RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5248-17T6
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
AARON NORMAN,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________
Argued February 26, 2019 – Decided March 29, 2019
Before Judges Yannotti, Rothstadt and Gilson.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 18-06-
0956.
Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for appellant (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Claudia Joy Demitro, of counsel and
on the brief).
Alyssa Aiello, Assistant Deputy Public Defender,
argued the cause for respondent (Joseph E. Krakora,
Public Defender, attorney; Alyssa Aiello, of counsel
and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The State appeals from an order entered by the Law Division on July 9,
2018, which dismissed an indictment charging defendant under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
9(a) with purposely and knowingly disobeying an order of pretrial release,
entered by the court pursuant to the Criminal Justice Reform Act (CJRA),
N.J.S.A. 2A:162-15 to -26. We reverse.
On September 26, 2017, defendant was charged in complaint-warrant W-
2017-0620-0422 with third-degree theft by unlawful taking of movable
property, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a). The judge entered an order dated
September 29, 2017, releasing defendant pretrial, subject to certain non-
monetary conditions. Among other things, the order stated that defendant shall
report to Pretrial Services once each month in person and by telephone, and that
defendant "[s]hall not commit any offense during the period of release."
On February 10, 2018, defendant was charged in complaint-warrant W-
2018-0091-1204 with third-degree eluding, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(b).
He was also charged in complaint-warrant W-2018-0092-1204 with fourth-
degree contempt of court, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a). A judge entered
an order releasing defendant subject to certain conditions.
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Thereafter, the State filed a motion for defendant's pretrial detention. The
trial court conducted a hearing and denied the State's motion. The judge entered
an order dated February 13, 2018, which released defendant on home detention
and other non-monetary conditions. The order stated in pertinent part that
defendant "[s]hall not commit any offense during the period of release."
On June 21, 2018, a Middlesex County grand jury returned Indictment No.
18-06-0955, which charged defendant with third-degree eluding. The grand jury
also returned Indictment No. 18-06-0956 charging defendant with purposely or
knowingly violating the court's September 29, 2017, pretrial release order.
On July 9, 2018, the trial court entered an order sua sponte dismissing
Indictment No. 18-06-0956. The court found that the CJRA does not permit the
State to charge a defendant with criminal contempt under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a)
based on violation of pretrial release order, and that double jeopardy protections
bar the prosecution of the charge. The State's appeal followed.
On appeal, the State argues that: (1) the court should not have dismissed
the contempt indictment because it was not palpably defective; (2) the plain
language of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) and the CJRA allows the State to charge a
defendant with contempt for a violation of a condition in a pretrial release order;
(3) a contempt charge for violating a pretrial release order is consistent with the
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purposes of the CJRA; (4) the contempt charge is consistent with New Jersey
case law; (5) federal law does not preclude a contempt charge for violating the
pretrial release order; (6) the Double Jeopardy Clause does not preclude the
State from charging defendant with violating the pretrial release order; and (7)
defendant was properly notified of the consequences of failing to comply with
the court's order.
In response, defendant argues: (1) the trial court correctly decided to
dismiss the charge of contempt under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a); (2) the plain
language of the CJRA and its legislative history show that the Legislature
rejected contempt as a remedy for a violation of a pretrial release order; (3) the
Legislature's intent to exclude contempt as a remedy is shown by its decision to
differentiate the CJRA from analogous provisions of federal law and a District
of Columbia statute; (4) New Jersey case law addressing similar violations of
conditions of probation and bail supports the conclusion that a violation of a
condition in a pretrial release order is not subject to prosecution for contempt
under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a); (5) the regulatory nature of the CJRA does not
support the use of a contempt prosecution as a remedy for a violation of pretrial
release conditions; (6) defendant was not properly notified he could be charged
with contempt if he violated a condition of release; and (7) double jeopardy
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protections preclude the State from imposing punishment for violating the
pretrial release order and the related substantive offenses.
Having thoroughly considered the arguments of the parties, we conclude
for the reasons stated in our opinion in State v. McCray, N.J. Super. (App.
Div. 2019), which also is filed today, that the trial court erred by dismissing the
indictment charging defendant with purposely or knowingly violating the court's
pretrial release order.
The CJRA does not preclude the State from charging a defendant with
contempt under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) based on a violation of a condition in a
pretrial release order, and defendant had adequate notice that he could be
charged under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a) if he violated the order. Moreover, the
double jeopardy protections in the United States Constitution and the New
Jersey Constitution do not bar the State from prosecuting defendant for contempt
under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-9(a), based on his commission of a new offense, and also
prosecuting defendant for that substantive offense.
Reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in
conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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