In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00067-CV
___________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 211th District Court
Denton County, Texas
Trial Court No. 17-7613-211
Before Sudderth, C.J.; Birdwell and Bassel, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Based on a jury verdict, the trial court terminated the parent-child relationship
between Appellant N.M. (Mother) and her son, B.M. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (O), (2). Mother appeals that final order. Her court-
appointed appellate counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and a brief in
support of that motion. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396 (1967); In
re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016). Counsel’s brief and motion meet the
requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record
demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. at 741–42,
87 S. Ct. at 1399. Further, counsel and this court informed Mother of her right to
request the record and to file a pro se response. See Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313,
319–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014); In re S.P., 509 S.W.3d 552, 559 (Tex. App.—El Paso
2016, no pet.). Mother filed a pro se response challenging the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence supporting all the grounds of termination found by the
jury. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (M), (O), (2). The Texas
Department of Family and Protective Services did not file a brief.
As the reviewing appellate court, we must independently examine the record to
decide whether counsel is correct in determining that an appeal in this case is
frivolous. See P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 28, n.14; Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1991). Having carefully reviewed the record, the Anders brief, and
Mother’s pro se response, we agree with counsel that this appeal is frivolous. See In re
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K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.). We find nothing in
the record that might arguably support Mother’s appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the
trial court’s final order.
As for appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw, we deny it in light of P.M.
because the brief does not show “good cause” other than counsel’s determination that
an appeal would be frivolous. See 520 S.W.3d at 27 (“[A]n Anders motion to withdraw
brought in the court of appeals, in the absence of additional grounds for withdrawal,
may be premature.”); In re A.M., 495 S.W.3d 573, 582 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2016, pets. denied) (noting that since P.M. was handed down, “most courts of
appeals affirming parental termination orders after receiving Anders briefs have denied
the attorney’s motion to withdraw”). The supreme court has held that when
intermediate appellate courts affirm Anders termination cases, “appointed counsel’s
obligations [in the supreme court] can be satisfied by filing a petition for review that
satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27–28.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
Bonnie Sudderth
Chief Justice
Delivered: August 15, 2019
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in the Interest of B.M., a Child
Combined Opinion