NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3652-16T3
DREW BRADFORD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CAROLE BOYD,
Defendant-Respondent.
___________________________
Submitted November 15, 2018 – Decided December 18, 2018
Before Judges Alvarez and Reisner.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Docket No. L-2100-15.
Drew Bradford, appellant pro se.
Carole Boyd, respondent pro se.
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Drew Bradford sued his former attorney, defendant Carole Boyd,
for malpractice. On January 9, 2017, the trial judge held that Bradford's
complaint would be dismissed for failure to file an affidavit of merit. Perhaps
because Bradford then filed multiple reconsideration motions, the original ruling
was not memorialized in an order until August 17, 2017. In the meantime,
plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration and for the judge's recusal, which
was denied by order dated March 24, 2017, and a second reconsideration motion,
which was denied by order of July 6, 2017.
Bradford appeals from all three orders, presenting the following points of
argument for our consideration:
Point 1 JUDGE MELVIN GELADE VIOLATED
THE COURT RULE 1:16-3(a) [sic].
Point 2 JUDGE GELADE DEMONST[RA]TED
BIAS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF.
Point 3 "BREACH OF CONTRACT IS A VIABLE
CAUSE OF ACTION."
Point 4 THE INTENTIONAL AND
[THREATENED] HARMS COMMITTED BY
CAROLE BOYD ARE CLEAR AND OBVIOUS
MALPRACTICE TO A JUROR, ESPECIALLY IN
THIS CASE, TO A SUPERIOR COURT JUDGE,
SINCE THIS IS A BENCH TRIAL.
Point 5 THE REASONABLE BENCH JUDGE
COULD EASILY COMPREHEN[D] THE
FOREGOING WITHIN Point 4 OF THIS BRIEF,
WHICH JUDGE MELVIN GELADE DID DO ON
JUNE 27, 2016 WITH NOTHING NEW ADDED BY
THE DEFENDANT NOR BY JUDGE GELADE. IF
AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT IS REQUIRED, THEN
THERE WAS UNNCESSARY DELAY BY
A-3652-16T3
2
DEFEN[D]ANT CAROLE BOYD (LACHES), AND
SOME TIME SHOULD BE ALLOWED FOR
APPELLANT TO OBTAIN AN EXPERT WITNESS
WITH AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT.
Point 6 CAROLE BOYD OWES TO
APPELLANT $6,011.79 AND CAROLE BOYD
TOOK $20,000 APPELLANT [sic], WHILE
NEGATING THE DREW BRAFORD V. DIANA
GLEASON LITIGATION. THE DREW BRADFORD
V. CAROLE BOYD LITIGATION IS CLEAR AND
OBVIOUS MALPRACTICE. THE FINANCIAL
HARM DONE BY CAROLE BOYD AGAINST
APPELLANT IS A CIRCUMSTANCE TO PLEASE
CONSIDER, AS HE COULD NOT AFFORD AN
AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT.
Point 7 ON JULY 6, 2017, JUDGE MELVIN
GELADE NEVER PROVIDED IN HIS COURT
ORDER (A425) WHAT HE WAS, SPECIFICALLY
OR IN GENERAL TERMS, DENYING REGARDING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO VACATE. (A432 –
A455). THEREFORE, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION "TO
VACATE AND RETURN THIS LITIGATION FOR
TRIAL WITH BREACH OF CONTACT AND
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF 2 MONTHS TO OBTAIN
AN EXPERT WITNESS ([AFFIDAVIT] OF MERIT)
FOR THE MALPRACTICE COUNT" SHOULD BE
GRANTED HEREIN WITHIN THIS APPEAL.
Having reviewed the record, we conclude that plaintiff's arguments are
without sufficient merit to warrant discussion, beyond the following brief
comments. See R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
A-3652-16T3
3
Boyd represented Bradford in the trial of a civil lawsuit, Bradford v.
Gleason, and she also represented him on the appeal. Boyd filed a merits brief
on Bradford's appeal, but declined to file a reply brief, because she contended
that he had not paid her fee. 1 The appeal was successful, in that Bradford
obtained a remand for a trial. See Bradford v. Gleason, No. A-5625-07 (App.
Div. Aug. 13, 2009). However, in later suing Boyd, Bradford contended that
she committed professional negligence by failing to file a reply brief in the
appeal. He argued that Boyd's failure to present certain information in the reply
brief eventually precluded him from pursuing an issue on the retrial.2 In addition
to asserting a claim for malpractice, Bradford characterized Boyd's allegedly
wrongful conduct as a breach of contract, violation of his civil rights, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 3
1
Eventually, Boyd and Bradford participated in fee arbitration, which resulted
in an order that Boyd refund approximately $6000 of the fee Bradford had paid
her.
2
In her response to this contention, Boyd asserted that she raised the issue in
the merits brief and, in her professional judgment, it was not necessary to repeat
the same point in a reply brief.
3
We will not discuss the civil rights and emotional distress claims further,
because Bradford did not brief those issues on this appeal.
A-3652-16T3
4
On January 9, 2017, Judge Melvin L. Gelade held that, regardless of the
legal label Bradford chose to place on his claim against Boyd, the crux of the
claim was malpractice, and Bradford was therefore required to file an affidavit
of merit, pursuant to the Affidavit of Merit Statute. See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.
We agree with Judge Gelade. As our Supreme Court has made clear,
regardless of how a claim is pled, the following analysis determines whether an
affidavit of merit is required:
It is not the label placed on the action that is
pivotal but the nature of the legal inquiry. Accordingly,
when presented with a tort or contract claim asserted
against a professional specified in the statute, rather
than focusing on whether the claim is denominated as
tort or contract, attorneys and courts should determine
if the claim's underlying factual allegations require
proof of a deviation from the professional standard of
care applicable to that specific profession. If such
proof is required, an affidavit of merit is required for
that claim, unless some exception applies.
[Couri v. Gardner, 173 N.J. 328, 340 (2002).]
Because Judge Gelade decided the original motion correctly, he did not
abuse his discretion in denying Bradford's motions for reconsideration. See
Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 384, 389 (App. Div. 1996). Finally,
we reject Bradford's contention that the judge was biased against him. Nothing
in this record supports that allegation.
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Affirmed.
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