NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4469-16T3
IN THE MATTER OF THE
ESTATE OF JOE W. GORDON, JR.,
Deceased.
Submitted March 19, 2019 – Decided April 11, 2019
Before Judges Rothstadt and Natali.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Camden County, Docket No. CP-
0130-2014.
David Mayfield, appellant pro se.
Saundra Gordon, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
This appeal relates to the administration of the Estate of Joe W. Gordon,
Jr., who died intestate on July 1, 2013. On June 23, 2014, almost a year after
his death, his wife, Saundra Gordon, filed a verified complaint seeking to be
appointed as the administratrix of the Estate, as Joe's1 surviving spouse, pursuant
to N.J.S.A. 3B:10-2. On November 5, 2014, the court appointed Saundra the
administratrix and dismissed a caveat filed by Joe's son, David Mayfield.2
Saundra maintained that David and his wife Barbara were responsible for
the costs incurred from 2004 to 2016 with respect to two properties Saundra and
Joe owned in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. After taking testimony from David
and Saundra, and considering documentary evidence, the court initially entered
a judgment against David on behalf of the Estate in the amount of $52,553,
which the court later reduced to $34,200 in an April 26, 2017 order. David
challenges the April 26, 2017 order as unsupported by substantial, credible
evidence in the record. We agree and reverse.
In 2004, David and Barbara operated a hair salon on "the 6700 block of
Germantown Avenue" in Philadelphia. According to David, in approximately
2007, he entered an agreement with Joe in which he and Barbara would move
1
For ease of reference, we refer to Joe W. Gordon, Jr., and his wife Saundra
Gordon, as, respectively, Joe and Saundra, and David Mayfield, and his wife
Barbara Mayfield, as David and Barbara, intending no disrespect.
2
Alice Cooper, Joe's former wife, also filed a verified complaint seeking to be
appointed administratrix, alleging she was Joe's surviving spouse. The court
dismissed her complaint in a September 6, 2016 order. She has not appealed
that order and is not a party to this appeal.
A-4469-16T3
2
their hair salon business from Germantown Avenue to his father's properties at
346-348 Chelton Avenue in Philadelphia. At the time of the agreement, David
understood that the Chelton Avenue properties were heavily encumbered by
outstanding city tax liens. David maintained that he and his father agreed that
if he satisfied the outstanding tax liabilities, Joe would "sign the properties over
to [him]." He also stated that he "wasn't the only child that stayed in . . .
propert[ies] that [Joe] owned," explaining that Joe "let [his daughter] stay in a
townhouse [in] [New] Jersey that was in foreclosure . . . rent free."
David testified that prior to his occupancy, the properties were vacant for
years and had broken windows, leaking roofs, poor plumbing, and a backed-up
sewer. As a result, in 2007 he began repairing the properties by installing new
bay windows and fixing the plumbing. In total, David testified that he spent
$22,000 on improvements. In 2008, David stated he moved into 348 Chelton
Avenue and operated a barber shop there for approximately a year. Barbara
moved her salon into 346 Chelton Avenue, where she operated the business from
2008 until 2016.
David stated that soon after occupying 348 Chelton Avenue, he learned
that Joe was not the sole owner of the properties, but that Saundra also had an
ownership interest. At that point, David considered the "deal . . . off," as he
A-4469-16T3
3
realized that his father could not unilaterally transfer ownership of the properties
to him.
As noted, Barbara continued to operate her hair salon business at 346
Chelton Avenue for a number of years after David vacated 348 Chelton Avenue.
Accordingly, Saundra filed a motion to remove her from the property, and on
April 22, 2016, the court entered an order directing David, his wife, and "any
other relatives, friends, or employees" to vacate the property located at 346-348
Chelton Avenue, on or before May 1, 2016.
The court held a plenary hearing on August 31, 2016, to determine the
extent to which David would be responsible for the costs associated with the
Chelton Avenue properties. Based on the testimony and proofs submitted at the
hearing, the court issued an order on September 6, 2016, in which it determined
that David owed the estate "either the costs to maintain the properties or a
reduced rental rate during the period of occupancy from July 1, 2004 until
December 31, 2013 – whichever results in the lowest amount of arrearage." The
court compared "the costs associated with the properties versus a reduced rental
rate of $300[] per month for both properties for the time period established," and
concluded the reduced rental rate resulted in the lowest amount of arrears, and
therefore calculated a judgment based on that rate. The court also found David
A-4469-16T3
4
paid for $11,000 in property improvements and deducted that amount from the
imputed rent owed, "resulting in a total due and owing of $52,553" by David to
the Estate.3
David filed a motion for a new trial and the court conducted another
hearing on January 31, 2017. At that hearing, Saundra disputed David's
testimony that he and Barbara moved into the Chelton Avenue properties in
2008. Rather, she claimed that they occupied the properties starting in July
2004. Saundra further testified that based on what Joe represented to her, "[t]he
agreement [between Joe and David] was [for] no rent, but [for David to] take
care of the utilities and the taxes[,] . . . [in exchange for] free use of the buildings
. . . " for "as long as he wanted to and he was taking care of the bills."
Saundra also detailed the taxes, water bill charges and fines owed on the
properties prior to, during, and after David and Barbara's occupancy. In this
regard, she testified that in 2002, there was an outstanding tax liability of
3
We note that David failed to include a transcript of the August 31, 2016
plenary hearing and relevant trial exhibits in his appellate appendix. We do not,
however, deem this failure an impediment to our appellate review, see Rule
2:6-1(a)(1)(I), as the September 6, 2016 order sufficiently explains the court's
reasoning in support of that order. Further, David submitted the January 31,
2017 and April 26, 2017 transcripts, which detail the factual bases for the April
26, 2017 order under review.
A-4469-16T3
5
$6,558.47 for the 348 Chelton Avenue property, and in 2005, a tax liability of
$6,271.88 for 346 Chelton Avenue. Saundra stated that as of June 2016, she
owed $28,797.64 in taxes for 348 Chelton Avenue, and $23,552 for 346 Chelton
Avenue.
With respect to utilities and fines, Saundra testified that as of 2005, there
was a $14,462.04 outstanding water bill for 348 Chelton Avenue, which
decreased to $11,717.93 by 2016. 346 Chelton Avenue also had a $2.40
outstanding water bill in 2010, which increased to $13,954.70 in 2016, after
David and Barbara vacated the properties. Saundra stated that this
"astronomical" rise was the result of someone tampering with the water meter.
She added that the city imposed fines of $3,664 for 346 Chelton Avenue and
348 Chelton Avenue as a result of David improperly leaving trash outside on
days not designated for trash removal.
In a January 31, 2017 oral opinion, the court commented on the "the lack
of proof" provided to the court, and specifically the absence of a written contract
memorializing David and Joe's agreement. The court also observed that Joe
never initiated a lawsuit against David, nor sent him a notice to terminate his or
Barbara's tenancy at any time prior to his death.
A-4469-16T3
6
However, the court stated that "there has to be some recognition of
[David's] responsibility to pay something during the period of time that he and
his wife occupied the property." The court accepted David's testimony that he
occupied 348 Chelton Avenue for one year and, because neither party introduced
an expert evaluation of the fair rental value of the properties, assessed a $300
per month rental rate, "which [it] thought was well below what the market would
have commanded back then," for a total of $3,600. With respect to Barbara's
tenancy at 346 Chelton Avenue, the court again accepted David's testimony that
she occupied that property for eight and a half years, and applied the same
imputed monthly rental rate, which totaled $30,600. The court stated it was
applying a quasi-quantum meruit theory, and that "[a]ll [it] did was [apply] a
very simple low, very low calculation of what the value would have been." The
court rejected David and Barbara's laches argument and stated that the doctrine
applied only to Joe, and not Saundra.
Additionally, the court determined it could not include the outstanding
water bill in the judgment because "the back bill [for 348 Chelton Avenue] . . .
is as high as the bill that [it] had when [David] vacated the property . . . [,] [s]o
it's almost like . . . he never incurred a dime of water expenses . . . ." With
respect to the increased outstanding water bill for 346 Chelton Avenue, the court
A-4469-16T3
7
stated that because it was "unsubstantiated completely that there was anything
going [on] with the [water] meter," it could not require David to pay these
expenses. The court also concluded that "if [David and his wife are] going to
pay rent, they don't pay real estate taxes because there's nothing in writing that
says that that's the case." Similarly, it found that there was nothing in writing
to require David to pay for the trash fines or liens and judgments owed on the
properties, and also noted that, according to Saundra's testimony, these
payments were not included in the agreement for David to pay for taxes and
utilities. The court then set a date for another hearing for the parties to obtain
experts or to provide further proofs to evaluate the fair rental value of the
properties.
The court held the subsequent hearing on April 26, 2017, but neither party
presented an expert evaluation of the properties' fair rental value. Accordingly,
in an April 26, 2017 order, the court entered judgment against David for
$34,200, representing the $300 imputed monthly rental value for the twelve
months David occupied 348 Chelton Avenue and the one hundred and two
months Barbara occupied 348 Chelton Avenue and 346 Chelton Avenue. With
respect to the imputed rental rate of $300, the court reiterated that it "just picked
$300 out of the air because it sounded really low and [it] didn't want to tax
A-4469-16T3
8
[David] with anything more than that, [with] there never having been a formal
lease that [it] was aware of." This appeal followed.
On appeal, David argues that the court's $34,200 judgment was not
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Specifically, he asserts
that there was no written agreement or lease, the taxes and water bills on the
Chelton Avenue properties were delinquent prior to his occupation of the
buildings, he spent money improving the properties based on his belief that he
would eventually obtain ownership, and in other circumstances, Joe allowed
each of his children to occupy his properties rent free.
Our review of a trial court's fact-finding in a non-jury case is limited.
Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011). "The general
rule is that findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported by
adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Deference is especially appropriate
when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility."
Ibid. (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)).
We do not "disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial
judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or
inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to
offend the interests of justice." Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412).
A-4469-16T3
9
However, we owe no deference to a trial court's interpretation of the law, and
review issues of law de novo. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 278 (2012);
Mountain Hill, L.L.C. v. Twp. Comm. of Middletown, 403 N.J. Super. 146, 193
(App. Div. 2008).
Applying these standards, we agree with the court that there is "nothing
in writing with regard to any contract for [David] to use th[e] [Chelton Avenue]
propert[ies]." As such, the court correctly refrained from imposing an obligation
on David to pay the outstanding taxes or water bills. See Silvestri v. Optus
Software, 175 N.J. 113, 121 (2003) ("Agreements containing a promise to
perform in a manner satisfactory to another, or to be bound to pay for
satisfactory performance, are a common form of enforceable contract."); Kieffer
v. Best Buy, 205 N.J. 213, 223 (2011) ("The judicial task is simply
interpretative; it is not to rewrite a contract for the parties better than or different
from the one they wrote for themselves."). However, when faced with
insufficient proofs to require David to pay those costs, the court erred by
entering a judgment of $34,200 based on a quantum meruit theory because the
court's factual findings were not supported by substantial credible evidence.
To establish a quantum meruit claim, Saundra, not David, had the burden
to prove: (1) performance of services, (2) defendant's acceptance of the services,
A-4469-16T3
10
(3) the expectation of compensation, and (4) the reasonable value of the services.
Starkey v. Estate of Nicolaysen, 172 N.J. 60, 68 (2002). Although it was
undisputed that David and Barbara occupied the Chelton Avenue properties to
operate their hair styling businesses, from our review of the record, Saundra
failed to establish an expectation of receiving monthly rent for the properties
from David or Barbara, or the reasonable rental value.
With respect to Joe and Saundra's expectation of compensation, Saundra
expressly testified that pursuant to what Joe told her, "[t]he agreement was [for]
no rent." In addition, David testified that his occupancy of the properties was
not based on the payment of monthly rent, but rather on the understanding with
Joe that he would become an owner after he satisfied the outstanding tax
liabilities, an agreement that David cancelled after he discovered that Joe was
not the exclusive owner of the property and could not satisfy his end of the
bargain by transferring ownership of the properties. In addition, there is no
evidence in the record that at any point between 2008 (or 2004 according to
Saundra), when David and Barbara moved into the property, and 2013 when Joe
died, that either Joe or Saundra requested rent from David or Barbara under a
lease or an at-will tenancy, or instituted summary dispossess proceedings. See
VRG Corp. v. GKN Realty Corp., 135 N.J. 539, 554 (1994) ("[P]laintiff [must]
A-4469-16T3
11
show that it expected remuneration from the defendant at the time it performed
or conferred a benefit on defendant . . . ."). Finally, as David testified, Joe
allowed his daughter to occupy another property rent free.
Further, Saundra did not introduce any competent evidence, expert or
otherwise, to establish that $300 per month represented reasonable rent for the
Chelton Avenue properties. Bereft of documentary or testimonial proofs that
would support such a rental value for properties that were vacant for years, and
which required significant rehabilitation, the court candidly admitted that it "just
picked $300 out of the air" based on its unsupported belief that such a rental
value represented "a very simple low, very low calculation of what the value
would have been." Thus, the court improperly entered a judgment of $34,200
based on a quantum meruit theory without proof of Joe and Saundra's
expectation of compensation for rental payments and the reasonable rental value
of the properties.
Reversed.
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12