NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1917-17T2
INGRID VALDIVIA and
DINO VALDIVIA,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
JOHN DERAFFELE,
Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________
Submitted October 18, 2018 – Decided March 28, 2019
Before Judges O'Connor and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Bergen County, Docket DC-011047-16.
John DeRaffele, appellant pro se.
Respondents have not filed briefs.
PER CURIAM
Defendant John DeRaffele appeals from the September 12, 2017 judgment
of the Special Civil Part awarding plaintiffs Ingrid Valdivia and Dino Valdivia
double a portion of their security deposit on a residential lease, damages
associated with having to vacate their home temporarily, attorney's fees, and
costs. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for entry of a revised
judgment.
I.
The following facts are derived from the record. DeRaffele owns a one-
family house in Bergen County. Plaintiffs began a month-to-month tenancy at
the house on April 1, 2015. The parties' lease set rent at $1500 a month, to be
paid on the first of the month, and required a $1500 security deposit. The lease
required thirty-days' notice to terminate and subjected plaintiffs to a $1500 re-
rent levy in the event they vacated the premises without providing notice.
According to DeRaffele, in early January 2016, plaintiffs expressed their
desire to vacate the house for financial reasons. However, they did not provide
notice of termination of the lease, did not vacate the premises, and did not pay
rent on January 1, 2016. DeRaffele served a notice to cure and a three-day rent
demand on plaintiffs, ultimately resulting in their paying the January 2016 rent.
Plaintiffs also did not pay the rent due on February 1, 2016. As a result,
on February 12, 2016, DeRaffele served a notice to cure and a three-day rent
demand on plaintiffs. Two days later, on February 14, 2016, the heating system
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in the home stopped working. Ingrid 1 testified that she awoke that morning to a
frigid home and contacted the police department. She left the apartment with
her daughters when instructed to do so by municipal officials. Dino was not
home at the time. Because of the cold temperature outside, the municipality
paid for plaintiffs to stay at a hotel that night.
DeRaffele had the heater replaced by a contractor the next day, February
15, 2016. According to Francisco Martinez, a handyman present in the home on
February 15, 2016, the heater could not be repaired because someone had
tampered with a valve, causing damage. Following DeRaffele's instructions,
Martinez purchased a new heater and brought it to the home, where Dino let him
and the contractor enter the house. The contractor installed the new heater.
Martinez testified that once the replacement heater was installed and operating,
he and Dino walked through each room of the house to ensure that the heat was
on. Martinez used a thermometer to record a temperature of sixty-eight degrees.
Ingrid testified that she returned to the home on February 15, 2016, to
retrieve clothing and discovered an activated carbon monoxide alarm and black
smoke pouring from the new heater. She testified that she called the fire
department, which, in turn, contacted the gas utility company, and shut down
1
As plaintiffs share a surname, we use first names. No disrespect is intended.
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3
the street on which the house is located. However, moments later, Ingrid
testified that she arrived at the home to find the street closed and the fire
department on scene, but was let into the home to retrieve clothing. When
pressed on cross-examination, Ingrid admitted that she could not produce
evidence that the fire department responded to the house on February 15, 2016.
Plaintiffs produced no evidence that the house was declared uninhabitable
or that they were instructed to vacate the home after the heater was replaced.
Plaintiffs, however, stayed in a hotel at the municipality's expense for two
weeks. DeRaffele testified that he was unaware plaintiffs refused to return to
the house or that they were staying at a hotel. The municipality did not seek
reimbursement for the hotel stay. Ingrid testified that she returned to the home
a few times "each week" after February 15, 2016, to retrieve clothing and that
on each occasion the house was cold because the heater was off. She did not
testify that she attempted to turn the heater on to warm the house.
On or about February 19, 2016, DeRaffele initiated eviction proceedings
against plaintiffs for failure to pay the February 2016 rent. Ingrid testified that
on that day, she sent DeRaffele a text demanding the return of the security
deposit, and told him that the family was vacating the house. The text was not
admitted as evidence. DeRaffele denies receiving any communications from
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plaintiffs notifying him of their intention to terminate the lease. Ingrid testified
that in response to her text DeRaffele told her to find a new place to live.
Ingrid claimed that once the two-week hotel stay ended, plaintiffs moved
to a hotel they paid for, then to the home of a family member, and ultimately
slept in a car. She produced no evidence supporting her claim that plaintiffs
paid for a hotel room or for any other expense after they left the house. Nor did
Ingrid testify as to a specific or estimated amount plaintiffs spent on the hotel
room or for other expenses.
Plaintiffs failed to pay the rent due on March 1, 2016, and rented an
apartment on March 15, 2016. According to DeRaffele, plaintiffs did not vacate
his property until March 22 or 23, 2016. Other than Ingrid's testimony that she
removed some of her clothing during weekly visits to the house, plaintiffs
produced no evidence with respect to when they removed their belongings,
furniture, and clothing from the house.
On March 22, 2016, the parties appeared in court for a hearing on eviction
proceedings relating to the unpaid February 2016 rent. Ultimately, plaintiffs
agreed to pay the entire rent for February 2016. Although plaintiffs were
represented by counsel, they did not claim that they were constructively evicted
on February 14, 2016.
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At the March 22, 2016 hearing, DeRaffele attempted to collect the unpaid
March 2016 rent. His demand was denied because he did not include the amount
of rent due for March 2016 in his pleadings. Plaintiffs never paid the March
2016 rent and DeRaffele did not return the $1500 security deposit to plaintiffs.
On August 16, 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Special Civil Part
alleging they were constructively evicted from the home on February 14, 2016.
They sought $9000 in relocation damages under the Anti-Eviction Act, N.J.S.A.
2A:18-61.1h(a), double their security deposit under the Security Deposit Act
(SDA), N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1, rent abatement for half of February 2016, $4500 in
attorney's fees, interest, and court costs.
DeRaffele filed an answer denying plaintiffs' claims, and a counterclaim
alleging plaintiffs did not vacate the house until March 22 or 23, 2016, allowing
him to retain their security deposit to cover the March 2016 rent, and that he was
entitled to a monetary award to repair damage done to the property by plaintiffs.
DeRaffele also alleged that plaintiffs did not give him notice of their intent to
vacate the premises, subjecting them to a penalty of $1500.
After a bench trial, the court issued an oral opinion concluding that
plaintiffs did not establish they were constructively evicted from the house on
February 14, 2016. The court found that plaintiffs moved out of the home for
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two days because of a short-term heating problem that was resolved on February
15, 2016. In addition, the court found no evidence in the record that plaintiffs'
lease was illegal or the home uninhabitable. Thus, the court concluded plaintiffs
were not entitled to an abatement of rent for February 2016 or relocation
expenses under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1h(a).
The court awarded plaintiffs $500 for expenses associated with having
temporarily moved from the house. Although acknowledging plaintiffs
produced no evidence that they paid for any expenses, and recognizing the
municipality paid for their hotel room for the two days in question, the court
awarded plaintiffs $500 for "gasoline and travel." This finding was made despite
the fact that there is no testimony or other evidence in the record regarding the
distance from the house to the hotel, how plaintiffs traveled to the hotel, or
whether they purchased or used gasoline to get to the hotel in excess of what
they would have used had the heater been working.
The court made no finding with respect to when plaintiffs terminated their
tenancy. As a result, the court did not address DeRaffele's claim that plaintiffs
owed rent for March 2016, and that they failed to provide timely notice of their
intention to terminate the lease.
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With respect to plaintiffs' security deposit, the court disallowed all offsets
claimed by DeRaffele for damages, except for $225 for "general cleanup,"
clearing the yard, and shampooing the rugs. The court awarded plaintiffs $2550,
representing twice the remaining $1275 of the security deposit. Finally, the
court awarded plaintiffs $850 in attorney's fees, plus court costs. The court
entered a judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $3800, plus costs.2
This appeal followed. DeRaffele argues that the trial court erred by not
addressing plaintiffs' obligation to pay the March 2016 rent, and their failure to
provide notice of termination of the lease. In addition, he argues that the court
erred by awarding $500 for expenses not supported by evidence, and by denying
further offsets to the security deposit, and in awarding attorney's fees. Finally,
DeRaffele argues that the trial court did not devote sufficient time to considering
the evidence prior to issuing its decision.
II.
Our scope of review of the judge's findings in this nonjury trial is limited.
We must defer to the judge's factual determinations, so long as they are
supported by substantial credible evidence in the record. Rova Farms Resort,
2
The court erred in its calculation of damages. The damages awarded to
plaintiffs, $500, $2550, and $850, equals $3900, not $3800.
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Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 483-84 (1974). This court's
"[a]ppellate review does not consist of weighing evidence anew and making
independent factual findings; rather, [this court's] function is to determine
whether there is adequate evidence to support the judgment rendered at trial."
Cannuscio v. Claridge Hotel & Casino, 319 N.J. Super. 342, 347 (App. Div.
1999). However, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm., 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We begin our analysis with a review of the trial court's conclusion that
plaintiffs were not constructively evicted from the house on February 14, 2016.
The record contains ample evidence supporting the court's finding that
DeRaffele had the heater replaced on February 15, 2016. We therefore affirm
the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs are not entitled to an abatement of their
February 2016 rent. See Chess v. Muhammad, 179 N.J. Super. 75, 80 (App.
Div. 1981) ("[T]enants are not entitled to an abatement when the landlord repairs
the defective condition within a reasonable time after learning of its existence").
In addition, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that plaintiffs are not
entitled to relocation expenses under N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1h(a). That statute
allows for the award of six times the monthly rent to a tenant "displaced because
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9
of an illegal occupancy in a residential rental premises[.]" The record contains
no evidence that plaintiffs' rental of DeRaffele's house was illegal.
We do not reach the same conclusion with respect to the trial court's award
of $500 in damages to plaintiffs for having been displaced from the home for
two nights. It is undisputed that on the two nights in question plaintiffs stayed
at a hotel, the cost of which was paid by the municipality. Plaintiffs produced
no evidence that the municipality requested reimbursement or that they incurred
any expense as a result of having to stay in the hotel. This is true with respect
to travel and gasoline expenses, which were awarded by the trial court. The
record contains no specific evidence regarding the distance between the house
and the hotel, how plaintiffs traveled to the hotel, and whether they used more
gasoline than they otherwise would have had they stayed at the house those two
nights. The award of $500 in damages is, therefore, not based on substantial
credible evidence and is reversed.
With respect to the trial court's award of double a portion of plaintiffs'
security deposit, a finding of when plaintiffs vacated DeRaffele's house is
essential to determine whether they are entitled to relief under the SDA. "It is
only the portion of the security deposit that is unlawfully held that can be
doubled under N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1." Lorril Co. v. La Corte, 352 N.J. Super. 433,
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442 (App. Div. 2002). "[T]he tenant's damages under the statute are to be
calculated based upon the total due him, not the amount of the initial deposit."
Yi v. Re/Max Fortune Props., Inc., 338 N.J. Super. 534, 539 (App. Div. 2001).
As noted above, the trial court made no specific finding with respect to
when plaintiffs vacated the house. Rather than remand the matter for a finding
of fact on this issue, we elect to exercise our original jurisdiction to determine
when plaintiffs vacated the house. We "may exercise such original jurisdiction
as is necessary to the complete determination of any matter on review." R. 2:10-
5; see also Farmingdale Realty Co. v. Borough of Farmingdale, 55 N.J. 103, 106
(1969) (finding that appellate courts may engage in findings of fact pursuant to
the "constitutional grant of necessary original jurisdiction to appellate courts").
There is considerable evidence in the record that plaintiffs remained at the
property after March 1, 2016. DeRaffele testified plaintiffs did not vacate the
premises until March 22 or 23, 2016. At a hearing on March 22, 2016, plaintiffs,
who were represented by counsel, paid the entire February 2016 rent and
DeRaffele's attempt to collect the March 2016 rent was denied only because he
did not write the amount of rent due for that month on his complaint. During
her testimony, Ingrid acknowledged attending the March 22, 2016 hearing , at
which she did not argue that plaintiffs had vacated the house before March 1,
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2016. She testified that it was her understanding that DeRaffele's demand for
the March 2016 rent was denied because he appeared at the hearing without
counsel.
More importantly, Ingrid testified that she returned to the house several
times "each week" after February 14, 2016 to retrieve her clothing. She did not
expressly deny having moved out on March 22 or 23, 2016, and did not state
when she, Dino, and their children removed all of their clothing, possessions,
and furniture from the house.
We find that plaintiffs occupied the house after March 1, 2016.
DeRaffele's testimony on this point was essentially undisputed. In addition, we
conclude that had plaintiffs moved out of the house prior to March 1, 2016, they
would not have paid all of the February 2016 rent at the March 22, 2016 hearing.
In addition, we find Ingrid's failure to identify at trial the date she and her family
moved out probative of the fact plaintiffs did not vacate the home until after
March 1, 2016.
Because we conclude that plaintiffs vacated the house after March 1, 2016,
we reverse the trial court's award of $2550 to plaintiffs under the SDA.
Plaintiffs owed DeRaffele $1500 in rent for March 2016. He was, therefore,
entitled to use plaintiffs' security deposit to cover that amount. Because
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plaintiffs were not entitled to recovery under the SDA, we also reverse the trial
court's award of $850 in attorney's fees to plaintiffs. See N.J.S.A. 46:8-21.1
(permitting the award of attorney's fees only "upon finding for the tenant").
We turn to DeRaffele's argument that the trial court erred by not allowing
additional amounts to cure damages at the house after plaintiffs moved out.
Having carefully reviewed the record, we conclude that the trial court's findings
of fact on this point are supported by the record. We therefore affirm the award
of $225 to DeRaffele for repairs at the house.
Finally, we address DeRaffele's argument that the trial court erred when
it failed to make a finding with respect to whether plaintiffs provided the
contractually required thirty-days' notice of their intention to terminate the lease.
We think it implicit in the trial court's findings of fact that DeRaffele was on
notice as of his February 19, 2016 exchange with Ingrid that plaintiffs intended
to terminate the lease. Ingrid testified that on that date she demanded the return
of plaintiffs' security deposit and that DeRaffele told her to vacate the home and
find a new place to live. Plaintiffs left the house slightly more than thirty days
later. We affirm the trial court's implicit rejection of DeRaffele's claim for
$1500 in damages for plaintiffs' violation of the notice provision of the lease.
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To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of DeRaffele's
remaining arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for entry of a judgment
in favor of DeRaffele in the amount of $225, plus costs. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
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