NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3362-17T3
FRANZBLAU DRATCH, PC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
BRIAN MARTIN,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
Submitted February 5, 2019 – Decided February 14, 2019
Before Judges Fisher and Hoffman.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-3435-13.
Peter A. Ouda, attorney for appellant.
Franzblau Dratch, PC, respondent pro se (Stephen N.
Dratch, of counsel and on the brief; Daniel Lebersfeld,
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
In 2013, the plaintiff law firm commenced this action for the collection of
legal fees allegedly incurred by the firm while representing defendant Brian
Martin in a matrimonial matter. Plaintiff had difficulties personally serving
defendant but claimed to have finally succeeded when it served the summons
and complaint on an adult at what was claimed to be defendant's abode. Plaintiff
claimed the served individual was defendant's relative and roommate. Based on
these representations about service, plaintiff sought and, on April 2, 2014,
obtained a default judgment in its favor and against defendant in the amount of
$17,839.49.
Defendant moved to set aside the default judgment, claiming the person
on whom service was made was not a member of his household and not known
to him. He also alleged a meritorious defense. The motion was granted on
March 4, 2016, following which defendant filed an answer and counterclaim.
Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the order that vacated the default
judgment. That motion was denied in April 2016. Upon moving again for
reconsideration, plaintiff was successful in convincing the judge to overturn the
order that vacated the default judgment. Defendant appealed, and we held that
the judge erred because a hearing was needed to resolve the factual disputes
essential to a determination about service of process. Franzblau Dratch, PC v.
Martin, No. A-1017-16 (App. Div. Dec. 12, 2017) (slip op. at 9).
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After we remanded, plaintiff moved to enforce a settlement it claimed was
reached in 2015. This was initially urged by plaintiff when it sought
reconsideration of the order that vacated the default judgment. Plaintiff claimed
then, and again by way of the motion filed after our remand, that defendant –
through a Florida attorney – agreed to pay $3500 in full settlement. On the
earlier occasion in September 2016, when vacating the order that vacated the
default judgment, the motion judge denied enforcement of this alleged
settlement "without prejudice"; the judge advised plaintiff at that time that "if in
fact you wish to enforce the settlement I will have a plenary hearing and be more
than willing to take testimony at that time."
Following our remand, and as the means of avoiding the mandated hearing
regarding service of process, plaintiff moved to enforce the alleged settlement.
Plaintiff asserted in its supporting papers:
Now that the matter has been remanded, [plaintiff]
seeks to enforce the settlement that was reached with
[defendant]. Furthermore, while the matter has been
pending in the Appellate Division, [defendant] paid
$1,200 to [plaintiff]. Accordingly, giving him the
credit of $1,200, a judgment should be entered in favor
of [plaintiff] and against [defendant] in the sum of
$2,300.
In responding to this motion, defendant referred to the earlier proceedings,
disputed that a settlement ever occurred, and cited the judge's statement in
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3
September 2016 that a hearing was necessary to determine whether a settlement
was reached. Defendant argued that the appropriate course would be for the
judge to conduct both hearings at the same time.
This motion was heard by another judge. On February 16, 2018, that judge
entered an order which enforced the alleged settlement and entered judgment in
favor of plaintiff and against defendant in the amount of $2300. The judge
provided no explanation for this ruling.
In appealing the February 16, 2018 order, defendant argues that an
evidentiary hearing was required on whether a settlement had been reached; he
also faults the judge for failing to explain his ruling, as required by Rule 1:7-
4(a). In responding to the appeal, plaintiff acknowledges the judge's failure to
provide a rationale for his ruling but argues we should exercise original
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 2:10-5 and put this "protracted litigation" to an end.
Plaintiff also argues that the written communications about the alleged
settlement overwhelmingly demonstrated the existence of a settlement and,
consequently, claims no hearing is required.
We need not burden this matter with any extensive discussion. Judges are
required to explain their rulings. See Estate of Doerfler v. Fed. Ins. Co., 454
N.J. Super. 298, 301-02 (App. Div. 2018). The parties and this court are entitled
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4
to know why the judge took the particular action he took. Because the judge
failed to comply with this basic requirement, we must vacate the February 16,
2018 order and remand for further proceedings. 1
We must also vacate the order under review because the record reveals a
genuine factual dispute about the existence of an enforceable settlement; that
dispute may only be resolved once the judge considers all relevant evidence
offered by the parties at an evidentiary hearing. Should it be determined at that
hearing that the parties entered into an enforceable settlement, the court should
then enter an appropriate judgment. If, however, it is found that no enforceable
settlement was reached, the court should conduct the evidentiary hearing about
service of process mandated by our earlier decision; that determination, if
necessary, will determine those steps, if any, that must thereafter be taken in this
litigation.
We vacate the February 16, 2018 order and remand for proceedings
confirming with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
1
We find insufficient merit in plaintiff's argument that we should exercise
original jurisdiction to warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(E).
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