17-2184
Bunjaj v. Barr
BIA
Hochul, IJ
A206 252 508
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 13th day of August, two thousand nineteen.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER,
8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
9 RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _____________________________________
12
13 ALEKSANDER BUNJAJ,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 17-2184
17 NAC
18 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _____________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Aleksander Bunjaj, pro se, Bronx,
24 NY.
25
26 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
27 Attorney General; John S. Hogan,
28 Assistant Director; Andrea N.
29 Gevas, Trial Attorney, Office of
30 Immigration Litigation, United
31 States Department of Justice,
32 Washington, DC.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Petitioner Aleksander Bunjaj, a native and citizen of
6 Albania, seeks review of a June 14, 2017, decision of the BIA
7 affirming an August 4, 2016, decision of an Immigration Judge
8 (“IJ”) denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
9 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re
10 Aleksander Bunjaj, No. A206 252 508 (B.I.A. June 14, 2017),
11 aff’g No. A206 252 508 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 4, 2016).
12 We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
13 and procedural history in this case.
14 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed
15 the IJ’s decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the
16 adverse credibility determination that the BIA declined to
17 reach. See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d
18 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review
19 are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin
20 Weng v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
21 The agency did not err in concluding that Bunjaj failed
22 to satisfy his burden of proof for asylum, withholding of
2
1 removal, and CAT relief. He claimed that supporters of a
2 local Socialist Party politician shot guns in the air outside
3 his home in 2009 when his father refused to vote for the
4 politician, and that police detained and beat him and
5 unidentified individuals threatened him in the run up to the
6 2013 elections on account of his support for the Albanian
7 Democratic Party. To establish eligibility, an asylum
8 applicant must show that he has suffered past persecution or
9 has a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of
10 race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
11 social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42),
12 1158(b)(1)(A), (B)(i).
13 Past Persecution
14 “Persecution is ‘an extreme concept that does not include
15 every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.’”
16 Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011)
17 (quoting Ai Feng Yuan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 416 F.3d 192,
18 198 (2d Cir. 2005)). A valid claim of past persecution may
19 “encompass[] a variety of forms of adverse treatment,
20 including non-life-threatening violence and physical abuse,”
21 but the harm must be sufficiently severe, rising above “mere
22 harassment.” Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d
3
1 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
2 As we recognized in Beskovic, “‘the difference between
3 harassment and persecution is necessarily one of degree,’ .
4 . . the degree must be assessed with regard to the context in
5 which the mistreatment occurs.” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467
6 F.3d 223, 226 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Ivanishvili, 433 F.3d
7 at 341) (internal citation omitted). “The [agency] must,
8 therefore, be keenly sensitive to the fact that a ‘minor
9 beating’ or, for that matter, any physical degradation
10 designed to cause pain, humiliation, or other suffering, may
11 rise to the level of persecution if it occurred in the context
12 of an arrest or detention on the basis of a protected ground.”
13 Id.
14 In determining whether Bunjaj established past
15 persecution, the agency acknowledged Beskovic and explicitly
16 considered the cumulative effect of the incidents endured by
17 Bujaj as required, Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420 F.3d 70, 79-
18 80 (2d Cir. 2005). Nevertheless, the agency reasonably
19 concluded that the harm Bunjaj suffered, while reprehensible,
20 was not sufficiently extreme to constitute persecution given
21 that Bunjaj was detained for only one night and suffered only
22 bruising that his mother treated with household items.
4
1 Additionally, the incidents were limited in scope, occurring
2 four years apart during election time and purportedly solely
3 at the behest of a local politician. See Mei Fun Wong, 633
4 F.3d at 72; cf. Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d
5 Cir. 2011) (finding no error in the agency’s determination
6 that an alien failed to establish past persecution when “prior
7 to his arrest and detention by local police, he suffered only
8 minor bruising from an altercation with family planning
9 officials, which required no formal medical attention and had
10 no lasting physical effect”).
11 Well-Founded Fear of Future Persecution
12 Absent past persecution, an applicant may establish
13 eligibility for asylum by demonstrating a well-founded fear
14 of future persecution, 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(2), which must
15 be both subjectively credible and objectively reasonable,
16 Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004).
17 Bunjaj failed to establish an objectively reasonable fear of
18 persecution on account of his membership in the Albanian
19 Democratic Party.
20 The agency reasonably found that the evidence showed that
21 the Democratic Party had controlled the national government
22 of Albania for years and retained a significant number of
5
1 parliamentary seats, and that there were no reports of
2 political prisoners in Albania. See Hoxhallari v. Gonzales,
3 468 F.3d 179, 185, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2006) (affirming the
4 agency’s determination that the Albanian Democratic Party’s
5 established electoral successes and parliamentary seats
6 diminished any fear of future harm nationwide). Further, the
7 agency reasonably found significant that Bunjaj had not
8 detailed any threats or harm to himself or his family members
9 who are active in the Democratic Party since the 2013
10 elections. See Melgar de Torres v. Reno, 191 F.3d 307, 313
11 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding future fear diminished when similarly
12 situated individuals are able to live unharmed in asylum
13 applicant’s native country); see also Jian Xing Huang v. U.S.
14 INS, 421 F.3d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 2005) (“In the absence of
15 solid support in the record . . . , [an applicant’s] fear is
16 speculative at best”).
17 Accordingly, the agency reasonably found that Bunjaj
18 failed to demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution, and
19 did not err in denying asylum, withholding of removal, and
20 CAT relief because all three claims were based on the same
21 factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-
22 57 (2d Cir. 2006).
6
1 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
2 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
3 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
4 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
5 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
6 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
7 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
8 34.1(b).
9 FOR THE COURT:
10 Catherine O=Hagan Wolfe
11 Clerk of Court
12
7