[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
APRIL 20, 2005
No. 04-12612
THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar
CLERK
________________________
BIA No. A78-410-514
MARGARITA MARIA RAMIREZ-CARDONA,
Petitioner,
versus
U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
__________________________
Petition for Review of an Order of
the Board of Immigration Appeals
_________________________
(April 20, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Margarita Maria Ramirez-Cardona, a native and citizen of Colombia,
petitions for review of the final order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”), which affirmed without opinion the immigration judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial
of asylum and withholding of removal under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) and the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (“CAT”).1 On appeal, Ramirez-
Cardona argues, inter alia, that the IJ erred by denying her petition for asylum,
under the INA, after finding that she did not demonstrate past persecution or a
well-founded fear of future persecution by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (“FARC”) based on her father’s political opinion and membership in a
social group, namely, a Community Action Board.2 Upon thorough review of the
record, as well as careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, we find no reversible
error and affirm.
When the BIA issues an affirmance without opinion, the IJ’s decision
becomes the final order subject to review. See Mendoza v. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d
1283, 1284 n.1 (11th Cir. 2003). As the fact-finder, it is the IJ’s duty to determine
1
Ramirez-Cardona’s removal proceedings commenced after April 1, 1997, the effective
date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”),
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). Accordingly, this case is governed by the
permanent provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), as amended by IIRIRA.
Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 321 F.3d 1331, 1332 (11th Cir. 2003); Balogun v. U.S.
Att’y Gen., 304 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2002).
2
Because we find that Ramirez-Cardona has not established a case for asylum, we do not
address her arguments that she also satisfied the higher standards for withholding of removal or
CAT relief. See Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1292-93 (11th Cir. 2001).
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credibility, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the IJ with respect
to credibility findings. See Vasquez-Mondragon v. INS, 560 F.2d 1225, 1226 (5th
Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). The IJ’s factual determination that an alien is not
entitled to asylum must be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence. See
Mazariegos v. Att’y Gen., 241 F.3d 1320, 1323 (11th Cir. 2001). Under this
highly deferential standard of review, a denial of asylum may be reversed only if
the evidence would compel a reasonable factfinder to find that the requisite fear of
persecution exists. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 n.1, 112 S. Ct.
812, 815 n.1, 117 L. Ed. 2d 38 (1992); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)
(“administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator
would be compelled to conclude to the contrary”).
An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for
asylum. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Attorney General has
discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.”
See INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1). A “refugee” is any person who is
unwilling to return to his home country or to avail himself of that country’s
protection “because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or
political opinion . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
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The asylum applicant carries the burden of proving statutory “refugee”
status. See Najjar v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1262, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001); 8 C.F.R. §
208.13(a). The applicant satisfies this burden by showing, with specific and
credible evidence: (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or
(2) a “well-founded fear” that his or her statutorily listed factor will cause future
persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b); Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. A “well-founded
fear” of persecution may be established based on (1) past persecution that creates a
presumption of a “well-founded fear” and by overcoming any rebuttal by the INS;
(2) a reasonable possibility of personal persecution that cannot be avoided by
relocating within the subject country; or (3) a pattern or practice in the subject
country of persecuting members of a statutorily defined group of which the alien is
a part. See 8 C.F.R § 208.13(b)(1), (2).
On appeal, Ramirez-Cardona argues that the IJ abused his discretion by
denying her asylum application because the evidence demonstrated that she had
suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on
account of her father’s political opinion and opposition to the FARC. More
specifically, Ramirez-Cardona asserts that she satisfied her burden to establish
statutory eligibility for asylum based on her own testimony, which she states must
be accepted as credible because the IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding.
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Based on this proposition, Ramirez-Cardona further argues that, although the IJ
noted her failure to provide medical or police reports to corroborate her claims, the
law does not require corroborating evidence when a petitioner’s testimony is
found to be credible, which Ramirez-Cardona maintains we must find (based on
the lack of an express adverse credibility finding in the IJ’s order).
Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that Ramirez-Cardona failed
to demonstrate asylum eligibility because she did not establish that she suffered
past persecution or had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of a
statutorily listed factor. Although Ramirez-Cardona contended that the FARC
targeted her family on account of her father’s membership in a community action
group and a conservative political group, and the IJ found her testimony to be
credible, she provided no evidence demonstrating that her father expressed his
political opinion to the FARC or that the FARC was even aware of his political
opinion.
Although there is some evidence that Ramirez-Cardona’s family was
targeted after her father refused to cooperate with FARC guerillas when they
requested to store weapons at the father’s house and asked for food and clothing,
such evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to satisfy Ramirez-Cardona’s burden.
See Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 392 F.3d 434, 438 (11th Cir. 2004) (finding that
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petitioner’s claim, based on harassment by FARC guerillas and petitioner’s failure
to cooperate with the guerrillas or to join their forces, did not establish persecution
for purposes of withholding of removal under INA); see also Perlera-Escobar v.
Executive Office for Immigration, 894 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.4 (11th Cir.1990)
(noting that this Circuit “has not adopted the . . . belief that political neutrality is a
political opinion” for purposes of the INA). Ramirez-Cardona has failed to
establish that the record compels a finding that the FARC persecuted her, or that
she had a well-founded fear of future persecution by the FARC, because of her
father’s political opinion, rather than solely on account of his refusal to cooperate.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
PETITION DENIED.
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