J. A12034/19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
CHELSIE LEE DAHLKE, : No. 1386 WDA 2018
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 30, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County
Criminal Division at No. CP-42-CR-0000460-2017
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 12, 2019
Chelsie Lee Dahlke appeals from the August 30, 2018 judgment of
sentence entered by the Court of Common Pleas of McKean County following
her conviction of unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles, driving
without a license, and driving while operating privilege is suspended or
revoked.1 After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court provided the following factual history:
In July of 2017 Patrick Chastain allowed [appellant] to
use his 1998 Jeep Grand Cherokee. [Appellant] had
asked to use the vehicle to pick up her minor son[s]
for a scheduled weekend visit with her. Mr. Chastain
testified that [appellant] was to bring the vehicle back
to Mr. Chastain the same day that she used it – which
was July 14, 2017. She did not return it when she
was supposed to. Mr. Chastain’s repeated attempts
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3928(a) and 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501(a) and 1543(a),
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to contact [appellant] were unsuccessful. He utilized
the same cell phone number to call and send text
messages to that he had reached [appellant] at in the
past. On July 18, 2017, he received a text message
response from [appellant] that simply indicated where
his vehicle could be located – that it was alongside
Route 155. When he found his vehicle “it was
trashed[”;] “My front bumper was ripped off of the
passenger side. It was covered in mud.”
Trial court opinion, 12/20/18 at (unnumbered page) 6 (citations to the record
omitted).
The Commonwealth charged appellant with the above-referenced
offenses, as well as criminal mischief – intentionally damages property.2 A
jury convicted appellant of unauthorized use of automobiles and other
vehicles, driving without a license, and driving while operating privilege is
suspended or revoked and acquitted her of criminal mischief – intentionally
damages property. On August 30, 2018, the trial court sentenced appellant
to 23 months’ probation and ordered her to perform 15-70 hours of
community service.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. The trial court
ordered appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and appellant timely complied. The trial court
then filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
A. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
a finding of guilt under 18 Pa. C.S.[A.]
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3304(a)(5).
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§ 3928(a), Unauthorized Use of Automobiles
and Other Vehicles, 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 1501(a),
Driving Without a License, and 75 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 1543(a), Driving While Operating Privilege
Suspended or Revoked, where the
Commonwealth’s evidence was insufficient to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
[a]ppellant operated or drove the vehicle in
question between July 15, 2017, and July 18,
2017?
B. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain
a finding of guilt under 18 Pa.C.S.[A.]
§ 3928(a), Unauthorized Use of Automobiles
and Other Vehicles, where the Commonwealth’s
evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that [a]ppellant lacked the
owner’s consent to operate the vehicle in
question or knew or had reason to know she
lacked the owner’s consent?
Appellant’s brief at 6.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, our standard of review is as follows:
As a general matter, our standard of
review of sufficiency claims requires that
we evaluate the record in the light most
favorable to the verdict winner giving the
prosecution the benefit of all reasonable
inferences to be drawn from the evidence.
Evidence will be deemed sufficient to
support the verdict when it establishes
each material element of the crime
charged and the commission thereof by
the accused, beyond a reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth need
not establish guilt to a mathematical
certainty. Any doubt about the
defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the
fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
and inconclusive that, as a matter of law,
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no probability of fact can be drawn from
the combined circumstances.
The Commonwealth may sustain its
burden by means of wholly circumstantial
evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that the
evidence establishing a defendant’s
participation in a crime is circumstantial
does not preclude a conviction where the
evidence coupled with the reasonable
inferences drawn therefrom overcomes
the presumption of innocence.
Significantly, we may not substitute our
judgment for that of the fact finder; thus,
so long as the evidence adduced,
accepted in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, demonstrates the
respective elements of a defendant’s
crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the
appellant’s convictions will be upheld.
Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-723
(Pa.Super. 2013) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). Importantly, “the jury, which passes upon
the weight and credibility of each witness’s testimony,
is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence.”
Commonwealth v. Ramtahal, [], 33 A.3d 602, 607
([Pa.] 2011).
Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 337-338 (Pa.Super. 2019).
In her first issue on appeal, appellant challenges whether the
Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant operated
and/or drove the Jeep—which is a required element to obtain a conviction for
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unauthorized use of automobiles and other vehicles,3 driving without a
license,4 and driving while operating privilege suspended or revoked.5
In order to obtain a conviction for unauthorized use of automobiles and
other vehicles, the Commonwealth need not “prove that the appellant was
operating the vehicle in motion. [Rather, t]he Commonwealth need only show
that the defendant was in the vehicle behind the wheel and had control and
management of it.” Commonwealth v. Johnson, 489 A.2d 821, 823
(Pa.Super. 1985), citing Commonwealth v. Taylor, 352 A.2d 137 (Pa.Super.
1975). Likewise, in order to obtain a conviction for appellant’s two charges
under the Motor Vehicles Code, the Commonwealth must meet a similar
burden. The Motor Vehicles Code defines “driver” as “a person who drives
or is in physical control of a vehicle.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 102 (driver)
(emphasis added).
3 “A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree if [s]he operates
the automobile . . . of another without the consent of the owner.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 3928(a) (emphasis added).
4“No person, except those expressly exempted, shall drive any motor vehicle
upon a highway or public property in this Commonwealth unless the person
has a driver’s license valid under the provisions of this chapter.” 75 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1501(a) (emphasis added).
5 “[A]ny person who drives a motor vehicle on any highway or trafficway of
this Commonwealth after the commencement of a suspension, revocation, or
cancellation of the operating privilege and before the operating privilege has
been restored is guilty of a summary offense . . . .” 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1543(a)
(emphasis added).
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At trial, the Commonwealth called Mr. Chastain to testify. Mr. Chastain
testified that appellant asked to borrow his Jeep so that she could pick up her
sons. (Notes of testimony, 7/30/18 at 16.) Mr. Chastain permitted her to do
so, with the understanding that appellant would return the Jeep that evening.
(Id. at 16-17.) Mr. Chastain testified that appellant failed to do so. (Id. at
17.) The evidence further reflects that appellant eventually sent Mr. Chastain
a text message indicating where his Jeep could be found alongside Route 155.
(Id. at 23.)
Based upon our review of the record, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, we find that the
Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that appellant operated and/or drove Mr. Chastain’s Jeep. The
circumstantial evidence presented by the Commonwealth permitted the jury
to reasonably infer that appellant was in Mr. Chastain’s Jeep, was behind the
wheel, and that she had control and management of the Jeep. See Johnson,
489 A.2d at 823. Accordingly, appellant’s first issue is without merit.
Appellant further avers that the Commonwealth failed to present
sufficient evidence that either appellant operated Mr. Chastain’s Jeep without
his consent or that appellant knew or had reason to know that she lacked
Mr. Chastain’s consent to operate his Jeep. (Appellant’s brief at 21.)
Specifically, appellant argues that Mr. Chastain failed to clearly communicate
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to appellant that he wanted her to return the Jeep to him after she picked up
her sons for the weekend. (Id. at 23.)
This court has previously held that,
the Commonwealth is not obligated to disprove every
possible explanation for appellant’s unauthorized use
of the automobile. It must only introduce sufficient
facts and circumstances from which, if believed, a jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that
appellant knew that [s]he was operating the
automobile without the owner’s consent.
Commonwealth v. Lloyd, 361 A.2d 430, 432-433 (Pa.Super. 1976), citing
Commonwealth v. Clark, 311 A.2d 910 (Pa. 1973).
Here, Mr. Chastain testified that he permitted appellant to borrow his
Jeep on the understanding that she would return the Jeep to him the same
day. (Notes of testimony, 7/30/18 at 16-17.) The record further reflects that
after appellant failed to return his Jeep the evening of the day she borrowed
it, Mr. Chastain attempted to reach appellant several times via text message
to inquire as to the whereabouts of his Jeep. (Id. at 18.) Finally, the
Commonwealth presented evidence that appellant texted Mr. Chastain several
days after she was to return his Jeep to notify him that the Jeep was located
alongside Route 155. (Id. at 23.)
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we find that
this evidence permitted the jury to reasonably infer that appellant lacked
Mr. Chastain’s permission to continue using his Jeep. See Franklin, 69 A.3d
at 722-723. Therefore, we find that appellant’s second issue is without merit.
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/12/2019
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