NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NOS. A-5118-15T4
A-5278-15T4
A-1927-17T3
PAUL B. DALNOKY,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and
ABM JANITORIAL SERVICES
MID-ATLANTIC, INC.,
Respondents.
______________________________
PAUL B. DALNOKY,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and
ATLANTIC COMMUNITY COLLEGE,
GALLOWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD OF
EDUCATION, and ABM JANITORIAL
SERVICES MID-ATLANTIC, INC.,
Respondents.
_______________________________
PAUL B. DALNOKY,
Appellant,
v.
BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, and
GALLOWAY TOWNSHIP BOARD
OF EDUCATION,
Respondents.
________________________________
Submitted February 6, 2019 – Decided February 21, 2019
Before Judges Reisner and Mawla.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
Labor and Workforce Development, Docket Nos.
072,646, 064,605, and 129,204.
Paul B. Dalnoky, appellant pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent, Board of Review in A-5118-15 and A-
5278-15 (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Peter H. Jenkins, Deputy Attorney
General, on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent, Board of Review in A-1927-17 (Melissa
Dutton Schaffer, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Aaron J. Creuz, Deputy Attorney General, on
the brief).
A-5118-15T4
2
Respondents ABM Janitorial Services Mid-Atlantic,
Inc., Atlantic Community College, and Galloway
Township Board of Education have not filed briefs.
PER CURIAM
In these consolidated matters, appellant Paul B. Dalnoky appeals from
decisions by the Board of Review, dated May 23 and June 15, 2016, and
December 1, 2017, denying him unemployment benefits. We affirm.
The following facts are taken from the record.
A-5118-15
On May 27, 2014, Dalnoky began full-time employment as a district
ambassador for ABM Janitorial Services Mid-Atlantic, Inc. (ABM) in Atlantic
City. In August 2014, his manager received a photograph by text from an
unknown number depicting Dalnoky lying down on the wall of the Korean War
Memorial. The manager recognized the photograph was taken in Dalnoky's
assigned work shift area, and concluded it was Dalnoky based on the uniform,
complexion, and stature of the person in the photograph.
As a result, pursuant to ABM's code of conduct, Dalnoky was placed on
investigative suspension. The code of conduct was set forth in the ABM
employee policy handbook, which forbade "[w]asting time, loitering, sleeping
during work hours, or leaving the workplace for any reason without
A-5118-15T4
3
authorization" and stated an employee could be immediately discharged for such
infractions. Dalnoky signed for and received the employee policy handbook
before commencing his employment with ABM.
As a result of ABM's investigation, Dalnoky's employment was
terminated. He filed a claim for unemployment benefits. A deputy from the
New Jersey Department of Labor, Division of Unemployment (Division) mailed
Dalnoky a determination that he was disqualified for unemployment benefits
because he was discharged due to misconduct connected to his work. Dalnoky
appealed the determination to the Tribunal.
The Tribunal conducted a three-day hearing. Dalnoky testified and
admitted he was lying on the wall of the Korean War Memorial, but claimed he
was resting his back due to a previous back injury. Dalnoky's manager also
testified and cited ABM's code of conduct, which allowed him to terminate
Dalnoky without warning for wasting time, loitering, or sleeping during work
hours. The manager also noted the Korean War Memorial was a public area,
which was not an approved break area for district ambassadors.
The Tribunal affirmed the deputy's findings. It concluded Dalnoky's
"action of laying down on the Korean War Memorial was the cause of his
discharge," which "violated company policy" and "disqualified [him] for
A-5118-15T4
4
benefits . . . in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b) and N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.6."1
Dalnoky appealed and the Board affirmed.
A-5278-15
Dalnoky was employed as a tutor by Atlantic Cape Community College
(ACCC)2 from approximately September 2013, through August 28, 2014. He
was then employed by Galloway Township Board of Education (Galloway),
during the 2014-2015 school year, as a per diem substitute teacher from March
19 to June 19, 2015. He remained on the substitute teacher list with Galloway
through the 2015-2016 school year, which made him eligible to work for
Galloway upon its request. Dalnoky was also on the substitute teacher list for
the Atlantic City Board of Education during the 2015-2016 school year.
Dalnoky filed for unemployment benefits on May 24, 2015. The Division
disqualified him for benefits from June 21, 2015, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-
4(g), because he was employed with an educational institution and had a
1
The Tribunal's decision cites "N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.6 Discharge or suspension
for insubordinate violation of an employer's rule." The regulation was re-
codified from N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.6 to N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.5, effective May 18,
2015.
2
Although the record and the caption reflect varying recitations, we utilize
Atlantic Cape Community College or ACCC to reflect the institution's official
name.
A-5118-15T4
5
reasonable assurance to perform educational services at an educational
institution in the next school year. Dalnoky appealed.
The Tribunal conducted a hearing and determined Dalnoky was eligible
for benefits from June 21, to September 5, 2015. The Tribunal found Dalnoky
was employed by ACCC during the 2014 base year and was not offered
employment by ACCC in the same or similar capacity for the semester
beginning in Fall 2014, or any semester afterwards. The Tribunal also found
Dalnoky was employed by Galloway in the school year ending in June 2015,
and this employment "commenced outside of the base year and was substantially
different from the work he performed for [ACCC]." Thus, the Tribunal
concluded that "[a]lthough [Dalnoky] was employed by an educational
institution in the school year ending [in June 2015,] and remained on the
substitute list for the subsequent school year, no period of ineligibility applie[d]
as the base year employment did not include work in that capacity or for a similar
employer."
The appeal was reopened by the Tribunal, on its own motion, in response
to an email communication from a representative from Pleasantville Department
of Labor and Work Development (PDL&WD). Dalnoky and representatives of
A-5118-15T4
6
ACCC participated in a telephonic hearing, after which the Tribunal issued a
decision denying Dalnoky benefits.
The Tribunal found Dalnoky had worked as a tutor for an educational
institution, ACCC, from September 2013 until August 28, 2014, and was
discharged for not abiding by the work schedule and submitting inaccurate
timesheets. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(g)(1), the Tribunal also concluded
Dalnoky was employed by Galloway during the 2014-2015 school year and had
a reasonable assurance of reemployment with an educational institution for the
2015-2016 school year because he remained on Galloway's substitute list.
Therefore, he was ineligible for benefits from June 21 to September 5, 2015.
Dalnoky appealed the Tribunal's decision and the Board affirmed.
A-1927-17
Dalnoky was employed by Galloway as a per diem substitute teacher from
March 19, 2015 until May 2017. He filed a claim for unemployment benefits as
of July 2, 2017. Pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(g)(1), the Division notified
Dalnoky he was ineligible for benefits from June 18 through September 9, 2017
because he was employed by an educational institution to perform educational
services and had a reasonable assurance of work in a subsequent academic year.
A-5118-15T4
7
Dalnoky appealed and the Tribunal held a hearing. Dalnoky testified he
was employed as a per diem substitute teacher by the following boards of
education: Galloway, Ocean City, Somers Point, Linwood, Pleasantville, and
Atlantic County. Dalnoky testified he was not actively seeking work with
Galloway during the 2016-2017 academic year because he was receiving regular
work as a substitute teacher for Atlantic County and Pleasantville through a
teacher staffing company, which ended in May 2017.
Dalnoky worked three days for Galloway during the 2016-2017 academic
year. He testified Galloway sent him a notice inquiring whether he wished to
be included on the substitute teacher list for the following academic year and he
advised them he was on the substitute teacher list for the 2017-2018 academic
year. He also testified he was on the substitute teacher list for the Ocean City
and Egg Harbor Township boards of education.
The Tribunal found Dalnoky ineligible for unemployment benefits
because he was employed by an educational institution performing educational
services and had a reasonable assurance of employment during the 2017-2018
academic year in multiple school districts, including Galloway. The Board
affirmed the Tribunal's decision.
A-5118-15T4
8
I.
The scope of our review of an administrative agency's final determination
is strictly limited. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). The
agency's decision may not be disturbed unless shown to be arbitrary, capricious,
or unreasonable, or inconsistent with the applicable law. Ibid.; In re Warren,
117 N.J. 295, 296-97 (1989). "If the Board's factual findings are supported 'by
sufficient credible evidence, courts are obliged to accept them.'" Ibid. (quoting
Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982)). Thus, "[i]n reviewing the
factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is
not whether an appellate court would come to the same conclusion if the original
determination was its to make, but rather whether the fact finder could
reasonably so conclude upon the proofs." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting
Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). We "must
. . . give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnes ses to
judge their credibility." Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App.
Div. 1997) (citation omitted).
A.
In A-5118-15, Dalnoky contends the benefits received in relation to his
termination from ABM should not have been included with the 2014 base year
A-5118-15T4
9
because he applied for unemployment benefits on May 25, 2014, but did not
begin work with ABM until May 27, 2014. Dalnoky asserts the findings of the
Tribunal were erroneous because ABM "defaulted" by not appearing at the
initial hearing. He also argues the evidence adduced at the hearing did not
support a finding of good cause to fire him.
The amount of benefits an individual receives pursuant to an application
for unemployment benefits is calculated based on the wages earned by the
applicant during his "base year." N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(c)(1). The "base year" is
defined as "the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters
immediately preceding an individual's benefit year" and the "benefit year" in an
application for unemployment benefits "begin[s] with the day on . . . which [an
applicant] first files a valid claim[.]" N.J.S.A. 43:21-19(c)(1), (d). Thus, the
base year to determine benefits for Dalnoky during his benefit year in this appeal
would be calculated before he filed a claim on May 25, 2014, and would not
include wages he earned from ABM. Regardless, Dalnoky received
unemployment benefits from August 17, through October 11, 2014, which is the
basis of the determination disqualifying him for benefits.
"The Unemployment Compensation Law (UCL), N.J.S.A. 43:21–1 [to -
24.4], provides income security through the payment of unemployment
A-5118-15T4
10
insurance benefits to qualified individuals who are involuntarily unemployed. "
N.J.A.C. 12:17-1.1(a). The adjudication of claims for misconduct connected
with the work is specifically governed by N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.1 to -10.8.
At the time of Dalnoky's termination from ABM, the UCL stated an
individual shall be disqualified for unemployment benefits "[f]or the week in
which the individual has been suspended or discharged for misconduct
connected with the work, and for the seven weeks which immediately follow
that week, as determined in each case." N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b) (2014) (current
version at N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b) (2018)). The applicable regulation stated: "For
an act to constitute misconduct, it must be improper, intentional, connected with
one's work, malicious, and within the individual's control, and is either a
deliberate violation of the employer's rules or a disregard of standards of
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of an employee." N.J.A.C.
12:17-10.2 (2014) (amended 2015) (current version at N.J.A.C. 12:17-2.1).
In Silver v. Bd. of Review, 430 N.J. Super. 44 (App. Div. 2013), we traced
the history of statutory misconduct disqualification, and attempts by the
Department to craft regulations in response to changes in the statute. We noted
the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(b) and added "severe misconduct" as
an intermediate level of misconduct between simple and gross misconduct. Id.
A-5118-15T4
11
at 53. However, because the Department had not yet adopted regulations
defining the term, we held "[u]ntil any new definition is promulgated by rule,
the definition contained in the present version of N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.2(a)
controls, except to the extent it is superseded by the 2010 amendment of the
statute." Id. at 55.
Subsequently, we set aside the regulatory definition of simple misconduct
because
the regulations the Department adopted in 2015 fail to
make this critical distinction between simple
negligence, on the one hand, and intentional, deliberate,
or malicious conduct, on the other hand, at least not
consistently. Unfortunately, the literal wording of
N.J.A.C. 12:17-2.1 defining and utilizing the term
"simple misconduct" confusingly blends concepts of
negligence with intentional wrongdoing that cannot be
sensibly understood or harmonized.
[In re N.J.A.C. 12:17-2.1, 450 N.J. Super. 152, 168
(App. Div. 2017).]
No new regulations have since been adopted. Therefore, for purposes of
this appeal, Silver instructs that simple misconduct requires "wil[l]fulness,
deliberateness, intention, and malice." 430 N.J. Super. at 58. We have held
"'intention[]' and 'malic[e]' as used in the regulation . . . include deliberate
disregard of the employer's rules or policies, or deliberate disregard of the
standards of behavior that the employer has the right to expect of an employee."
A-5118-15T4
12
In re N.J.A.C. 12:17-2.1, 450 N.J. Super. at 162 (emphasis in original) (quoting
Silver, 430 N.J. Super. at 56).
Discharge or suspension for insubordination or violation of an employer's
rule is defined as follows:
An individual shall be considered to have been
discharged for an act of misconduct where it is
established that he or she has committed an act of
misconduct and as defined in N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.2 and
met one of the following:
1. Refused without good cause to comply
with instructions from the employer, which were
lawful, reasonable, and did not require the
individual to perform services beyond the scope
of his or her customary job duties;
2. Acted beyond the expressed or implied
authority granted to the individual by the
employer; or
3. Violated a reasonable rule of the
employer which the individual knew or should
have known was in effect.
[N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.6(a) (2014) (amended 2015)
(current version at N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.5(a)).]
Here, the Tribunal found Dalnoky was lying on the Korean War Memorial
in public view, which was a violation of ABM's company policy and cause for
his discharge. Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-10.6(a), Dalnoky's violation
constituted misconduct connected with the work and grounds to disqualify him
A-5118-15T4
13
for unemployment benefits. Therefore, the Board's decision to affirm the
Tribunal's factual findings and decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable. To the extent we have not addressed the other claims raised on
this appeal it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(1)(D) and (E).
B.
In A-5278-15, Dalnoky argues it was an error to reopen the Tribunal's
initial decision based upon a request from the PDL&WD. He also argues the
Tribunal examiner misinterpreted N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(g) and the statute unfairly
burdens substitute teachers. In A-1927-17, Dalnoky argues N.J.S.A. 43:21-4
requires a finding of a reasonable assurance of returning to work at an
educational institution and the Tribunal's findings do not support the conclusion
he had a reasonable assurance of employment for the 2017-2018 school year.
We are unpersuaded by these arguments.
N.J.A.C. 1:12-18.4 states:
(a) In the absence of jurisdiction by the Board of
Review, a party to a benefit claim may file a request for
reopening of an Appeal Tribunal decision if:
1. The party's appeal to the Board of
Review was dismissed as late without good
cause;
A-5118-15T4
14
2. The party did not appear at the Appeal
Tribunal hearing for good cause shown;
3. The party is seeking to amend the
Appeal Tribunal decision due to a mistake in law
or computation thereby affecting the legal
conclusion of the Appeal Tribunal; or
4. The party has new or additional
evidence.
(b) Such request shall be submitted as promptly
as possible, shall not act as a stay of proceedings in the
case, and shall not suspend the payment of benefits.
Additional time for such request may be granted where
fraud, newly discovered evidence, or other good cause
is shown.
(c) The Appeal Tribunal shall notify all interested
parties of the request for reopening. The parties shall
have 10 days to submit written arguments. After
reviewing the matter, the Appeal Tribunal will schedule
a hearing, issue an amended decision, or deny the
request in an order explaining the reasons. All
interested parties will be notified by the Appeal
Tribunal of any subsequent decision or order which
shall contain appeal rights to the Board of Review.
Furthermore, "[e]very decision of an appeal tribunal shall, immediately
upon issuance, be transmitted to the executive secretary of the Board . . . for
consideration. The Board shall forthwith determine whether or not the decision
shall be allowed to stand." N.J.A.C. 1:12-18.1(c).
A-5118-15T4
15
Dalnoky's contention the PDL&WD representative did not qualify as an
interested party, and thus could not request the Tribunal re-open its initial
decision, lacks merit. The Board has broad discretion to review and determine
whether a Tribunal's decision should be upheld.
Furthermore, the facts in both A-5278-15 and A-1927-17, demonstrate
Dalnoky had a reasonable assurance of performing educational services at an
educational institution in the following academic year. N.J.S.A. 43:21-4(g)(1)
states:
benefits shall not be paid based on such services for any
week of unemployment commencing during the period
between two successive academic years, or during a
similar period between two regular terms, whether or
not successive, or during a period of paid sabbatical
leave provided for in the individual's contract, to any
individual if such individual performs such services in
the first of such academic years (or terms) and if there
is a contract or a reasonable assurance that such
individual will perform services in any such capacity
for any educational institution in the second of such
academic years or terms[.]
[(Emphasis added).]
N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.4(a) states "[a]n employee of an educational institution
shall be ineligible for benefits for any week that begins during the period
between academic years or terms and during vacation periods and holiday
recesses, if the employee has reasonable assurance of returning to work in any
A-5118-15T4
16
such capacity[.]" A reasonable assurance of returning to work means "a written,
oral, or other implied agreement that the employee shall perform services in any
such capacity during the next academic year, term, or remainder of a term."
N.J.A.C. 12:17-12.4(a)(1). "An employee who is employed for all or part of a
term in a day-to-day substitute position has reasonable assurance of recall if he
or she is placed on a substitute list for the next academic year or term." N.J.A.C.
12:17-12.4(a)(3).
In both appeals, Dalnoky testified he was placed on a substitute teacher
list for the subsequent academic year for numerous school districts. Therefore,
pursuant to the aforementioned regulations, he had a reasonable assurance of
returning to work at an educational institution to perform educational services
by virtue of his placement on the substitute list.
Finally, we have previously rejected the claim that substitute teachers are
unfairly burdened by N.J.S.A. 43:21-4. Indeed, we have stated:
We discern no merit in claimant's further
argument that because substitute teachers may be
ineligible for unemployment benefits during the
summer recess they are denied equal protection of the
law. Denial of benefits in such cases "conform[s] with
the Legislature's intent not to subsidize the vacation
periods of those who know well in advance that they
may be laid off for certain specified periods."
A-5118-15T4
17
[Patrick v. Bd. of Review, 171 N.J. Super. 424, 427
(App. Div. 1979) (alteration in orginal) (Davis v.
Unemployment Comp. Bd. Comm'n, 39 Pa. Comwlth.
146, 148 (Comwlth. Ct. 1978)).]
For these reasons, we reject Dalnoky's claim the statute disproportionately
burdens substitute teachers.
Affirmed as to A-5118-15, A-5278-15, and A-1927-17.
A-5118-15T4
18