statement must properly specify the error
to be addressed on appeal. In other words, the Rule 1925(b)
statement must be specific enough for the trial court to identify
and address the issue [an appellant] wishe[s] to raise on appeal.
[A c]oncise [s]tatement which is too vague to allow the court to
identify the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent
of no [c]oncise [s]tatement at all. The court's review and legal
analysis can be fatally impaired when the court has to guess at
the issues raised. Thus, if a concise statement is too vague, the
court may find waiver.
Commonwealth v. Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2011) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).
Appellant's Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement does not specify precisely
which elements of which crimes she contends the Commonwealth failed to
prove. See Concise Statement, 6/14/2018 ("Counsel intends to raise a
claim that the verdicts were against the sufficiency of the evidence."). This
Court has repeatedly required an appellant to specify in the Rule 1925(b)
statement the particular element or elements upon which the evidence was
insufficient. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 1072
1 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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(Pa. Super. 2017). "Such specificity is of particular importance in cases
where, as here, the appellant was convicted of multiple crimes each of which
contains numerous elements that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a
reasonable doubt." Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 968, 982 (Pa.
Super. 2016) (citing Commonwealth v. Garland, 63 A.3d 339 (Pa. Super.
2013)). Based upon this Court's desire to apply Rule 1925 in a "predictable,
uniform fashion," this Court has determined that waiver applies even where,
as here, the Commonwealth fails to object and the trial court addresses the
issue in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. Roche, 153 A.3d at 1072 (holding that
where Roche was convicted of first -degree murder and criminal conspiracy, a
concise statement asserting only that the evidence was insufficient to
sustain these convictions resulted in waiver); Commonwealth v. Tyack,
128 A.3d 254, 260 (Pa. Super. 2015) (holding that Tyack's "boilerplate"
concise statement declaring "that the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction" was too vague even where Tyack was convicted only of one
crime). In light of the foregoing, we find Appellant's sufficiency claim waived.
Regardless, even if Appellant did not waive her sufficiency claim, she
would still not be entitled to relief. Our standard of review in challenges to
the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine
whether, viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
most favorable to the [Commonwealth as the] verdict winner,
there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact -finder to find every
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying
[the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute
our judgment for the fact -finder. In addition, we note that the
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facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth need
not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding
a defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact -finder unless the
evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no
probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.
Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 716 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citation omitted).
On appeal, Appellant argues "[t]he evidence was weak and
inconclusive" based upon the inconsistencies in A.F.'s testimony. See
Appellant's Brief at 10-11 ("[A.F.] stated at trial the events concerning the
sexual abuse took place when she was seven or six. However, at a
preliminary hearing [A.F.] stated she could not remember how old she was
when the sexual assaults took place. Also, when being interviewed by the
Philadelphia Children's Alliance, [A.F.] could not remember when the events
took place. [A.F.] stated that the sexual assault happened in [Appellant's]
room on multiple days. At a preliminary hearing [A.F.] testified that it
happened on one day.") (citations omitted). Furthermore, Appellant noted
that despite A.F. testifying about Appellant's abuse of Children's younger
siblings, DHS took no further action regarding these allegations and "[i]n
fact, it was stipulated at trial that when O.F. was interviewed[,] she did not
disclose any abuse." Id.
Here, while presented as a sufficiency claim, Appellant's argument on
appeal is essentially challenging the weight of the evidence, asking this
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Court to assess the credibility of testifying witnesses and reweigh the
evidence presented at trial. This we will not do. Our case law is clear that
the finder of fact is "in the best position to view the demeanor of the
Commonwealth's witnesses and to assess each witness'[s] credibility."
Commonwealth v. Olsen, 82 A.3d 1041, 1049 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted). Thus, it was within the province of the jury, as fact -finder, to
believe A.F's testimony that Appellant engaged in physical and sexual abuse
of Children and discredit the testimony of Appellant that she was innocent of
the crimes charged. See Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 562
(Pa. Super. 2006) (recognizing that "testimony of a sexual assault victim, if
believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant, despite
contrary evidence from defense witnesses. If the factfinder reasonably could
have determined from the evidence adduced that all of the necessary
elements of the crime were established, then that evidence will be deemed
sufficient to support the verdict.") (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Miller, 172 A.3d 632, 642 (Pa.
Super. 2017) ("Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility
are matters for the finder of fact.").
Moreover, even if we were to review this issue as a properly preserved
sufficiency claim, we would conclude that the Commonwealth met its burden
of proving each and every element of the crimes for which Appellant was
convicted. As aptly set forth by the trial court:
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Rape of a child involves sexual intercourse by forcible
compulsion or threat of forcible compulsion where the victim is
under the age of 13[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 3121. [IDSI] with a child
involves anal intercourse by forcible compulsion or threat of
forcible compulsion where the victim is under the age of 13[.] 18
Pa.C.S. [§] 3123, 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 3101. Incest involves sexual
intercourse with a descendant[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4302.
Endangering the welfare of children involves violating a
duty of care, protection or support[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 4304.
Corruption of minors involves any act that tends to corrupt the
morals of a minor[.] 18 Pa.C.S. [§] 6301. Unlawful contact with
[a] minor involves being intentionally in contact with a minor for
the purpose of committing a sexual offense enumerated in
Chapter 31 of Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes[.] 18 Pa.C.S.
[§] 6318.
At trial it was overwhelmingly demonstrated that Appellant
[and R.F.] had entered into a conspiracy to systematically
sexually and physically abuse their four minor children over a
period of years. Their abhorrent ongoing conduct included
forcible anal and vaginal intercourse, the display of pornographic
movies, the touching of private parts of their bodies, applying
substances to their bodies, physical beatings and directing and
ordering of the children to engage in sexual activities with each
other.
Rather than attempt to stop the abuse as a responsible
parent, Appellant had pleasurably participated with [R.F.] as he
and [Appellant] sexually violated every private orifice of each
minor child, who ranged in ages from six years old to a toddler.
Appellant cruelly laughed while the children engaged in these
forced sexual activities.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 8-9. In light of the foregoing, Appellant's
sufficiency claim fails.
We now turn to Appellant's weight -of -the -evidence issue. In support
of her weight claim, Appellant cites the same inconsistencies in A.F.'s
testimony as set forth supra. Appellant's Brief at 11-12. In sum, Appellant
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claims "[t]he inconsistent testimony is a shock to one's sense of justice and
a new trial should be granted." Id. at 12.
Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the
exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the
trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence
presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration
to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when
reviewing a trial court's determination that the verdict is against
the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons
for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court's conviction
that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the
evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of
justice.
However, the exercise of discretion by the trial court in
granting or denying a motion for a new trial based on a
challenge to the weight of the evidence is not unfettered. The
propriety of the exercise of discretion in such an instance may be
assessed by the appellate process when it is apparent that there
was an abuse of that discretion.
Commonwealth v. Widmer, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (Pa. 2000) (internal
citations omitted). See also Commonwealth v. Britton, 134 A.3d 83, 86
(Pa. Super. 2016) ("The trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all,
part or none of the evidence.") (citation omitted).
The trial court found the testimony of Children to be "credible and
compelling. The heartbreaking accounts of unspeakable horrors was
corroborated by the testimony of" C.A., Mr. Li, Ms. Kline, "and the
videotapes of [Children's] interviews. The cumulative evidence of guilt was
overpowering." Trial Court Opinion, 1/10/2019, at 10.
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In reviewing the issue before us, we reiterate that "[a]ppellate review
of a weight claim is a review of the exercise of discretion, not of the
underlying question of whether the verdict is against the weight of the
evidence." Widmer, 744 A.2d at 753.
The term 'discretion' imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom
and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the
framework of the law, and is not exercised for the purpose of
giving effect to the will of the judge. Discretion must be
exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice,
personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions. Discretion is
abused when the course pursued represents not merely an error
of judgment, but where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable
or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that
the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
Id. (citation omitted).
With this in mind, upon review of the record, we discern no abuse of
discretion in the trial court's determination. Here, the jury had the
opportunity to hear all evidence presented and assess the credibility of those
who testified. This included listening to defense counsel speak at length
during closing about the inconsistences in the testimony presented. Despite
this, it is evident by the jury's verdict that they found that not only was A.F.
credible, but that her testimony, in conjunction with the additional evidence
and testimony, including corroborating testimony from her brother, AL.F.,
supported the finding that Appellant physically and sexually abused Children.
Moreover, Appellant has not alleged, and we do not conclude, that the trial
court acted unreasonably, or displayed prejudice, bias, or ill -will when
denying Appellant's weight claim. No relief is due.
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Lastly, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of her sentence.
Appellant's Brief at 13-14. Accordingly, we bear in mind the following.
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant
challenging the discretionary aspects of his [or her] sentence
must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part
test:
We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether
appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some
citations omitted). Here, Appellant timely filed a post -sentence motion and
notice of appeal, and included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in her
brief. We now turn to consider whether Appellant has presented a
substantial question for our review.
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case -by -case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d
825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). "A substantial question exists only when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
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sentencing process." Griffin, 65 A.3d at 935 (citation and quotation marks
omitted).
In her 2119(f) statement, Appellant's claims her sentence is
"manifestly excessive and imposed in violation of the Sentencing Code[.]"
Appellant's Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant contends her aggregate
sentence of 44 to 88 years' incarceration "is virtually a life sentence." 2 Id.
Under 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9721, the [trial] court has discretion to
impose sentences consecutively or concurrently and, ordinarily,
a challenge to this exercise of discretion does not raise a
substantial question. The imposition of consecutive, rather than
concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only
the most extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate
sentence is unduly harsh, considering the nature of the crimes
and the length of imprisonment.
Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 171-72 (Pa. Super. 2010)
(citations omitted).
[A] sentence can be so manifestly excessive in extreme
circumstances that it may create a substantial question. When
determining whether a substantial question has been raised, we
have focused upon whether the decision to sentence
consecutively raises the aggregate sentence to, what appears
upon its face to be, an excessive level in light of the criminal
conduct in this case.
Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 133-34 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
2 Within the argument section of her brief, Appellant contends the "trial court
failed to sufficiently take into consideration the rehabilitative needs of
[Appellant], her lack of prior record and the sentencing guidelines when
imposing sentence." Appellant's Brief at 14.
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In this case, prior to sentencing, the trial court set forth the guideline
ranges for each of the crimes Appellant was convicted. N.T., 5/18/2018, at
6-9. Furthermore, the trial court noted that "in addition to presiding over
the jury trial and listening to all the testimony, th[e trial court had] reviewed
in depth the mental health assessment of [Appellant] as well as the [PSIS]
report conducted pursuant to the [trial c]ourt's order." Id. at 5. Moreover,
the trial court heard statements made by Appellant, her brother and cousin,
as well as listened to victim impact statements.
In addition, the trial court gave sufficient justification for any deviation
from the guidelines. Specifically, at sentencing, the trial court set forth the
following.
[T]o the extent I deviate upward, it is for the following
reasons, ma'am. The amount of damage that you have done to
your children, to whom you have been entrusted their care, is
immeasurable. The damage is permanent. The trauma that
resulted had a rippling effect to traumatizing other children
within their sphere. The genesis of all of that is you. And yet you
sat here and you spoke. The only time I saw any, any ounce of
emotion, whatsoever, was when I said you were supposed to be
weaned off of the methadone that has been your crutch, and
that [was it]. I took great care throughout this trial to listen very
intensely to everything. I daresay that the rippling effect of the
trauma that was in this case was felt by even folks in my
courtroom, including the jury and our court officers. This case
will haunt me.
3 "[W]here the sentencing judge had the benefit of a [PSI] report, it will be
presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding
the defendant's character and weighed those considerations along with
mitigating statutory factors." Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 135 A.3d 1028,
1038 (Pa. Super. 2016).
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I have evaluated and tried to understand what cannot be
understood. I take into account your longstanding abuse of
various narcotics that you give varying versions in reference.
You stand before me at the age of forty-three years old with an
alcohol and narcotics abuse history beginning at the age of
fourteen. Your abuse of various narcotics to which [R.F.] also
died in January 2016, your co -abuser, was extensive but by no
means an excuse for your behavior. It was alcohol, progressed
to marijuana, heroin, morphine, cocaine, methamphetamine,
PCP. And it was remarked by the mental health assessment that
methadone was your drug of abuse beginning at the age twenty-
four along with heroin most particularly.
* * *
Itdid not go unnoticed by th[e trial c]ourt that in addition to the
sexual abuse committed by you, the reason that these children
were removed from your care in the first place was because of
the horrendous, horrendous conditions that were very visible
within their home to anybody that actually would go there. They
were removed from a home that you wouldn't put dogs or cats
in. The longstanding nature and methods of your abuse are part
and parcel of my sentence. You used your children, your babies,
as sexual playthings for your enjoyment and the enjoyment of
[R.F.]. And you can shake your head all you want, but I believe
them. It is beyond my comprehension as to why the need for
self -gratification in that manner.
N.T., 5/18/2018, at 29-31.
It is clear to this Court that the trial court took into account all
necessary considerations, including the mitigating factors presented by
Appellant. Nonetheless, for the reasons cited supra, the trial court
determined that a lengthy period of incarceration was appropriate in light of
the heinous nature of the crimes Appellant was convicted of. We find no
abuse of discretion in this determination. Nor has Appellant demonstrated
to this Court that "the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law,
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exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision." Commonwealth v.
Johnson, 125 A.3d 822, 826 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting Commonwealth
v. Disalvo, 70 A.3d 900, 903 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
Accordingly, after a review of the briefs, record, and applicable case
law, we are not persuaded that Appellant's issues warrant relief from this
Court.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/1/19
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