People v. Ealy

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Appellate Court Date: 2019.08.12
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People v. Ealy, 2019 IL App (1st) 161575

Appellate Court THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
Caption COURTNEY EALY, Defendant-Appellant.

District & No. First District, Second Division
Docket No. 1-16-1575

Filed May 28, 2019

Decision Under Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 14-CR-06853-02;
Review the Hon. Vincent Gaughan, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Michael T. Mulligan, of Mulligan Law, LLC, of Chicago, for
Appeal appellant.

Kimberly M. Foxx, State’s Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg,
Annette Collins, Christine Cook, and Daniel Piwowarczyk, Assistant
State’s Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

Panel PRESIDING JUSTICE MASON delivered the judgment of the court,
with opinion.
Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment and opinion.
 OPINION

¶1 Defendant, Courtney Ealy, and his codefendant, Clint Massey, were convicted of murder
in the shooting death of Javan Boyd. The State’s evidence showed that Boyd, a taxi driver, was
waiting for his fare when Ealy and Massey, as shown on security camera video, approached
the taxi and shot Boyd. On appeal, Ealy argues that (i) the evidence was insufficient to convict
him of murder, (ii) the State’s improper comments deprived him of a fair trial, (iii) his right to
a speedy trial was violated, and (iv) his 38-year sentence was excessive. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND
¶3 On the night of February 21, 2014, defendants attended a party at 39th Street and
Wentworth Avenue in the Wentworth Gardens housing project. Ealy wore a Burberry shirt and
white pants, and Massey wore a tiger-striped jogging suit. Also attending the party were
Kaprice Johns, Jasmine Brown, Germontay Carpenter, T’Keyah Herbert, and Jerome
Anderson.
¶4 Defendants left the party with Herbert in Herbert’s van. 1 After they left, Johns, who
remained at the party, got into an argument with a group of women known as “Pretty in Pink”
because Johns disliked the song that was being played. As they argued, someone fired a gun
into the air multiple times. Johns did not see who fired the shots, but she guessed that the
shooter wanted to stop the argument because it was too loud. The gunshots did not hit anyone.
¶5 After the altercation, Johns left the party with Brown, Carpenter, and Anderson. They left
in Johns’s car, with Anderson driving. Carpenter made a phone call to either Ealy or Massey,
who were still with Herbert in her van, and told them about the altercation at the party.
Carpenter put the call on speakerphone, and Brown could hear Ealy’s voice, which she
recognized, on the other end.
¶6 Anderson drove to Wendy’s, where they met up with a red car and Herbert’s van. Ealy and
Massey exited the van and got into the red car, along with a man named D-Rose. (A fourth
man, unidentified at trial, was the driver.) The three vehicles drove back toward Wentworth
Gardens in a convoy: first the red car, then Herbert’s van, then Johns’s car. According to Johns,
they intended to “see who shot at [them]” and “deal with the matter.”
¶7 Meanwhile, Latoya Adams was visiting her mother in Wentworth Gardens. Around 3 a.m.
on the morning of February 22, she called for a taxi to go to a friend’s house. Javan Boyd was
dispatched to the call.
¶8 As the three-vehicle convoy approached 38th Street and Princeton Avenue, they passed
Boyd sitting in his parked car, waiting to pick up Adams. The three vehicles all made a U-turn
and came to a stop. Ealy, Massey, and D-Rose disembarked from the red car and approached
Boyd’s car from the passenger side.
¶9 Both Johns and Herbert witnessed the shooting. According to Johns, Ealy and Massey were
standing next to each other, with D-Rose behind them. Ealy and Massey spoke to Boyd, and

1
At trial, Herbert admitted attending the party, but she denied seeing defendants at the party or
knowing anything about the shooting. She was impeached with a signed statement she made to
Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Patrick Waller on March 4, 2014, which was admitted as substantive
evidence. See 725 ILCS 5/115-10.1 (West 2014).

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 then Johns saw “a light flash from the gun” and Boyd “jumping” as if he was getting shot. At
trial, Johns said she did not see the actual gun, but in a prior statement to detectives, Johns
identified Ealy as the shooter. After the shooting, D-Rose ran back to Johns’s car and got
inside, saying “sh**” and “he’s dead.” Ealy and Massey ran back to one of the other vehicles,
and all three vehicles drove away. As they left, Johns could see Boyd “slumped over” in his
car.
¶ 10 Herbert saw Ealy and Massey open Boyd’s passenger-side door and then saw Massey firing
a gun into the car. She heard four or five gunshots, after which Ealy and Massey returned to
the red car and drove away.
¶ 11 The shooting was captured on surveillance cameras belonging to the Chicago Housing
Authority (CHA), which owns the Wentworth Gardens housing project. The video footage was
played for the jury. In the videos, three vehicles drove past Boyd’s taxi and then came driving
back the other way. The convoy leader, a red car, stopped next to Boyd’s taxi and two men got
out, one wearing a striped track suit (Massey) and the other wearing a brown shirt and white
pants (Ealy). They approached Boyd’s car from the front passenger side and appeared to be
talking to him. Boyd’s taxi started backing up, but hit a vehicle parked a couple of feet behind
him. (At this point, D-Rose got out of the red car and ran back toward Johns’s car.) There was
a bright flash of light near Ealy’s hand; Boyd’s car surged forward and hit another parked car
in front. Ealy and Massey ran forward to look in the front passenger window. Ealy returned to
the red car, Massey followed him a few moments later, and the three vehicles drove away.
¶ 12 Adams came outside to pick up her taxi and found Boyd hanging out of the driver’s side
of his car. She asked him if he was okay. He did not respond. Someone else had already called
the police, so Adams called the taxi company to inform them that their driver had been shot.
She then remained at the scene and cooperated with police when they arrived.
¶ 13 After leaving the scene of the shooting, Johns dropped Anderson off at his house and then
drove to the Shell gas station at 55th Street. Ealy was waiting there. He entered Johns’s car,
told her that he dropped his iPhone at the scene, and asked her to help him retrieve it. Brown
said that it was stupid to go back, but Johns agreed to do it. On the way there, Ealy spoke about
the shooting. He said that he asked the victim if he was “from over here” and specified the part
of Wentworth Gardens where the party had been. The victim said he was. Ealy also said “man
down,” which Johns understood to mean the victim was dead.
¶ 14 By the time Johns returned to the scene of the crime, police had already cordoned off the
area. Johns parked the car and approached on foot. She told officer Chris Martin that she had
dropped her phone nearby and asked whether she could retrieve it. Martin refused, explaining
that it was a crime scene.
¶ 15 Johns returned to her car and drove closer to the crime scene. While in the car, she spoke
with Sergeant Arthur Young. She gave him a fake name (“Brianna Johns”) and also a fake
story, telling him that she was driving in the area when she heard several gunshots and saw a
man with braided hair and a dark sweater near the victim’s car; she got scared and dropped her
phone near the victim’s car. Johns then gave Young the phone number. Although Johns did
not have Ealy’s number memorized, Ealy told her the number as she was speaking to Young.
At trial, Johns recalled that the number began with “773-803.”
¶ 16 Officers did, in fact, find an iPhone in the middle of the street near the victim’s vehicle.
Pursuant to a search warrant, detectives conducted data extraction on the phone, which

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 revealed that its number was 773-809-****. The phone was also swabbed for DNA; testing
revealed a mixture of at least three DNA profiles that were not suitable for comparison.
¶ 17 A latent fingerprint impression recovered from Boyd’s passenger side window was
identified as belonging to Ealy. Inside Boyd’s car, the police recovered three 9-millimeter fired
cartridge casings and two 9-millimeter fired bullets; additionally, the medical examiner
recovered two more 9-millimeter bullets from Boyd’s chest. Kellen Hunter, a firearms
examiner for the Illinois State Police, determined that the bullets were all fired from a single
gun, and the cartridge casings were all fired from a single gun. He was unable to determine
whether the bullets and cartridges were fired from the same gun, since it is impossible to match
a fired bullet to a fired cartridge casing. He also could not determine what kind of gun they
were fired from, since both 9-millimeter revolvers and 9-millimeter semi-automatic weapons
exist.
¶ 18 Ealy moved to sever his trial from Massey’s. Massey did not move for severance. After a
hearing, the motion was denied. Ealy and Massey were tried together before a jury. For both
defendants, the State sought a conviction for first degree murder and a 15-year sentence
enhancement for being “armed with a firearm” during the commission of the offense. The jury
was instructed concerning accountability as to both the murder and the firearm allegation.
Specifically, for the firearm allegation, the jury was instructed to determine whether “the
defendant, Courtney Ealy, or one for whose conduct he is legally responsible was armed with
a firearm.”
¶ 19 The jury found both defendants guilty of first degree murder, but it found that the firearm
allegation was proven only as to Massey. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court
sentenced Ealy to 38 years’ imprisonment.

¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 Ealy argues that (i) the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree murder, (ii)
his right to a fair trial was violated by improper prosecutorial comments during opening and
closing arguments, (iii) his right to a speedy trial was violated, and (iv) his 38-year sentence
was excessive. We consider these arguments in turn.

¶ 22 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 23 Ealy’s first contention is that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of first degree
murder. Specifically, he argues that the State failed to prove the intent necessary to hold him
accountable for Massey’s actions. The State disagrees and additionally argues that we need not
limit our review to evidence of accountability, since the evidence was also sufficient to prove
Ealy guilty directly.
¶ 24 It is well settled that a general verdict of guilty will not be invalidated on evidentiary
grounds as long as sufficient evidence exists to support any grounds for conviction submitted
to the jury. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 49-50 (1991). When reviewing the sufficiency
of the evidence, it is not our function to retry the defendant. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d
1, 8 (2011). Rather, we must determine “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Jackson, 232 Ill.
2d 246, 280 (2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).

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¶ 25 Initially, the State points out that it did not seek to convict Ealy solely on a theory of
accountability. Rather, since the evidence was in conflict as to which defendant was the
shooter, the State argued that “[i]t doesn’t matter who shot that gun that killed Javan Boyd,
because *** [t]he law of accountability tells you that it is as if each of them had their finger on
the trigger and pulled it.” Ealy nevertheless argues that the jury’s verdict—finding him guilty
of murder but also finding that the firearm allegation was not proven—necessarily means that
the jury found him guilty on a theory of accountability. We disagree. In fact, the jury’s findings
are irreconcilable regardless of the theory of guilt adopted. If the jury believed that Ealy was
the shooter, then the jury should have found the firearm enhancement proven as to him. If, on
the other hand, the jury believed Massey was the shooter, then the jury must have found Ealy
to be accountable for Massey’s actions and, therefore, should have found the firearm allegation
proven under a theory of accountability. See People v. Rodriguez, 229 Ill. 2d 285, 293-94
(2008) (15-year sentence enhancement for being “armed with a firearm” applies to unarmed
defendant who aids and abets armed defendant). 2
¶ 26 But this inconsistency—whether the product of juror lenity, compromise, or some other
unknowable reason—cannot be used to attack Ealy’s conviction. Our supreme court has made
clear that “defendants in Illinois can no longer challenge convictions on the sole basis that they
are legally inconsistent with acquittals on other charges.” People v. Jones, 207 Ill. 2d 122, 133-
34 (2003); see also People v. Reed, 396 Ill. App. 3d 636, 648 (2009) (defendant cannot
challenge conviction based on an inconsistent answer to a special interrogatory); People v.
Jackson, 372 Ill. App. 3d 605, 612 (2007) (courts will not use a jury’s response to a sentence
enhancement inquiry for any purpose other than sentence enhancement). “[E]ven with legally
inconsistent findings, sufficiency-of-the-evidence review is a sufficient safeguard against jury
irrationality.” Reed, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 648.
¶ 27 Here, the evidence was sufficient to convict Ealy of first degree murder either as a principal
or an accomplice. As noted, there was conflicting evidence at trial as to who shot Boyd: Johns
testified that she did not see the murder weapon, but she acknowledged that she identified Ealy
as the shooter to police. On the other hand, Herbert identified Massey as the shooter in her
written statement to ASA Waller. It was the jury’s responsibility to assess the credibility of
witnesses, determine the weight to give their testimony, and resolve conflicts or inconsistencies
in the evidence. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 280-81. The jury could reasonably have believed
Johns’s identification of Ealy and found him guilty based on his own conduct.
¶ 28 Ealy argues that Johns’s identification was uncorroborated by any trial testimony. But
“recanted prior inconsistent statements can be sufficient to support a conviction, even without
corroborating evidence.” People v. Cox, 377 Ill. App. 3d 690, 700 (2007) (citing People v.
Thomas, 354 Ill. App. 3d 868, 880 (2004), People v. Craig, 334 Ill. App. 3d 426, 439 (2002),
and People v. Curtis, 296 Ill. App. 3d 991, 999 (1998)). Ealy also argues that Johns was not a
credible witness because (i) she lied to police when trying to retrieve Ealy’s phone from the
scene of the crime and (ii) she made her statement to police while in custody on unrelated

2
By contrast, the 20- and 25-year firearm enhancements apply only to defendants who “personally
discharged” a firearm and, therefore, cannot be found on a theory of accountability. Rodriguez, 229 Ill.
2d at 294-95. According to the State, because it was unclear whether Ealy or Massey (or both) shot
Boyd, it chose not to seek the 20- and 25-year enhancements for defendants.

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 charges. Ealy is, in effect, inviting us to substitute our judgment regarding Johns’s credibility
for that of the jury, which we will not do. See Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 280-81.
¶ 29 Ealy next argues that the CHA surveillance video demonstrates conclusively that he was
not the shooter. We disagree. The video is of insufficient quality to determine which defendant
is holding the gun at any given time, but, notably, a bright light resembling a muzzle flash can
be seen coming from Ealy’s hand immediately before Boyd’s car lurches forward. Nor do we
find it significant that Ealy returned to the red car before Massey, since the shooting could have
been over by that point or, as the State argues, Ealy could have given the gun to Massey who
continued firing into the taxi. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for a reasonable jury to
conclude that Ealy shot Boyd.
¶ 30 Although this is by itself enough to support the verdict (see Griffin, 502 U.S. at 49 (“if
there is any one count to support the verdict, it shall stand good, notwithstanding all the rest
are bad” (internal quotation marks omitted))), there also was sufficient evidence to find Ealy
guilty on a theory of accountability. A person is legally accountable for the criminal conduct
of another if “either before or during the commission of an offense, and with the intent to
promote or facilitate that commission, he or she solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid
that other person in the planning or commission of the offense.” 720 ILCS 5/5-2(c) (West
2014). To establish the requisite intent, the State must prove that the defendant shared the
principal’s criminal intent or there was a common criminal design. People v. Perez, 189 Ill. 2d
254, 266 (2000). Where a common criminal design is alleged, “ ‘[e]vidence that a defendant
voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts with knowledge of its design
supports an inference that he shared the common purpose and will sustain his conviction for
an offense committed by another.’ ” People v. Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 13 (quoting In re
W.C., 167 Ill. 2d 307, 338 (1995)).
¶ 31 Here, there was more than sufficient evidence that Ealy joined the convoy returning to
Wentworth Gardens for the express purpose of avenging the slight to Johns and her friends.
The group’s common criminal design was to “see who shot at [them]” and “deal with the
matter.” Under the circumstances, and particularly in light of what transpired, it is reasonable
to infer that the group did not intend to “deal with” the perpetrators in a peaceful or lawful
manner.
¶ 32 Additionally, it is undisputed that Ealy and Massey confronted Boyd together. Ealy asked
whether Boyd was from “over here,” to which Boyd replied that he was; then, according to
Herbert, Massey began shooting Boyd. Ealy made no move to stop the shooting, nor did he
dissociate himself from the crime after the fact. Rather, he ran back to the red car with Massey,
and they fled the scene together. Later, when discussing the shooting with Johns, Ealy
displayed no remorse but instead bragged that it was “man down.” He did not report the
shooting but sent Johns to speak with police in a failed attempt to retrieve his dropped cell
phone. All of these facts support an inference that Ealy was acting pursuant to a common
criminal design with Massey. See Perez, 189 Ill. 2d at 267 (“Proof that the defendant was
present during the perpetration of the offense, that he fled from the scene, that he maintained
a close affiliation with his companions after the commission of the crime, and that he failed to
report the crime are all factors that the trier of fact may consider in determining the defendant’s
legal accountability.”).
¶ 33 Ealy argues that even if he shared a common criminal design to retaliate for the incident at
the Wentworth Gardens party, he could not have planned to kill Boyd, who was not connected

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 to that incident. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel emphasized how apparently irrational it was
that Ealy and Massey would exact revenge for the earlier altercation between two groups of
women by shooting a man who, as far as they were aware, had not even attended the party. But
Boyd was only shot after he agreed (in response to Ealy’s query) that he was from “over here,”
while parked outside a Wentworth Gardens residence. The jury could have concluded that
based on Boyd’s response, Ealy and Massey believed Boyd was one of the guests at the party
and decided to “deal with the matter” by shooting him. Moreover, under a common-design
theory, a defendant can be found legally accountable for a crime that he did not specifically
intend, as long as his companion committed the crime in furtherance of the intended act.
Fernandez, 2014 IL 115527, ¶ 21 (citing People v. Kessler, 57 Ill. 2d 493, 497 (1974)
(defendant could be held accountable for unplanned shootings committed by his initially
unarmed companions)). Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, we find the evidence was sufficient
to convict Ealy of first degree murder.

¶ 34 B. Prosecutorial Comments
¶ 35 Ealy additionally argues that he was deprived of a fair trial because (i) the prosecutor
improperly referenced Boyd’s family in opening argument and (ii) the prosecutor referred to
defendants as “shooters” in closing argument. We apply an abuse of discretion standard in
reviewing the trial court’s ruling on the propriety of the challenged remarks, and a de novo
standard in reviewing whether any misconduct was egregious enough to warrant a new trial.
People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶¶ 61-62.
¶ 36 During opening statements, the prosecutor stated that Boyd “was working as a cab driver.
And as a cab driver, this job he did to help support his family.” Later in the same argument,
the prosecutor stated that Boyd was “trying to earn money for his family.” After the State’s
argument concluded, the experienced trial judge sua sponte called a sidebar and asked:
“THE COURT: Is Mr. Boyd’s family any way involved as evidence in this case or
the commission of this crime?
THE STATE: No. No.
THE COURT: Then quit mentioning that he has a family. *** Unless it’s germane
to the trial, you don’t mention the victim’s family.”
Defense counsel, who had not previously objected, then objected to the prosecutor’s statements
“for the record.”
¶ 37 Ealy raised no argument regarding these statements in his posttrial motion. Accordingly,
the issue is forfeited (People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 611-12 (2010) (to preserve a claim
for review, defendant must both object at trial and raise the issue in his posttrial motion)), and
Ealy does not argue plain error. We will therefore honor Ealy’s forfeiture. Moreover, we note
that the mentions of Boyd’s family were brief, not repeated by either party after the court’s
admonishment, and the court instructed the jury that arguments do not constitute evidence. See
People v. Deramus, 2014 IL App (1st) 130995, ¶ 64 (prosecutor’s improper comment did not
warrant reversal where it was brief, the comment was surrounded by proper argument, and the
jury was properly instructed that arguments do not constitute evidence).
¶ 38 Ealy next argues that the State erred by referring to him and Massey as “shooters” during
closing argument. Specifically, the prosecutor stated that after the altercation at the party, Johns
and her friends “left that party and they went to get their shooters, these two.” Likewise, in

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 rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: “You heard that the girls called these two, their shooters, their
backup to go back, to retaliate, to take care of business.”
¶ 39 This contention of error is also forfeited, since Ealy failed to object or raise the issue in his
posttrial motion. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d at 611-12. Ealy acknowledges his forfeiture but argues
that we may still consider the issue under the plain error doctrine, which allows us to review
“clear and obvious” unpreserved errors when either (i) the evidence is so closely balanced that
the error threatened to tip the scales against the defendant, or (ii) the error “is so serious that it
affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial
process.” People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 565 (2007). It is axiomatic that without error,
there can be no plain error. People v. Smith, 372 Ill. App. 3d 179, 181 (2007); see People v.
Walker, 232 Ill. 2d 113, 124-25 (2009) (initial step in plain error analysis is to determine
whether error occurred at all).
¶ 40 We find no error in the State’s characterization of Ealy and Massey as “shooters,” since
the evidence shows that they did, in fact, shoot Boyd. It is well established that prosecutors are
given wide latitude during closing argument and may comment on the evidence and any
reasonable inferences arising therefrom, even if those inferences reflect negatively on the
defendant. People v. Nicholas, 218 Ill. 2d 104, 121 (2005). The prosecutor’s remarks were a
fair comment on the evidence that after Carpenter called them to “see who shot at [them]” and
“deal with the matter” (to quote Johns), Ealy and Massey returned to Wentworth Gardens and
shot Boyd.
¶ 41 Ealy argues that the challenged statements imply that he had a reputation as a shooter or
was associated with some group in the role of shooter, neither of which is supported by the
record. Viewing the statements in context, as we must (People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 441
(2010)), we find no such implication; it is apparent that the prosecutor was referencing the
shooting of Boyd that occurred later that night. Thus, Ealy’s contention of error, plain or
otherwise, is without merit.

¶ 42 C. Right to a Speedy Trial
¶ 43 Ealy next argues that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the court granted the
State’s pretrial motion to extend the term for an additional 60 days to enable the State to secure
eyewitnesses for trial. Although Ealy forfeited this issue by failing to include it in his posttrial
motion, this court has reviewed unpreserved challenges to the extension of the speedy trial
term because a speedy trial implicates fundamental constitutional concerns. People v.
McKinney, 2011 IL App (1st) 100317, ¶ 29.
¶ 44 The Speedy Trial Act provides, in relevant part, that “[e]very person in custody in this State
for an alleged offense shall be tried by the court having jurisdiction within 120 days from the
date he or she was taken into custody.” 725 ILCS 5/103-5(a) (West 2014). The trial court may
continue the case up to an additional 60 days if it determines that “the State has exercised
without success due diligence to obtain evidence material to the case and that there are
reasonable grounds to believe that such evidence may be obtained at a later day.” 725 ILCS
5/103-5(c) (West 2014). The State bears the burden of showing due diligence (People v.
Battles, 311 Ill. App. 3d 991, 997-98 (2000)), and “[t]he test of due diligence is whether the
State began efforts to locate its witness in sufficient time to secure [his or] her presence before
the speedy trial term expired” (People v. Exson, 384 Ill. App. 3d 794, 799 (2008)). We review

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 the trial court’s decision to grant an extension for an abuse of discretion. People v. Connors,
2017 IL App (1st) 162440, ¶ 16.
¶ 45 The record reflects that, starting in July 2015, the State made numerous efforts to locate
Carpenter, Johns, and Brown to subpoena them as material witnesses. From July through
December, at least eight unsuccessful attempts were made to locate and serve Carpenter. On
December 8, on the State’s motion, the trial court declared him a material witness and ordered
any law enforcement officials who located him to bring him before the court. As for Johns, at
least 15 unsuccessful attempts were made to locate and serve her during the same time period.
Investigators also contacted various associates of Johns, made multiple attempts to obtain her
work address, and sought assistance from the United States Marshal Office Great Lakes
Regional Fugitive Task Force, to no avail. Finally, after several unsuccessful attempts, Brown
was served on December 12 and ordered to appear for Ealy’s trial, which was scheduled for
December 28. Meanwhile, Ealy filed a written speedy trial demand on December 4.
¶ 46 On December 28, Brown appeared in court for trial, but Carpenter and Johns had not yet
been located. The trial was continued on the State’s motion to January 15, 2016, and the court
admonished Brown to return on that date. By January 15, Johns had still not been located.
Carpenter had been located and served, but neither he nor Brown appeared in court. On the
State’s motion, the court issued rules to show cause against Carpenter and Brown and also
issued warrants for their arrest. Trial was rescheduled for January 22.
¶ 47 On January 20, the State requested, for the first time, leave to obtain a buccal swab from
Ealy for DNA testing. Ealy’s counsel objected, pointing out that in the unlikely event that the
DNA testing results came back before the scheduled trial date, Ealy would not have time to
review the results without seeking a continuance, thereby breaking his demand for speedy trial.
The trial court acknowledged that it was “late in the game,” but granted the State’s motion. On
January 22, the State again answered not ready for trial due to lack of witnesses.
¶ 48 Ealy’s speedy trial period was set to expire on February 17. On February 1, the State moved
for a 60-day extension, citing its continued inability to locate witnesses and detailing its
unsuccessful efforts to obtain their appearance at trial. Ealy objected, pointing out that the State
was still testing the DNA evidence, which would not be available to them if the trial was timely
held. The State denied that its reason for seeking an extension was to obtain more time to
process the DNA evidence. The court granted the State’s motion, saying, “This is one of the
most comprehensive searches for witnesses that I have heard.” After the extension was granted,
both Johns and Brown were taken into custody, and the case proceeded to trial on March 4
(i.e., 15 days into the 60-day extension) without Carpenter.
¶ 49 Based on the record, it is abundantly clear that the trial court acted within its discretion in
finding due diligence by the State and in granting the extension. To attempt to secure witnesses
for trial, the State engaged in extensive efforts spanning over seven months before the end of
the speedy trial window, and over four months before Ealy made his speedy trial demand. See
Exson, 384 Ill. App. 3d at 799.
¶ 50 Ealy does not challenge the materiality of Carpenter, Johns, and Brown to the State’s case.
Nor does Ealy challenge the truthfulness of the State’s representations regarding the efforts it
took to secure those witnesses. Instead, Ealy argues that (i) there were no “reasonable grounds
to believe” that Carpenter’s testimony could be obtained and (ii) the State did not show due
diligence in locating Johns and Brown. Both contentions lack merit. With regard to Carpenter,
Ealy makes a conclusory statement that it was “not surprising[ ]” that the State could not find

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 him, since after being served, he traveled to Atlanta, Georgia. But as the State explained to the
court on January 22 and again in its motion for extension of time, United States Marshals, the
FBI, and Atlanta law enforcement were all searching for Carpenter. Under those
circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to find reasonable grounds to
believe that Carpenter’s testimony could be obtained.
¶ 51 With regard to Johns and Brown, Ealy speculates that the State could easily have secured
them within the 120-day period, but deliberately delayed to obtain more time to complete its
DNA testing. This speculation has no basis in the record, since the State’s efforts to find Johns
and Brown are well documented, and DNA testing was not a significant part of the
prosecution’s case. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
State’s motion for an extension of the speedy trial period.

¶ 52 D. Sentence
¶ 53 Finally, Ealy argues that his 38-year sentence for first degree murder was excessive in light
of his youth (he was 19 at the time of the shooting) and “the fact that he did not shoot the
victim.”
¶ 54 Although this court may reduce a defendant’s sentence under Illinois Supreme Court Rule
615(b)(4), that power should be exercised “cautiously and sparingly.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). We review the trial court’s
sentencing decision for an abuse of discretion (People v. Hauschild, 226 Ill. 2d 63, 90 (2007)),
keeping in mind that such a decision is entitled to great deference because of the trial court’s
superior opportunity to observe the defendant and the proceedings. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at
212 (citing People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 209 (2000), citing People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48,
53 (1999)).
¶ 55 Upon reviewing the record, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court. Ealy’s 38-year
sentence was squarely in the middle of the 20-to-60-year sentencing range for first degree
murder (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-20(a) (West 2016)), and the trial court explicitly stated that it took
into consideration the appropriate factors in aggravation and mitigation. Ealy is essentially
inviting us to reweigh the factors in his favor, which we may not do. See Alexander, 239 Ill.
2d at 214-15 (appellate court erred by reweighing sentencing factors to give additional weight
to defendant’s rehabilitative potential). Moreover, as discussed, it was not proven at trial that
Ealy “did not shoot the victim,” so Ealy’s argument in this regard lacks merit. The trial judge
at sentencing could reasonably have believed, consistent with the trial evidence and the jury’s
general verdict of guilty, that Ealy was the one who fatally shot Boyd.

¶ 56 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 57 The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, since (i) the evidence was sufficient to convict
Ealy of first degree murder, (ii) the challenged prosecutorial comments do not require reversal
because some were fair comments on the evidence and the remainder were not raised in Ealy’s
posttrial motion, (iii) the trial court acted within its discretion in granting a 60-day extension
of the speedy trial period, and (iv) Ealy’s 38-year sentence, in the middle of the 20- to-60-year
sentencing range, was not excessive.

¶ 58 Affirmed.

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