RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4816-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
TERRANCE P. HOUSTON,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted February 4, 2019 – Decided February 26, 2019
Before Judges Sumners and Mitterhoff.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 09-07-0757.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel,
on the brief).
Angelo J. Onofri, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent (Randolph E. Mershon III, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Terrance Houston appeals from the Law Division's order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR") without an evidentiary
hearing. We affirm.
We briefly summarize the relevant facts. On July 31, 2009, a Mercer
County grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant with: second-
degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) (count one); second-degree sexual
assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(b) (count two); and second-degree endangering the
welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a) (count three). On June 24 2010,
defendant, represented by counsel, pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree
endangering the welfare of a child. The plea was part of a global plea agreement,
in which defendant also pleaded guilty to one count of third-degree resisting
arrest on a separate indictment (Indictment No. 09-07-0758) in exchange for
the State dismissing the remaining charges on both indictments and dismissing
two other indictments (Indictment Nos. 08-12-1117 and 09-03-0256) in their
entirety. Additionally, the State agreed to recommend a concurrent, custodial
sentence of five years and parole supervision for life ("PSL").
On November 12, 2010, the sentencing judge imposed a five-year term
and applicable fines and penalties, in accordance with the plea agreement. On
June 8, 2011, the sentencing judge issued an amended judgment of conviction
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2
to reflect that defendant was sentenced to PSL, as called for by both the PSL
statute1 and the plea agreement.
On May 29, 2015, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR. On December
15, 2016, PCR counsel filed a supplemental brief in support of defendant's PCR
petition. On May 2, 2017, Judge Robert C. Billmeier heard oral argument on
defendant's PCR petition and rendered an oral decision denying PCR without an
evidentiary hearing.
On appeal of the denial of PCR, defendant raises the following points for
our review:
POINT I
DEFENDANT RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF PLEA COUNSEL BECAUSE HE
WAS COERCED INTO ACCEPTING A GLOBAL
PLEA OFFER.
POINT II
THE PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
DEFENDANT'S AMENDED SENTENCE WHICH
IMPOSED PAROLE SUPERVISION FOR LIFE WAS
LEGAL.
POINT III
AS THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL
FACTS IN DISPUTE, AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
WAS REQUIRED.
1
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.49(a).
A-4816-16T4
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Having considered the record in light of the applicable legal principles,
we affirm for substantially the reasons expressed in Judge Billmeier's well-
reasoned oral opinion. We add only the following comments.
In cases where the PCR court does not conduct an evidentiary hearing, we
review the PCR judge's determinations de novo. State v. Jackson, 454 N.J.
Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018). A PCR petitioner faces the burden to
establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance of the credible evidence.
State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002).
To establish an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, a convicted
defendant must demonstrate: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, and (2)
the deficient performance actually prejudiced the accused's defense. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-part test in New Jersey). To challenge
a guilty plea based on the ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate "that there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors,
[the defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial." State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)). A defendant must also
show that "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under
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4
the circumstances." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); see also
State v. Maldon, 422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011).
Turning to defendant's first point, we find that defendant presents
insufficient evidence to support a prima facie claim that his plea counsel was
constitutionally ineffective and coerced him to plead guilty. As noted by the
PCR judge, defendant's certification offers "no details as to the nature of how
[plea counsel] coerced him . . . to enter into this global plea. And, in this
certification it does not indicate that [defendant] would have rejected the State's
global plea and demanded to proceed to trial had counsel not forced him to plead
guilty." Additionally, defendant represented to the court that he was not being
forced or threatened to enter into the plea. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S.
63, 74 (1977) ("Solemn declarations in open court carry a strong presumption
of verity."). For these reasons, we agree with the PCR judge that defendant's
claim that he was coerced by his counsel into pleading guilty lacks support in
the record.
We also reject defendant's contention that the sentencing court erred by
issuing an amended judgment of conviction to reflect that defendant was
sentenced to PSL. Pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), "[a] motion may be filed and
an order may be entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not authorized by
A-4816-16T4
5
law including the Code of Criminal Justice." In interpreting Rule 3:21-10(b)(5);
the Supreme Court noted that a court's ability to correct an illegal sentence "is
not unlimited." State v. Schubert, 212 N.J. 295, 309 (2012). A court may not
"authorize an enlargement of the punishment after the sentence imposed had
been satisfied and the defendant discharged." Ibid. (quoting State v. Laird, 25
N.J. 298, 307 (1957)). Nonetheless, "[a]n illegal sentence that has not been
completely served may be corrected at any time without impinging upon double-
jeopardy principles." Ibid. (quoting State v. Austin, 335 N.J. Super. 486, 494
(App. Div. 2000)).
In this case, the PSL statute requires that a defendant convicted of
endangering the welfare of a child be sentenced to PSL. 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6.4(a).
Therefore, without PSL, defendant's sentence was illegal. See Schubert, 212
N.J. at 308-09. The sentencing court issued the amended judgment of conviction
to reflect that defendant was sentenced to PSL on June 8, 2011, but defendant
was not released from prison on parole until January 11, 2013. Thus, the
sentencing court correctly issued an amended judgment of conviction to correct
defendant's illegal sentence prior to defendant's completion of his custodial
2
Additionally, at the plea hearing, defendant represented to the court that he
knew that he faced PSL as a component of his sentence and that he had reviewed
the official plea forms, which detailed PSL.
A-4816-16T4
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sentence. Cf. id. at 311-313 (holding that trial court improperly amended
judgment of conviction to add a sentence to community supervision for life
where defendant had completed his probationary sentence more than four years
before the court amended the judgment of conviction).
For these reasons, the PCR judge appropriately exercised his discretion in
denying an evidentiary hearing, as defendant failed to establish a prima facie
basis for relief. See State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div.
2013) ("[W]e review under the abuse of discretion standard the PCR court's
determination to proceed without an evidentiary hearing."). The remaining
issues raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written
opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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