NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-2179-17T2
TARSIS MATOS,
Appellant,
v.
NEW JERSEY STATE
PAROLE BOARD,
Respondent.
_______________________
Submitted January 29, 2019 – Decided February 13, 2019
Before Judges Suter and Geiger.
On appeal from the New Jersey State Parole Board.
Tarsis Matos, appellant, pro se.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa Dutton Schaffer, Assistant
Attorney General, of counsel; Christopher Josephson,
Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Tarsis Matos appeals from a November 22, 2017 final agency
decision of the New Jersey State Parole Board (Board) denying him parole and
establishing a 120-month future eligibility term (FET). We affirm.
Matos is incarcerated at South Woods State Prison, serving a life sentence
subject to a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility for murder, kidnapping, and
multiple counts of aggravated assault and possession of a weapon for an
unlawful purpose. On March 7, 1987, Matos shot and killed an acquaintance in
an apartment in Newark. He then pointed a gun at another occupant and forced
him to leave the apartment. Matos held the second victim at gunpoint for two
hours before releasing him in a different section of Newark. Matos fled to
Florida and was arrested on May 26, 1987. Matos was charged, indicted, and
convicted by a jury of all counts.
These were not Matos's first offenses. In March 1983, Matos was
sentenced in New York to an indeterminate term of one to three years for
criminal possession of a weapon. He was paroled in May 1984 and absconded.
On July 28, 1985, Matos shot and killed a person at a dance club in New York
City while a fugitive. Matos was convicted of murder and weapons offenses and
sentenced on those offenses to a term of twenty-five years to life, subject to a
twenty-five-year minimum, to run consecutively to his New Jersey sentence.
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Matos has committed six institutional infractions while serving his prison
term in New Jersey, including four infractions for indecent exposure (prohibited
act .053, N.J.A.C. 10A:4-4.1(a)(3)(v)). His most recent infraction for indecent
exposure was committed in 2016.
Matos first became eligible for parole on May 24, 2017. A parole hearing
officer referred the case to a Board panel for a hearing. The two-member Board
panel denied parole on April 7, 2017, determining there was a substantial
likelihood Matos would commit a new crime if released on parole at this time.
The Board panel expressed the following reasons for denying parole: nature and
circumstances of the offenses (murder, kidnapping, possession of a weapon,
aggravated assault); prior offense record is extensive; offense record is
repetitive; nature of criminal record increasingly more serious; committed to
incarceration for multiple offenses; prior opportunities on parole revoked due to
commission of new offenses; prior opportunity on parole and prior incarceration
failed to deter criminal behavior; numerous, persistent institutional infractions
resulting in loss of commutation time and confinement in detention and
administrative segregation, with last infraction on January 16, 2017; insufficient
problem resolution due to lack of insight into criminal behavior and substance
abuse problem not having been sufficiently addressed (alcohol); inmate has not
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3
significantly addressed his decision-making skills; inmate's aggressive and at
times violent behavior along with handgun possession; inmate continues to
violate institutional rules and regulations; inmate has little to no remorse for the
victims; this is inmate's second murder in two years; and inmate has four
weapons convictions and was on parole in New York at the time of the instant
offenses.
The Board panel found the following mitigating factors: participation in
programs specific to behavior; participation in institutional programs;
institutional reports reflect favorable institutional adjustment; attempt made to
enroll in programs but was not admitted due to wait list; and risk assessment
evaluation.
The two-member Board panel referred the case to a three-member panel
for establishment of a FET that may be in excess of the Board's presumptive
schedule. On June 7, 2017, a three-member Board panel established a 120-
month FET based on the same reasons expressed by the two-member panel in
denying parole.1 The three-member Board panel also considered the same
1
According to respondent, Matos's projected parole eligibility date is in June
2023, based on the application of commutation, work, and minimum custody
credits pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.53(a).
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4
mitigating factors as the two-member Board panel, and a letter of mitigation
submitted by Matos.2 The three-member Board panel determined "that the
factors supporting the denial of parole, collectively, are of such a serious nature
as to warrant the setting of a [FET] which differs from the presumptive term of
[twenty-seven] months (+/- [nine] months)." Based on its "comprehensive
review of the entire record," the three-member Board panel found it "clear" that
Matos "remain[s] a substantial threat to public safety." The panel also found
that after thirty years of incarceration, Matos:
Present[s] as not having conducted a true introspection
into [his] past violent behavior, nor [does he]
acknowledge the severity of [his] actions. [Matos's]
negative personality traits have affected [his]
behavioral choices and impelled [him] to behave in an
anti-social manner in the future; and
[Does] not recognize stressors and cues that have
negatively impacted [his] decision making, leading to a
life marked with repeated contact with the criminal
justice system. [Matos] offered to the Board panel that
[he] committed the present offenses because [he]
needed money, but offered nothing as to why [he] chose
violent acts as a resolution to meet those needs.
Concerns remain that [Matos] will not be able to
appropriately process negative and/or stressful
situations in the future; and
2
The three-member panel's narrative decision also mistakenly included a
discussion of another inmate's case, which has no relevance to this matter. The
Board moved to remand the appeal to allow the three-member panel to amend
its narrative decision. We denied the motion.
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Present[s] as an individual who requires additional
programming/counseling to address the issues detailed
within this Notice.
The three-member Board panel also found establishing an FET less than 120
months "would be wholly inconsistent with the conclusion that [Matos has] not
shown the requisite amount of rehabilitative progress in reducing the likelihood
of future criminal activity."
Matos appealed the panels' decisions to the full Board, arguing: (1) the
Board panel failed to consider material facts; (2) the Board panel failed to
document that a preponderance of the evidence indicates a substantial likelihood
that the inmate will commit a crime if released on parole; (3) Matos should have
been provided an interpreter in accordance with N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.13(f); (4)
the Board panel established an FET prior to a notice of decision being issued on
the administrative appeal; (5) the denial of parole was contrary to the evidence
in the record and an abuse of discretion; and (6) the 120-month FET is excessive
and unjustly punitive.
The full Board affirmed, finding no merit in Matos's challenges to the
denial of parole and the length of the FET. The Board found the Board panel
"considered the aggregate of information pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.11 and
fully documented its decision pursuant to N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.18(f)." The Board
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6
concurred with the findings reached by the two-member and three-member
Board panels, rejecting his claim "the Board panel demonstrated personal
interest, prejudice or bias." This appeal followed.
Matos raises the following arguments on appeal: (1) the Board panel
denied appellant's right to procedural due process by violating written Board
policy; (2) the denial of parole was arbitrary and capricious because the reasons
stated for the denial were inadequate and the denial was not supported by
credible evidence in the record; (3) the Board panel utilized erroneous material
facts to deny parole; (4) the three-member Board Panel failed to consider
appellant's participation in rehabilitation; (5) the usage of psychological
concepts such as lack of insight, remorse, and empathy as a substantial basis for
denying parole was an abuse of discretion due to the vagueness of these
undefined concepts and their highly subjective nature; and (6) the 120-month
FET is excessive and unreasonable.
Our review of the Board's decision is deferential. J.I. v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 228 N.J. 204, 230 (2017). That is so because "Parole Board decisions are
highly 'individualized discretionary appraisals,'" Trantino v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 166 N.J. 113, 173 (2001) (quoting Beckworth v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 62
N.J. 348, 359 (1973)), and are presumed valid, McGowan v. N.J. State Parole
A-2179-17T2
7
Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002). We will not disturb the Board's
determination "unless there is a clear showing that it is arbitrary, capricious, or
unreasonable, or that it lacks fair support in the record." J.B. v. N.J. State Parole
Bd., 229 N.J. 21, 43 (2017) (quoting In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27-28 (2007)).
The burden is on the inmate to demonstrate the Board's actions were
unreasonable. McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 563.
Defendant is serving a sentence for an offense committed before August
18, 1997. Therefore, "the issue before us is governed by the standard in N.J.S.A.
30:4-123.53(a) and 30:4-123.53(c) prior to the amendment of those statutes on
that date." Williams v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 336 N.J. Super. 1, 7 (App. Div.
2000) (citing N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.10). For offenses committed before August 18,
1997, "the Parole Board may deny parole release if it appears from a
preponderance of the evidence that 'there is a substantial likelihood that the
inmate will commit a crime under the laws of this State if released on parole at
such time.'" Ibid. (quoting L. 1979, c. 441, § 9).
Having reviewed the record in light of these well-settled standards,
including the psychological evaluation and other materials in the confidential
appendix, we conclude Matos's arguments are without merit. We discern no
basis for disturbing the Board's decision to deny parole and impose the FET,
A-2179-17T2
8
which is amply supported by the record, and affirm substantially for the reasons
expressed by the Board in its written decision. We add the following comments.
We find no basis to conclude the Board's decision was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable, that it lacked fair support in the record, or that i t
violated Matos's constitutional rights or any regulations or written Board
policies. The record demonstrates that the Board considered "the aggregate of
all of the factors which may have any pertinence," Beckworth, 62 N.J. at 360,
and "focus[ed] its attention squarely on the likelihood of recidivism,"
McGowan, 347 N.J. Super. at 565. The Board acted well within its bounds in
finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Matos would likely commit a
new crime if released on parole at this time.
Concerning the FET, an inmate serving a minimum term greater than
fourteen years is ordinarily assigned a twenty-seven-month FET after a denial
of parole. N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(a)(1). A three-member panel may impose a
FET in excess of administrative guidelines in cases where an ordinary FET is
"clearly inappropriate due to the inmate's lack of satisfactory progress in
reducing the likelihood of future criminal behavior." N.J.A.C. 10A:71-3.21(d).
The Board considered the mitigating and aggravating factors, and acted well
within its authority in increasing defendant's FET.
A-2179-17T2
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Matos's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
extended discussion in a written opinion beyond the following brief comments.
R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Matos claims he was denied due process because he was not provided an
interpreter at his Board panel hearing. We disagree. The Board reviewed the
electronic recording of the Board panel hearing and found Matos
understood the Board panel's questions as [his] answers
were appropriately responsive, and [Matos], in turn,
asked questions of the Board panel which were
answered. At no time did [Matos] request the services
of an interpreter or express [an] inability to understand
the hearing process or questions posed by the Board
panel.
In addition, the psychological evaluation report dated November 16, 2016, states
Matos "was given the option of utilizing a Spanish language interpreter and he
clearly declined the need for such. His level of comprehension and
communication did appear sufficient for evaluation purposes."
Matos also complains he was denied due process because the Board did
not provide a Board representative to assist him during the Board panel hearing.
An inmate is entitled to the assistance of a Board representative in his
preparation for appearances before the hearing officer and Board panel .
N.J.A.C. 10A:71-2.11, -3.13(g). However, neither the regulations nor the
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Federal or State Constitutions require the Board to provide a representative t o
appear on the inmate's behalf at an initial parole eligibility hearing. See Gerardo
v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 221 N.J. Super. 442, 448-49 (App. Div. 1987) (setting
forth the minimal due process rights applicable to a hearing to grant or deny
parole). This is so because a parole "rescission determination concerns liberty
interests that are greater than those involved in an initial eligibility
determination." Id. at 449.
Matos argues that insufficient problem resolution and lack of insight are
not factors the Board may consider when deciding whether to grant or deny
parole. We are unpersuaded by this argument. Insufficient problem resolution
and lack of insight are relevant to the underlying causes for an inmate's
criminality and likelihood of reoffending. See e.g., McGowan, 347 N.J. Super.
at 558 (discussing the Board's findings regarding the inmate's lack of insight
into what caused him to commit his offenses).
Lastly, Matos complains the three-member Board panel based its decision
on incorrect facts. We disagree. The narrative decision contains three
paragraphs discussing the facts in a different case. We consider the erroneous
inclusion of those paragraphs to be a mere scrivener's error that escaped
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detection. Neither the Board panel nor the Board based their decisions on those
extraneous facts.
Affirmed.
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TARSIS MATOS VS. NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD (NEW JERSEY STATE PAROLE BOARD)
Combined Opinion