NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4321-17T2
K.S.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.S.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________
Argued March 20, 2019 – Decided April 4, 2019
Before Judges Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County,
Docket No. FM-13-0267-07.
J.S., appellant, argued the cause pro se.
K.S., respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Defendant J.S.1 appeals from a post-judgment order dated April 12, 2018,
which addressed issues of child support, college payments, and parenting time.
We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part, for the reasons set forth in
this opinion.
We take the following facts from the record. The parties were married for
more than six years when the court entered a judgment of divorce on October
19, 2006, incorporating a property settlement agreement (PSA). A daughter and
son were born of the marriage, who are presently nineteen and seventeen years
of age, respectively.
In May 2015, plaintiff K.S. filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights
requesting defendant pay his portion of expenses set forth in the PSA and child
support. Defendant filed a cross-motion to force the sale of the marital home,
located in Hazlet, and restrict plaintiff from relocating out-of-state. The court
directed the matter to mediation. The court subsequently signed an order dated
September 3, 2015, setting defendant's child support obligation at $455 per
week. On January 12, 2016, the court entered an order scheduling a case
management conference to address the unresolved issues.
1
We utilize initials to protect the parties' and the children's privacy.
A-4321-17T2
2
On September 9, 2016, the parties filed a consent order, which resolved
the remaining issues. The consent order stated the following:
CUSTODY AND PARENTING TIME
18. Plaintiff shall continue to be the [parent of]
primary residence and [d]efendant the parent of
alternate residence.
19. [The son] shall commute from Hazlet . . . to
[New York City] during the week and if [d]efendant has
a room set up for [the son], he will be allowed to have
overnights with [d]efendant during the week, if [the
son] so chooses. . . . Defendant shall have one weekend
per month with [the son], if [the son] is residing in NYC
from Monday to Thursday, which shall be agreed upon
at the beginning of the school year with the parties to
make efforts to coordinate those weekends with
functions in the city or defendant's holidays. Plaintiff
shall continue to remain the parent of primary residence
of both children.
The consent order also required defendant to continue paying child
support of $455 per week, and expressly contemplated the daughter's college
attendance beginning in fall 2017, and the son's enrollment at a private high
school in New York City in fall 2016. The consent order specifically noted the
fact the son's attendance of high school in New York City would not constitute
a change in circumstances enabling a modification of child support.
The consent order also stated:
A-4321-17T2
3
The parties agree that each shall contribute toward their
children's college education. College expenses shall
include tuition, room and board, miscellaneous school
fees, books, computer, supplies, transportation, meal
plans, and any other college related costs and expenses
which are not covered by student loans, grants, work-
study or scholarships. The child shall accept all
possible financial aid and subsidized Stafford loans
available to him or her. Defendant has an income of
approximately $167,000 per year after deducting his
child support obligation and [p]laintiff has an income
of approximately $58,000.00 per year including child
support by [d]efendant. Based on the parties[']
respective incomes, [d]efendant shall be responsible for
seventy-five . . . percent and [p]laintiff shall be
responsible for twenty[-]five . . . percent of any college
expenses not covered by the child's financial aid as set
forth above.
The parties also agreed to split the cost of the daughter's car insurance once she
turned seventeen and obtained her driver's license.
In January 2017, plaintiff filed an order to show cause to transfer the son
from his high school in New York City to a school in Bensalem, Pennsylvania,
near her residence. The court granted the application.
In November 2017, defendant filed a motion, in pertinent part, to enforce
the consent order's provisions concerning parenting time with the parties' son,
and payment of the daughter's college expenses and car insurance. He also
requested sanctions and attorney's fees due to plaintiff's refusal to mediate these
issues. Plaintiff cross-moved to enforce litigant's rights, including the payment
A-4321-17T2
4
of child support arrears, defendant's obligation for their daughter's car insurance,
reimbursement of medical expenses, and contribution to their son's
extracurricular activities.
The motion judge interviewed the parties' son in camera, but failed to
record the interview. Subsequently, the judge signed the April 12, 2018 order,
which denied defendant's requests for parenting time and modification of child
support. In her written findings, the judge stated she considered the son's
representation during the interview that he was seeing defendant "at least
monthly and planned to continue to do so." Thus, the judge concluded "[i]n
light of the child's age," it was not appropriate to order parenting time with
defendant. The judge also found defendant did not present an "extreme change
of circumstances that warrants modification of the parties' agreed upon
parenting time schedule or child support."
The motion judge also denied defendant's request that plaintiff pay
twenty-five percent of their daughter's college tuition pursuant to the consent
order. Specifically, the judge stated:
Based on the parties' [c]ertifications, this [court] finds
that it is inequitable for [plaintiff] to contribute
[twenty-five percent] towards college contribution. It
is clear that [plaintiff] does not have the money to
contribute more than what she already has. Therefore,
this [c]ourt finds that [plaintiff] shall be obligated to
A-4321-17T2
5
contribute twenty[-]five percent . . . towards college
expenses at a rate consistent with an in-state and public
college/university. [Plaintiff] has provided [defendant]
with [$2000] . . . towards college expenses and so
[plaintiff]'s obligation towards college expenses has
been satisfied.
The motion judge also denied defendant's request for sanctions and counsel fees.
The order granted plaintiff's cross-motion to enforce litigant's rights. This
appeal followed.
I.
"Appellate courts accord particular deference to the Family Part because
of its 'special jurisdiction and expertise' in family matters." Harte v. Hand, 433
N.J. Super. 457, 461 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394,
412 (1998)). "We do 'not disturb the "factual findings and legal conclusions of
the trial judge unless . . . convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by
or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence
as to offend the interests of justice."'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)
(alterations in original) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of
Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Therefore, "[o]nly when the trial court's
conclusions are so 'clearly mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should we interfere[.]"
Ibid. (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104
(2008)). "We will reverse only if we find the trial judge clearly abused his or
A-4321-17T2
6
her discretion[.]" Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 72 (App. Div. 2012).
However, "all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci, 448 N.J. Super.
546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citing Reese v. Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App.
Div. 2013)).
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal: 1) the motion judge
abused her discretion when she declined to enforce the parenting time provisions
of the consent order with the parties' son; 2) when plaintiff opposed defendant's
motion, she was actually seeking a modification of parenting time and the judge
erred because she did not make any findings as to whether there was a change
in circumstances; 3) the parenting time issue was not moot because, contrary to
his representations, the parties' son had not been seeing defendant; 4) the judge
interviewed the parties' son over defendant's objection and further erred when
she did not make a recording of the interview; 5) the judge permitted the parties'
son to schedule parenting time on his own, which essentially re-wrote the terms
of the consent order; 6) the judge erred when she denied defendant's request for
a downward modification of child support and failed to impute an income to
plaintiff; 7) the judge erred when she found defendant had to establish an
"extreme" change in circumstances in order to modify child support; 8)
defendant established a change in circumstances because his income had
A-4321-17T2
7
declined, his living expenses increased, plaintiff is voluntarily unemployed, and
plaintiff's standard of living has increased by virtue of her cohabitation with a
fiancé; 9) the judge erred when she did not enforce plaintiff's obligation to pay
twenty-five percent of their daughter's college expenses and limited plaintiff's
contribution without holding a plenary hearing or requiring her to complete a
case information statement (CIS); and 10) the judge erred by failing to sanction
plaintiff for refusing to attend mediation, as required by the consent order, and
award defendant counsel fees for enforcing the order.
A.
Rule 5:8-6 empowers "the court . . . on its own motion or at the request of
a litigant [to] conduct an in camera interview with the child(ren)." If a court
chooses to conduct an interview with the child,
Rule 5:8–6 mandates the court to: (1) conduct an
interview with the child in camera; (2) "afford counsel
the opportunity to submit questions for the court's use
during the interview"; (3) "place on the record its
reasons for not asking any question thus submitted"; (4)
create and preserve a stenographic or recorded audio
record of each interview in its entirety; and (5) provide
transcripts of the interview(s) to counsel and the parties
upon request and payment for the cost.
[D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 459 (App. Div.
2014) (quoting Peregoy, 358 N.J. Super. at 206)
(quoting Rule 5:8-6).]
A-4321-17T2
8
Because the motion judge did not comply with these requirements, we
must determine whether the oversight constitutes reversible error. Generally, to
be reversible, error must be clearly capable of producing an unjust result. State
v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 312 (2006). If the error is harmless, it will be
disregarded by the court. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 333 (1971). The prospect
of an unjust result must be "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether
the error led the [fact-finder] to a result it otherwise might not have reached."
Id. at 336.
Here, the motion judge arguably had enough evidence to adjudicate the
parenting time dispute without conducting an in camera interview with the son
because of the order permitting the son to change schools and the consent order
granting him discretion to choose his residence. Moreover, at oral argument,
defendant clarified he does not seek a remand for the motion judge to re-
interview the parties' son because he opposed an interview from the onset.
Therefore, although the judge erred by failing to record the interview, the error
was harmless.
Furthermore, "the age-of-majority statute provides that . . . 'every person
[eighteen] or more years of age shall . . . be deemed to be an adult,' N.J.S.A.
9:17B–3, in order to exercise 'the basic civil . . . rights' of adults, N.J.S.A.
A-4321-17T2
9
9:17B–1(a)." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. W.F., 434 N.J. Super. 288,
296 (App. Div. 2014). "Adults normally are not under the custody of another."
Ibid. "Therefore, the issue of custody of . . . children become[s] moot when they
turn[] eighteen-years-old." Id. at 296-97. "It is firmly established that
controversies which have become moot or academic prior to judicial resolution
ordinarily will be dismissed." Id. at 297 (quoting Cinque v. N.J. Dep't. of Corr.,
261 N.J. Super. 242, 243 (App. Div. 1993)). An appellate court will only decide
a moot matter if the issues at hand "involve significant matters of public policy,
are extremely important, and undoubtedly will recur in cases that are likely to
be mooted before adjudication." In re N.N., 146 N.J. 112, 124 (1996).
As we noted, the parties' son is seventeen. He will become an adult in
May 2019. A remand of this matter to re-interview the parties' son on the record,
which defendant concedes he does not desire, would be an unwise expenditure
of judicial resources given the circumstances.
B.
We turn to the issues concerning child support and the terms of the
matrimonial settlement agreement. Matrimonial settlement agreements are
"'entitled to considerable weight with respect to their validity and enforceability'
in equity, provided they are fair and just" because they are "essentially
A-4321-17T2
10
consensual and voluntary in character[.]" Dolce v. Dolce, 383 N.J. Super. 11,
20 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Petersen v. Petersen, 85 N.J. 638, 642 (1981)); see
also Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 153 (1980). However, courts retain the
equitable power to modify support provisions at any time. Lepis, 83 N.J. at 145.
The child support provisions of a matrimonial settlement agreement are
subject to review and modification on a showing of changed circumstances. Id.
at 146. Under that standard, the judge determines whether the agreement is fair,
equitable, and if it "should receive continued enforcement without
modification." Id. at 148–49. "Courts have consistently rejected requests for
modification based on circumstances which are only temporary or which are
expected but have not yet occurred." Id. at 151.
"The moving party has the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
changed circumstances before discovery of the opposing spouse's finances will
be ordered." Stamberg v. Stamberg, 302 N.J. Super. 35, 42 (App. Div. 1997)
(citing Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157). "By prima facie is meant evidence that, if
unrebutted, would sustain a judgment in the proponent's favor." Baures v.
Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 118 (2001). "When the movant is seeking modification of
child support, the guiding principle is the 'best interests of the children.'" Lepis,
A-4321-17T2
11
83 N.J. at 157 (quoting Hallberg v. Hallberg, 113 N.J. Super. 205, 209 (App.
Div. 1971)).
In Lepis, the Court provided a non-exhaustive list of general principles in
which courts have recognized as changed circumstances:
(1) an increase in the cost of living . . .
(2) increase or decrease in the supporting
spouse's income . . .
(3) illness, disability or infirmity arising after the
original judgment . . .
(4) the dependent spouse's loss of a house or
apartment . . .
(5) the dependent spouse's cohabitation with
another . . .
(6) subsequent employment by the dependent
spouse . . .
(7) changes in federal income tax law . . .
[Lepis, 83 N.J. at 151 (citations omitted).]
"When children are involved, an increase in their needs — whether occasioned
by maturation, the rising cost of living or more unusual events — has been held
to justify an increase in support by a financially able parent[.]" Ibid.
Here, as we noted, defendant alleged a multitude of changed
circumstances. However, the consent order contemplated many of these
A-4321-17T2
12
circumstances, namely, the advent of college for the parties' daughter and the
attendant cost of transportation, and the son leaving his school in New York City
and residing with plaintiff. Other circumstances alleged by defendant existed
and were known to the parties at the time they entered into the order, including
defendant's cost of living in New York City, and plaintiff's unemployment and
residence with her fiancé. Some circumstances alleged by defendant simply do
not meet the bar to warrant modification of the consent order, namely, the
fourteen percent drop in defendant's income, which the record does not establish
was a permanent change.
We agree with defendant the motion judge employed the incorrect
standard when she found he had not established an "extreme" change in
circumstances. However, this too was harmless error because the objective
evidence in the record did not demonstrate defendant had established a prima
facie case for a change in circumstances pursuant to Lepis.
C.
We reach a different result regarding the motion judge's determination
relating to the college contribution. The order lacked findings to support the
judge's decision.
A-4321-17T2
13
"In appropriate circumstances, parental responsibility includes the duty to
assure children of a college . . . education." Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529,
544 (1982). "Although the court will enforce an agreement to the extent it is
just and equitable, when it appears no longer fair to do so, the court is not bound
by the agreement or its prior orders." Moss, 289 N.J. Super. at 359 (citing Lepis,
83 N.J. at 146-48). Like any request to modify the terms of a matrimonial
agreement, "if circumstances have changed in such a way that requiring
defendant to pay for college would no longer be equitable and fair, the court also
remains free to alter the prior arrangement." Id. at 359-60 (quoting Lepis, 83
N.J. at 161 n.12).
In Newburgh, 88 N.J. at 545, the Supreme Court set forth twelve factors
for evaluating claims for contribution towards the cost of higher education,
which are:
(1) whether the parent, if still living with the child,
would have contributed toward the costs of the
requested higher education; (2) the effect of the
background, values and goals of the parent on the
reasonableness of the expectation of the child for higher
education; (3) the amount of the contribution sought by
the child for the cost of higher education; (4) the ability
of the parent to pay that cost; (5) the relationship of the
requested contribution to the kind of school or course
of study sought by the child; (6) the financial resources
of both parents; (7) the commitment to and aptitude of
the child for the requested education; (8) the financial
A-4321-17T2
14
resources of the child, including assets owned
individually or held in custodianship or trust; (9) the
ability of the child to earn income during the school
year or on vacation; (10) the availability of financial aid
in the form of college grants and loans; (11) the child's
relationship to the paying parent, including mutual
affection and shared goals as well as responsiveness to
parental advice and guidance; and (12) the relationship
of the education requested to any prior training and to
the overall long-range goals of the child.
We have upheld the application of the Newburgh factors by a trial court, despite
the presence of an agreement to fund college expenses. See Moss, 289 N.J.
Super. at 359-60.
Here, the consent order required defendant to pay seventy-five percent,
and plaintiff twenty-five percent, of the children's college expenses. The
percentage of the parties' contributions was predicated on their incomes at the
time and the financial aid received to offset the cost of college. However, the
motion judge disregarded the consent order and concluded "it is inequitable for
[plaintiff] to contribute [twenty-five percent] towards [the] college contribution.
It is clear that [plaintiff] does not have the money to contribute more than what
she already has." Citing plaintiff's certification, which the motion judge found
credible, the judge limited plaintiff's "twenty[-] five percent [contribution] . . .
towards college expenses at a rate consistent with an in-state and public
college/university."
A-4321-17T2
15
We are constrained to reverse the determination because there is no
evidence the parties intended to limit their college cost obligation to an in-state
or public college education. Indeed, the consent order does not impose such a
limitation, and the parties' daughter was attending a private college in Vermont
when the motion judge adjudicated the dispute.
Notwithstanding, the judge relied upon plaintiff's certification, which was
disputed by defendant and offered no clarity. Indeed, at once, plaintiff's
certification cited the in-state tuition cost of a four-year college in Pennsylvania,
certified the parties' daughter "could have also attended [New York] public
universities and received in-state tuition," and certified she believed at the time
their daughter would be attending another university in Pennsylvania on a full
scholarship. In an email submitted with her certification, plaintiff said that only
if her contribution were limited to $2000 per year would she consent to the
daughter attending private college.
The motion judge's order lacked the necessary findings of fact or
conclusions of law to support her decision. R. 1:7-4(a). Instead, the order
appears to be an amalgamation of the views expressed in plaintiff's certification.
More was required because there was no objective evidence presented to the
judge of plaintiff's inability to pay more than $2000 per year. Indeed, plaintiff
A-4321-17T2
16
filed no CIS and her certifications only provided records of defendant's tax
history and a screenshot of her bank account. The evidence presented could not
permit a factfinder to determine plaintiff's college contribution either under the
terms of the consent order or Newburgh, let alone support the result achieved
here. For these reasons, we reverse and remand this aspect of the order, and
direct the parties to present CISs to the motion judge, who shall then determine
whether a plenary hearing is necessary to adjudicate the college contribution
dispute. The judge shall state her findings of fact and conclusions of law.
D.
Finally, we reject defendant's argument the motion judge erred when she
did not impose sanctions upon plaintiff for failing to attend mediation. We also
reject defendant's assertion it was an error to not award him counsel fees.
Paragraph twenty-six of the parties' consent order required mediation in
the event a party breached the terms of the order and required the party in breach
to pay the costs of mediation. According to the record, defendant's attorney
emailed plaintiff to schedule mediation. Plaintiff replied as follows: "Prior to
scheduling any mediation we need a list of issues and positions because the party
in the wrong is to pay mediator's fees. Please send me a list of issues your client
is alleging and his positions." Defendant's counsel never proffered the list of
A-4321-17T2
17
issues for mediation and instead scheduled a mediation. In response, plaintiff
stated she would not attend mediation until she received a "clear and detailed
list of issues from [his counsel], and specifically what [defendant]'s position
[was on] each issue."
The motion judge determined defendant had "unilaterally scheduled
mediation without [plaintiff]'s advice and consent. Further, [defendant] failed
to communicate with [plaintiff] as to the issues that were to be addressed in
mediation." We agree. Because mediation is an inherently voluntary process,
plaintiff could not be compelled to attend without first understanding the issues
in dispute and whether she was actually in breach to warrant a mediation.
We reach a similar conclusion regarding the motion judge's denial of
counsel fees. "An allowance for counsel fees and costs in a family action is
discretionary." Eaton v. Grau, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 225 (App. Div. 2004) (citing
R. 4:42–9(a)(1)).
Here, the judge concluded plaintiff's cross-motion was in good faith and
was successful. The judge determined defendant's application was in bad faith
and he had the ability to pay his own counsel fees. The judge concluded the
circumstances did not warrant an award of counsel fees to either party.
A-4321-17T2
18
Our review of the record supports the motion judge's conclusions.
Although the judge's determination of the college issue was erroneous,
defendant's failure to identify the issues for mediation, unilateral scheduling of
mediation, and subsequent haste to file an enforcement motion that was
unsuccessful, supports a finding he did not act in good faith.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-4321-17T2
19