MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 08 2019, 7:10 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
court except for the purpose of establishing Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Elizabeth A. Bellin Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Elkhart, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Ellen H. Meilaender
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Robert D. Goodwin, August 8, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-275
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Stephen R.
Appellee-Plaintiff Bowers, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D02-1805-F5-160
May, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-275 | August 8, 2019 Page 1 of 10
[1] Robert D. Goodwin appeals his conviction of Level 5 felony carrying a
handgun without a license. 1 Goodwin argues the trial court abused its
discretion when it admitted video evidence of him discussing an outstanding
warrant in an unrelated matter, because the admission of that evidence violated
Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and the trial court’s order in limine. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On May 21, 2018, Officer Jared Davis and Officer Lauren Adams, who were in
separate cars, were conducting surveillance on a known drug house. As they
were conducting surveillance, they observed a maroon Chrysler driving away
from the house. The vehicle presented two infractions that could justify a traffic
stop: (1) portions of the license plate were unreadable from less than fifty feet
during the day, because the plate was affixed beneath a dark-tinted plastic
holder; and (2) the vehicle failed to signal its intention to turn left at least 200
feet prior to turning. Officer Davis initiated a traffic stop.
[3] As soon as Officer Davis turned on his emergency lights, the passenger door of
the vehicle opened, and the passenger jumped out before the vehicle came to a
complete stop and ran away extremely quickly. Officer Davis observed the
fleeing passenger to be an African-American male, with dreadlocks, wearing a
blue/white/black striped jacket. Officer Davis radioed that the passenger was
1
Ind. Code § 35-47-2-1 (2017).
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fleeing from the stop, but he was staying with the driver of the car. Officer
Davis also reported identifying information about the fleeing passenger.
[4] Officer Adams was close to the area, so she began looking for the passenger
who fled. She briefly lost sight of the passenger as he ran between an alley and
a house, but she was flagged down by a frantic resident waving, pointing, and
stating “he’s running that way.” (App. Vol. II at 15.) Officer Adams turned
onto the next street and observed an African-American male, with dreadlocks,
wearing a blue/white/black striped jacket, walking normally down the street.
Officer Adams approached the individual in order to investigate and ordered
the individual, later identified as Goodwin, to his knees and handcuffed him.
[5] Seconds after detaining Goodwin, a witness called Dispatch stating she saw an
African-American male, wearing a blue/white/black striped jacket, remove a
silver handgun with black grips from his waist band. Officers located two
handguns nearby, and one of them matched the caller’s description. The two
handguns were seized as evidence, and officers arrested Goodwin for carrying a
handgun without a license. A criminal history report on Goodwin revealed a
prior felony conviction for carrying a handgun without a license.
[6] On May 24, 2018, the State charged Goodwin with Class A misdemeanor
carrying a handgun without a license. Due to his prior conviction of possession
of a handgun without a license, the State filed an Information alleging
Goodwin was subject to enhancement of his crime to a Level 5 felony. Prior to
trial, Goodwin moved for the court to exclude:
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1. Any character evidence regarding Defendant in the following
forms: (1) other wrongs; (2) prior bad acts; and (3) non-
charged conduct or criminal offenses not reduced to
convictions and admissible pursuant to Indiana Rules of
Evidence 404(b) or 609;
(Id. at 30). After hearing arguments on the motion, the trial court granted
Goodwin’s motion in limine.
[7] On December 11, 2018, a jury was impaneled and trial began. During trial, the
State moved to admit a video from Officer Adams’ body camera. Defense
counsel objected to the entire video on relevance grounds and to a portion of
the video on Evidence Rule 404(b) grounds because in a portion Goodwin
referenced a warrant from an unrelated matter. Specifically, in those four
seconds, Goodwin said, “I thought I had a warrant.” (Tr. Vol. III at 22.) The
court overruled the relevance objection and admitted the video with the four
seconds that reference the warrant redacted. Before the video was played for
the jury, however, defense counsel notified the court that Goodwin insisted the
entire video be published to the jury without redaction, which was contrary to
counsel’s advice. After confirming Goodwin truly wanted the entire video to be
published, the trial court played the entire video for the jury.
[8] At the close of trial, the jury found Goodwin guilty of carrying a handgun
without a license. Subsequently, Goodwin pled guilty to having a prior
handgun conviction, which elevated his conviction to a Level 5 felony. The
trial court sentenced Goodwin to an aggravated sentence of five-and-a-half
years.
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Discussion and Decision
[9] The admission or exclusion of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and we review for an abuse of discretion. Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d
864, 871 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. An abuse of discretion occurs when the
decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances
before it, id., and the decision will not be disturbed absent a requisite showing
of abuse. Id.
[10] Goodwin asserts the trial court violated Indiana Evidence Rule 404(b) and its
own in limine order when it admitted video evidence in which Goodwin refers
to the existence of a warrant for him in an unrelated matter. Rule 404(b)(1)
provides: “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person
acted in accordance with the character.” Such evidence may, however, be
admissible to prove “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake or lack of accident.” Evid. R. 404(b)(2).
[11] In deciding whether to admit Rule 404(b) evidence, a trial court must: (1)
determine that the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to a
matter at issue other than the defendant’s propensity to commit the charged act;
and (2) balance the probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect
pursuant to Indiana Evidence Rule 403. Freed v. State, 954 N.E.2d 526, 530
(Ind. Ct. App. 2011). Rule 403 provides in part that “[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
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the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury.”
The trial court is afforded wide latitude in weighing probative value against
prejudice under Rule 403. Freed, 954 N.E.2d at 531.
[12] We will reverse the court’s evaluation and decision to admit or exclude
evidence only on a showing of an abuse of discretion. Id. Even if the
admission is an abuse of discretion, “we will not reverse if the admission of
evidence constituted harmless error.” Micheau v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1053, 1059
(Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Fox v. State, 717 N.E.2d 957, 966 (Ind. Ct. App.
1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied), trans. denied. Error is harmless if “the
conviction is supported by substantial independent evidence of guilt as to satisfy
the reviewing court that there is no substantial likelihood that the questioned
evidence contributed to the conviction.” Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563, 569
(Ind. 2000), reh’g denied.
[13] Here, the trial court initially admitted the video evidence with the four-second
portion redacted. (Tr. Vol. III at 23.) However, Goodwin then insisted the
entire video be played without redaction:
Mr. Banik: Contrary to my good advice, my client is asking that
we play the entire video, start to finish, no redactions,
no nothing.
The Court: I’m sorry?
Mr. Banik: Contrary to my good advice, my client has directed
that he wants the entire video played and if not
during [Officer Adams’] case then we’re going to play
the whole thing during his. No redaction. No
portions.
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The Court: I think we need to make a record on that outside of
the presence of the jury.
*****
Mr. Banik: Robert, I’ve indicated to you that I think parts of the
video, in particular, a part that says—well you tell the
officer you thought you had a warrant, ought to be
not played for the jury. Do you understand that? Do
you understand that’s what I told you.
Mr. Goodwin: Yes.
Mr. Banik: And you’re saying that you strongly disagree with
that and you want the whole video, no redactions,
100% start to finish to come in to the jury?
Mr. Goodwin: Yes, cause my knowledge that I didn’t—this is a
surprise to me. It never was in my motion discovery
(sic). I haven’t seen-
The Court: You need to speak up. I’m still having trouble
hearing you.
Mr. Goodwin: I haven’t seen the video that they are talking
about.
*****
The Court: That’s not the question. At this point [what] we’re
trying to figure out Mr. Goodwin is whether the video
which has been identified by the State is going to be
played for the jury or not. Mr. Banik has objected
partially on grounds of relevancy. I’ve overruled that
objection because it goes to the question of your
identity. He has also objected because one of the
portions of that exhibit or one of the portions of that
video is a reference to a warrant, which is obviously a
reference to another charge, which would not
normally be admissible against you and which could
prejudice you in the eyes of the jury and so Mr. Banik
is making that objection. What you have indicated
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here is you want them to see the entire video even
though there might be a legal objection. That’s where
we were until you said you hadn’t seen any videos.
Mr. Goodwin: I haven’t seen any video.
The Court: So my question is, how do you know that you want
the jury to see the entire video if you’re saying you
have not seen it at all because frankly, I don’t make—
I don’t think that makes any sense.
Mr. Goodwin: But if you just going to show partial of it, I
haven’t seen that either. I haven’t seen any videos of
it.
The Court: Well Mr.—Mr. Banik says you have and you say that
you haven’t. I’m not going to resolve that issue today.
What I’m going to say is this, do you—are you
insisting that the jury see this entire video, which you
claim you haven’t seen? Are you asking me to make
that ruling in this case?
Mr. Goodwin: Yes Your Honor.
(Id. at 24, 25-29.)
[14] Goodwin attempts to construe the issue on appeal as being about “hybrid
representation,” 2 but the record clearly indicates that any error that occurred
was invited by Goodwin himself. “The doctrine of invited error is grounded in
estoppel and precludes a party from taking advantage of an error that he or she
commits, invites, or which is the natural consequence of his or her own neglect
or misconduct.” Balicki v. Balicki, 837 N.E.2d 532, 541 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005),
2
Hybrid representation occurs when “the duties of trial advocacy are shared by a defendant and his attorney,
or when a defendant proceeds pro se with an attorney in an advisory capacity.” See Swinehart v. State, 376
N.E.2d 486, 490 (Ind. 1978) (citing Bradberry v. State, 266 N.E.2d 538, 537 (Ind. 1977)).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-275 | August 8, 2019 Page 8 of 10
trans. denied. The trial court initially admitted the video with the four seconds of
Evidence Rule 404(b) evidence redacted. Goodwin himself, against the advice
of counsel, insisted the trial court change that ruling and admit the entire video.
We cannot conclude the trial court erred when it admitted the unredacted video
at Goodwin’s insistence, and Goodwin cannot now allege that admission was
error. See Dennerline v. Atterholt, 886 N.E.2d 582, 596 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(appellant invited the error when he consented to the striking of his setoff
defense and to the exclusion of evidence regarding settlements with nonparties;
thus, those issues were waived on appeal), reh’g denied, trans. dismissed.
[15] Even if Goodwin had not invited the error, the admission was harmless because
the evidence of Goodwin’s guilt was too strong for the verdict to be impacted
by his four-second reference to the warrant. Goodwin was identified as the
person who rapidly fled from the traffic stop, and police located him a block or
so away from the traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. III at 19-20.) A witness positively
identified Goodwin as the man she saw outside her house, and police found
nearby the gun she described as being in Goodwin’s possession. (Tr. Vol. II at
204-06, 207.) We are confident the jury would have found Goodwin possessed
that gun even if those four seconds had been redacted from the video. See Fox,
717 N.E.2d at 966 (defendant failed to establish harm because the trial court’s
admission of the video tape was cumulative and not the only direct evidence of
the events because two witnesses testified at trial).
Conclusion
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[16] Because Goodwin invited any error that occurred and any error was harmless
in light of the evidence against Goodwin, we affirm.
[17] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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