NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3107-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JAMES H. SCOTT,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 24, 2018 – Decided May 10, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz and Ostrer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Indictment No. 04-05-0414.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Michael James Confusione, Designated
Counsel; William P. Welaj, on the brief).
Michael A. Monahan, Acting Union County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (James Colin
Brady, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant James H. Scott appeals from a January 3, 2017 order denying,
without an evidentiary hearing, his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR). He
collaterally challenges his convictions for multiple counts of first-degree
robbery and related firearms offenses arising from four robberies involving
multiple victims between April 24 and May 17, 2003.1 Defendant was also
convicted of separate possessory firearms offenses committed the day he was
arrested, May 20, 2003. He received an aggregate sentence of forty-three years,
subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, including consecutive
terms of eighteen, fifteen, and ten years for robbery counts relating to three of
the incidents.
Defendant contends he received ineffective assistance of counsel because
his trial attorney did not file a pre-trial motion to sever the counts related to the
five separate incidents; and his appellate attorney did not raise the issue on
appeal. We disagree and affirm. We are not convinced that a severance motion
would have succeeded, particularly given the prosecution, albeit unsuccessful,
of a conspiracy count that encompassed all four robberies. Furthermore,
1
We affirmed these convictions on direct appeal. State v. Scott (Scott I), No.
A-0853-06 (App. Div. Aug. 27, 2010).
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defendant has not demonstrated that, even if his attorneys were deficient, he
suffered prejudice as a result.
I.
The PCR court's order follows a remand from the Supreme Court. State
v. Scott (Scott III), 225 N.J. 337 (2016). The PCR court initially denied
defendant's petition without oral argument. We affirmed that decision
substantially for the reasons the judge set forth in a written decision . State v.
Scott (Scott II), No. A-3951-13 (App. Div. Jan. 19, 2016), slip op. at 4-5. We
agreed that a severance motion would not have succeeded because, in a trial for
any of the five incidents, evidence as to the others would have been admissible
under N.J.R.E. 404(b) as proof of a charged conspiracy. Scott II, slip op. at 5.
It did not matter, for purposes of our ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis,
that the jury ultimately acquitted defendant of the conspiracy count. Ibid. We
also held that the PCR correctly dispensed with oral argument. Ibid. On that
point alone, the Supreme Court summarily reversed and remanded for oral
argument, pursuant to State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012). Scott III, 212 N.J.
at 337.
At the subsequent oral argument, defendant reprised his previous written
arguments. The PCR court was unpersuaded. Citing State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580,
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3
601-02 (1992), the court observed that, although a party may seek relief from
prejudicial joinder under Rule 3:15-2, no prejudice exists if, in a trial on a single
charge, evidence of the other charges would be admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b)
and the four-prong Cofield test. See State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992)
(holding evidence of other crimes and wrongs is admissible if "relevant to a
material issue"; "similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the charged
offense"; "clear and convincing"; and its apparent prejudice does not outweigh
its probative value). The court concluded that a severance motion would have
failed because evidence of the robberies would have met the Cofield test.
The court noted:
[T]he defendants committed a series of nighttime
robberies over the course of a month in the nearby
towns of Union and Linden using the same vehicle, the
same weapon, the same clothing, and the same modus
operandi. The defendant's theory of the case was that
he didn't participate in any of the crimes charged.
Therefore, evidence of each of the charged crimes
would have been admissible at separate trials for the
purpose of showing a common scheme or plan and as
evidence of identity and intent. . . . The crimes were
similar in kind and reasonably close in time to each
other, and the evidence was clear and convincing based
on the video, the statements of the defendant, the gun,
the gloves, the ski masks, the sweatshirt, the jacket, the
seized proceeds of the robberies and the stolen car
parked in front of the defendant's home. This evidence,
taken together, was extremely probative of the common
scheme knitting the charged robberies together and of
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the identity of the perpetrators. . . . [T]he probative
value of the evidence far outweighed its prejudice to the
defendant . . . .
Furthermore, citing State v. Louf, 64 N.J. 172, 177 (1973), the court held
that evidence of the four incidents was admissible to prove the conspiracy
charge, notwithstanding the jury's not-guilty verdict on that count. The PCR
court stated, "[I]t is well-settled that, where the crime charged was allegedly
committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, evidence of the acts of any conspirator
in furtherance of a common plan, including other crimes, is admissible against
all of the parties to the conspiracy."
On appeal, defendant presents the following point for our consideration:
POINT I
THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF COURT ERRED
IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE
FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL
REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL AS A
RESULT OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO FILE
A MOTION FOR SEVERANCE INVOLVING THE
VARIOUS CHARGES RELATING TO FOUR
SEPARATE ROBBERIES AS WELL AS THE
CHARGES RELATING TO VARIOUS WEAPONS
OFFENSES.
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
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B. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES
REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED UPON
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MAKE AN
APPROPRIATE MOTION, EVIDENTIARY
HEARINGS, PETITIONS FOR POST-
CONVICTION RELIEF AND MOTIONS FOR
SEVERANCE MADE PURSUANT TO RULE
3:152(b).
C. THE DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY
ADDRESS TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO
MAKE A MOTION FOR SEVERANCE PRIOR
TO TRIAL WHICH EFFECTIVELY DENIED
TO THE DEFENDANT HIS ABILITY TO
RECEIVE A FAIR TRIAL.
II.
We review de novo the PCR court's factual findings without an evidentiary
hearing. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 421 (2004). We also owe no deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law. Ibid.
In reviewing the merits of defendant's petition, we apply the familiar two-
pronged Strickland standard to determine whether defendant has shown that (1)
his counsel's performance was so deficient that it "fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness," and (2) there was "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). "The
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6
right to effective assistance" includes that of appellate counsel, and the same
Strickland test applies. State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 610-11 (2014). "A
defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing" before a PCR court if he
or she establishes: "a prima facie case in support of post-conviction relief";
"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the
existing record"; and a "hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief." R.
3:22-10(b).
A.
It is not ineffective to refrain from filing a meritless motion or raising an
unsuccessful argument. State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007); State v.
Worlock, 117 N.J. 596, 625 (1990). We agree with the PCR court's assessment
that a severance motion would likely have failed. The PCR court accurately
described the applicable test for determining whether joinder is unduly
prejudicial. Substantially for the reasons the PCR court expressed, had the
robbery incidents been severed, evidence of the remaining incidents would have
been admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b) to demonstrate "a common scheme or
plan [that] embodies the commission of two or more crimes so related that proof
of one tends to establish the other." State v. Lumumba, 253 N.J. Super. 375,
387 (App. Div. 1992); see also State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 92 (2013) ("Other-
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crimes evidence may also be admitted on the issue of identity when a particular
weapon or disguise used in one crime connects a defendant to another offense.");
State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 474 (1990) (applying the predecessor to N.J.R.E.
404(b) and holding that "evidence of the other crimes would have been
admissible [in a trial of severed counts] . . . to establish either identity or the
weapon used"). Here, defendant and his cohort used the same masks, gloves
and weapons in multiple robberies, which identified them as the offenders.
Significantly, the indictment also charged that defendant conspired with
his co-defendants to commit the robberies between April 24 and May 17, 2003.
Where evidence that a defendant committed another crime "tends to establish
the existence of a larger continuing plan of which the crime on trial is a part, it
is admissible for such purpose." Louf, 64 N.J. at 178. Thus, the evidence of
each incident was admissible to prove the alleged conspiracy, notwithstanding
the jury's later acquittal of that count.
B.
Secondly, we are unpersuaded that defendant suffered any prejudice from
the joinder of the multiple charges. As the trial judge observed at the sentencing
hearing, the evidence against defendant was "overwhelming." Defendant
confessed in writing to all four robbery incidents. He was arrested in possession
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of instruments of the robbery, including a semi-automatic handgun, ammunition
and the distinctive face-masks and gloves that the victims described and that
appeared in surveillance footage. In subsequent searches of defendant's and a
co-defendant's home, police seized fruits of the robberies, including stolen
merchandise and the key to a car he stole from one victim (along with a parking
ticket issued after the theft). Defendant's main defense was that he had
confessed falsely while under pressure to clear his mother and uncle from
suspicion, as he was driving his mother's car when arrested and he possessed
bullet-proof vests that belonged to his uncle, a police detective. Yet, the
evidence that defendant's will was overborne was weak.
In sum, defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that,
even if the charges were severed, and even if the evidence of the other robberies
were not admissible at each trial, the result would have been different. See State
v. Lazarchick, 314 N.J. Super. 500, 519 (App. Div. 1998) (finding the prejudice
prong was not met where defense counsel did not object to consolidation),
disapproved on other grounds by Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 561,
570 (2002).
Affirmed.
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