MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Aug 16 2019, 8:39 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Laurie Baiden Bumb Thomas A. Massey
Bumb Law Office, LLC Massey Law Offices, LLC
Evansville, Indiana Evansville, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Kevin Heckel, August 16, 2019
Appellant-Respondent/Cross-Appellant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-DR-2860
v. Appeal from the Spencer Circuit
Court
Tammy Heckel, The Honorable Lucy Goffinet,
Appellee-Petitioner/Cross-Appellee Special Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
74C01-1606-DR-210
Crone, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Kevin Heckel (“Husband”) and Tammy Heckel (“Wife”) both appeal the trial
court’s order dissolving their marriage. Husband contends that the trial court
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erred in dividing the marital estate equally and in summarily finding Wife’s
witnesses more credible than his witnesses regarding the valuation of marital
assets. Wife contends that the trial court erred in excluding certain assets from
the marital estate and in failing to rule on her petition asserting that Husband is
in contempt of a provisional order requiring him to share farm rental income
with her. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dividing the marital estate equally and in summarily finding Wife’s witnesses
more credible than Husband’s, but that it erred in excluding certain assets from
the estate and in failing to rule on Wife’s contempt petition. We therefore
affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with instructions to include the
challenged assets in the marital estate, equalize the estate accordingly, and issue
a ruling on Wife’s contempt petition.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] Husband and Wife were married in October 1998. Their two children were
born in 2001 and 2003. In 2003, Husband’s mother deeded approximately 210
acres of Heckel family farmland, including a seventy-nine-acre turkey farm, to
the parties jointly as husband and wife. Husband and Wife built their marital
residence on a forty-acre parcel of that farmland. Husband and Wife also
acquired farmland on their own, including the 108-acre Polster Farm, and
rented some of their farmland. Husband was employed by Covia, formerly
known as Unimin, and also managed the family farming operations. Wife
operated a gift shop in a building that she and Husband purchased.
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[3] In June 2016, Wife petitioned to dissolve the marriage. In January 2017, Wife
filed a petition for contempt asserting that Husband had failed to divide $20,000
in 2016 farm rental income equally with her in violation of an October 2016
provisional order. The final hearing was held over multiple days in May and
June 2018. During the hearing, the trial court stated that it would rule on the
contempt petition in its final order. See Tr. Vol. 4 at 140 (“I’m going to save my
ruling for the $10,000 to go with the […] final decree.”). The parties submitted
proposed findings and conclusions at the trial court’s request.
[4] In October 2018, the trial court issued its own findings, conclusions, and order
dissolving the parties’ marriage and addressing child- and property-related
issues. The relevant findings and conclusions read as follows:1
[Findings]
37. The Court finds Husband’s income at his current employer is
$117,712.92.
38. The Court finds Wife’s income is $51,000.
39. Based upon evidence and testimony presented the Court
finds that the farming operations have been operating at a loss
and no income will be attributed to either party.
….
43. Indiana Code 31-15-7-4 provides that all marital property is
1
We replace the trial court’s references to the parties with “Husband” and “Wife” where appropriate.
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to be divided and that the trial court shall divide the property in a
just and reasonable manner.
44. Indiana Code 31-15-7-5 states that the Court shall presume
that an equal division of marital property is just and reasonable.
45. There was no relevant evidence that [was] submitted by
either party relating to the disposition or dissipation of marital
property.
46. There was no Prenuptial Agreement.
47. Wife has a high school diploma and very little college.
Almost all of her business attempts have been failures.
48. Husband has an Electrical Engineering degree from Purdue
University and has been very successful in employment.
49. The parties acquired a substantial amount of farm land
during the marriage. Some of the farmland was deeded to them
by Husband’s mother.
….
59. The Court does not find Husband’s valuations of the
residence, farm land and operations convincing.
60. The Court finds Wife’s valuations of the residence[,] farm
land and operations convincing.
….
63. Based upon evidence and testimony presented the Court
finds Husband’s [Unimin] 401(k) to have a pre-marital rollover
amount of $85,002.26 which will be fully set aside to him.
64. Based upon evidence and testimony the Court finds
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Husband’s Unimin 401(k) valued at $346,365.53.
….
66. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented the Court
finds the Putnam Investment account in the amount of $5,457.19
to be a pre-marital asset belonging to Husband and should be
fully set aside to him.
67. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented the Court
finds the FPA Paramount Fund account in the amount of
$5,164.73 to be a pre-marital asset belonging to Husband and
should be fully set aside to him.
….
[Conclusions]
….
5. Wife shall be awarded the marital residence, along with 5
acres, … free and clear of any claim from the Husband. The
Court finds the value of the marital residence, and the
surrounding 5 acres, to be $402,000.00. Husband shall execute a
Quitclaim Deed to relinquish his name from the joint title.
6. Husband shall be awarded the remaining 35 acres that
surround the marital home. The court finds the value of the 35
acres to be $105,000.00. Wife shall execute a Quitclaim Deed to
relinquish her name from the joint title.
7. Husband shall be the sole owner of the mortgage debt due and
owing on the home in the amount of $197,181.00.
8. Husband shall be the sole owner of the home equity debt due
and owing in the amount of $49,190.93.
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9. Husband shall transfer or pay off all the joint indebtedness
from the marital residence within sixty (60) days of the date of
this order.…
10. Husband shall become the sole owner of the 79 acres
containing the turkey farm …. The Court finds the value of the
79 acres, containing the turkey farm, to be $960,000.00. Wife
shall execute a Quitclaim Deed to relinquish her name [from] the
joint title to this real estate.
11. Wife shall become the sole owner of the 108 acres of farm
ground known as the Polster Farm. The Court finds the value of
the 108-acre farm to be $540,000.00. Husband shall execute a
Quitclaim Deed to relinquish his name from the joint title.
12. Husband shall become the sole owner of the remaining 121
acres of jointly owned real estate. The Court finds the value of
the real estate to be $525,000.00. Wife shall execute a Quitclaim
Deed to relinquish her name from the joint title.
13. The Court is awarding Husband all of the jointly owned real
estate that originated from the Heckel family farm, with the
exception of the 5 acres upon which the marital residence is
located.
14. Each party shall be the sole owners of any crops, fixtures,
barns, grains, bins, timer and any other similar assets upon the
real estate awarded to that party.
15. Husband shall within thirty (30) days provide to Wife copies
of all lease agreements.
16. Wife shall become the sole owner of the business Evergreen
Boutique and Christmas Shop, LLC. The Court finds the value
of the business to be $50,000.00. Husband shall execute a
Quitclaim Deed to relinquish his name from the joint title.
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17. Wife shall be the sole owner of the Edwards Jones IRA in
the amount of $29,447.66.
18. Husband’s Unimin 401(k) shall be equally (50/50) divided,
with the exception of the $85,002.26 pre-marital rollover amount,
with Wife to receive a lump sum $173,182.77 by qualified
Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) and Husband shall be the
sole owner of the remaining balance.…
19. Husband’s Unimin Pension plan shall be equally (50/50)
[divided] by QDRO. The Court finds Wife’s interest to be in the
amount of $37,116.86. Husband shall become the sole owner of
the remaining balance.…
20. Husband shall become the sole owner of the Putnam
Investment account. The court concludes this to be a premarital
asset.
21. Husband shall become the sole owner of his FPA Paramount
account. The court concludes this to be a premarital asset.
22. Wife shall become the sole owner of [a Toyota Highlander
valued at $30,000, a mower, a four-wheeler, and] home
furnishings with the approximate value of $20,000.00.
23. Husband shall be the sole owner of the personal property in
his possession and also [certain farm equipment as well as all]
other machinery, fixtures and equipment for the farm operation
located on the real estate awarded to the husband.
24. Husband shall be responsible for the Old National Bank farm
operation loan in the amount of $46,753.33.…
25. Husband shall be responsible for the Old National Bank
commercial loan in the amount of $53,447.24.…
26. Husband shall be responsible for the debt due and owing on
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the Toyota Highlander in the amount of $18,341.57.…
27. Husband shall be responsible for the Custody Evaluation Fee
in the amount of $18,850.00.…
28. Husband shall be responsible for the payment of the Farm
Bureau Policy Renewal in the amount of $4,814.00.
29. Each party shall be responsible for their own attorney fees.
….
31. To effect the Court’s 50/50 distribution of marital assets
Husband shall pay to Wife a lump sum property settlement
payment of $64,987.30, which shall accrue no interest if timely
paid within three (3) months from the date of this Decree.
Appealed Order at 5-15.
[5] Both parties now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.
Discussion and Decision
Section 1 – The trial court clearly erred in excluding a portion
of Husband’s 401(k) and the Putnam Investment and FPA
Paramount accounts from the marital estate.
[6] We first address Wife’s argument that the trial court erred in excluding a
portion of Husband’s 401(k) and the Putnam Investment and FPA Paramount
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accounts from the marital estate.2 Where, as here, the trial court asks the
parties to submit proposed findings and then enters findings of fact and
conclusions on its own motion, “the specific findings control only as to the
issues they cover, while a general judgment standard applies to any issue upon
which the court has not found.” Apter v. Ross, 781 N.E.2d 744, 751 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2003), trans. denied. “The specific findings will not be set aside unless they
are clearly erroneous, and we will affirm the general judgment on any legal
theory supported by the evidence.” Id. “A finding is clearly erroneous when
there are no facts or inferences drawn therefrom that support it.” Id. A
judgment is clearly erroneous if it relies on an incorrect legal standard. Buse v.
Trs. of Luce Twp. Reg’l Sewer Dist., 953 N.E.2d 519, 523 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
[7] “In reviewing the trial court’s findings, we neither reweigh the evidence nor
judge the credibility of the witnesses. Rather, we consider only the evidence
and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom that support the finding.” Apter,
781 N.E.2d at 751 (citation omitted). While we defer substantially to a trial
court’s findings of fact, we do not do so to conclusions of law. Buse, 953
N.E.2d at 523. “We evaluate questions of law de novo and owe no deference
to a trial court’s determination of such questions.” Id. (quoting McCauley v.
Harris, 923 N.E.2d 309, 313 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied (2011)). “In
other words, ‘[a] decision is clearly erroneous if it is clearly against the logic and
2
Husband asserts that “[t]he trial court’s Findings specifically include each of these pre-marital assets in the
marital estate.” Husband’s Reply Br. at 8. The trial court listed the assets in its findings, but it did not
include them in its itemized balance sheet of the marital estate.
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effect of the facts and circumstances that were before the trial court’ or if the
court misinterprets the law.” Id. (quoting Young v. Young, 891 N.E.2d 1045,
1047 (Ind. 2008)).
[8] Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(a) provides that the trial court in a dissolution
action “shall divide the property of the parties, whether: (1) owned by either
spouse before the marriage; (2) acquired by either spouse in his or her own right:
(A) after the marriage; and (B) before final separation of the parties; or (3)
acquired by their joint efforts.” (Emphases added.) “Indiana law has been
uniformly interpreted as requiring the trial court to divide ‘all’ the property of
the parties, specifically prohibiting the exclusion of any assets from the scope of
the court’s powers to divide and award.” Nill v. Nill, 584 N.E.2d 602, 604 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1992), trans. denied. “Only property acquired by an individual spouse
after the separation date is excluded from the marital estate.” Thompson v.
Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 912 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (emphasis added), trans.
denied (2005). “While the trial court may ultimately determine that a particular
asset should be awarded solely to one spouse, it must first include the asset in its
consideration as to how the marital estate should be divided.” Hartley v.
Hartley, 862 N.E.2d 274, 282 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
[9] Based on the foregoing, we agree with Wife that the trial court clearly erred in
excluding the premarital rollover portion of Husband’s 401(k) and his Putnam
Investment and FPA Paramount accounts from the marital estate. Therefore,
we reverse and remand with instructions to include those assets in the marital
estate and equalize the estate accordingly.
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Section 2 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
dividing the marital estate equally.
[10] We now address Husband’s argument that the trial court erred in dividing the
marital estate equally. The division of marital assets is a highly fact-sensitive
task within the trial court’s sound discretion, and we will reverse only for an
abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of Marek, 47 N.E.3d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2016), trans. denied. “We will reverse a trial court’s division of marital
property only if there is no rational basis for the award; that is, if the result is
clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances, including the
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom.” Id. “We will also reverse if the
trial court has misinterpreted the law or disregarded evidence of factors listed in
the controlling statute.” Id. “Although the facts and reasonable inferences
might allow for a conclusion different from that reached by the trial court, we
will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.” Id.
[11] Indiana Code Section 31-15-7-4(b) provides that the court “shall divide the
property in a just and reasonable manner[.]” The court may do so by dividing
the property in kind; “setting the property or parts of the property over to one
(1) of the spouses and requiring either spouse to pay an amount, either in gross
or in installments, that is just and proper”; “ordering the sale of the property
under such conditions as the court prescribes and dividing the proceeds of the
sale”; or ordering the distribution of pension benefits “that are payable after the
dissolution of marriage, by setting aside to either of the parties a percentage of
those payments either by assignment or in kind at the time of receipt.” Id
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[12] “The court shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between
the parties is just and reasonable.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-5.
However, this presumption may be rebutted by a party who
presents relevant evidence, including evidence concerning the
following factors, that an equal division would not be just and
reasonable:
(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the
property, regardless of whether the contribution was income
producing.
(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each
spouse:
(A) before the marriage; or
(B) through inheritance or gift.
(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the
disposition of the property is to become effective, including the
desirability of awarding the family residence or the right to dwell
in the family residence for such periods as the court considers just
to the spouse having custody of any children.
(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to
the disposition or dissipation of their property.
(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:
(A) a final division of property; and
(B) a final determination of the property rights of the
parties.
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Id. “The statutory factors are to be considered together in determining what is
just and reasonable; any one factor is not entitled to special weight.” In re
Marriage of Lay, 512 N.E.2d 1120, 1125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987). “The party
seeking to rebut the presumption of equal division bears the burden of proof of
doing so, and a party challenging the trial court’s decision on appeal must
overcome a strong presumption that the trial court acted correctly in applying
the statute[.]” Marek, 47 N.E.3d at 1288.
[13] Husband argues,
It is difficult to imagine a factual situation that is more
appropriate for an unequal division of marital property than is
presented here, where farm land that has been owned by the
Husband’s family for generations is deeded to the parties, with
the intent that ownership be with the Husband who was born,
raised, and worked on the farm since childhood, and where the
Wife has made no contributions of any kind toward the
acquisition or maintenance of the farm land.
Husband’s Br. at 29.3 He contends that “[t]he only findings that might arguably
support an equal division would be Findings 37 and 38 concerning the earnings
3
Husband suggests that the trial court should have excluded the Heckel family farmland from the marital
estate. This suggestion is a nonstarter for the reasons given in Section 1 above.
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of the parties and Findings 47 and 48 concerning their earning abilities.” Id. at
33.4
[14] The substantial disparity in the parties’ earnings and earning ability is a valid
justification for an equal division of the marital estate, even considering
Husband’s maintenance of the farmland and the trial court’s award of the
marital residence and a small portion of that farmland to Wife. Wife points out
that after she and Husband received the deed to the Heckel family farmland
from his mother, they obtained a joint mortgage to pay off the existing $45,000
mortgage on the property and to pay $50,000 to each of Husband’s two siblings
on his mother’s behalf. In other words, the farmland did not simply land in
Wife’s lap with no strings attached. We cannot conclude that the trial court
abused its discretion in dividing the marital estate equally between the parties.
Section 3 – The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
summarily finding Wife’s witnesses more credible than
Husband’s witnesses.
[15] Husband also contends that the trial court abused its discretion “by summarily
adopting all of the valuations of the Wife’s appraisers and valuators and
4
Husband complains,
There was no finding that the trial court had determined that an equal division of the marital
estate was just and reasonable or that the Husband had failed to rebut the presumption that an
equal division is presumed to be just and reasonable by his relevant evidence in support of an
unequal division.
Husband’s Br. at 32-33. Those findings are implicit in Conclusion 31.
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rejecting all of the valuations of the Husband’s appraisers and valuators.”
Husband’s Br. at 38. He complains that
the appraisers employed different methods and approaches in the
process of placing a value on [the] properties and their resulting
opinions of value varied significantly. The total combined value
of the Wife’s experts was approximately $400,000 higher than the
total combined value placed by the Husband’s experts on [the]
properties.
Id. He further complains that the trial court
provided no review, analysis or critique of the testimony of the …
experts, their qualifications or their different methods and
approaches to the valuation of the properties. Based upon the
trial court’s findings, it is difficult to ascertain whether the court
even considered and weighed the testimony and opinions of the
Husband’s valuators.
Id. at 39.
[16] The trial court has broad discretion in determining the value of property in a
dissolution action, and its valuation will be disturbed only for an abuse of
discretion. Bertholet v. Bertholet, 725 N.E.2d 487, 497 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002). “If
there is sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s decision, no abuse of
discretion occurred.” Id. Husband cites no relevant authority for the
proposition that a trial court is required to enter detailed findings regarding why
it found one party’s witnesses more credible than another’s, particularly absent
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a request for special findings pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A).5 Contrary
to Husband’s assertion, the trial court specifically stated that it considered the
testimony and opinions of his valuators, and it simply found them less credible
than those of Wife’s valuators. Husband’s argument is merely a request to
reweigh evidence and judge witness credibility, which we may not do.
Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion.
Section 4 – On remand, the trial court must rule on Wife’s
petition for contempt regarding the farm rental income.
[17] Finally, we address Wife’s argument that the trial court erred in failing to rule
on her petition to hold Husband in contempt for failing to divide $20,000 in
farm rental income equally with her pursuant to the October 2016 provisional
order. This was clearly an oversight on the trial court’s part, and therefore on
remand the court must rule on this issue.6
5
Husband devotes a significant portion of his statement of facts to a description of both parties’ valuations of
various properties. Wife does the same. As this Court stated under similar circumstances in Crider v. Crider,
15 N.E.3d 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied,
This case highlights just how inexact property valuation is; the trial court was faced with
[multiple] qualified experts who presented diametrically opposed opinions, supported by
extensive reports and reasoning, as to the value of [certain] real estate. It was for the trial court
to decide which opinion to accept. We cannot reweigh the evidence or “judge the credibility of
the battling expert witnesses.”
Id. at 1059 (quoting Goodwine v. Goodwine, 819 N.E.2d 824, 830 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). We find Husband’s
citation to Garriott v. Peters, 878 N.E.2d 431 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied (2008), inapposite because the
trial court in that case gave no reason for discrediting a party’s unrefuted evidence.
6
We reject Wife’s suggestion that we may rule on her contempt petition as a court of first instance. We also
reject Husband’s suggestion that the issue is moot because the trial court’s provisional order was extinguished
by its final order.
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[18] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.
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