in Interest of A.B-A

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY
August 8, 2019

2019COA125

No. 18CA1145, People in Interest of A.B-A. — Juvenile Court —
Dependency and Neglect — Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
and Enforcement Act — Temporary Emergency Jurisdiction

In this dependency and neglect case, a division of the court of

appeals concludes that the human rights “escape clause” of the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA)

did not apply to excuse enforcement of a prior child custody order

entered by an Iranian court. As a result, the division concludes

that the juvenile court exceeded its temporary emergency

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when it terminated parental rights.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2019COA125

Court of Appeals No. 18CA1145
Adams County District Court No. 16JV301
Honorable Priscilla J. Loew, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of A.B-A., a Child,

and Concerning M.B. and S.T-K.,

Respondents-Appellants.

JUDGMENT VACATED AND CASE
REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II
Opinion by JUDGE PAWAR
Dailey and Casebolt*, JJ., concur

Announced August 8, 2019

Heidi M. Miller, County Attorney, Howard Reinstein, Deputy County Attorney,
Westminster, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee

Jeff Ruff, Guardian Ad Litem

Patrick R. Henson, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver, Colorado,
for Respondent-Appellant M.B.

Pamela K. Streng, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Georgetown,
Colorado, for Respondent-Appellant S.T-K.

*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art.
VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2018.
¶1 Mother, S.T-K., and father, M.B., appeal the juvenile court’s

judgment terminating their parent-child relationships with their

son, A.B-A. We consider whether, under the Uniform Child-custody

Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), sections 14-13-101

to -403, C.R.S. 2018, the juvenile court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to terminate parental rights based on an existing child

custody order in Iran. We also consider the Adams County

Department of Human Services’ (Department) contention that the

juvenile court could disregard the prior child custody order either

because the prior order does not conform to UCCJEA jurisdictional

standards or because Iranian child custody law violates

fundamental principles of human rights.

¶2 We conclude that the juvenile court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to terminate parental rights and could not disregard the

Iranian order. We also conclude that the juvenile court erred in

allowing the Department to serve father by publication. We

therefore vacate the judgment and remand the case for further

proceedings.

1
 I. Background

¶3 Mother, father, and the child are citizens of Iran. The parents

divorced in Iran in 2009, when the child was six years old. Custody

of the child remained with mother pursuant to a court order.

¶4 Mother moved to California in 2011. The child remained in

Iran, where his maternal grandmother and father cared for him at

different times between 2011 and 2015. The child joined mother in

California in 2015.

¶5 Mother and the child moved to Colorado in August 2016. The

following month, mother suffered a mental health crisis and entered

a mental health facility on an involuntary hold. Consequently, the

Department took the child into protective custody. The Department

filed a petition in dependency or neglect in October 2016. The

juvenile court entered a deferred adjudication as to mother and

later adjudicated the child dependent and neglected as to mother.

¶6 Father was in Iran at all times during the proceeding. In July

2017, the Department moved to serve him by publication because it

had been unable to contact him. The juvenile court granted the

motion, and the Department published a summons in an Adams

2
 County-area newspaper. Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court

entered a default adjudication as to father.

¶7 The Department moved to terminate parental rights in

December 2017. In April 2018, the day before the scheduled

termination hearing, father contacted the family’s caseworker. He

said he had just learned of the case and wanted the child returned

to him. Father continued to telephone the caseworker over the next

month. Even so, in May 2018, the juvenile court terminated both

parents’ parental rights.

II. The Juvenile Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Under the UCCJEA

¶8 Mother contends that the juvenile court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to terminate parental rights under the UCCJEA,

sections 14-13-101 to -403, C.R.S. 2018, because an Iranian child

custody order was already in effect. We review the juvenile court’s

subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA de novo and agree

with mother. People in Interest of C.L.T., 2017 COA 119, ¶ 14.

A. Foreign Child Custody Orders in Dependency and
Neglect Proceedings

¶9 Dependency and neglect proceedings must comply with the

UCCJEA. People in Interest of M.S., 2017 COA 60, ¶¶ 11-12. The

3
 UCCJEA establishes a comprehensive framework that a Colorado

court must use to determine whether it may exercise jurisdiction in

a child custody matter or whether it must defer to a court of

another state. C.L.T., ¶ 16. Subject to the limitations discussed

below, Colorado courts must treat a foreign country as though it

were a state of the United States for purposes of jurisdiction under

the UCCJEA. § 14-13-104, C.R.S. 2018; In re Parental

Responsibilities Concerning T.L.B., 2012 COA 8, ¶ 19. As this case

concerns a foreign country’s child custody order, we will discuss

provisions of the UCCJEA that refer to another “state” in terms of

their application to a “foreign country.”

¶ 10 The UCCJEA aims to avoid jurisdictional competition over

child custody matters in an increasingly mobile society. See Brandt

v. Brandt, 2012 CO 3, ¶ 19; C.L.T., ¶ 15; M.S., ¶ 15. To that end,

the UCCJEA provides that the foreign court that issued a child

custody order retains exclusive, continuing jurisdiction over the

determination. § 14-13-202, C.R.S. 2018. The foreign court’s

jurisdiction continues until (1) the foreign court determines that it

no longer has exclusive, continuing jurisdiction; (2) the foreign

court declines jurisdiction on the ground that Colorado provides a

4
 more convenient forum; or (3) either the foreign court or a Colorado

court determines that the child, the parents, and anyone acting as

a parent do not presently reside in the foreign country.

§ 14-13-203, C.R.S. 2018; C.L.T., ¶ 31. As relevant here, the

foreign court may not be deprived of jurisdiction if a parent

presently resides in the foreign country. Brandt, ¶ 27.

¶ 11 A Colorado court may not modify a foreign child custody order

unless two conditions are met: (1) the Colorado court has

jurisdiction to make an initial custody determination under section

14-13-201, C.R.S. 2018; and (2) the foreign court has lost or ceded

jurisdiction under section 14-13-203.

¶ 12 Notwithstanding a prior, enforceable foreign child custody

order, however, a Colorado court may exercise temporary

emergency jurisdiction to protect a child who is present in Colorado

from mistreatment, abuse, or abandonment. § 14-13-204, C.R.S.

2018; T.L.B., ¶ 21; see also People in Interest of M.C., 94 P.3d 1220,

1225 (Colo. App. 2004).

¶ 13 But this temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA

is limited in scope and in time. Importantly, a Colorado court

exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction may not enter a

5
 permanent custody disposition. M.C., 94 P.3d at 1225 (while

exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction, a juvenile court may

not adjudicate a child dependent or neglected or terminate parental

rights). When exercising temporary emergency jurisdiction to enter

a temporary emergency order, the Colorado court must specify in its

order a time period that the court considers adequate to allow the

person seeking a child custody determination to obtain an order

from the foreign court. § 14-13-204(3). And the Colorado order

remains in effect only until the foreign court enters an order or the

period expires, whichever occurs earlier. Id.; T.L.B., ¶ 21 (a

temporary emergency order under the UCCJEA lapses as soon as

the court that otherwise has jurisdiction enters an order).

¶ 14 Because the juvenile court’s emergency jurisdiction is limited

in scope and time, it is imperative that the juvenile court promptly

ascertain whether a foreign custody order exists and, if one does,

whether the foreign order limits the juvenile court’s jurisdiction.

See 19 Frank L. McGuane, Jr. & Kathleen A. Hogan, Colorado

Practice Series: Family Law and Practice § 27:9, Westlaw (2d ed.

database updated May 2019) (the emergency nature of proceedings

does not suspend the juvenile court’s obligation to communicate

6
 with the court of another jurisdiction regarding a prior custody

action). To facilitate the court’s assessment, each party to a

dependency and neglect proceeding must provide information

regarding where and with whom the child has resided during the

last five years; any other proceeding involving custody, visitation, or

parenting time with the child; any proceeding that might affect the

Colorado dependency and neglect proceeding; and the names and

addresses of nonparties who might have physical custody of the

child or claim rights of parental responsibilities, custody, visitation,

or parenting time. § 14-13-209, C.R.S. 2018. This duty of

disclosure applies to parents, social services agencies, guardians ad

litem, and any other persons who may have acquired party status

as intervenors or otherwise. C.L.T., ¶ 22 n.1. The department, as

the petitioning party in dependency and neglect proceedings, bears

the burden of establishing the juvenile court’s subject matter

jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. See Brandt, ¶ 33.

¶ 15 When the juvenile court discovers a foreign custody order, the

Colorado court must immediately confer with the foreign court “to

resolve the emergency, protect the safety of the parties and the

child, and determine a period for the duration of the temporary

7
 order.” § 14-13-204(4); see also § 14-13-110, C.R.S. 2018; People

in Interest of D.P., 181 P.3d 403, 407 (Colo. App. 2008) (Colorado

judge must personally confer with issuing court and may not

delegate that responsibility to a law clerk).

¶ 16 With this framework in mind, we now turn to the facts of this

case.

B. The Juvenile Court Lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction to
Terminate Parental Rights

¶ 17 In December 2017, the Department filed with the juvenile

court an English translation of the parents’ Iranian dissolution

decree. The decree includes an order granting custody of the child

to mother.

¶ 18 At the termination hearing, mother’s counsel asserted that,

under the UCCJEA, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to

terminate parental rights. The juvenile court stated that it was

unsure whether a specific Iranian child custody order existed.

Without resolving this issue, the court found that it had jurisdiction

and terminated both mother’s and father’s parental rights. This

was error. Because there was an Iranian child custody order in

place, the only jurisdiction that the juvenile court could exercise

8
 was temporary emergency jurisdiction under section 14-13-204(4).

And temporary emergency jurisdiction does not allow a court to

enter a permanent custody disposition, as the juvenile court did

here. We therefore conclude that the juvenile court lacked subject

matter jurisdiction to terminate mother’s and father’s parental

rights.

¶ 19 The Department argues that the Iranian child custody order

did not limit the juvenile court to exercising only temporary

emergency jurisdiction because (1) the Iranian child custody order

does not conform to the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional standards and (2)

the child custody law of Iran violates fundamental principles of

human rights. We reject both contentions.

1. The Order Conforms to the UCCJEA’s
Jurisdictional Standards

¶ 20 Colorado courts must recognize and enforce a foreign child

custody order if it was made under factual circumstances that

substantially comply with the UCCJEA’s jurisdictional standards.

§ 14-13-104(2). As relevant here, these requirements are met if the

issuing court was in the child’s home state, the parents had notice

of the proceeding, and the parents had an opportunity to be heard.

9
 See § 14-13-201(1)(a) (establishing criteria for home state

jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination);

§ 14-13-205, C.R.S. 2018 (parents must have notice and an

opportunity to be heard).

¶ 21 Where, as here, the material facts underlying a jurisdictional

issue are not in dispute, we review the matter de novo as a question

of law. Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo.

2000).

¶ 22 The child custody order contains sufficient facts to

demonstrate substantial conformity with the UCCJEA’s

fundamental jurisdictional requirements. Because the child

custody order is a provision of the order dissolving the parents’

marriage, we consider the dissolution order as a whole.

¶ 23 The dissolution order includes facts establishing that Iran was

the child’s home state. Specifically, the order states that both

parents resided in Tehran, Iran, and that the issuing court is in

Tehran. As well, the order indicates that both parents participated

in the proceeding by stipulating to the division of property and child

custody. It states that father accepted certain property from

10
 mother, agreed to divorce mother, and waived his right to custody of

the child.

¶ 24 The Department asserts that the order is inadequate because

it does not describe the factors the court considered in making its

custody determination. But this is irrelevant to the jurisdictional

question. See § 14-13-201 cmt. 2 (explaining that the UCCJEA

eliminated “best interest” language used by its predecessor, the

Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), because it

“tended to create confusion between the jurisdictional issue and the

substantive custody determination”); Brandt, ¶ 23 (by removing best

interests analysis, the UCCJEA avoids injecting the merits of a

custody dispute into the determination of jurisdiction).

¶ 25 For these reasons, we conclude that the Iranian custody order

was made under factual circumstances in substantial conformity

with the jurisdictional standards of the UCCJEA.

2. The Human Rights Exception Does Not Apply

¶ 26 Alternatively, the Department contends that the Iranian

custody order is not enforceable in Colorado and therefore did not

limit the juvenile court’s jurisdiction because the child custody law

11
 of Iran violates fundamental principles of human rights. See

§ 14-13-104(3). We disagree.

¶ 27 The UCCJEA does not require enforcement of a foreign child

custody order if the child custody law of the foreign country violates

fundamental principles of human rights. § 14-13-104(3).

¶ 28 The UCCJEA does not define the phrase “fundamental

principles of human rights,” and the comment accompanying

section 14-13-104 expressly “takes no position on what laws

relating to child custody would violate fundamental freedoms.”

§ 14-13-104 cmt. “While the provision is a traditional one in

international agreements, it is invoked only in the most egregious

cases.” Id. In applying section 14-13-104, “the court’s scrutiny

should be on the child custody law of the foreign country and not

on other aspects of the other legal system.” Id.

¶ 29 The comment notes that Section 20 of the Hague Convention

on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction contains a

similar provision. Id. Courts interpreting the UCCJEA’s “escape

clause” — as the human rights exception is commonly known —

have looked to that provision for guidance. See, e.g., Coulibaly v.

Stevance, 85 N.E.3d 911, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017); Toland v. Futagi,

12
 40 A.3d 1051, 1058 (Md. 2012); In re Yaman, 105 A.3d 600, 611

(N.H. 2014). Construing Section 20, the United States Department

of State has explained that a country may invoke the human rights

exception “on the rare occasion that [to do otherwise] would utterly

shock the conscience of the court or offend all notions of due

process.” Hague International Child Abduction Convention; Text

and Legal Analysis, 51 Fed. Reg. 10,494, 10,510 (Mar. 26, 1986).

The exception “was intended to be restrictively interpreted and

applied, and . . . not to be used, for example, as a vehicle for

litigating custody on the merits or for passing judgment on the

political system of [another] country.” Id.

¶ 30 The interpretation of the escape clause is a question of first

impression in Colorado.

¶ 31 The Department argues that Iran’s child custody law violates

fundamental principles of human rights because it does not require

an evaluation of the child’s best interests or ensure that mothers

are afforded an equal opportunity to parent their children. In

particular, the Department alleges in its answer brief that Iranian

child custody law includes the following features:

13
 • Fathers are considered the head of the family and have legal

custody of children even when mothers have physical

custody.

• Fathers exercise direct control over their children’s

movement, including change of residence, choice of

employment, travel abroad, and obtaining a driver’s license

or passport.

• Custody of a child automatically transfers to the father

when the child turns seven years old unless the father is

found legally unfit to care for the child.

• A Muslim mother who converts to a different religion will

lose custody of her child.

¶ 32 The Department did not invoke the human rights exception in

the juvenile court. Consequently, the juvenile court did not address

it. And on appeal, the Department does not identify any record

evidence or include any legal citation to support its characterization

of Iranian child custody law. We are unwilling to say that Iranian

child custody law violates fundamental principles of human rights

based on nothing more than the Department’s unsupported claims.

Because the record does not establish that the escape clause

14
 applies, we conclude that the juvenile court was required to

recognize the Iranian child custody order.

¶ 33 In so concluding, we also note that nothing about the Iranian

child custody order in this case suggests a violation of fundamental

principles of human rights. See Coulibaly, 85 N.E.3d at 918-19 (the

UCCJEA does not limit courts to considering foreign child custody

law “only on its face, without regard to whether that law was

applied in a manner violative of fundamental human rights”).

¶ 34 Most of the Department’s escape clause arguments center

around an alleged gender preference given to fathers in Iranian

child custody determinations. (Again, these are arguments made

without citation to Iranian law.) But the Iranian child custody

order in this case does not enforce a gender presumption. Instead,

the Iranian court’s dissolution order granted full custody to mother:

The permanent custody of the common son
named [A.B-A.], 6 years old, is by [mother] and
[father] waived from himself the right of
custody. [Child support] of the son is 1000000
Rls. per month and should be paid by [father]
to [mother].

¶ 35 As to the assertion that Iranian child custody law deprives

non-Muslim mothers of custody rights, the Department does not

15
 suggest that mother was in danger of losing custody based on her

religious practice. And under the circumstances of this case, in

which the juvenile court has already purported to terminate

mother’s parental rights on different grounds, we perceive no

potential prejudice to mother.

¶ 36 To support application of the escape clause in this case, the

Department relies heavily on the decision in Amin v. Bakhaty, 798

So. 2d 75 (La. 2001), in which the Louisiana Supreme Court

considered whether to cede jurisdiction to an Egyptian court under

the UCCJEA’s predecessor, the UCCJA. The Department points to

similarities between the child custody law of Egypt and Iran —

again, without citation to legal authority. The analogy to Amin fails

for three reasons.

¶ 37 First, the court in Amin reviewed whether a Louisiana trial

court had discretion to exercise jurisdiction to enter an initial child

custody order — not whether the trial court had jurisdiction to

modify a prior custody order. Id. at 77.

¶ 38 Second, the Amin court determined that it could exercise

jurisdiction because doing so served the best interests of the

subject child. Id. at 79-80 (interpreting residual jurisdiction under

16
 La. Stat. Ann. § 13:1702(A)(4)(ii) (2001)). But the UCCJEA no

longer allows courts to exercise jurisdiction on this basis. An

official comment to section 14-13-201 states that the “best interest”

language of the UCCJA was eliminated because it “tended to create

confusion between the jurisdictional issue and the substantive

custody determination.” § 14-13-201 cmt. 2.

¶ 39 Third, the Amin court did not consider, as we must, whether

the foreign country’s child custody law violated fundamental

principles of human rights. Amin is therefore unhelpful in

determining whether the escape clause applies here.

¶ 40 For these reasons, we conclude that the human rights

exception did not permit the juvenile court to disregard the Iranian

child custody order in this case. Because the juvenile court had to

recognize the Iranian child custody order, it could exercise only

temporary emergency jurisdiction under the UCCJEA. The juvenile

court had no authority to enter permanent custody orders. By

entering permanent custody orders that terminated mother’s and

father’s parental rights, the juvenile court exceeded its jurisdiction.

We must therefore vacate that judgment.

C. The Absence of Diplomatic Relations with Iran is Irrelevant

17
¶ 41 The Department argues that the juvenile court’s lack of

jurisdiction to enter permanent custody orders was harmless error

because the United States has no diplomatic relations with Iran.

¶ 42 First, and most importantly, the Department cites no

authority, and we are aware of none, for the proposition that a

court’s actions in excess of its jurisdiction may be deemed

harmless. A court without jurisdiction “is deprived of any authority

to act.” People in Interest of P.K., 2015 COA 121, ¶ 9. The

Department does not explain how we could affirm a judgment that a

court lacked authority to enter.

¶ 43 Second, to the extent that the Department intended to argue

that the absence of diplomatic relations with Iran meant that the

juvenile court’s exercise of jurisdiction in this case was proper, we

disagree. According to the Department, because the United States

has no diplomatic relations with Iran, the juvenile court could not

have conferred with an Iranian court. This argument requires us to

resolve two questions: Does the absence of diplomatic relations (1)

provide an exemption from the UCCJEA as a matter of law; or,

18
 alternatively, (2) excuse the court’s failure to comply with the

UCCJEA in this case? We answer both questions “no.”

¶ 44 The first question requires us to interpret the UCCJEA.

Statutory construction involves a question of law that we review de

novo. People in Interest of C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662, 665-66 (Colo. App.

2011). Our goal is to effectuate the intent of the legislature. Id. at

666. We begin by applying the plain language of the statute, giving

words and phrases their ordinary meanings. Id. If the language is

unambiguous, we do not resort to other methods of statutory

construction. Id. “Where the legislature could have chosen to

restrict the application of a statute, but chose not to, we do not read

additional restrictions into the statute.” Springer, 13 P.3d at 804.

¶ 45 Section 14-13-104 expressly provides two exceptions to the

rule that Colorado courts must treat a foreign country as if it were a

state of the United States for purposes of determining jurisdiction

under the UCCJEA. The exceptions do not include an exemption

for a foreign country that has no diplomatic relations with the

United States. We will not read such an exception into the statute.

See Springer, 13 P.3d at 804. Consequently, the absence of

diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States does

19
 nothing to alter the juvenile court’s duty to confer with the Iranian

court that issued the custody order.

¶ 46 Nor does the lack of diplomatic relations make it impossible for

the juvenile court to attempt to fulfill this duty in this case. The

record does not support the Department’s assertion that the

juvenile court had no means of contacting the Iranian court.

Instead, the record shows only that the juvenile court did not

recognize its duty to confer and, as a result, made no effort to do so.

The Department’s speculation that such efforts would have failed is

just that: speculation. Such speculation provides no basis to

conclude that the court’s error was harmless.

¶ 47 In the end, because the juvenile court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction to terminate either parent’s parental rights, we vacate

the judgment of termination.

III. Father Is Entitled to Notice and An Opportunity
to Be Heard on Remand

A. The Juvenile Court Erred When It Allowed
Service by Publication

¶ 48 Father contends that the juvenile court erred when it granted

the Department’s motion to serve him by publication in Adams

County knowing that he was in Iran. We agree.

20
¶ 49 We review the constitutional sufficiency of service by

publication de novo. Synan v. Haya, 15 P.3d 1117, 1119 (Colo.

App. 2000).

¶ 50 Due process requires, at a minimum, that a parent receive

adequate notice of a dependency and neglect proceeding and an

opportunity to be heard. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108,

1115 (Colo. 1986); Synan, 15 P.3d at 1119. Notice must be

reasonably calculated to apprise parents of the pendency of an

action and afford them an opportunity to present objections. In re

C.L.S., 252 P.3d 556, 559 (Colo. App. 2011). And, when

termination is sought, “due process requires that a parent be

provided with adequate notice of a termination hearing and an

opportunity to protect [his or] her interests at the hearing itself.”

M.M., 726 P.2d at 1115.

¶ 51 Section 19-3-503(8)(b), C.R.S. 2018, authorizes service by

publication in dependency and neglect actions when a parent has

no residence in Colorado and his or her place of residence is

unknown. C.R.C.P. 4(g) provides that a motion for service by

publication shall include the following information:

• the facts authorizing service by publication;

21
 • the efforts, if any, that have been made to obtain personal

service; and

• the address, or last known address, of the person to be

served or a statement that the address and last known

address are unknown.

The motion must establish that the party seeking service by

publication exercised due diligence to obtain personal service or

that efforts to do so would have been to no avail. C.R.C.P. 4(g).

¶ 52 Even when the person to be served cannot be located, service

by publication may still not be constitutionally sufficient if other

means of service are more likely to afford actual notice. See Synan,

15 P.3d at 1120. For example, if the person’s identity and

something of his or her whereabouts are known, service by

publication alone is unlikely to pass constitutional muster. Id.

Instead, when “some evidence indicates the whereabouts of [an]

absent party, any form of substituted service authorized by the trial

court must have a reasonable chance of giving that party actual

notice of the proceeding.” Id. (publication in Denver-area

newspaper did not satisfy due process when evidence indicated the

defendant was in Japan).

22
¶ 53 The Department submitted an affidavit in support of the

motion for publication. The affidavit averred that it “state[d] in

detail all of the efforts made by [the Department] to procure

personal service” on father. But it did not describe any efforts to

locate father or make contact with him. Instead, the affidavit stated

that father was in Iran, the caseworker was unable to contact him

or his family, and the caseworker knew of no source of information

to assist the Department in providing personal service. The

affidavit also stated, in conclusory fashion, that the Department

had exercised due diligence in attempting to locate father.

¶ 54 Further, while mother could presumably have provided the

address at which she and father had previously resided together,

the affidavit stated that father’s last known address was unknown.

And, although plainly incorrect, the affidavit stated that the actual

identity of the child’s biological father was unknown.

¶ 55 The juvenile court granted the Department’s motion to serve

father by publication in an Adams County-area newspaper. But the

evidence before the court did not establish what, if any, efforts the

Department had made to locate father. See C.R.C.P. 4(g). And the

evidence indicated that father was in Iran, but it did not establish

23
 whether the Department had attempted to provide personal service

by any means that would likely result in father receiving actual

notice. See Synan, 15 P.3d at 1120.

¶ 56 Thus, we conclude that the juvenile court erred when it

allowed the Department to serve father by publication.

B. The Department’s Later Efforts and Contact
with Father Did Not Cure the Juvenile Court’s Error

¶ 57 The Department purported to serve father by publication in

August 2017, and the juvenile court adjudicated the child

dependent or neglected as to father later that month. In November

2017, the caseworker asked mother’s relatives in Iran for father’s

contact information, but they did not have it. In late December

2017, the caseworker had the child send father a message via

Facebook with her contact information and a request to contact her.

The Department’s diligent search team also contacted father

through Facebook, but the record does not indicate whether the

message was in English or Farsi, the only language that father

speaks. And the record does not establish whether either message

apprised father of the dependency and neglect proceeding or the

reason for the caseworker’s request.

24
¶ 58 In April 2018, two days before the termination hearing was

set, father’s nephew contacted the caseworker. The nephew advised

the caseworker that father had received her Facebook message and

wished to speak with her.

¶ 59 Father and the caseworker spoke the next day via telephone

with a Farsi interpreter. According to the caseworker’s report,

father said that he was very concerned about the child and wanted

to know what was happening with him. The caseworker told father

that the Department had moved to terminate parental rights, that

the child had decided he did not want to return to Iran, and that

the Department was not in favor of returning the child to Iran.

Father responded that he would not relinquish his parental rights

and would do whatever it took to fulfill his parental duties. He told

the caseworker that he wanted the child to return home and

explained that he had allowed the child to move with mother to the

United States for a better life, but it was “not ok[ay] how this case

[had] opened.” He asked how he could get involved in the case.

¶ 60 The caseworker told father she would contact him after the

termination hearing the next day. In her report, the caseworker

recommended that the juvenile court terminate father’s parental

25
 rights. At the hearing, however, the Department and the guardian

ad litem moved to continue the hearing to allow time to assess the

child’s wishes.

¶ 61 The juvenile court continued the termination hearing for one

month. At the next hearing, the caseworker testified that father

had telephoned her frequently during the past month. She reported

that father said he was unable to travel to the United States

because he was “not welcome” here. And, as father notes in his

opening brief, an executive order banning most Iranian nationals

from traveling to the United States was in effect when father learned

of the proceedings. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg.

13,209 (Mar. 9, 2017).

¶ 62 Despite the caseworker’s extensive contact with father before

the termination hearing, the record does not indicate that she asked

him for his mailing address or that the Department otherwise

attempted personal service. Nor does the record show that father

ever received formal notice of the dependency and neglect

proceeding, a copy of the petition in dependency and neglect, a copy

of the motion for termination, or any advisement of his rights. See

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 § 19-3-503 (summons shall set forth parent’s constitutional and

legal rights).

¶ 63 To the extent father had actual notice of the proceeding

through his communication with the caseworker, such notice did

not cure the court’s error. See People in Interest of J.C.S., 169 P.3d

240, 252 (Colo. App. 2007) (Taubman, J., dissenting) (actual notice

is not a substitute for the formal requirements of service of process

in dependency and neglect proceedings). Unlike in other civil cases,

a summons in a dependency and neglect proceeding must advise

respondent parents of their rights, including the right to counsel,

and explain that the termination of the parent-child relationship is

a possible remedy under the proceeding. § 19-3-503(1). The record

does not indicate that the caseworker provided any of this

information to father.

¶ 64 On remand, the juvenile court shall order the Department to

serve father with the petition in dependency and neglect in

accordance with section 19-3-503.

C. Father’s Remaining Contentions

¶ 65 Because we vacate the termination judgment, we need not

address father’s contentions that the juvenile court violated his

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 right to due process by (1) failing to appoint counsel to represent

him and (2) terminating his parental rights on the ground of

abandonment without requiring the Department to show what

efforts it had made to locate him. We note, however, that the

juvenile court must ensure that father has a meaningful

opportunity to participate in the proceedings, including

representation by court-appointed counsel if appropriate. See

§§ 19-1-105, 19-3-202(1), C.R.S. 2018.

IV. Conclusion

¶ 66 The judgment terminating mother’s and father’s parental

rights is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings.

On remand, the juvenile court shall provide notice of the

dependency and neglect proceeding to father in accordance with

section 19-3-503.

¶ 67 The juvenile court shall limit the duration and scope of its

temporary emergency jurisdiction consistent with section

14-13-204. The juvenile court shall immediately communicate with

the Iranian court on the record in accordance with sections

14-13-204(4) and 14-13-110.

JUDGE DAILEY and JUDGE CASEBOLT concur.

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