NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this
opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3718-16T2
MICHAEL STANTON,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY DEPARTMENT
OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent.
_____________________________
Submitted December 19, 2018 – Decided May 20, 2019
Before Judges Nugent and Reisner.
On appeal from the New Jersey Department of
Corrections.
Michael Stanton, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant, Michael Stanton, a prison inmate, appeals from the final
disciplinary action taken against him by the Department of Corrections (DOC).
We affirm.
Stanton was an inmate at Bayside State Prison when the events underlying
this appeal occurred. According to the record of the disciplinary proceedings,
on a February afternoon in 2017, two corrections officers who were attempting
to locate the source of a strong odor of something burning entered a cell
occupied by Stanton and another inmate. Stanton initially complied with an
officer's order to stand up, place his hands on his head, and face the cell window,
but he then moved his hands toward his waist. He disobeyed an order to return
his hands to his head and instead reached toward or into his waistband while
turning toward the officer. The officer sprayed Stanton with a spray called O.C.
spray. With the assistance of several other officers who had responded to a call
for assistance, the officer who had sprayed Stanton restrained him, as he had
become combative. During the struggle, an officer dislodged from Stanton's left
hand a four-inch brush handle. The handle had been sharpened to a point on one
end and had a shoelace through a hole on the other end. The incident caused a
delay of approximately one hour in prison movements.
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The DOC charged Stanton with three of the acts prohibited by N.J.A.C.
10A:4-4.1: *.202, possession or introduction of a weapon, *.306, conduct which
disrupts or interferes with the security or orderly running of the institution, and
*.708, refusing to submit to a search. Following a hearing, the hearing officer
found Stanton guilty of the charges. The sanction for the *.202 charge was 365
days of administrative segregation, 365 days loss of commutation time, thirty
days loss of recreation time, and confiscation of the weapon. The sanctions for
the *.306 and *.708 charges were "combined" with the sanctions for the *.202
charges.
Stanton filed an administrative appeal, and the Assistant Superintendent
upheld the hearing officer's decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Stanton raises the following points:
POINT I
DHO RALPH SHOWED PREJUDICE BY NOT
ALLOWING STANTON TO ASK PERTINENT
QUESTIONS REGARDING SCO. PEREZ'S
FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH D.O.C. STANDARDS
OF OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES, WHICH
WOULD PROVE HIS MALICIOUS INTENT &
EXPOSE THE FALSIFIED CHARGES &
STATEMENTS. AS WELL AS TAKE INTO
CONSIDERATION PEREZ WASN'T IN
COMPLIANCE WITH DOC STANDARDS.
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POINT II
DHO VIOLATED STANTON'S DUE PROCESS
RIGHTS BY ALLOWING POSTPONEMENT TO
EXCEED BEYOND THE ALLOTTED TIME TO GO
ON A VACATION INCLUDED IN 10A 4-9.7(A)2.
POINT III
INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS MADE BY ALL
OFFICERS DURING THE CONFRONTATION
DOES NOT SUPPORT THE FABRICATED
CHARGES AGAINST STANTON. IT EXPOSE[S]
THE LIES TOLD BY THE OFFICERS IN ORDER TO
COVER UP THE TRUTH.
POINT IV
VIDEO EVIDENCE PURPOSELY DESTROYED TO
COVER UP ALL THE FABRICATED LIES BY ALL
REPORTING OFFICERS TO JUSTIFY THE
PHYSICAL ATTACK AGAINST STANTON AND
SETTING HIM UP WITH A WEAPON THAT
WOULD'VE PROVED BEYOND A SHADOW OF A
DOUBT IT WASN'T HIS. A CRIME OF THE
FOURTH DEGREE. 2C:28-6.
Our scope of review is narrow. Generally, we will not disturb the DOC's
final administrative decision imposing disciplinary sanctions upon an inmate
unless the inmate demonstrates that the decision is arbitrary or capricious, or is
unsupported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Henry v. Rahway
State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980). Evident from a careful consideration
of the record is that the DOC's final decision is supported by substantial
evidence. See McDonald v. Pinchak, 139 N.J. 188, 195 (1995); N.J.A.C. 10A:4-
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9.15(a) ("A finding of guilt at a disciplinary hearing shall be based upon
substantial evidence that the inmate has committed a prohibited act.").
The arguments Stanton raises in his first and third points reflect little more
than his disagreement with the hearing officer's factual determinations and
credibility findings. The questions he says he was precluded from asking were
mostly irrelevant or objectionable for security or other reasons, and his argument
that the statements of all officers were inconsistent represents nothing more than
his disagreement with the weight the hearing officer gave to those statements.
The record also demonstrates the disciplinary proceedings were conducted
in a manner that afforded Stanton the due process to which he was entitled. See
Avant v. Clifford, 67 N.J. 496, 522 (1975). Most of the delays in the hearing
were attributable to Stanton's requests, such as his requests that statements be
obtained from two inmates and his request to confront seven corrections officers.
His request for video surveillance footage was denied not because it was
purposefully destroyed, as he alleges, but because the video system stored only
five days of recordings.
In short, the DOC's final decision is supported by sufficient credible
evidence on the record on the whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Stanton's arguments
lack sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
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Affirmed.
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