In the Matter of the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of J.W. (Minor Child) L.W. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
Aug 02 2019, 8:38 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana
Brooklyn, Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
In the Matter of the Termination August 2, 2019
of the Parent-Child Relationship Court of Appeals Case No.
of J.W. (Minor Child); 19A-JT-451
L.W. (Mother), Appeal from the Vigo Circuit
Court
Appellant-Respondent,
The Honorable Sarah K. Mullican,
v. Judge
The Honorable Daniel W. Kelly,
Indiana Department of Child Magistrate
Services, Trial Court Cause No.
84C01-1802-JT-258
Appellee-Petitioner.
Najam, Judge.
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Statement of the Case
[1] L.W. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s termination of her parental rights over
her minor child, J.W. (“Child”). Mother presents a single issue for our review,
namely, whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support the
termination of her parental rights.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] Mother is the biological mother of Child, who was born on January 20, 2016.
On March 7, 2017, DCS received a report that Mother had been involved in a
domestic violence incident while Child and Child’s six-year-old sister, A.L.,
were present. The report also indicated that Mother was using drugs and that
the home was in poor condition. DCS substantiated the report and removed
Child and A.L. from Mother’s care. On March 13, DCS filed a petition
alleging Child to be a Child in Need of Services (“CHINS”). 1 After a hearing,
the court adjudicated Child to be a CHINS. Thereafter, the court entered its
dispositional order and instructed Mother to submit to a substance abuse
assessment, a clinical interview and assessment, a mental health evaluation,
and to random drugs screens. In addition, the court instructed Mother to
participate in home-based case management and supervised visitation with
Child.
1
At the time, Mother was already involved with DCS due to the “educational neglect” of A.L. Ex. at 19.
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[4] Mother “didn’t complete any one service at any point in time.” Tr. Vol. III at
139. Accordingly, on March 1, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate
Mother’s parental rights over Child. Following a hearing, the court granted the
State’s petition on August 20. In support of its order, the court entered the
following findings and conclusions:
c. There is a reasonable probability that the conditions which
resulted in the removal of the child[] from [his] mother will not
be remedied or the reasons for placement outside of the home of
the parents will not be remedied or that the continuation of the
parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the
child[] as follows:
1. On or about March 7, 2017, the Department of Child Services
received a report of domestic violence between [Child’s] mother,
[Mother], and her girlfriend. [Mother] was found to have
suffered a gash on her forehead during the altercation. Also, a
man pulled a gun on [Child’s] mother in the presence of [Child]
and his sister, [A.L.]. There were also allegations of Mother
using heroin as well as filthy home conditions.
2. When the DCS assessment worker went to the home to
investigate the report, Mother had two black eyes and
acknowledged the domestic violence incident, stating that she
had been hit in the face with a mag light. She also acknowledged
that a man had pulled a gun on her. She told the [Family Case
Manager (“FCM”)] that she had not planned to make a police
report regarding the incident for fear of retaliation.
3. DCS tried to persuade Mother to file for a no contact order or
an order of protection, but she refused. She also refused to
submit to a drug screen in order for DCS to determine whether
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the children had a sober caregiver. [Mother] stated that she had
lost her food stamps and there was little food in the home.
4. At the time of this assessment, [Child’s] sister, [A.L.] had
already been the subject of an Informal Adjustment related to
poor school attendance. However, on March 9, 2017, she was
again absent from school. When, on March 10, 2017, [A.L.] was
again absent from school, both children were removed from
Mother’s care. When the assessment worker arrived at the home
on that day, [A.L.] answered the door and reported that her
mother was sleeping. She had no clean clothing. [Child] was in
a Pak-N-Play with dried feces on him. There were cigarette butts
within the child’s reach. DCS determined that [A.L.] had missed
9 days of school in the past two months. [Child] had a serious
medical condition, specifically, a shunt in the brain for
hydrocephalus, but [Mother] had failed to schedule a follow-up
appointment after the insertion of the shunt.
5. DCS put in extensive reunification services for [Mother]. She
was assigned a care manager for Hamilton Center, who worked
with [Mother] on her mental health, substance abuse,
employment and housing. Mother admitted to ongoing use of
meth and marijuana in June, 2017, when she began working with
her. [Mother] was ordered to submit to a mental health
assessment to determine if she met the criteria for a dual
diagnosis group and was ordered to obtain individual counseling.
She never participated in a mental health assessment and refused
to meet with the first therapist, Dr. Jackson, who had been
assigned to her. She was then to meet with Dr. Tyrone Powell
for individual therapy, but was discharged from that service for
missing multiple appointments without contact.
6. [Mother] was only able to obtain employment during the
pendency of the CHINS case on two occasions, one job lasting
for approximately two weeks and the other only two hours. She
sought Social Security Disability, but was denied for failure to
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follow through with her application. Therefore, she was unable
to obtain any means of support for [Child]. The Hamilton Care
Center Manager, Holly Neil, supervised one of [Mother’s]
supervised visits before they were moved to the DCS office, but
[Mother] fell asleep during that visit.
7. Mother has been unable to maintain stable housing
throughout the CHINS proceedings. She has resided temporarily
in several shelters. She was in the Eagle Street house for three
weeks, at Club Soda and Freebirds. She frequently moves and
changes her phone number. The difficulty maintaining contact
with Mother has been one of the many impediments to getting
services to her. In addition, Mother has often been hostile,
making it difficult to help her. On one occasion, Mother
threatened to harm FCM Jennifer Lewis. [Mother] has been
diagnosed with schizophrenia, but has rejected services to
address her mental health needs.
8. When [Mother] sustained a broken leg, she refused to have a
walking boot placed on her leg, stating that she felt the pump on
the boot was being used to monitor her actions. Other examples
of paranoid behavior were also given in court.
9. [Mother] has suffered multiple injuries from the various
people with whom she has lived and associated herself. She has
threatened her Hamilton Center care manager and family.
10. Dr. Tyrone Powell, who has provided psychological services
to [Mother,] testified that she was referred to him for an
assessment on September 5, 2017. He diagnosed her with
schizoaffective disorder and substance abuse disorder, with
methamphetamine and sedatives her preferred drugs. He said
that she suffers from mood disturbance, delusions, paranoia and
depression. Dr. Powell’s goals were to help [Mother] deal with
her depression and to help her develop coping skills for her
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depression and anxiety without abusing drugs. He referred her to
Hamilton Center’s Matrix drug treatment program. She was also
to meet with him one to two times per month, beginning
September 5, 2017. By October 25, 2017, [Mother] had been
kicked out of Eagle Street for taking another resident’s
medication. She was suffering from suicidal ideations and
attempted to get herself run over in traffic. When Dr. Powell met
with [Mother] the last time, on January 11, 2018, she was living
at the Conner Center and had been homeless for the past two
months. She admitted to having used drugs on Christmas Day,
2017 due to her continuing depression. He made a second
referral to the Matrix program, but [Mother] failed to show for it.
11. [Mother] was referred to therapist Dominque Jackson after
her in-patient stay, but never met with her and was closed out of
that service for non-compliance.
12. [Mother] went to the Eagle Street transitional program for
dual diagnosis females, which is a 90-day program. She stayed
for three weeks in September of 2017. During her stay, she had
numerous rule violations. She was eventually asked to leave the
facility. No improvement was noted during her stay at Eagle
Street.
13. Jennifer Norris worked with [Mother] as a care manager
with Raintree Consulting. She was unable to get [Mother]
employment. At one time, [Mother] got an apartment, but was
quickly evicted and became homeless.
14. DCS Family Case Manager Jennifer Lewis was handling
[Child’s] sibling’s Informal Adjustment when the CHINS case
was opened on [Child]. Ms. Lewis put in a referral to Hamilton
Center, since the Raintree referral had been closed out in April of
2017. [Mother] had an appointment for a substance abuse
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assessment, and Ms. Lewis offered to drive her to the assessment.
[Mother] refused to participate in the assessment.
15. Temporary housing was found for Mother at Club Soda, a
sober living environment, after Mother had her leg broken with a
baseball bat in a domestic violence incident. She was kicked out
of Club Soda after two weeks for refusing to keep a cast on her
broken leg.
16. Despite the court orders in the pending CHINS case, Mother
never attended NA or AA meetings. DCS provided bus passes to
[Mother] in June, August, September, October and November of
2017 and again in January of 2018 to ensure that she had
transportation for purposes of attending services.
17. During a supervised visit, Mother smacked [Child] in the
mouth, claiming that [Child] had bit her lip. In another
supervised visit, [Mother] was extremely agitated and had
difficulty sitting still. There were numerous incidents reported
during the supervised visits. During a supervised visit on August
19, 2017, [Mother] fell asleep a couple of times during the visit.
[Child’s] sister, [A.L.] had to keep [Child] from putting chalk in
his mouth. Mother ended that visit early. During a supervised
visit on September 15, 2017, [Child] pulled the string on a toy
bow and snapped it into his neck. [Mother] frequently was on
her phone during visits and in October and November of 2017,
she missed virtually all of her visits, claiming to have a job.
When DCS attempted to have her get them her schedule so they
could schedule around work, she did not cooperate. She
eventually lost that job for too many no-shows.
18. In early 2018, DCS filed a modification to request that
services be stopped. The court granted that modification March
15, 2018.
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19. No progress was made with regard to Mother’s mental
health or substance abuse, so none of the original concerns
leading to removal have been remedied.
d. Termination is in the best interests of the minor child as
testified to by DCS and CASA.
e. The Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan for
the care and treatment of the child[], which is adoption.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 48-52. Accordingly, the court terminated Mother’s
parental rights as to Child. This appeal ensued.
Discussion and Decision
[5] We begin our review of this issue by acknowledging that “[t]he traditional right
of parents to establish a home and raise their children is protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.” Bailey v. Tippecanoe
Div. of Fam. & Child. (In re M.B.), 666 N.E.2d 73, 76 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996), trans.
denied. However, a trial court must subordinate the interests of the parents to
those of the child when evaluating the circumstances surrounding a
termination. Schultz v. Porter Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re K.S.), 750 N.E.2d
832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). Termination of a parent-child relationship is
proper where a child’s emotional and physical development is threatened. Id.
Although the right to raise one’s own child should not be terminated solely
because there is a better home available for the child, parental rights may be
terminated when a parent is unable or unwilling to meet his or her parental
responsibilities. Id. at 836.
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[6] Before an involuntary termination of parental rights can occur in Indiana, DCS
is required to allege and prove:
(B) that one (1) of the following is true:
(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
reasons for placement outside the home of the
parents will not be remedied.
(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
threat to the well-being of the child.
***
(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and
(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of
the child.
Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (2018). DCS’s “burden of proof in termination of
parental rights cases is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” R.Y. v. Ind.
Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re G.Y.), 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-61 (Ind. 2009) (quoting
I.C. § 31-37-14-2).
[7] When reviewing a termination of parental rights, we will not reweigh the
evidence or judge the credibility of the witnesses. Peterson v. Marion Cty. Off. of
Fam. & Child. (In re D.D.), 804 N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans.
denied. Instead, we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that
are most favorable to the judgment. Id. Moreover, in deference to the trial
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court’s unique position to assess the evidence, we will set aside the court’s
judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
Judy S. v. Noble Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child. (In re L.S.), 717 N.E.2d 204, 208 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied.
[8] Here, in terminating Mother’s parental rights, the trial court entered specific
findings of fact and conclusions thereon. When a trial court’s judgment
contains findings and conclusions, we apply a two-tiered standard of review.
Bester v. Lake Cty. Off. of Fam. & Child., 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). First,
we determine whether the evidence supports the findings and, second, we
determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. “Findings are clearly
erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either
directly or by inference.” Quillen v. Quillen, 671 N.E.2d 98, 102 (Ind. 1996). If
the evidence and inferences support the trial court’s decision, we must affirm.
In re L.S., 717 N.E.2d at 208.
[9] On appeal, Mother “does not dispute” that there is a reasonable probability that
the conditions that resulted in Child’s removal or continued placement outside
of the home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child
relationship poses a threat to the well-being of Child. Appellant’s Br. at 7.
Mother also does not dispute that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of Child. Rather, Mother only asserts that the trial court erred when
it concluded that the termination of her parental rights is in the Child’s best
interests.
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[10] In determining whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of a
child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of the evidence. A.S. v.
Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs. (In re A.K.), 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
“A parent’s historical inability to provide adequate housing, stability and
supervision coupled with a current inability to provide the same will support a
finding that termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best
interests.” Castro v. State Off. of Fam. & Child., 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2006), trans. denied. “Additionally, a child’s need for permanency is an
important consideration in determining the best interests of a child.” In re A.K.,
924 N.E.2d at 224.
[11] Here, Mother contends that termination is not in Child’s best interests because,
while she “had not yet remedied all the conditions that led to [Child’s]
removal” as of the date of the fact-finding hearing, she “had secured housing”
at an impatient treatment facility, had “maintained her sobriety” since entering
the facility one week prior, had “reinitiated services” for mental health
treatment, and “expressed sincere love” for Child. Id. at 8. In essence, Mother
asserts that termination of her parental rights was not in Child’s best interests
because, “with additional time, she could indeed remedy” the conditions that
led to Child’s removal. Appellant’s Br. at 8.
[12] Mother’s contentions on appeal amount to a request that we reweigh the
evidence, which we cannot do. FCM Lewis testified that termination of
Mother’s parental rights is in Child’s best interests. Additionally, the Court-
Appointed Special Advocate testified that “[r]eintroducing [Mother] back into
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[Child’s] routine would not be in [Child’s] best interest, as he has stability in his
life now.” Tr. Vol. III at 144. Further, the evidence demonstrates that Mother
received referrals for several services, including for individual therapy, a mental
health assessment, and a substance abuse assessment. But Mother did not
participate in the mental health assessment. And while Mother initially met
with a psychologist, she was later discharged from that service for failing to
attend appointments.
[13] Mother has also failed to maintain stable housing. Throughout the proceeding,
Mother lived at various shelters or slept on friends’ couches. The longest
amount of time Mother resided in any one place was for the three weeks she
stayed in the Eagle Street house before she was kicked out for taking another
resident’s medication. In addition, Mother was referred to multiple substance
abuse treatment programs, but she either did not attend or she left the program
shortly after starting. As a result, Mother continues to use drugs. Indeed,
Mother told her case manager that she was “in active meth use” as of June
2018, which was approximately one month before the fact-finding hearing. Id.
at 41. And Mother testified that as of the date of the hearing she had only been
sober for “a week.” Id. at 164.
[14] Child needs consistent and reliable care, and he needs permanency. The
totality of the evidence, including Mother’s inability to provide a safe and stable
home to Child and her failure to address her mental health and substance abuse
issues, supports the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s
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parental rights is in Child’s best interests. We therefore affirm the trial court’s
judgment. 2
[15] Affirmed.
Bailey, J., and May, J., concur.
2
Mother briefly asserts that “[t]he court failed to make any specific finding regarding why termination of
Mother’s parental rights was in [Child’s] best interests, other than a general conclusory finding.” Appellant’s
Br. at 7. While the trial court did not make extensive findings to support its conclusion that termination is in
Child’s best interest, the court did find that termination is in Child’s best interest “as testified to by DCS and
CASA.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 52. Accordingly, the trial court supported its conclusion with a specific
finding, namely, that both DCS and the CASA testified that termination was in Child’s best interest.
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