In re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.B., B.L., Elv.L., Eli.L., and A.L. (Minor Children) and C.L. (Mother) v. Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Aug 13 2019, 9:25 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Valerie K. Boots INDIANA DEPARTMENT OF
Danielle L. Gregory CHILD SERVICES
Marion County Public Defender Agency Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
– Appellate Division Attorney General of Indiana
Indianapolis, Indiana
Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
CHILD ADVOCATES, INC.
DeDe K. Connor
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re the Termination of the August 13, 2019
Parent-Child Relationship of Court of Appeals Case No.
S.B., B.L., Elv.L, Eli.L., and 19A-JT-224
A.L. (Minor Children) and Appeal from the Marion Superior
C.L. (Mother), Court
The Honorable Marilyn A.
Appellant-Respondent,
Moores, Judge
v. The Honorable Larry Bradley,
Magistrate

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 Indiana Department of Child Trial Court Cause Nos.
Services, 49D09-1805-JT-577
49D09-1805-JT-578
Appellee-Petitioner, 49D09-1805-JT-579
49D09-1805-JT-580
And 49D09-1805-JT-581

Child Advocates, Inc.,
Appellee-Guardian ad Litem.

Mathias, Judge.

[1] The Marion Superior Court terminated the parent-child relationship of C.L.

(“Mother”) and her five children, S.B., B.L., Elv.L., Eli.L., and A.L. on

December 14, 2018. Mother argues she was entitled to dismissal of the

termination petition because the factfinding hearing was outside the statutory

parameters of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On May 27, 2016, all five children were adjudicated Children in Need of

Services (“CHINS”) and placed in foster homes. Mother was ordered to

successfully complete services including home-based therapy and a domestic

violence assessment. Mother improved, and the children progressed in therapy

throughout 2017. On August 2, 2017, the children were placed with Mother in

temporary in-home trial visitation (“TTV”). The children were again removed

from Mother’s care in September 2017 because of a variety of concerns

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 including the lack of utilities in the home, inappropriate discipline, domestic

violence and Mother’s non-compliance with drug screens. The children’s

providers noted that the children regressed during TTV and many of their

problematic behaviors reappeared. Tr. pp. 37–38, 171, 176. After the children

were removed, Mother was noncompliant and did not participate in case

management to address her issues of housing, employment, parenting skills,

healthy relationships, and the children’s trauma. The Marion County

Department of Children Services (“MCDCS”), Guardian ad Litem, and other

providers did not recommend resuming Mother’s visitation with the children,

and the placement plan changed from reuniting the family to adoption. Ex.

Vol., Petitioner’s Ex. 30.

[3] On May 13, 2018, MCDCS filed petitions for the involuntary termination of the

parent-child relationship for each child. Appellant’s App. Vol II, pp. 50–53,

Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 2–13. Mother requested a mediation date and a

factfinding hearing date at a pre-trial hearing on August 3, 2018, eighty days

after MCDCS filed the termination petitions. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 84.

The court scheduled mediation for October 1, 2018, and set the factfinding

hearing for December 4 and 11, 2018. Id. at 83-84. There is no indication that

Mother objected to the hearing dates set.

[4] Mediation was rescheduled for November 7, 2018, 176 days after MCDCS filed

the termination petitions. Id. at 92. No agreement was reached in mediation,

and the factfinding hearing began December 4, 2018, 210 days after the

termination petitions were filed. Id. at 97.

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[5] At the beginning of the December 4 hearing, Mother orally requested dismissal

of the termination matter, arguing the hearing was beyond the statutory limit of

180 days after the petitions were filed. Tr. p. 4. The trial court denied the

motion.

[6] The trial court issued findings of fact and terminated the parent-child

relationship as to all five children. Mother does not challenge the findings and

conclusions of the trial court. Mother solely appeals the trial court’s denial of

her motion to dismiss.

Discussion and Decision

[7] Indiana Code section 31-35-2-6 specifies the timeline for conducting factfinding

hearings in parental rights termination proceedings. The statute provides:

(a) Except when a hearing is required after June 30, 1999, under
section 4.5 of this chapter, the person filing the petition shall
request the court to set the petition for a hearing. Whenever a
hearing is requested under this chapter, the court shall:

(1) commence a hearing on the petition not more than
ninety (90) days after a petition is filed under this chapter;
and

(2) complete a hearing on the petition not more than one
hundred eighty (180) days after a petition is filed under
this chapter.

(b) If a hearing is not held within the time set forth in subsection
(a), upon filing a motion with the court by a party, the court shall

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 dismiss the petition to terminate the parent-child relationship
without prejudice.

I.C. § 31-35-2-6. Here, the factfinding hearing commenced 210 days after the

termination petitions were filed and concluded 217 days after the petitions were

filed. Mother asserts she is entitled to dismissal of the petitions due to the

untimeliness of the hearings and that the failure to dismiss denied her right to

due process. Appellant’s Br. p. 14.

[8] The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo.

Matter of N.C, 83 N.E.3d 1265, 1267 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (citing In re Adoption of

M.L., 973 N.E.2d 1216, 1223 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)).

[9] The State argues that Mother acquiesced to the hearing date and thus waived

her right to challenge the setting of the factfinding hearing date, even though it

fell outside the statutory 180 days. Appellee’s Br. at 15. There is no record of

Mother objecting to the timeliness of the dates set at the August 3, 2018 pre-trial

hearing.

[10] This matter is directly addressed in Matter of N.C., where the court determined

the parents waived the right to dismissal for untimeliness by requesting a

continuance of a scheduled hearing date, and then agreeing the date “sound[ed]

good.” 83 N.E.3d at 1267.1 In the present case, Mother also agreed to the

1
Mother attempts to distinguish the present case from Matter of N.C., stating that she requested the hearing
date, not MCDCS; her counsel was unaware of the close deadline or that the matter was being scheduled
outside of the deadlines; and her counsel did not request a continuance of the proceedings. However, Mother

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 mediation and hearing dates set on August 3, 2018. Her assent to the

factfinding hearing dates constitutes a waiver of her right to object to the

timeliness of the hearing.

[11] The State also argues that Mother failed to meet the requirements of Indiana

Code section 31-35-2-6(b) because she orally moved for dismissal at the outset

of the factfinding hearing and failed to file a motion for dismissal. The court in

Matter of N.C. determined the plain language of the statute contemplates the

filing of a motion and that orally moving for dismissal does not satisfy the

requirements of subsection (b). 83 N.E.3d at 1267.2 Mother’s failure to submit a

written motion for dismissal waives her right to challenge the court’s denial.

[12] Mother’s failure to object to the mediation and factfinding hearing dates set at

the pre-trial hearing on August 3, 2018 constitutes a waiver of the right to

challenge the factfinding hearing date, even though it fell outside the statutory

180 days. Mother further failed to preserve an issue for appellate review

through her failure to submit a written motion to dismiss. Mother can be

afforded no relief on this appeal.

fails to develop these arguments any further. “Each contention must be supported by citations to the
authorities, statutes, and the Appendix or parts of the Record on appeal relied on, in accordance with Rule
22.” Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a). Accordingly, we consider them waived for failure to state a cogent
argument. See In re Adoption of M.S., 10 N.E.3d 1272, 1282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citing Ind. Appellate Rue
46(A)(8)(a)).
2
Mother argues that her due process rights were violated by the untimeliness of the factfinding hearing.
However, her assent to the factfinding hearing dates and failure to submit a written motion to the trial court
waive her due process arguments. Mother further failed to show how she was prejudiced by this delay in any
way.

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 Conclusion

[13] Mother agreed to the setting of the factfinding hearing date outside the statutory

parameters and failed to submit a written motion to dismiss the termination

proceedings. She thus preserved no issue for appellate review under Indiana

Code section 31-35-2-6.

[14] Affirmed.

May, J., and Brown, J., concur.

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